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Abstract
Noam Chomsky, the founding father of generative grammar and the instigator of
some of its core research programs, claims that linguistics is a part of psychology,
concerned with a class of cognitive structures employed in speaking and
understanding. In a recent book, Ignorance of Language, Michael Devitt has
challenged certain core aspects of linguistics, as prominent practitioners of the
science conceive of it. Among Devitt’s major conclusions is that linguistics is not a
part of psychology. In this thesis I defend Chomsky’s psychological conception of
grammatical theory. My case for the psychological conception involves defending a
set of psychological goals for generative grammars, centring on conditions of
descriptive and explanatory adequacy. I argue that generative grammar makes an
explanatory commitment to a distinction between a psychological system of
grammatical competence and the performance systems engaged in putting that
competence to use. I then defend the view that this distinction can be investigated
by probing speakers’ linguistic intuitions. Building on the psychological goals of
generative grammar and its explanatory commitment to a psychological theory of
grammatical competence, I argue that generative grammar neither targets nor
presupposes non-psychological grammatical properties. The latter non-
psychological properties are dispensable to grammarians’ explanations because
their explanatory goals can be met by the theory of grammatical competence to
which they are committed. So generative grammars have psychological properties
as their subject matter and linguistics is a part of psychology.45
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1. Introduction
1.1 What is the subject matter of Linguistics?
This is a thesis in the philosophy of linguistics. The thesis is about the subject
matter of linguistic theories. In the broadest terms, linguistics is the scientific study
of language. However, the scientific study of language is not an attempt to explain
all linguistic phenomena, or everything that we pre-theoretically think of as a part of
our language.
For example, the science of language does not directly address the kinds of
questions literature students ask about Keats’ language and what Keats meant by
particular choices of words. They might consider the question of what Keats meant
when, speaking of the nightingale, he said that he, Keats, was “too happy in thine
happiness”.
1 There are special subtleties to a poet’s language and meanings, and
discerning these subtleties is an art in itself. It may involve understanding the poet’s
particular style, historical circumstances, state of mind and literary intentions. The
science of language, as currently practiced, does not afford us much insight into
these questions. This is perhaps to be expected because such phenomena look to
involve a wide range of potentially intractable factors; factors that may not be easy
to make precise and objective. The scientific investigation of language looks to strip
away our peculiar perspectives and interests in order to get some precise and
objective explanation of central linguistic facts.
This is not to detract from the importance of other perspectives on language.
It is a theme of Noam Chomsky’s writings on language and mind that someone
committed to scientific inquiry can consistently believe that there is much of human
interest concerning what people say and do that falls well beyond the scope of such
inquiry.
2 We might, for example, think that there is more to be learnt about the
1 Keats’ Ode to a Nightingale is available from the Every Poet archive at:
http://www.everypoet.com/Archive/Poetry/John_Keats/keats_ode_to_a_nightingale.htm
2 See Chomsky (1995a).9
subtleties of Keats’ meaning by reading his letters, studying Spenser, or consulting
history books than from the whole of the scientific inquiry into language.
Linguists want to explain certain central facts about all human languages. To
that extent, linguistics may reveal something about the fundamentals of even a
poet’s language; facts about linguistic form and meaning that do appear to be
amenable to scientific inquiry. This thesis focuses on one part of the science of
language. It focuses on that part of linguistics that is concerned with the structure of
the sentences that we utter and hear. This part of linguistics is called grammar, or
syntax. Grammarians are interested in languages as combinatorial systems that
exhibit special, complex structures: the sentences that we utter and comprehend,
read and write. Linguistic structures are built by combining lexical items. These
lexical items are selected from a lexicon: a stock of the words and other items that
populate the sentences of a language. Over the last fifty years there has been an
intensive and extremely fruitful investigation into the structures of human languages,
initiated by Chomsky, which has come to be known as the Generative Enterprise. It
has this name because the central concern of linguists within this enterprise is to
construct generative grammars for human languages.
3 A generative grammar is a
theory of a language that yields an explicit, structural description of all and only the
sentences of that language.
Here is a simplified piece of theorising of the sort that generative
grammarians are involved in. It concerns the analysis of sentences containing
reflexives like myself, yourself, herself, himself, itself, ourselves, yourselves, and
themselves. Though it is simplified, it is illustrative of the structural complexity
which generative grammar has brought to light.
4 Consider the following examples.
(1) I shaved myself
(2) *Myself shaved me.
English-speakers recognise (1) as a perfectly good sentence. But those same
speakers immediately recognise that there is something amiss with (2). As English-
3 Chomsky (1955/75, 1957, 1965) are founding texts of generative grammar.
4 This presentation is adapted from Adger (2003) pp.116-120.10
speakers, we would replace (2) with (1). Generative grammarians want to explain
the recognised difference between (1) and (2). These are constructions containing
reflexives. So the grammarian tries to give a precise characterisation of the
structures containing reflexives that are sentences of human languages, such as
English, and those that are not.
Grammarians can explain a lot about the behaviour of reflexives, including
the permissible structures in which they occur, in terms of a special sort of
structural dependency between the items, or constituents, that make up sentences.
This special structural dependency is called c-command, short for constituent-
command, and is an extremely useful tool in theorising about linguistic structure.
5
To see how c-command works, look at the tree diagram below.
B
/ \
A C
/ \
D E
Sitting at the top of the tree diagram is node B, which labels the whole structure. B
contains the constituents at nodes A, C, D and E. Of those constituents, B
immediately contains A and C which are directly below B in the tree. Similarly, C
immediately contains D and E which are directly below C in the tree. A very
intuitive way of thinking about these relations is in familial terms. B is the mother
of A and C but the grandmother of D and E. C is the mother of D and E. A and C
5 C-command relations are part of the explanation of the behaviour of reflexives and pronouns (see
Adger 2003 pp.118-20, 149-152) as well as negative polarity items such as any (pp.120-2), and
relations of Agreement (Adger 2003 pp.167-9, Chomsky 2001).11
are sisters, as are D and E. In addition to relations like motherhood and sisterhood,
there are further structural relations that hold between the nodes in the tree. Some of
these relations are important to linguistic structure, and c-command is one of these.
A node X c-commands a node Y if, and only if, X’s sister either: (i) is Y, or
(ii) contains Y. In our tree, A and C c-command one another as they are sisters. But
A also c-commands D and E as its sister C contains them. B doesn’t c-command
anything as it stands in no relations of sisterhood. Neither is B c-commanded by
anything since it contains all the other nodes. Nodes can c-command preceding as
well as following nodes, running from left-to-right.
Reflexive constructions, like (1) and (2), are an example of c-command in
action. In order for a reflexive to be part of an acceptable sentence like (1), it has to
enter into special relationships with other constituents in the structure in which it
occurs. For a reflexive, like myself in (1), to be a part of a good sentence it must be
bound: it must be referentially dependent on, i.e. have its interpretation fixed by, an
antecedent in that sentence. Myself in (1) is bound by I. We need to know how it is
determined when a potential antecedent can bind a reflexive; for all seems to go
well with (1) but not with (2). A popular hypothesis in grammatical theory is that a
reflexive must be bound by an antecedent that c-commands it.
6 In what follows I’ll
offer some linguistic argument for that hypothesis.
What could explain the contrasting judgements English-speakers make
about (1) and (2)? It seems that in (1) the reflexive is co-referential (shares a
referent) with another expression in the sentence, in this case I. So we might form
the following generalisation:
The Co-reference Generalisation: A reflexive must be co-referential with
another expression in the sentence.
However, the Co-reference Generalisation would not explain the difference between
(1) and (2) because we can easily imagine circumstances in which the myself and
me in (2) co-refer, and yet (2) would still be a recognisably poor sentence though (1)
isn’t.
6 For a famous investigation of these issues see Chomsky (1981).12
We might look at some of the properties the different lexical items in (1) and
(2). Lexical features pertaining to number, person and gender are called ψ-features.
We might hypothesise that a reflexive and its antecedent must bear the same ψ-
features. We could then frame a new hypothesis about reflexives: that they must be
co-referential with another expression in the sentence that shares the same ψ-feature
specification. But again this wouldn’t explain the difference between (1) and (2). In
both (1) and (2) we have two expressions which share singular, first-person ψ-
features, one of which is a reflexive. So this hypothesis falsely predicts that (1) and
(2) should be equally good.
An aspect of (1) that we need to capture is that myself doesn’t merely co-
refer with I but is actually bound by I. It must be interpreted to refer to the same
individual that I does. If, in addition to this dependency, we add the notion of c-
command, we can drastically improve upon our previous generalisations:
The Reflexive Generalisation: A reflexive must be bound by an antecedent
that c-commands it.
As roughly depicted in the tree diagram below, the noun phrase (NP) I, c-
commands the NP myself in (1). Generally, in simple sentences like (1), the object
of a sentence will be c-commanded by the subject of a sentence, since the object is
contained in the subject’s sister and not vice-versa.
7
(1) I shaved myselfsentence
/ \
Inoun phrase shaved myselfverb phrase
/ \
shavedverb myselfnoun phrase
7 I assume here that sentences are composed NP-VP, see Chomsky (1986) p.60 for discussion and
Adger (2003) p.90-6 for relevant constituency tests.13
In (2) the reflexive is not bound by a c-commanding antecedent because even if
myself is interpreted as co-referential with me it is not c-commanded by me as we
can see.
(2) Myself shaved mesentence
/ \
MyselfNP shaved meVP
/ \
shavedV meNP
This Reflexive Generalisation making use of c-command relations thus explains the
contrast between (1) and (2).
8
We can test the Reflexive Generalisation that appeals to binding and c-
command against competitors such as the principle that a reflexive must be bound
by a preceding expression. This competing explanation does not extend to further
data such as (3).
(3) *[The man I saw] shaved myself.
8 Our reflexive generalisation is roughly equivalent to Principle A of Binding Theory (see Chomsky
1981 and 1995) which states that a reflexive must be bound by a local antecedent. Reflexives cannot
be bound by elements that are too “far away” structurally, whilst pronouns cannot be bound by
elements that are to “close by”. The notion of locality is a theoretical one: there is a whole branch of
grammatical theory that focuses on the lower and upper bounds on the distance that may separate
two elements that enter into a grammatical relation, and on the movement of constituents. The
principle can also been stated in terms of the notions of governing category or domain (see Chomsky
1987 p.185), where the domain of a constituent X is the phrase which immediately contains X,
roughly “the smallest phrase containing it”. So X will c-command constituents in its domain.
Principle A of classical Government and Binding Theory states that a reflexive must be bound by an
antecedent in its domain. Principle B states that a pronoun may not be bound by an antecedent in its
domain. Principle C states that a referring expression must be free (unbound) everywhere.14
In (3) the pronoun I, which is a potential antecedent for myself, precedes the
reflexive but (3) is not a good sentence. As indicated by the square brackets, The
man I saw is a constituent of the sentence (3), according to standard tests for
constituency
9, and contains I.
Looking back to the schematic tree diagram, The man I saw occurs at node
A. But there is further structure to The man I saw, so I is at a node below node A in
the tree. We can see that I doesn’t c-command myself as there is a node above I
which does not contain the reflexive. The node which contains myself is C which is
not a sister of I. Hence, I does not c-command myself though it does precede it. The
notion we need is not precedence but c-command.
Keeping our simplified piece of grammatical theory in mind; how could it
be an open question what linguistics is about? The question seems to have an easy
answer: linguistics is about whatever linguists are studying. At least as far as
grammar goes, linguistics is about the structural complexity of human languages.
The subject matter of generative grammar seems reasonably clear: languages and
the linguistic forms that they exhibit, such as the reflexive structures we just
examined. At one level, the question of what linguistics is about seems to have an
easy answer.
However, there is a deeper question about the subject matter of linguistics.
Chomsky makes the following claim about the nature of linguistics:
Linguistics is simply that part of psychology that is concerned with one specific class of
steady states, the cognitive structures employed in speaking and understanding.
10
Chomsky thinks that linguistics is among the psychological sciences, a part of
psychology, because its subject matter is the psychological structure of speaker-
hearers.
11 Chomsky claims that the generative grammars investigated by linguists,
including the lexicon and the principles that govern linguistic structures, describe
9 It has a coherent, independent semantic interpretation, can be replaced by constituents, can occur in
object position and can be clefted as in “It was the man I saw that you wanted to meet”.
10 Chomsky (1975) p.160
11 I’ll often use just “speaker” instead of “speaker-hearer”.15
the structure of the minds of those who speak and understand language. The
Reflexive Generalisation, if correct, would therefore characterise psychological
structure engaged in recognising the difference between (1) and (2). I’ll call this
conception of the subject matter of linguistics, the psychological conception.
12
The psychological conception is widely adopted by linguists themselves.
The following excerpt from Adger’s introduction to syntax is representative:
[T]he idea of a sentence is more abstract than the idea of an utterance (which is something
you can hear, record, feed into a computer as sound waves etc.). A sentence itself is
something which can’t be recorded, heard, or electronically manipulated, only uses of
sentences can... The sentences themselves are defined by the knowledge of English that I
put to use in writing them. Although it sounds counter-intuitive, what you see on this page
are technically utterances, in that they have external, physical manifestation. Sentences, on
the other hand, are internal, mental entities, which have an abstract form.
13
As Adger conceives it, the grammatical structures that are the subject matter of
generative grammar are “internal, mental entities”. We make utterances, and these
utterances are shaped by our underlying psychological structure. According to the
psychological conception, what linguists study are these underlying psychological
structures, as distinguished from the use of these structures in utterances.
Despite widespread endorsement amongst linguists, this psychological
conception of generative grammar has been heavily criticised by philosophers.
14
Michael Devitt’s recent book, Ignorance of Language, constitutes a new attack on
the psychological conception.
15 Among Devitt’s major conclusions is that
linguistics is not a part of psychology. He believes that the subject matter of
linguistics is not the psychological states of speaker-hearers. Devitt sets the issue up
in stark terms that I’ll devote a lot of attention to in this thesis. Ultimately, I’ll argue
12 This is Devitt’s (2006) terminology. The psychological conception has also been labelled “the
cognitive conception” (Smith 2006), “conceptualism” (Katz 1981), “mentalism” (Chomsky 1965,
Smith 2007), and “The Right View” (Fodor 1985).
13 Adger (2003) p.2
14 See, for example, Devitt and Sterelny (1989, 1999), Dummett (1989), Katz (1981, 1985), Quine
(1972), Searle (1974, 1992), Soames (1984, 1985)
15 Devitt (2006)16
that he betrays fundamental confusions about the psychological conception of
generative grammar and the reasoning that has been adduced in its favour.
The question at issue is not what it is for a true theory to be linguistic, which
Fodor describes as a “boring” question.
16 Chomsky and opponents to the
psychological conception are not arguing about how the word “linguistic” should be
used and which sorts of research are worthy of that label. The question at issue is
rather the one that Fodor deems the “interesting” question, concerning what it is for
theories of linguistic phenomena to be true. The interesting question is about the
truth-makers of linguistic explanations: are linguistic explanations made true by
psychological facts? If so, then linguistic theory is a psychological theory. If not,
then linguistic theory is about something other than the psychological structures that
are engaged in speaking and understanding language.
So there has been, and still is, controversy about the subject matter of
linguistics. If Devitt is right, and linguistics is not a part of psychology, then it
makes for an interesting situation. The orthodox psychological conception, of which
Devitt takes the above statement from Chomsky to be representative, should be
given up. The linguists in question are mistaken about the nature of their own
enterprise in a fundamental respect. The theories they offer are not about the
psychological states of those who speak and understand languages.
In place of the psychological conception, Devitt offers a non-psychological
conception of generative grammar. According to Devitt, the subject matter of
generative grammars is language and linguistic structures, but not psychological
structures. Devitt calls the particular brand of non-psychological conception which
he endorses, the linguistic conception. The linguistic conception has two
components.
L1. Linguistics is claimed to be about a non-psychological domain of
linguistic facts. This component is common to all non-psychological
conceptions.
L2. Grammatical properties are properties of physical tokens such as
acoustical signals and written marks. They are relational properties
16 Fodor (1985) p.14617
of these physical occurrences: they are determined by the relations
that bits of the sound stream and ink marks stand in to one another,
and to social and psychological facts. They are also high level
properties: realisable by heterogeneous physical tokens. This
component is a particular claim about the nature of the non-
psychological domain of grammatical properties not common to all
non-psychological conceptions.
I’m going to reserve the label linguistic conception for Devitt’s view that has these
two components. And I’ll call the collection of all the views that commit to L1 but
not necessarily to L2, non-psychological conceptions.
17
In §1.3, I’ll consider Devitt’s argument against the psychological conception.
For now, I want to suppose that the subject matter of linguistics is an open question.
What might help us to determine an answer to the question? We can look to three
broad features of linguistic inquiry. The first is the linguist’s explananda. We can
examine the phenomena that the generative grammarian seeks to explain, and the
goals of the theories. The second is the linguist’s evidence. We can examine the
sorts of evidence brought to bear in generative grammar, and what the evidence is
employed as evidence for: i.e. what sorts of hypotheses the evidence supports. The
17 It is also possible to adopt L2, or some other non-psychological conception of grammatical
properties, without adopting L1. For it is conceivable that someone could hold both that grammatical
properties are non-psychological properties and that the scientific study of grammar is an
investigation of the psychological states of speaker-hearers engaged in the cognition of grammar.
Such compatibilist views have not received much attention. The idea that the science of grammar is
directed at psychological properties of speaker-hearers is usually taken to foreclose on the possibility
that there are non-psychological grammatical properties instantiated in our physical environment.
Though he would put the view in terms of grammatical types rather than Devitt’s tokens, Longworth
has expressed some sympathy for such a view (Longworth 2007, forthcoming and unpublished ms.).
Longworth thinks that the scientific image of grammatical properties according to which
grammatical properties are properties of a psychological system and what he calls the manifest image,
according to which grammatical properties are there in the environment for us to happen upon, are
reconcilable. The concern of my thesis is to establish what the science of grammar is about; this is a
prior question to whether any such compatibilist strategy is defensible.18
third is the linguist’s explanans: the sorts of hypothesised properties that are
required to explain the explananda. With an account of generative grammar’s
explanatory goals in hand, and an account of the evidence grammarians draw upon,
we can examine the nature of the posits of grammatical theory. We can ask what
sort of theoretical properties are postulated by the grammarian to achieve his
explanatory goals.
One point of clarification is required. Chomsky has, on occasion, argued that
generative grammar is a psychological science as a matter of theoretical choice. His
thought is that the subject matter of generative grammar is determined by which
phenomena generative grammarians seek to explain. This, he claims, is settled by
the selection of a domain of inquiry. Hence, he says:
The issue of mentalism versus antimentalism in linguistics apparently has to do only with
goals and interests, and not with questions of truth or falsity, sense or nonsense.
18
One might think that the question of whether generative grammar is a psychological
science is thereby deflated. Generative grammar is a theoretical investigation,
successful or unsuccessful, of a selected range of phenomena and attempts to
answer questions thereof. Chomsky’s thought is that generative grammarians have
chosen a range of phenomena pertaining to our cognition of language as their target
of explanation and so generative grammar is a psychological science. As Chomsky
sees it, one can choose to be interested in the investigation of our cognition of
language, as Chomsky claims generative grammarians are, or one can choose not to
be. But there is no antecedent question of what linguistics is about as such.
However, there are substantive issues waiting in the wings. Opponents of
the psychological question, such as Devitt, see themselves as asking for some
justification for thinking that, in asking questions about central linguistic facts, we
are thereby proposing a set of questions about our cognition of language. It may be
that psychological phenomena are the stated targets of explanation. But there are
important questions about whether this theoretical focus is well-motivated, whether
linguistic inquiry has been in keeping with these explanatory goals, whether
18 Chomsky (1965) fn.119
linguists bring their evidence to bear on psychological hypotheses and whether the
posits of their theories are best interpreted as psychological structures. And these
are questions that Chomsky also addresses. So there is plenty of scope for defending
the psychological conception beyond the appeal to an initial choice of explanatory
goals.
I think Chomsky would agree that linguists are not infallible in their self-
conception. It is, then, at least conceivable that opponents of the psychological
conception could convince us that linguists are mistaken in taking themselves to be
answering questions about our cognition of language, if the theories could be better
interpreted as pertaining to some non-psychological domain.
Devitt is not the only philosopher who thinks that linguists should be
convinced to give up the psychological conception of generative grammar. Katz is
committed to L1 but not L2 because on Katz’s view, linguistics is not a part of
psychology but neither is it a part of any other empirical science. Katz thinks that
the fundamental questions for grammarians concern a range of structural facts about
languages that should be specified independently of hypotheses about the
psychological states of speakers. He has sought to defend the view that grammatical
theory is a part of mathematics rather than psychology.
19 Katz thinks that
mathematical propositions are about Platonic objects: atemporal, aspatial and
acausal objects that are not located in the natural world, or indeed anywhere else.
Hence, Katz thinks that mathematics, and therefore linguistics, are non-empirical
investigations.
Whatever plausibility these challenges to the psychological conception have,
resides in their ability to show how the inquiry focuses on non-psychological issues
and how generative grammars appeal to non-psychological facts. Without such
further support, challenges to the psychological conception would amount to little
more than a prohibition to inquire into perfectly good questions. Chomsky would be
justified in maintaining that generative grammar is an inquiry into psychological
structures engaged in speaking and understanding language, insofar as he has
offered a cogent account of that inquiry, unless there is a good argument for an
19 Katz (1981,1985, 1996)20
alternative conception or for disputing that generative grammar is a promising
avenue for investigating psychological structure.
Over the course of the twentieth-century, language has been conceived in
various ways as a topic for systematic inquiry. Amongst these conceptions are
conceptions of language as a collection of social facts, as something observable in
the physical environment, as something abstract and immutable and as a structured
psychological state. In the remainder of this chapter, I’ll outline the psychological
conception of generative grammar and Devitt’s argument against that conception,
before considering a range of non-psychological conceptions of language as a topic
of inquiry.
1.2 The Psychological Conception of Linguistics
Chomsky claims that generative grammar is concerned with a class of
psychological states engaged in speaking and understanding language. So, this is
one way to conceive of language as a topic of inquiry: as a special cognitive
proficiency that we have, like that we have for seeing, hearing or reasoning.
Barring special cognitive impairment or extremely hostile environmental
conditions, all humans acquire at least one language. Moreover, a central
component of this capacity for language seems to be species-specific. The nature of
animal communication is a huge area of scientific research. Many other animals do
make noises and gestures to communicate with varying degrees of sophistication.
There are even a number of species that have very impressive abilities to
discriminate between human speech sounds.
20 But the capacity to combine
expressive elements, building hierarchical structure according to recursive rules,
over an unbounded range seems to be unique to humans.
Considering the human faculty for language (FL), Hauser, Chomsky and
Fitch (henceforth, HCF) point to this capacity as the key difference between human
and non-human communication systems. They say:
20 See HCF (2002) p.1574 and works cited there.21
Animal communication systems lack the rich expressive and open-ended power of human
language (based on humans’ capacity for recursion).
21
The recursive rules that characterise human languages generate a potential infinity
of expressions and engender special hierarchical dependencies amongst the
elements of these expressions. Other animals possess a very limited capacity to
learn the long-distance dependencies that populate such utterances as Jim, that
bloke that’s always down the pub, drinking beer and eating peanuts, shaves himself.
Other species apparently lack the ability to recombine meaningful units to form an
unlimited variety of larger structures, each of which differs systematically in
meaning. And studies of animal capacities for generating other discrete infinities,
such as the numbers suggest that:
Animals can represent number approximately as a magnitude with scalar variability … with
greater discriminability among small numbers than among large (keeping distances between
pairs constant) and between numbers that are farther apart (e.g. 7 versus 8 is harder than 7
versus 12). The approximate number sense is accompanied by a second precise mechanism
that is limited to values less than 4 but accurately distinguishes 1 from 2, 2 from 3, and 3
from 4; this second system appears to be recruited in the context of object tracking and is
limited by working memory constraints… The system apparently never takes on the open-
ended generative property of human language.
22
Monkeys taught to count items up to three or four and to manipulate these numbers
do not spontaneously progress in their understanding of number but have to be
taught the whole process afresh for each new number.
Imagining a Martian scientist investigating life on earth, HCF surmise that:
[I]t might note that the faculty mediating human communication appears remarkably
different from that of other living creatures; it might further note that the human faculty of
language appears to be organized like the genetic code – hierarchical, generative, recursive,
and virtually limitless with respect to its scope and expression.
23
21 HCF (2002) p.1570
22 HCF (2002) p.1577
23 HCF (2002) p.156922
This infinite expressive power is responsible for the prolific and flexible nature of
linguistic communication. It makes for a qualitative difference between human
communication in language and the communicative efforts of species that lack
language. Further, this discrete infinity is built out of a stock of more than 50,000
elements, far exceeding the number which can be stored by other creatures.
24 Apes
that are trained intensively to use gestures or a keyboard come to grasp, at most,
around 150 items and they do so laboriously. They can put them together in groups
of two or three with little regard for order beyond the short sequences or repetitions
that prompt reward, and they have no capacity for hierarchy. They lack that “spurt”
in the growth of their combinatorial abilities that all human children experience,
allowing children to go on building bigger and bigger structures.
25
This combinatorial proficiency, a cognitive capacity that only we have,
naturally suggests itself as a locus of study if we want to understand language as
something that we have but other species lack. As Barry Smith puts it:
We are unique both in our handling of recursive structure and our capacity to encode this in
a limited range of speech sounds. And this ability to apprehend and integrate, so rapidly, the
phonetic, syntactic and semantic information in virtue of which sound events are recognised
as linguistically significant speech is a staggering achievement and requires explanation.
26
Proponents of the psychological conception are impressed and intrigued by these
special properties of the human propensity for language. They conceive of
linguistics as an investigation of this psychological capacity for building these
structures distinctive of linguistic communication.
27 The central questions about this
capacity concern our knowledge of linguistic structure, its acquisition and its use.
Proponents of the psychological conception, like John Collins, think it plausible that
24 The figure comes from Wallman (1992), Pinker and Jackendoff (2005) suggest that this is “more
than 100 times the most extravagant claims for vocabulary in language trained apes or in natural
primate call systems.”
25 See Smith (2006) for discussion.
26 Smith (2006)
27 This interest in the productivity of language goes back to early work in generative grammar (see
Chomsky 1965).23
the subject matter of generative grammar is a reflection of these central questions
about language. He says:
The psychological nature of linguistics flows from general considerations about the central
questions we ask in linguistics: What do we know? How do we acquire the knowledge?
How do we put the knowledge to use?
28
The psychological conception of generative grammar begins with the recognition
that there is a state of the human brain that supports this psychological capacity for
structuring sounds and marks linguistically. As this structure is conceived at a level
of abstraction from the physical behaviour of the brain, we can call this
psychological state, a state of the mind/brain.
29 As an idealisation, we can assume
that we all start out with a FL in the same state prior to grammar acquisition.
Grammar acquisition involves the development of this state of the mind/brain, FL,
under the causal influence of the linguistic environments in which children find
themselves.
This state of the human mind/brain, FL, has been referred to variously as a
grammar, a language faculty, a system of grammatical competence and an I-
language. The latter terminology, I-language, brings out the identification of
language as a topic of inquiry with this special state of the mind/brain.
30 The I-
stands for three things. An I-language is an internal system of the mind/brain. It is
individual to the speaker rather than a property of communities of speakers and can
be specified independently of properties of the individual’s environment. It is
intensionally specified as a recursive procedure for pairing sounds with structured
descriptions over an unbounded range, rather than a merely extensional
specification of the set of paired sounds and sentences. I-languages are identified
28 Collins (2006)
29 Chomsky (1987 p.178) says that for the grammarians purposes we are to “understand talk about
the mind to be talk about the brain undertaken at a certain level of abstraction from (as yet unknown)
mechanisms, at which we can formulate an explanatory theory.” Jackendoff (2002) adopts the
terminology f-mind, f- to suggest that we are talking about the structure of the brain at a functional
level of description.
30 See Chomsky (1986) for its introduction.24
not with the utterances or written texts that speakers produce, but with an internal
cognitive structure that shapes this production. I-language is part of our biological
endowment, much like our visual system.
On this psychological conception of languages as I-languages, generative
grammarians aim to characterise the initial state of the I-language and its
development into its mature states. They also aim to understand the integration of
the I-language with the other cognitive systems of the mind/brain that put this I-
language to use. As Smith puts it, the psychological conception is concerned with
the properties that make our use of language language; those psychological
properties that give form and character to this distinctively human capacity to speak
and comprehend.
31
Chomsky adopted the term I-language in an attempt to disambiguate
between two ideas.
32 Chomsky had previously talked about the grammar of a
speaker’s language, explicitly using grammar to cover both the linguistic structure
of a speaker’s mind and the linguist’s theory of that structure. I-language is not a
new notion but rather a new term introduced “in the hope of overcoming persistent
misunderstanding of the technical notion ‘grammar’”.
33 With I-language there was
no opportunity for confusion as it was defined explicitly from the start as a state of
the mind-brain:
Since the origins of work in generative grammar in the 1950s, it has been pointed out that
the term “grammar” is being used with a systematic ambiguity: to refer to the internal states
of Jones’s faculty of language FL, and to the linguist’s theory of that state. But that usage
proved confusing. I therefore suggested that we restrict the term “grammar” (“particular” or
“universal grammar”) to the theories constructed by the linguist and refer to the internal
state that grammars seek to describe as I-languages (“I” to suggest internal, individual,
intensional).’
34
31 Smith (2006)
32 See Chomsky (1986).
33 Chomsky (2003) p.270
34 ibid25
In this thesis I’ll often talk about the state of grammatical competence or the
grammatical competence system which also serves to distinguish an aspect of the
mind-brain from a grammarian’s theory thereof.
When Chomsky coined the term I-language he also intended to draw a
contrast with a rather different conception of language as a topic of inquiry, the E-
language conception. The E- in E-language stands for external and extensional. On
E-language conceptions, languages are external to the minds of speakers,
extensionally specified as a set of pairs of sounds or sentences and meanings, which
are not the property of an individual speaker-hearer. More specifically, Chomsky
has used the term “E-language” to apply to conceptions of language as a social,
public or otherwise non-individual phenomenon whose properties are fixed by
convention or practical accomplishment. Chomsky’s own evaluation of these E-
language conceptions is that they are poorly defined, often incoherent and parasitic
on the I-language conception for whatever theoretical interest they do have.
This is apt to sound very radical to philosophical ears. Influential
philosophical figures, such as Quine and Wittgenstein, have argued that language is
an inherently social and public phenomenon.
35 And furthermore, part of our
commonsensical conception of language may be to think of languages as “out
there”, independent of their individual speakers.
36 In more reflective moments, we
might think about languages as not only “out there” but also as having all sorts of
interesting non-psychological properties such as aesthetic properties, as well as
historical and cultural significance.
37 So the notion of a partially shared, public
language of which speakers partake may be a feature of common thought and
35 Quine (1960), Wittgenstein (2001)
36 Caution is required here because investigating our ordinary conception of language is a scientific
endeavour in itself: a part of ethnoscience. There are all kinds of disputes in psychology and
philosophy about our commonsensical conceptions of physics, objects, psychology etc., so why not
language too? Over 70% of the world’s speakers are illiterate and it may be that cultures which lack
written texts and other visual means to linguistic communication with durable environmental
elements are less predisposed to think of languages as “out there”, persisting objects of which they
partake.
37 Wiggins (1997) appeals to such properties of language as part of his attack on the psychological
conception.26
parlance. In speaking of the rules of English or German, it appears that linguists
themselves happily appeal to such shared languages, but the appearance may be
misleading.
In Chomsky’s view, there is nothing peculiar or novel about the I-language
perspective in scientific linguistics. He says:
It is not accurate to speak of “rejection of the notion of ‘shared public language’” as
peculiarly mine; it is a commonplace of the empirical study of language. In the technical
literature one finds such terms as “Chinese” or “Italian”, but these are understood to be
mere conveniences, not notions with some place in the theoretical explanation of
phenomena of language. The burden of proof falls on those who claim otherwise. To my
knowledge, the burden has not been met, rarely even recognised.
38
Chomsky thinks that a lack of interest in E-language conceptions - conceptions of
Chinese or Italian as external, public and partially shared - is just a feature of the
way that scientific linguistics proceeds, absent any substantive proposals about the
role such conceptions might play in grammatical theory. Chomsky’s suspicion is
that, to the extent that any sense has been made of E-languages, they are just
interest-relative abstractions from the I-languages of sufficiently similar groups of
speakers. They are assimilations of speakers whose I-languages are roughly similar
according to linguistic principles and who are similar enough according to non-
linguistic factors of geography, culture and history.
Hence, Chomsky surmises that E-languages are of little scientific interest.
Though they may be of interest to the ethnoscientist who investigates our ordinary
understanding of such concepts as language, our commonsensical conceptions have
little bearing on how we should conceive of language as a topic for scientific
inquiry. Chomsky thus views our ordinary conceptions of shared languages as much
like our ordinarily thinking about the setting of the sun: such conceptions are not
part of explanatory theory. There is no constraint on any scientific theory to stick to
our commonsensical understandings; this extends to linguistics.
It’s worth pausing to consider why Chomsky does not think that linguistic
inquiry should be constrained by the way we ordinarily think about languages or by
38 Chomsky (2003a) p.27027
philosophical systematisations of ordinary thought. Chomsky is committed to
methodological naturalism: a commitment to apply successful scientific methods to
the study of linguistic and mental phenomena, in the hope of eventually integrating
accounts of language and the mind with the core natural sciences.
39 Methodological
naturalism does not preclude other ways of investigating language but rather
provides a particular form of understanding. This sort of scientific understanding is
supposed to give us some objective, precise and testable explanatory theory
supported by empirical evidence. This is clearly a different sort of understanding to
that which might be afforded by the study of our ordinary concepts or by arts such
as history and literature. Chomsky claims that despite widespread acceptance of
methodological naturalism, critics of the psychological conception typically critique
the notions it employs and the theoretical framework in which they are embedded,
on grounds other than their adherence to scientific methodology and the explanatory
insight they offer.
To take an example, Chomsky sees John Searle’s attack on the
psychological conception of generative grammar as an instance of this tendency.
Searle claims that the theories offered by generative grammarians cannot be
explanations of speakers’ minds because they fail to meet a general criterion for
describing the mind. This criterion is Searle’s “connection principle”: the content of
any mental states attributed to a subject must be consciously accessible in
principle.
40 Chomsky argues that Searle’s connection principle is at root
methodological dualism: the supposition that the study of mind and language should
be held to independent standards, beyond those that guide scientific inquiry in other
domains. Without such dualistic strictures, what counts as psychological is just
what our best theories of psychological phenomena discover. Chomsky thinks that
much of the criticism of the I-language perspective and support for E-language
conceptions is underpinned by such methodological dualism, holding the scientific
inquiry into language to independent commonsensical or aprioristic standards, and
that this is unjustified.
39 See Chomsky (1995a, 2000) for discussion.
40 Searle (1992) p.15628
To recap, on Chomsky’s psychological conception, when grammarians
make claims about reflexives and their binding, they are making abstract claims
about the psychological states of speakers. When they talk about English, this just
serves to conveniently pick out the I-language states of a roughly similar population
of speakers. If speakers sufficiently like us in the language they speak and
understand find certain constructions that are in accordance with our hypothesised
linguistic principles to be unacceptable then we might choose to revise those
principles. Alternatively, we might take them thereby to be sufficiently dissimilar to
us, to think that they speak a different language encoded in a differently organised
I-language system. There are empirical issues about the similarities and differences
between speakers but not about the notion of English which is informal and open-
ended. The empirical issue is that there are speakers with differently configured I-
languages, who began with the same biological endowment for I-language; and this
requires some explanation. The similarity that loosely binds together English-
speakers for the linguist is underwritten by a theoretical understanding of I-
languages.
41
In this thesis, the opposition I consider to the I-language perspective has a
wider remit than Chomsky suggests for E-language conceptions. I consider non-
psychological conceptions of language as something external to the mind, without
any necessary commitment to languages being extensionally specified, social or
shared, or conforming to ordinary conceptions.
It’s noteworthy that what Chomsky means in locating languages internally,
what he calls internalism, is different from what is usually meant by internalism in
the philosophy of mind. Chomsky is explicit that by internalism he does not mean
any doctrine that denies that “mental states are individuated by reference to features
of the subject’s environment or social context”, or that holds that “subjects in the
same internal (neural) state are in the same mental states”.
42 Chomsky’s internalism
is a distinctly methodological doctrine:
41 See Collins (2006) for discussion of these issues.
42 See Chomsky (2003). See Burge (1979, 1986) for classic arguments for the “externalist” or “anti-
individualist” view that psychological states are individuated by reference to features of a subject’s
environment and/or social context. For an individualist view of psychology, see Fodor (1980). For
opposition to Burge, see Segal (1989, 2000).29
Internalism studies internal states, including those involved in what tradition (and common
sense) often regard as mental aspects of the world. It may develop a concept of “mental
state”, but if so, that will be a technical construct, finding its place within a particular
context of theoretical explanation, denying or asserting nothing about other usages.
43
Chomsky sees studies of human and animal behaviour as dividing into two
components. One component is an attempt to discover the internal organisation of
the organism that equips it for the behaviour. The second component involves
understanding how that internal organisation interacts with the environment.
Chomsky’s internalism is his focus on the first of these components, and commits
him to the fruitfulness of this approach.
44
The development of Chomsky’s conception of grammar is closely connected
to his critique of behaviourist conceptions (on which I’ll say more in §1.3.1). In his
famous review of Skinner’s Verbal Behaviour, Chomsky argued that behaviourist
concepts of stimulus and response that had objective meaning in work on animal
behaviour, became opaque, yielding trivialities or falsehoods, when applied to
human language.
45 Chomsky argues that if we want to understand linguistic
behaviour then the behaviour itself is the wrong target for a linguistic theory. For
linguistic behaviour is itself the effect of a highly complex interaction amongst
systems within humans of which only some are linguistic. For this reason Chomsky
thought it unlikely that there could be an explanatory theory of language pitched at
the level of behaviour, per se. Rather Chomsky suggested that it might be possible
to characterise aspects of the knowledge of language that shapes linguistic
behaviour through its interaction with systems for producing and perceiving
language. He therefore proposed that the best object of study in linguistics is not
verbal behaviour, which is itself the product of diverse and little understood systems,
but rather our knowledge of linguistic form and meaning.
43 Chomsky (2003) p.269
44 See Williamson (2006) for an argument that the study of cognition cannot be factored into internal
and external components.
45 Chomsky (1959)30
There is a corresponding thought about linguistic behaviour that seems to be
shared amongst proponents of the psychological conception:
The cognitive perspective regards behaviour and its products not as the objects of inquiry,
but as data that may provide evidence about the inner mechanisms of mind … The
properties and patterns that were the focus of structural linguistics find their place but as
phenomena to be explained along with innumerable others, in terms of the inner
mechanisms that generate expressions.
46
On the psychological conception, behaviour is not the primary locus of linguistic
properties but is linguistic only derivatively of the role of special cognitive systems
in shaping and apprehending it. It is the latter “inner mechanisms” which are
supposed to explain the special properties of linguistic behaviour and which are,
therefore, taken to be the primary target of linguistic inquiry.
One source of theoretical disagreement amongst linguists who endorse the
psychological conception is over which phenomena form part of the core FL and
which are part of the conceptual-intentional systems of thought and the other
cognitive systems that interface with the grammatical system. By Chomsky’s recent
definition, FL narrowly conceived (FLN) is that cognitive property distinctive of
linguistic communication that equips us for recursive structure building. FLN is to
be distinguished from language more broadly conceived (FLB) which involves the
integration of recursive structures into systems for intention-conceptualisation and
perception-articulation. Chomsky claims that, unlike the recursive structure building
of FLN, the mechanisms that are part of FLB are not specific to humans.
47 One
consequence of Chomsky’s recent view is to push some of what were once
46 Chomsky 2000 p.5-6
47 There is much controversy about which of the FLB mechanisms are replicated in other animals
and to what degree. For example, our categorical perception of speech, which seems finely tuned to
the details of human speech, may not constitute a uniquely human adaptation. There is evidence to
suggest that macaques, chinchillas and birds have the capacity to discriminate amongst the human
speech sounds. See HCF (2002) p.1572 and works cited there.31
considered core principles of FL into the interface between language and other
systems which are part of FLB.
48
There are also disagreements about how the I-language is to be understood
amongst those who advocate the psychological conception. Some who adopt the
psychological conception challenge the idea that the properties of I-languages are
all properties of the individual speaker. Ludlow, for example, has suggested that I-
languages have referential, semantic properties; properties which cannot be
specified at the level of the individual in independence from their environment. In
investigating the referential semantics of I-languages, Ludlow suggests that the
linguist will be appealing to features of the world beyond the individual speaker.
49
The referential properties of I-languages are relations between the internal
representations and aspects of the world beyond the speaker’s mind. If Ludlow is
right then I-languages would be internal and intensional but not individual.
Chomsky himself is sceptical about a science of reference and about the idea that
natural languages have referential semantics.
50 This interesting issue will not be
addressed in this thesis.
And there are disagreements over the commitments of conceiving of I-
languages as psychological states. Chomsky has a very thin notion of what it takes
for a state to be “cognitive”, “psychological” or “mental” and uses the terms
interchangeably. On Chomsky’s view, there are no substantial criteria that
something has to meet in order to be “mental” or “psychological” beyond its
postulation as part of our best theories of mental phenomena. For Chomsky,
“mental” and “psychological” are rough and ready notions of commonsense, and
there is no “mark of the mental” that serves to sort the mental from the non-mental
independently of our developing psychological theories. He says that his approach
is “’mentalistic’ but in what should be an uncontroversial sense. It is concerned with
48 See Safir (2004) for discussion of whether binding falls within FLN or at the semantic interface.
For more general discussion of HCF’s claims see Pinker and Jacknedoff (2005), and HCF’s replies
in Fitch, Chomsky and Hauser (2005) and Chomsky, Hauser and Fitch (2005).
49 Ludlow (2003), Chomsky (2003c)
50 Chomsky (2000)32
“mental aspects of the world”, which stand alongside its mechanical, chemical,
optical and other aspects.”
51
As Chomsky sees it, terms such as “mental” serve only to loosely carve out
a domain of inquiry rather than to make a substantive claim about a phenomenon.
I will be using the terms “mind” and “mental” here with no metaphysical import. Thus I
understand “mental” to be on a par with “chemical”, “optical”, or “electrical”. Certain
phenomena, events, processes, and states are informally called “chemical” (etc.) but no
metaphysical divide is suggested thereby. The terms are used to select certain aspects of the
world as a focus of inquiry. We do not seek to determine the true ‘criterion of the chemical’,
or the ‘mark of the electrical’, or the ‘boundaries of the optical’. I will use “mental” the
same way, with something like the ordinary coverage, but no deeper implications.
52
The domain of psychological inquiry includes some phenomena for which our
brains, and not other parts of our bodies, are chiefly responsible. Our knowledge of
linguistic structure is one such phenomenon, though other functions the brain serves,
such as regulating our body’s temperature, happen not to be included in our
ordinary classification.
In keeping with this attitude to notions like mental and psychological,
Chomsky is happy, unlike Searle, to posit mental states of which speakers have no
conscious awareness and never will. Chomsky suggests that conscious states have
no special place in the inquiry into language, forming a “scattered and probably
uninteresting subpart of the full cognitive structure”.
53 Smith has pointed out the
contrast here with philosophers like Dummett who afford conscious psychological
states a special role in characterising a speaker’s language.
54 Dummett distinguishes:
[B]etween those regularities of which a speaker, acting as a rational agent engaged in
conscious, voluntary action, makes use from those that may be hidden from him and
51 Chomsky (2000) pp.5-6
52 Chomsky (2000) p.106
53 Chomsky (1975) p.163
54 Smith (2006)33
uncovered by a psychologist or a neurologist: only those regularities of which, in speaking,
he makes use characterize the language as a language.
55
But most proponents of a psychological conception of language will insist for
empirical reasons, as Smith does, that regularities of which a speaker has no
conscious awareness do serve to characterise his language. Remember how the
reflexive generalisation constrains our interpretation of (1) so that myself depends
for its meaning on I and see how it shapes our understanding of sentences like (4)
and (5) so that it is he that fixes the interpretation of himself.
(1) I shaved myself.
(4) He shaved himself.
(5) We knew that he shaved himself.
But our reflexive generalisation is not a generalisation of which speakers make
“use” in Dummett’s sense, for they are not consciously guided by it or consciously
aware of it. As Smith says:
Dummett is surely wrong, on empirical or evidential grounds alone, to insist that the only
generalisations or regularities that feature as part of our language are those of which we
have conscious apprehension. That would be a hopeless move in the face of the
generalizations linguistic theory gives rise to, and for which there is evidence in the
conscious intuitive judgements of speakers.
56
The empirical evidence does not support Dummett’s view because the
generalisations in which linguistic theory traffics are, for the most part, beyond the
conscious reach of speakers. It took careful examination of linguistic data and some
theoretical inference to get to the Reflexive Generalisation. The facts about a
speaker’s I-language are conceived as facts about the speaker’s mind that outstrip
what is consciously available to him. The states of an I-language are unconscious
55 Dummett (1993) p.104
56 Smith (2006) p.96834
states of the mind/brain that are partially explanatory of the speaker’s conscious
judgement and his use of language.
Chomsky’s view is that the psychological is just whatever our best theories
of “psychological” or “mental” phenomena, such as knowledge of language, tell us
it is. He thinks that there is nothing more substantive to be said than that,
independently of the results of empirical inquiry. But there are adherents to the
psychological conception who make further substantive claims about what marks
the domain of inquiry out as psychological and about what sort of psychological
inquiry generative grammar is.
In particular, it has been suggested by some that I-languages are intentional
or representational systems.
57 Advocates of such views think that the best way to
understand the cognition of language involves states of the I-language representing
linguistic properties or having linguistic properties as their intentional content,
conceived as their truth- or correctness-condition.
58
Chomsky has sought to distance himself from the idea that I-languages are
intentional or representational in the above sense. Chomsky’s view is that the notion
of representational or intentional content is obscure and unexplanatory. He says:
I do not know of any notion of “representational content” that is clear enough to be invoked
in accounts of how internal computational systems enter into the life of the organism. And
57 This component is adopted by Egan (1995, 2003), Rey (2000, 2003, 2005) and Smith (2006,
2006a, 2008) amongst others.
58 This view is not ruled out by recent moves to a phase/derivational model, free of levels of
representation as Hinzen suggests. Hinzen (2006 p.250) says: “If this line of thought is carried to the
limit, the notion of representation ceases to play an explanatory role ... At least intuitively, a
derivation does not represent anything, it just proceeds.” But as Collins points out (unpublished ms.
b p.6) intuitively a derivation does require representations, if this just means structures that can be
built and transformed, so “doing without levels of representation is not to do without
representations”. Whether the notion of representation should be understood in terms of content or
aboutness, or merely formal structure would still be an open question. Chomsky (2000), and Collins
(2004, 2006, 2007, 2008a) favour a structural or categorical understanding of a representation (x-
representations rather than representations of or about x) which eschews the notions of content and
intentionality.35
to the extent that I can grasp what is intended, it seems to me very questionable that it
points to a profitable path to pursue.
59
Though I do not intend to enter into this issue in my thesis, it is noteworthy that
there are those amongst the supporters of the psychological conception who would
have a fourth “I” – that of intentional – added to the list of internal, individual and
intensional. My question about whether the grammatical properties described by
linguists are psychological properties is prior to the question of whether the
psychological states that realise those properties are representational or intentional
states.
A final noteworthy difference amongst supporters of the psychological
conception is over the role that knowledge plays in the psychology of language. We
saw that Chomsky denies E-languages have any explanatory role in linguistics. So,
on his account, whatever our knowledge of language consists in, it cannot be a
relation between internal states of speakers and the properties of an E-language.
Chomsky eschews such independent objects with which the states of the I-language
can align or fail to align. There is just the I-language: an internal mental state that
effects a generative procedure for assigning structural descriptions to expressions.
From Chomsky’s perspective, “knowledge of language” is just an informal locution
that serves to pick out the relevant states of the speaker. Chomsky says “we should
think of knowledge of language as a certain state of the mind/brain...furthermore as
a state of some distinguished faculty of the mind – the language faculty – with its
specific properties, structure and organisation.”
60
Though Chomsky thinks there is a perfectly reasonable sense in which
generative grammar is an inquiry into a species of knowledge
61 he is happy to give
up the term and talk about our cognition of language, rather than knowledge, in the
face of philosophical scruples about consciousness, justification and the alleged
relational nature of knowledge. One’s “knowledge of language” so conceived is
then the I-language state and its integration with other cognitive systems. Though
59 Chomsky (2003) p.274. Jackendoff (2002) also eschews the notion of representational content.
60 Chomsky (1987) p.178
61 See Chomsky (1980, 1986)36
“knowledge of language” suggests a relation between the knower and that which is
known, for Chomsky such a relational conception collapses without E-languages.
62
This Chomskian view that the correct theoretical conception of knowledge
of language is as a state, the knowledge-of-language state, has been defended by
Collins. Critiquing the relational conception, he says:
There is, as it were, nothing objective to get right. Languages are not external objects we
can go right or wrong about… It turns out, as part a matter of discovery, part methodology,
that we do not know languages.
63
Though Collins holds that there is a state we might think of as the knowledge-of-
language-state, this is not a commitment to the relational conception.
But there are those, such as Smith, who envisage a more substantial role for
a relational conception of knowledge.
64 The conception of knowledge of language
as the I-language state eliminates the problem of specifying the relation between
speaker’s mental states and the languages they know: knowledge of language, from
this perspective, just is the I-language state. But Smith claims some such relation is
required if we are to defend the view that people know languages - a view that he
takes to have significant virtues - since knowledge “requires there to be a subject
matter to be right or wrong about”.
65 This is Smith’s “Missing Object of Knowledge
Problem”:
If languages are no longer seen as “out there” but are conceived as internal to speakers,
what is the object of speakers’ knowledge of language? … [W]e seem to have swapped one
problem for another since there now appears to be nothing to relate them to: no object of
knowledge.
66
62 Jackendoff’s (2002) view is similar: a speaker “knows a language” if their f-mind includes certain
integrated structures.
63 Collins (2004) pp.514-6
64 See Smith (2006, 2006a, 2008) and Matthews (2006)
65 Smith (2006) p.971
66 Smith (2006) p.97437
According to Smith, the trouble with the conception of knowledge of language as
simply the I-language state, rather than a relation to linguistic fact, is that the state
“fixes the facts of language rather than conforming to them”.
67
Smith thinks that although the facts about a speaker’s language are
determined by their I-language, there is still room for their having knowledge of
linguistic facts. On Smith’s account, our knowledge of language is conscious
knowledge of particular linguistic facts, linguistic facts which are determined by the
unconscious and general principles of our I-language. Smith’s account exploits the
gap between the linguistic facts determined by our I-language and the verdicts of
conscious judgements, which are higher level effects of a variety of cognitive
factors, to get the distinction between something seeming to me to be a part of my
language and its actually being so. In this sense, speakers’ judgements can succeed
or fail to track the linguistic facts:
The speaker can be out of step with his own linguistic system…it is only when the effortless
and groundless intuitive judgements speakers make flow from (in whatever way they do),
and conform to, the assignment of structure made by the underlying I-language that the
speakers’ intuitions count as knowledge.
68
When judgements are out of step with the I-language, speakers can lack knowledge
of their own language. Although, phenomenologically, it might strike us that in
making linguistic judgements we are reacting to linguistic facts, ‘out there’ and
external to us, on Smith’s account, “we are reacting to something within our own
breasts and not consciously accessible to us at all.”
69
Smith counts the cost of giving up on the relational conception more dearly
than Collins. He wants to hold onto the idea that speakers have a large of number of
items of specific knowledge about their language including authoritative first-
personal knowledge of what their words mean, which arrangements of words are
sentences of their language and how these sentences can and cannot be understood.
The view that we know the meanings of our own words and their legitimate
67 Smith (2006) p.975
68 Smith (2006) pp.977-8
69 Smith (2006) p.97838
arrangements has its independent attractions. I know what I am saying and, on the
whole, I know when you are saying something in a language I understand.
70 And
Smith wants to integrate the linguist’s account of the I-language state with an
account of first-personal knowledge of language.
Smith is more sanguine than Collins about the prospects of an account of
how the I-language states bear on personal-level states of conscious knowledge.
Collins claims that our first-personal knowledge of language is about as complex an
interaction effect as we could imagine. Consequently, Collins thinks we have little
idea how to develop a theoretical framework in which to embed the view that first-
personal states conform with states of the I-language. Smith’s thought is that, given
the absence of an external object of knowledge, any such framework for integrating
the I-language and personal-level accounts will have to involve a constraint of
tracking which holds between the first-personal states and the I-language states.
Smith’s second motivation for building knowledge of language, relationally
understood, into the psychological conception is his view that for speakers’
linguistic judgements to be useful as evidence they must constitute knowledge of
the language about which they are judgements.
71 For example, most English-
speakers consciously know that in (1) I means the same thing as myself. Smith
thinks that if such judgements did not constitute knowledge of our language, as
distinguished from mere responses to presented material, then they would not be
good data for hypotheses about the language we have mastered.
On Collins’ non-relational view, there is no requirement that the judgements
constitute knowledge or bear any epistemic credentials at all. There is only a
70 Compare Matthews (2006 p.215): “When it comes to justifying our reliance on language as a
reliable means of communication...any explanation of the role of linguistic competence as the ground
of this authority is going to have to characterise this competence in epistemic terms...[because] we
have to know this pairing [that I-language effects] so that we can know what it is we and others are
saying.”
71 Matthews (2006) presses the same point: “Linguists need some justification for crediting these
judgements as an accurate expression of the informant’s linguistic competence. But there would
seem to be no reason to credit these judgements unless informants actually know certain things about
their language, e.g., the pairing of sounds and meanings that their language effects, and furthermore
their judgements actually express this knowledge.”39
theoretical inference from the judgements to an ensemble of underlying systems of
which the I-language is one. The knowledge-of-language state properly integrated
into wider systems, yields linguistic judgements.
There is far more to be said on each side of this disagreement but I will not
attempt to resolve the dispute here. Both sides agree that the grammatical properties
studied by generative grammarians are properties of a psychological system. My
question of whether linguistics is a part of psychology is therefore antecedent to this
disagreement over the nature and role of knowledge within the psychological
conception of language.
A common critical response to Chomsky’s psychological conception of linguistics
as an investigation of I-language is that it is a plain confusion: “Language is one
thing, our knowledge of language or linguistic competence is another”, so the
response goes. When we think about the languages we know, we typically think of
English, Russian and the like, of which we can come to have knowledge, and not of
something encoded in our heads. Scientific linguists find these ordinary
classifications of English and Russian unenlightening. But, so the response goes,
linguists still appeal to languages, perhaps precisifications of English and Russian
that individual speakers may have knowledge of or be competent in. The perceived
confusion is that linguists are explicitly committed to the existence of such
languages and that there is a deeply entrenched distinction between the study of
language and the study of the psychology of language.
And perhaps we should expect such a distinction. Just as there is a
distinction between the logical implications and even an ideal reasoner’s
competence with the implication relations, or a distinction between mathematical
truths and our mathematical competence; so we should expect a distinction between
the grammatical structure of a language and the system of grammatical competence.
Just as there is a special human propensity for language so there is for logical
deduction and also for mathematics. But in light of the distinctions, one would
presumably not want to hold that logic and mathematics are a part of psychology.
Frege brought out the unpleasant consequences of thinking of the laws of
logic as laws of empirical psychology. For imagine that they were and that there40
were beings whose thoughts were governed by very different laws that contradicted
ours. What would we then say about them?
The psychological logician could only acknowledge the fact and say simply: those laws
hold for them, these laws hold for us. I should say: we have a hitherto unknown type of
madness. Anyone who understands laws of logic to be laws that prescribe the way in which
one ought to think – and not natural laws of human beings taking a thing to be true – will
ask, who is right?... The psychological logician cannot ask this question: if he did he would
be recognising laws of truth that are not laws of psychology.
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Husserl, considering the laws of logic as they stand to the laws of thought, asks us
to imagine an ideal thinker, in whom all thinking proceeds as the logical laws
require:
Naturally the fact that this occurs must have its explanatory ground in certain psychological
laws, which govern the course of the mental experience of this being... Would the natural
laws and the logical laws in this assumed situation be one and the same? Obviously, the
answer is ‘No’. Causal laws, according to which thought must proceed in a manner which
the ideal norms of logic might justify, are by no means identical with those norms.
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Proponents of the psychological conception need to convince opponents that the
study of language is different: that where there are good reasons to distinguish
between the study of logic or mathematics and the study of our cognitive capacities
in that direction, there are no such good reasons to distinguish between studies of
linguistic structure and of the psychological structure of those that speak and
understand language. Knowing all the truths about human psychology, we would
still not have resolved all the mathematical questions. So why should we expect our
knowledge of the truths about human psychology to reveal all the truths about the
grammars of natural languages? As Katz puts the point, there seems to be:
72 Frege (1967) p.14
73 Husserl (1970) p.10341
[A] fundamental distinction between the knowledge speakers have of their language and the
languages that speakers have knowledge of. This distinction is simply a special case of the
general distinction between knowledge and its object.
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In the next section I’ll examine Devitt’s recent development of this style of
argument applied to the study of grammar. Then I’ll look at the different
conceptions of language as a topic of inquiry that are on offer if one endorses
Devitt’s argument against the psychological conception.
1.3 Non-psychological Conceptions of Linguistics
In his recent book Ignorance of Language, Devitt argues that we ought to take
generative grammars to be true not of the psychological states of speakers, but
instead of a linguistic reality distinct from speakers’ psychological states.
75 Devitt
has a particular conception of this linguistic reality which he calls the linguistic
conception. His argument for the linguistic conception of generative grammars over
the psychological conception involves drawing three quite general distinctions and
74 Katz (1981) p.78 As far as Katz’s own Platonist proposal for distinguishing our knowledge of
language from the natural languages themselves goes, Chomsky (1986 p.33) takes a rather different
view: "There is no initial plausibility to the idea that apart from the truths of grammar concerning the
I-language and the truths of UG concerning [the initial state of FL] there is an additional domain of
fact about P-language [a Platonic object], independent of any psychological states of individuals."
75 Devitt calls this view the Representationalist Thesis: the view that speakers stand in an
unconscious or tacit propositional attitude relation to the principles of their language which are
represented in their language faculty. Devitt argues that, if knowledge of language is so understood,
a competent speaker could be completely ignorant of their language. In the first main chapter of the
book (pp.1-40) he offers a self-standing argument for the view that linguistics is not a part of
psychology. Having satisfied himself that generative grammars are not characterisations of speaker’s
psychological states he considers a range of positions on the psychological reality of grammar, none
of which he finds to offer any support for the Representationalist Thesis. It is the argument that
linguistics is not a part of psychology, and not the issue about the Representationalist Thesis, which
is my concern. Though Devitt’s argument against linguistics being a part of psychology is intended
to be self-standing, he takes it to be supported by a particular view of linguistic intuitions as they
serve as evidence for grammars. I discuss this view of linguistic intuitions in Chapter Four.42
then defending their applicability to the science of language. The distinctions are
general in the sense that they are supposed to apply to any domain in which we find
a competence and its products, and can be illustrated without appeal to the specific
features of language. The first is:
I. The distinction between a theory of competence and a theory of the
products of that competence.
Devitt illustrates the distinction using the example of a blacksmith and the
horseshoes he makes. The blacksmith has a competence, a competence in making
horseshoes. The horseshoes themselves are the products, or outputs, of the
blacksmith’s competence. The nature of the produced horseshoes is one thing and
the nature of the blacksmith’s competence to produce such items is another. So,
Devitt observes, one should distinguish between a theory of the blacksmith’s
competence to produce horseshoes and a theory of the horseshoes themselves.
76
Devitt’s second distinction is between the sorts of rules that characterise
competences and the sorts of rules that characterise the products of competences.
The rules that characterise the operations of a competence, Devitt calls processing
rules. The rules that characterise the system of products, Devitt calls structure rules.
So his second distinction is:
II. The distinction between the processing rules that characterise the
operation of a competence and the structure rules that characterise the
products of a competence.
Devitt illustrates this distinction using the example of bee dances. Bees returning
from distant food sources produce a waggle dance. The positioning and pattern of
this dance indicate the direction of the food source. Devitt notes that Karl von
76 Devitt also discusses the examples of a theory of chess moves and a theory of chess competence,
and a theory of well-formed formulas and a theory of a logic machine’s “competence” to produce
them.43
Frisch won a Nobel Prize for his theory of the bee dance. Von Frisch hypothesised
that:
To convey the direction of a food source, the bee varies the angle the waggling run makes
with an imaginary line running straight up and down… If you draw a line connecting the
beehive and the food source, and another line connecting the hive and the spot on the
horizon just beneath the sun, the angle formed by the two lines is the same as the angle of
the waggling run to the imaginary vertical line.
77
The dance is the product of a competence that the bees have for dancing. For Devitt,
the dance is a representational system characterised by a set of structure rules and it
is the task of a theory of the dance to discover those rules. But what a theory of the
dance will not reveal is how the bees manage to produce the dance. The processing
rules within the bee that enable it to perform this feat remain a mystery. For this,
Devitt claims, one needs a distinct theory of the bee’s competence, a specification
of the processing rules that characterise this competence.
78
But Devitt allows that the theory of the bee dance will tell us something
about the bee’s competence. Whatever the processing rules that characterise the
internal workings of the bee, they must produce dances that are characterised by the
structure rules of the dance. Devitt allows for some deviations from the structure
rules amongst the products, where there are errors in the processing and as a
consequence the processing fails to produce outputs governed by the structure rules.
But processing errors aside, Devitt thinks that the competence produces dances that
are governed by the structure rules and he calls this relationship respect.
79
77 Frank (1997) pp.181-2
78 It is important to note at this juncture that Devitt here equates competence with processing. This is
not the conception of competence that most proponents of the psychological conception of
generative grammar appeal to. The standard view of grammatical competence is of a structured state
of the mind/brain conceived as: a body of standing information that is integrated with independent
processing systems for perceiving and producing speech. So it is usual to distinguish competence
from processing. I develop this issue in Chapter Three.
79 Devitt (2006, 2006a p.577). Devitt (2006 p.23) says “A theory of competence must posit
processing rules that respect the structure rules of the outputs”.44
On the strength of a theory of the dance, Devitt claims we know that there is
something “we-know-not-what” inside the bee that respects the structure rules of
the dance, but we do not know the processing rules on this basis. We do not know
how the processing rules respect the structure rules. In particular, we do not know
whether any of the structure rules are also processing rules. This brings us to
Devitt’s third and final distinction:
III. The distinction between processing rules respecting structure rules and
the structure rules being included amongst the processing rules.
Whilst we know that the processing rules respect the structure rules, it would be a
further hypothesis that those structure rules were amongst the processing rules.
Devitt suggests that any further claims about the relationship between the structure
rules and processing rules will require supplementary evidence or argumentation:
To move beyond the minimal claim [respect] and discover the way in which the bee’s
competence respects the structure rules of the dance, we need evidence beyond anything
discovered by von Frisch, evidence about the bee’s “psychology”.
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Devitt suggests is that it is far more plausible to take the study of horseshoes or bee
dances to involve theorising about horseshoes or bee dances themselves rather than
the competences of the blacksmith or the bee to produce them. By analogy, a theory
of language should be distinguished from a theory of linguistic competence, and we
should take generative grammar to involve theorising about language. A language,
as understood by Devitt, is the product of a competence in a language, rather than a
competence to produce and understand linguistic material. According to Devitt,
linguistics is not the study of a core system of linguistic cognition, I-language,
80 Devitt (2006a) p.577. See also Devitt (2006) p.21-3. It is worth remarking that the relation
between von Frisch’s theory and the bee’s cognitive capacity for dancing may be more intimate that
Devitt suggests. As pointed out by Longworth (forthcoming p.13) it seems plausible that von Frisch
was attempting to offer not just any old structural description of the bee’s dance, of which there may
be many, but that set of structural relations to which the bees are sensitive in producing and
recognising the dance patterns.45
which he thinks Chomsky has conflated with a language or a grammar. Distinction
I addresses this perceived conflation. Applying the general distinctions to the case
of language, linguistics proper should be distinguished from the study of linguistic
competence.
I. Distinguish between a theory of linguistic competence and a theory of the
language which is a product of that competence.
Correspondingly, the structure rules that characterise the language speakers produce
and understand should be distinguished from the rules that characterise the
linguistic processing performed by the brain in production and consumption.
II. Distinguish between the rules that characterise the linguistic processing
performed by the brain and the structure rules that characterise the language.
And finally, according to Devitt, the fact that the rules involved in processing
language must respect the rules that characterise linguistic structure should not be
confused with the hypothesis that the linguistic structure rules are amongst the
linguistic processing rules.
III. Distinguish between the linguistic processing rules respecting the
structure rules of the language and the structure rules being included
amongst the processing rules.
One might wonder why Devitt needs all three distinctions. Devitt’s desired
conclusion - that a theory of language is distinct from a theory of linguistic
competence - might appear to be arrived at by the application of distinction I.
However, Devitt needs distinctions II and III to prevent the theory of language as a
product, collapsing into the theory of competence. If linguistic competence and its
products were characterised by one and the same set of rules then it might seem that
the distinction between the two theories was merely notional. With that equation
blocked, or at least shown to require supplementary argument, Devitt can, prima
facie at least, draw a distinction between the theory of language and the theory of46
competence in a language. The theory of language and the theory of linguistic
competence will be mutually informing, on Devitt’s model, but only insofar as the
competence produces the language and thereby respects the rules described in
linguistics proper.
How is the truth of Devitt’s linguistic conception of generative grammar
supported by his distinctions? What Devitt takes the distinctions to show is that “the
truth of a grammar entails that its rules govern linguistic reality but does not entail
that they govern psychological reality.”
81 On Devitt’s model, the processing system
respects linguistic structure; it produces outputs governed by the structure rules. It
cannot but do so because it is a competence in the language that the structure rules
describe. But this supports only a minimal proposal about the psychological reality
of grammar (M):
(M) Something inside the speaker (we know not what) is responsible for producing outputs
that respect a highly elaborate set of structure rules.
82
Devitt lays down the following gauntlet:
If the psychological conception is to be saved, there must be something wrong with the
three distinctions or with their application to linguistics. It’s as simple as that.
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It is important in understanding Devitt’s challenge to note how in drawing
distinctions I – III, his chosen terminology deviates from the standard terminology
used by grammarians. Devitt asks us to treat grammatical competence as a
processing system and this is at odds with the orthodox understanding of
competence established by Chomsky.
84 Chomsky makes a fundamental distinction
between grammatical competence, as a system of underlying knowledge or
information, and our linguistic performances, such as our perceptions and
productions of utterances. Linguistic processing is a part of linguistic performance;
81 Devitt (unpublished ms. b) p.5
82 Devitt (2006) p.57, (2006a) p.578
83 Devitt (2006a) p.578
84 See Chomsky (1965) pp.4-6247
we process speech in real-time as part of assigning structural interpretations to
utterances and we build structures in real-time as part of producing utterances. But
the underlying system of competence is not usually conceived as a system for the
processing of linguistic material involved in our use of language. As standardly
understood, competence is the underlying state of knowledge that encodes pairings
of sounds and structures over an unbounded range: it is not a processor that once
activated by a stimulus runs through a set of procedures for structurally describing
speech and building linguistic structures for utterance.
Grammarians hypothesise that grammatical competence constrains or shapes
our linguistic performances; that our use of language is informed by our knowledge
of a grammar. So conceived, insofar as grammatical competence has products, they
are not externalised performance events but inputs to systems internal to the mind.
Most grammarians, following Chomsky, think that the explanation of our linguistic
performance requires our understanding the factors involved in real-time language
processing and that this is a distinct task from constructing the generative grammar
that they take to be a theory of our grammatical competence.
85 Devitt’s distinctions
blur the competence-performance distinction, as standardly understood, by making
competence a matter of processing. The complication this adds is that both Devitt
and supporters of the psychological conception can agree that a grammatical theory
should be distinguished from a processing theory.
Devitt says: “I do not take [a grammar] to be psychologically real in virtue
of its meeting the Respect Constraint. But this difference may be merely verbal.”
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What Devitt denies is that generative grammars describe an aspect of our
psychology in virtue of their being respected by a theory of competence, understood
as a processing system. But Devitt’s respect constraint, which he specifies as a
constraint holding between the generative grammar of a speaker’s language and the
processing a speaker performs, could be understood as Chomsky’s competence-
performance distinction. Suppose we distinguish between the theory of the
85 A richer understanding of linguistic performance would involve not only a theory of grammatical
competence and the processing of linguistic structure but theories of other competences and levels of
processing, semantic and pragmatic.
86 Devitt (2006) p.67 fn.648
speaker’s language, conceived of as a theory of the grammar he knows, and a theory
of linguistic processing, with the linguistic processing meeting conditions imposed
by the known grammar. Then we have a psychologically real generative grammar
which stands in Devitt’s respect relation to the processing theory. It is only Devitt’s
commitment to the non-psychological nature of what grammatical theories posit –
i.e. to the external location of the linguistic structure rules – that makes his
distinctions incompatible with the psychological conception. So the real
disagreement between Devitt and the psychological conception he opposes is that
Devitt will insist upon a distinction between the linguistic structure rules realised
externally to the speaker and the rules that characterise the speaker’s internal
linguistic competence. Chomsky denies that generative grammar focuses on or
requires such external structure. Devitt locates the structures that grammarians
investigate external to the mind/brain, whereas Chomsky takes the investigated
structures to be structures of the mind/brain.
Hence, Devitt’s particular way of putting his challenge needs amendment
because, on one construal, the distinctions that he presses his opponent to
accommodate actually animate the conception he is opposing. Collins offers the
following construal of Devitt’s distinctions that is entirely in keeping with the
psychological conception:
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Revised Distinction I. A theory of the language faculty is distinct from a
theory of its products, if such products are to be understood as performance
events. This distinction is enshrined in the competence-performance
distinction.
Revised Distinction II. The structure rules are the rules that generative
theories posit and these are distinct from processing mechanisms. A theory
of competence is not (directly) a theory of processing.
87 See Collins (unpublished ms. a, 2007a, 2008, 2008a) but also Slezak (unpublished ms.) and Smith
(2006a, unpublished ms.)49
Revised Distinction III. Whatever the brain does in terms of processing, we
take it to “respect”, i.e. meet, the conditions our competence theory specifies
insofar as we take it to be a correct theory.
Devitt’s opponent can thereby distinguish a theory of linguistic structure from a
theory of linguistic processing and accommodate the distinctions. Collins’
reconstruction shows how schematically similar Devitt’s views appear to
Chomsky’s in distinguishing theories of grammar and of processing. The clear
difference is that Chomsky and Devitt think of theories of language as theories of
different domains. The point of divergence is that Devitt thinks the linguistic
structure rules describe an aspect of our physical environment whereas Chomsky
thinks they are best understood as describing an aspect of human psychology.
The challenge then is not whether Devitt’s opponent, who endorses the
psychological conception, can show that there is “something wrong with the three
distinctions or with their application to linguistics”. After all, on one widespread
interpretation of the distinctions, the psychological conception accommodates them.
The challenge is whether we ought to draw the distinctions as Devitt construes them;
separating psychological and non-psychological theories in addition to drawing the
relevant psychological distinctions.
In replies to critics, Devitt claims that no one defending the psychological
conception has responded to his argument which is beguilingly simple: the three
general distinctions apply to linguistics and thereby suggest that linguistics is not a
part of psychology.
88 Collins is not the only proponent of the psychological
conception to complain about Devitt’s conflating of competence and performance,
and the way it obscures his argument.
89 A number of critics have claimed that, as
they stand, Devitt’s distinctions provide no reason to deny that generative grammar
is a part of psychology. Devitt’s distinctions do not specify what a language is or
what the psychology of language involves, and so they do not make it perspicuous
how the conclusion that linguistics is not a part of psychology follows from the
distinction between a theory of linguistic structure and a theory of processing.
88 Devitt (2006a, 2006b, 2007a, 2007b)
89 Slezak (unpublished ms.), Smith (unpublished ms.)50
Devitt’s opponents, in particular Smith, by way of defending the
psychological conception, maintain that Devitt only provides three imperatives to
draw quite general distinctions and a claim that those distinctions apply to
linguistics.
90 So the argument is elusive because it is unclear what is being claimed
about the nature of psychology and the nature of language such that the study of the
latter is not a part of the study of the former. Devitt tells us what his view of
linguistic reality is, as described by his linguistic conception, but that conception
was supposed to be the conclusion of his argument. The argument itself offers no
specification of what language is. If the content of the distinctions is to be taken as a
premise in an argument against linguistics being a psychological science, it has to
be made clear what is being supposed about the nature of language. The argument
can be elaborated so as to make clear what is supposed to justify the choice of
Devitt’s linguistic conception of generative grammar over Chomsky’s
psychological conception.
In a series of recent papers, Devitt’s critics have determined the following
elaboration of his argument which incorporates Devitt’s view of linguistic reality:
91
P1. There are three quite general distinctions I – III.
P2. Distinctions I – III apply to linguistics.
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P1 and P2 belong to the original formulation of the argument but there are three
further premises that Devitt is relying on in his argument.
P3. A theory of a language is a theory of the structure rules that govern
outputs/products.
P4. The outputs/products are external, physical tokens (or properties thereof).
P5. From P3 and P4, A generative grammar is a theory of language dealing
with the linguistic structure rules that are realised by external, physical
outputs.
90 Smith (unpublished ms.)
91 Presented in Collins (unpublished ms. a), Smith (unpublished ms.).
92 Devitt (2006) pp.23-3051
From P5 Devitt draws the desired conclusion, C1. From P5 and his distinctions I - III,
Devitt draws C2, his own position on the psychological reality of grammar.
C1. The linguistic conception is true and the psychological conception is
false.
C2. A generative grammar is a theory of the nature of the external outputs
that constitute language, not of the psychological reality of language in its
competent speakers beyond adherence to (M).
This is where Devitt’s original argument ends up
93, though the crucial P3 – P5 are
now explicit. This brings out more clearly that everything turns on whether a
generative grammar, as a theory of a language, is best interpreted as a theory of the
rules that govern external outputs rather than the rules that govern grammatical
competence. On this way of stating the argument, Devitt’s key claim is that the
grammatical properties which grammarians target are properties of external
products. Devitt’s argument now hangs on the nature of the grammatical reality that
is being inquired into. He proposes a conception of language and grammatical
reality that Chomsky rejects.
Devitt portrays Chomsky as thinking that grammar is an aspect of the human
mind and offers the view that grammars are about language as a conflicting view.
Devitt takes the latter view to exhibit a certain simple-minded quality and to be in
tension with Chomsky’s view. But there is no internal tension whatsoever in
Chomsky holding both that grammars are about languages and an aspect of the
human mind. There is no tension because Chomsky thinks that languages, in the
relevant sense, are mental: they are I-languages, internal to the human mind/brain.
So he can hold both that grammars are about language and about the mind,
describing the linguistic structures licensed by our grammatical competence. On the
psychological conception, a generative grammar does detail the linguistic structures
of speakers’ languages but these structures are cognitive. The question is whether
93 Devitt (2006) pp.30-852
Devitt is right to think of the structures and properties appealed to in generative
grammar as external to the human mind or whether Chomsky is right to think they
are a part of the human mind/brain.
Devitt thinks that once his distinctions have been drawn and applied it is
more plausible that linguistics is the study of language conceived as a non-
psychological phenomenon. He says:
[The] actual and possible idealised outputs, governed by a system of rules and fitting into a
structure are what we would normally call a language. Indeed, wherever there is a linguistic
competence there has to be such a language, for the language is what the competence
produces: the language is what the speaker is competent in; it is definitive of the nature of
the competence.
94
On this basis, Devitt suggests that the psychological conception amounts to a
blurring of the distinctions and requires special pleading in the form of auxiliary
hypotheses or argumentation. We might suppose, for now, that Devitt is right on the
issue of prima facie plausibility, since initial plausibility is not the important issue.
It is unclear that any onus or burden of proof lies with Chomsky in the way Devitt
suggests. Chomsky has presented a research program into core linguistic
phenomena, guided by a certain theoretical conception of language. Even supposing
Devitt is right about what we would normally call a language, that classification
may not be the one that animates scientific research. Linguistics is an attempt to get
some explanatory perspective on linguistic phenomena so it is not really to the point
whether or not it matches up with our ordinary classifications. From Devitt’s
perspective, it is incumbent on advocates of the psychological conception to say
more about how it is motivated and why it locates grammatical properties not in a
physically-realised, extra-mental reality of produced noises and marks but in a
psychological substratum that underlies those phenomena. But equally, it is
incumbent on Devitt to say something about the fruits, potential or actual, of his
non-psychological, physicalist conception of language; and how that conception
meshes with the methodology and empirical results of generative grammar.
94 Devitt (2006) p.3153
If Devitt had simply said that generative grammar is about language, and
said nothing about the nature of grammatical reality, he would then merely be
challenging Chomsky to justify his claims about the psychological objectives of
generative grammar, the role of psychological evidence in supporting psychological
hypotheses, and his contention that generative grammars describe an aspect of
human psychology. This would have highlighted the fact that to detail and defend
Chomsky’s psychological conception of grammatical reality is a substantial task. In
contrasting the psychological conception with the view that generative grammars
describe a linguistic reality, Devitt could then be understood as asking Chomsky to
spell out the arguments and evidence in its favour. But without an alternative
competing conception, this challenge might have seemed hollow. Hence, Devitt
offers his own vision that language, the grammatical reality described in generative
grammar, is physical and to be located outside the human mind. In doing so, he
incurs just the same burden as there is on Chomsky to produce arguments and
evidence for his view.
We might grant Devitt that, with the distinctions drawn, a non-psychological
conception is the more, prima facie, plausible view. However, considerations of
initial plausibility are clearly inconclusive for determining which sorts of properties
or structures a scientific theory posits in achieving the explanatory goals it aims at.
Devitt himself does not want to lean too hard on pre-theoretical ideas about
language. As he remarks “Linguistics, like other sciences, largely determines its
own domain”: determining some explanatory goals and working out what sorts of
theoretical constructs will be required to meet them.
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Devitt’s pro-psychological conception opponents say that, having selected a
range of facts about linguistic form and meaning as their target phenomena, the
linguist is involved in investigating the psychological structure that shapes the
forms and meanings we find amongst streams of sound and marks. Devitt’s
conclusion is that his opponent is wrong on this point: linguistics is best interpreted
as constructing non-psychological theories to explain non-psychological properties
located in sounds and marks. Intuitively, Devitt thinks, linguistics is about
languages but not psychological states.
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If we suppose with Devitt that his thought about prima facie plausibility is
correct then, with the distinctions in place, proponents of the psychological
conception would need to offer elucidation and arguments, theoretical or empirical,
for why we should take the science of grammar to be an investigation of
grammatical competence. Where might they look for such arguments? Devitt’s
view is that the explanatory successes of generative grammar do not tell in favour of
the psychological conception widespread amongst linguists. He says of his critics
that:
A theme…is that linguistics conceived psychologically is a piece of admirable “empirical
science” whereas conceived linguistically it would be a piece of regrettable “metaphysics”.
This theme is spurious. The change in conception has no effect on the empirical nature of
linguistics.
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Devitt’s suggestion is that the switch in conception is consistent with both the status
of linguistics as an empirical science and the fruits of “the wonderfully successful
research program in linguistics initiated and sustained by Chomsky”.
97 His claim is
not that linguists should give up linguistics as currently pursued and shift their
attention to a new research program. He says: “Insofar as the research program is
the one of constructing grammars in pretty much the way they are being constructed.
I am all for it”.
98 Rather his claim is that linguistics as it has been pursued to date is
concerned with and animated by non-psychological grammatical properties.
To the extent that Devitt’s objective is strictly interpretation of the science
rather than revision of its methodology and results, I think he would hold himself to
the following principle which I’ll call the No Violence Principle.
No Violence: An account of what linguistics is about ought not to jeopardise its explanatory
successes.
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To see if non-psychological conceptions of generative grammar, of which Devitt’s
linguistic conception is one, meet this No Violence Principle and offer any further
attractions beyond minimal consistency, we first need to know what non-
psychological conceptions of language might be on offer. Devitt’s suggestion is that
generative grammars are best interpreted as describing properties of our physical
environment, but I’d like to consider a wider range of options.
1.3.1 Social Conceptions
One such non-psychological conception of linguistic properties is a social
conception. Broadly speaking, a social conception of linguistics would hold that
linguistic properties are social properties: properties inherently of, or available to,
humans living in groups, who interact and communicate with one another. The
conception would be non-psychological insofar as social properties are not
properties of our individual psychologies. I’ll consider three ways of developing the
view that languages are social phenomena which might support a conception of
linguistics as concerned with social properties. The first is Quine’s view of
languages as socially acquired skills, whose properties are located in publicly
observable behaviour. The second is McDowell’s view that the properties of the
languages we speak and understand should be understood in terms of our
participation within communal practices. On both these views linguistic properties
are manifest in social behaviour rather than properties of a psychological system
like an I-language. The third is Wiggins’ view of languages as historically
determined, social objects.
Language and Behaviour
In 1959, Chomsky wrote a celebrated review of Skinner’s Verbal Behaviour in
which he critiqued Skinner’s behaviourist view that human language could be
explained in terms of conditioned responses to external stimuli.
99 Chomsky raised
three main problems for the behaviourist approach. Chomsky argued that the
99 Chomsky 195956
behaviourist’s theoretical notions of stimulus and response lose all objectivity when
we try to apply them to our verbal behaviour and I’ll return to this issue below. He
argued that the behaviourist framework fails to accommodate the freedom that is
part of our use of language, the use of language generally being stimulus-free. He
also pointed out that behaviourism seemed unable to accommodate the structural
complexity of human languages. Despite the influence of Chomsky’s critique, there
are still those who think that an inquiry into linguistic facts, including grammatical
facts, is an inquiry into social facts to be located in behaviour.
Quine famously claimed that “Language is a social art”, arguing that the
facts about languages are facts about socially observable behaviour.
100 Quine’s
social conception of language is based on his view about the evidence that is
relevant to the study of language. Quine’s view is that facts about a speaker’s
dispositions to overt behaviour are the only evidence relevant to a theory of their
language. Quine had two arguments for this view, which I’ll call the acquisition
argument and the manifestation argument.
The acquisition argument runs as follows:
In acquiring [language] we have to depend entirely on intersubjectively available cues as to
what to say and when. Hence, there is no justification for collating linguistic meanings,
unless in terms of men’s dispositions to respond overtly to socially available stimulations.
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Quine’s view is that acquiring a language is a matter of picking up on cues available
in social situations, cues that can be used to learn the form and significance of
utterances. The major premise of the acquisition argument is that language
acquisition is a matter of responding to socially available cues, such as an utterance
of “shut the door” and the door-shutting behaviour that follows it, depending
“entirely” on the observation of behaviour and the reinforcement of behaviours
thereby learnt. This was a view that Quine maintained throughout his writings,
claiming much later on that “Each of us learns his language by observing other
people’s behaviour and having his own faltering verbal behaviour observed and
100 Quine (1960) p.ix
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reinforced or corrected by others.”
102 For Quine then the facts about the languages
we acquire are determined by socially available cues and by reinforcement and
correction in social situations.
However, Chomsky rightly pointed out that it is an empirical assumption
about language acquisition.
103 It is an empirical assumption, because it is not
something we could know to be the case by mere reflection on the superficial
aspects of acquiring a language. As I shall explain, Quine agreed that he was
making an empirical assumption about language acquisition but thought his
assumption rested on firm foundations.
The assumption that language acquisition is the development of conditioned
responses to observable stimuli was an assumption that Chomsky had called into
question in his review of Skinner:
It is not easy to find any basis (or, for that matter, to attach very much content) to the claim
that reinforcing contingencies set up by the verbal community are the single factor
responsible for maintaining the strength of verbal behaviour. The sources of the “strength”
of this behaviour are almost a total mystery at present.
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Chomsky was unconvinced by Quine’s account of language acquisition for similar
reasons to those which left him unconvinced by Skinner’s. Quine’s account rests on
the notion of similarity. The fundamental idea is that habits in our behaviour can be
explained by our finding some stimuli more similar to one another than others and
there being a correlative similarity in our responses. Accordingly, speakers of
languages are conceived of as having a similarity-space: finding certain linguistic
stimuli similar, so as to place them in this similarity-space which coordinates
similar stimuli and similar responses. According to Chomsky, the behaviourist owes
us an explanation of what special linguistic similarities consist in, how speaker-
hearers are sensitive to the similarities and how they produce behaviour according
to them. The behaviourist could offer the explanation that stimuli are linguistically
similar when they provoke the same behavioural responses. But we then need to
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know what characterises similarity of response in the linguistic case. And this needs
to be specified without appealing to similarity of stimuli. If the behaviourist wants
to define similarity of stimuli in terms of similarity of linguistic response then
similarity of linguistic response will have to be defined in independent terms.
Chomsky suggests that behaviourist theories, such as Skinner’s and Quine’s, tend to
tacitly close this loop and lapse into vacuity.
To the extent that behaviourists avoid this problem, by giving the terms
linguistic “stimulus” or “response” precise and independent meanings, Chomsky
argued that they grossly oversimplify and misrepresent the linguistic phenomena. A
pigeon’s pecking or dog’s salivating behaviours might be accommodated within the
paradigm of stimulus and response. Animal psychologists train pigeons to peck on a
pad or lever a certain number of times to receive food. The pigeon can vary the
number of times that it pecks dependent on the number of pecks that will release the
food. Pigeon’s have varying levels of success at such tasks depending on the size of
the numbers and the accuracy required of them. The pigeon’s pecking behaviour
can be explained as a conditioned response. The behavioural response is
conditioned by the number of pecks it takes to get the food, and the stimulus is the
food. In such cases, the stimulus is exposure to a clearly specified variable, and we
get clearly specifiable responses.
But it is less clear how we identify the “stimulus” for normal linguistic
behaviours, such as commonplace utterances. As Chomsky argues:
A typical example of stimulus control for Skinner would be the response to a piece of music
with the utterance Mozart or to a painting with the response Dutch. These responses are
asserted to be "under the control of extremely subtle properties" of the physical object or
event. Suppose instead of saying Dutch we had said Clashes with the wallpaper, I thought
you liked abstract work, Never saw it before, Tilted, Hanging too low, Beautiful, Hideous,
Remember our camping trip last summer?, or whatever else might come into our minds
when looking at a picture (in Skinnerian translation, whatever other responses exist in
sufficient strength). Skinner could only say that each of these responses is under the control
of some other stimulus property of the physical object.
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Further, the linguistic properties of verbal behaviour, such as the properties of
reflexives, are more complex than the stimulus-response account is able to
accommodate. There are no observable stimuli peculiarly germane to elicit
linguistic responses structured at that fineness of grain; so it is unclear how to
construct an informative description of the stimulus for my putting together a
reflexive construction. Moreover, the preponderance of our verbal behaviour seems
to be stimulus-free: a matter of choosing to express ourselves freely. If I were to
utter “Shizzaam!” or “Zaapp!” or make some other spontaneous utterance, this
seems to be a matter of my own free will. The behaviourist says that it is a
conditioned response to an extremely subtle property of my environment that acts as
a stimulus to determine my utterance.
Chomsky criticised Quine’s explanation of language acquisition in terms of
the child placing linguistic stimuli (such as its parents’ utterances) on a pre-
linguistic similarity space that measures properties of the sounds (such as length and
pitch). He offered the following clarification of the view on Quine’s behalf. We can
think of a similarity space as an inbuilt measure of qualitative distance, perhaps
“restricted to dimensions with physical correlates such as brightness or loudness,
and distance defined in terms of those physical correlates”.
106 Chomsky argues that
we now have a “doctrine of innate spaces” which must face empirical testing along
with other accounts of the organism’s contribution to language acquisition. By way
of reply, Quine claimed the innate similarity spaces he appeals to must exist, as
there can be no regularity or habit in our linguistic behaviour without dispositions to
find stimuli similar. So, Quine claimed that it is the nature of these innate similarity
spaces that must be experimentally determined but their existence is not in question.
Although Chomsky might agree with Quine that an innate similarity space is
involved in language acquisition, he maintains that it is an empirical matter to
determine the nature of such spaces and their development. Quine suggests that our
sense of linguistic similarity is largely determined by the cumulative effect of
linguistic stimuli on a space that maps physical magnitudes. But there are
competing explanations of our sense of linguistic similarity, adopting different
views about the child’s innate endowment. These competing explanations postulate
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a rich, language-specific body of information that supports language acquisition. If
Quine’s view is simply that there is some variety of information pertaining to
similarity deployed in language acquisition, then the hypothesis would not have to
face the evidence or compete with alternative hypotheses; but only because it is
trivial and so does not support any particular account of language acquisition. Only
details and evidence could suffice to allay Chomsky’s concern that Quine assumes
an empirically vacuous notion of similarity space.
A further problem that Chomsky raises concerns the role that the notion of
analogical synthesis plays within Quine’s account. Analogical synthesis is a
hypothesised process involving abstraction from sentences thus far encountered and
the reassembly of the parts of those sentences to form new sentences. Consider the
following example of analogical synthesis. A child hears the utterance “Simon is
tall” tied to observations of Simon. The child abstracts the parts “Simon”, “is” and
“tall” from the sentence. The child then hears the utterance “James is short” tied to
observation of James and abstracts the parts “James”, “is” and “short”. The child
then synthesises these parts to form the new utterance “Simon is short” on analogy
with the previously uttered sentences. Quine used the notion of analogical synthesis
to explain how we can understand sentences that are not directly tied to observable
stimuli. We first learn sentences that are directly tied to observables. Then we
abstract the contributions of similar parts to those sentences. We then recombine
those parts to form new sentences in the absence of directly observable stimuli.
Quine assumes that the child can extract the words from the sounds by some kind of
abstract categorisation. He also assumes that the child can recombine those words
grammatically, i.e. the child doesn’t utter “Simon James short”. Quine owes us an
explanation of how each of these steps is achieved.
Chomsky claims that the account is “empty until an account of ‘analogy’ is
given, and none exists”.
107 Equally, the claim that the child effects ‘synthesis’ labels
a mystery until a basis for the abstraction and assembly is specified and empirically
tested. Without a thorough investigation of the psychology of the child, a vast and
uncomprehended contribution is attributed to steps labelled analogy and synthesis.
According to Chomsky, it is an empirical problem, unaddressed by Quine’s account,
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to assess what properties of the mind determine the nature of the language we
acquire.
Chomsky highlights the magnitude of the empirical problem of language
acquisition in his review of Skinner, when he writes:
Study of the actual observed ability of a speaker to distinguish sentences from nonsentences,
detect ambiguities, etc., apparently forces us to the conclusion that this grammar is of an
extremely complex and abstract character, and that the young child has succeeded in
carrying out what from the formal point of view, at least, seems to be a remarkable type of
theory construction. Furthermore, this task is accomplished in an astonishingly short time,
to a large extent independently of intelligence, and in a comparable way by all children.
Any theory of learning must cope with these facts.
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On the basis of these facts, Chomsky began to think it very implausible that in
acquiring a language we are learning a social art, for: “[W]hen we learn a language
we are not ‘learning sentences’ or acquiring a ‘behavioural repertoire’ through
training. Rather, we somehow develop certain principles (unconscious of course)
that determine the form and meaning of indefinitely many sentences.”
109 Quine’s
reply to the suggestion that language acquisition is a form of development involving
heavy constraints from innate linguistic principles was to distinguish between our
aptitude for language and our acquisition of language. He says:
Language aptitude is innate; language learning, on the other hand, in which that aptitude is
put to work turns on intersubjectively observable features of human behaviour and its
environing circumstances, there being no innate language and no telepathy.
110
Since Quine is claiming that language acquisition is not a matter of innate linguistic
constraint and there are no innate linguistic principles, this would appear to
Chomsky to be merely a restatement of unjustified empirical assumptions, to which
he accuses Quine of adhering.
111 According to Chomsky, whether language
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acquisition is principally a matter of observing behaviour and circumstances is a
matter for empirical investigation. Questioning Quine’s assumptions, Chomsky
claimed that no evidence had ever been presented for the view that children acquire
their language by learning from verbal behaviour with the aid of correction.
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Chomsky, along with many other linguists, has come to strongly favour a large role
for the “innate language” that Quine dismisses. As work in generative grammar
flourished, it revealed the astonishing complexity of the languages humans acquire.
But it also revealed the depth and uniformity of their underlying principles. It
became clear to Chomsky that:
We must deal with the crucial…fact that what a person knows [in knowing a grammar] is
vastly underdetermined by available evidence, and that much of his knowledge is based on
no direct evidence at all… There is little doubt that this problem of “poverty of stimulus” is
in fact the norm rather than the exception.
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Following Chomsky, I argue in Chapter Five that Quine’s assumption about
language acquisition is a false empirical assumption and that there is a preponderant
role for innate, language-specific principles that tightly constrain the course of
grammar acquisition.
But suppose the chips fell the other way and Quine’s view that language
acquisition is learning from external stimuli with reinforcement and correction is
correct. What follows? The second, suppressed, premise of the acquisition argument
is that linguists can draw upon no more evidence than is available to the child in
language acquisition. Quine recognised that he had provided the linguist with a
“meagre basis” but he maintained that “the native speaker has had no other”.
114 He
restricts the linguist to behavioural evidence because he thinks language acquisition
takes place on the basis of that evidence alone. Chomsky takes issue with this claim
about what is required of inquiry into speakers’ verbal behaviour:
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Prediction of the behaviour of a complex organism would require, in addition to
information about external stimulation, knowledge of the internal structure, the ways in
which it processes information and organizes its own behaviour.
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Even if Quine had been right about language acquisition and the materials available
to the native speaker, nothing follows about the evidence that the linguist might
appeal to. The a priori restriction of the linguist’s data to that which he shares with
the child is unjustified, in Chapter Four we’ll see the implausibility of the restriction
in light of actual, scientific practice. Suffice to say for now that linguists, just like
scientists in any other field, make use of whatever evidence is pertinent and
available to them. There is no route from the nature of language acquisition to
Quine’s conclusion that the only evidence relevant to the study of language is
socially observable behaviour.
The second of Quine’s arguments for his behaviourist view of the evidence
relevant to studying language turns on what is manifest in episodes of linguistic
understanding. There is a point of contact here with the work of Michael Dummett
and Crispin Wright on linguistic meaning.
116 The shared thought is that there can be
nothing more to the linguistic meanings grasped in episodes of linguistic
understanding than what is manifest in linguistic behaviour. What a speaker is taken
to mean by those that understand him is not generally informed by their knowledge
of the speaker’s internal organisation or other unobservable facts. Rather the
speaker’s meaning is grasped on the basis of what can be gleaned from his overt
behaviour. Quine claims “There is nothing more to linguistic meaning than what is
gleaned from overt behaviour in observable circumstances.”
117 And he takes this to
support a behaviourist restriction on the linguist’s evidence.
It does not, however, follow from the fact that we can typically grasp what is
said by fellow speakers of our language on the basis of their verbal behaviour that
there is nothing more to our understanding one another’s meanings than our
observation of overt behaviour. The fact that we typically grasp someone’s meaning
on the basis of their verbal behaviour is perfectly compatible with, and arguably it
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presupposes, psychological determinants of meaning and understanding. A
speaker’s psychological systems shape his linguistic behaviour in special ways such
that observers with sufficiently similar psychological systems recognise distinctive
configurations in the noises he emits. Linguistic understanding is achieved by
attending to verbal behaviour, but there are more determinants to the meanings
expressed and the understandings achieved than the overt behaviour. Chomsky is
right to warn us off the idea that properties of the mind amenable to empirical
investigation “impose no conditions on language”.
118 We do typically grasp
meanings by observing one another’s behaviour, but the reason we hear the
structured meanings in verbal behaviour is that we are appropriately configured to
be sensitive to such properties. The nature of these sensitivities does not lie open to
view in ordinary exchanges but is not thereby irrelevant to the linguist in theorising
about the properties of the linguistic structures we produce and comprehend.
Behaviourists, like Quine, think that aspects of a speaker’s mental
organisation that have no reflection in our actual or potential dispositions to verbal
behaviour are not pertinent to linguistic inquiry, so the linguist should appeal
exclusively to evidence drawn from behaviour. But proponents of the psychological
conception, like Chomsky, can agree that aspects of our mental organisation which
have no reflection in our actual or potential dispositions to verbal behaviour are not
the focus of linguistic inquiry. Chomsky may agree with this whilst maintaining that
the real explanation of linguistic phenomena lies not in verbal behaviour but in
cognitive states that shape that behaviour, of which the I-language is one. It is
platitudinous that aspects of the speaker irrelevant to the kind of language they
speak and understand will be irrelevant to the study of language. Drawing on
remarks of the later Wittgenstein’s, such as the famous “an inner process stands in
need of outward criteria”
119, philosophers like Dummett and Wright have been
attracted to the thought that the inner workings of the mind do not explain the
nature of meaning and understanding. But the internal structure that Chomsky
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postulates to explain linguistic behaviour is not what Wittgenstein described as a
“wheel that can be turned though nothing else moves with it”.
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The cognitive states in question are not inner mechanisms, or “wheels”, that
turn without shaping our verbal behaviours. Such idle wheels are irrelevant to
behaviourist and Chomskian alike. Quine’s manifestation argument is no
justification for his behaviourist scruples because it provides no reason to think that
cognitive organisation is irrelevant to linguistic meaning and understanding. The
verbal behaviour, to which Quine restricts the linguist, receives its explanation from
the cognitive facts, such as the structure of our I-language, which he legislates
against. The argument that linguists should consider only behavioural evidence
because we, as cognitively equipped speaker-hearers, can understand our language
without consulting further evidence is a non-sequitur.
There is another strand to Quine’s manifestation argument which concerns
the basis on which one is counted as being a competent language user. Quine claims
that we are counted as competent language users on the basis of our behaviour and
not on the basis of our internal structure:
As long as our command of language fits all external checkpoints, where our utterances or
our reaction to someone’s utterances can be appraised in light of some shared situation, so
long all is well. Our mental life between checkpoints is indifferent as to our rating as a
master of the language.
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Quine is very likely correct, at least as far as commonsensical classifications go,
that our mental organisation is not the criterion by which we are usually counted or
discounted as being a competent language user – or as Quine puts it “a master of the
language”. We are normally counted a master of a language on the basis of our
proficient use of a language. So, generally it is verbal behaviour and not mental
organisation that indicates our understanding a language to fellow language users.
But as Ryle notes, our ordinary conception of someone being competent in a
language is vague and open-ended. Competence in French does not, for example,
require that someone be competent to translate highly technical French treatises
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though it can do in special circumstances. Usually, of someone competent in French
“We expect no more than that he will ordinarily cope pretty well with the majority
of ordinary French-using and French-following tasks. ‘Knows French’ is a vague
expression and, for most purposes, none the less useful for being vague.”
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Whatever the purposes or merits of attributing mastery of a language on this
basis, there should be no a priori constraint on the science of language to count
behaviourally similar language users as possessing the same language or equivalent
grammatical competences. What requires explanation by the science of language is
not our (commonsensical) criteria for attributing mastery but rather the properties of
languages which speakers know – properties that equip speakers to exhibit such
behaviours as fit, as Quine puts it, “all external checkpoints”.
On the psychological conception, the point of such attributions of mastery is
tangential to the scientific conception of possessing a language, and language
possession is not indifferent to internal organisation. A speaker’s possessing an I-
language – his possession of a competence in the technical sense described in
Chapter Three - is his possession of a special cognitive system. A speaker could
retain this I-language whilst losing all his expressive powers and abilities to use his
language, hence failing to meet “external checkpoints” and falling short of the
ordinary criterion. The possession of an I-language might not be our everyday sense
of linguistic competence, but that is no reason to think it is not the sense relevant in
linguistics.
With the linguist’s evidence restricted to behaviour, Quine found that in
ascribing linguistic forms and meanings to a speaker’s words the linguist always
goes beyond the evidence so as to “impute our sense of linguistic analogy
unverifiably to the native mind”.
123 The attributions of linguistic form and meaning
are “unverifiable” because, Quine claimed, there will always be at least two
alternative attributions of form and meaning to the speaker’s words consistent with
the totality of behavioural evidence but mutually inconsistent. This was Quine’s
thesis of the indeterminacy of translation: for any speaker of a language there are
always at least two alternative translation manuals for the language consistent with
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the totality of behavioural evidence but inconsistent with one another. Given
Quine’s view that there is no further non-behavioural evidence that could decide
between the theories, there is no objective fact about the forms and meanings of the
speaker’s language. The thesis was thought by Quine to place severe restrictions on
linguistics, limiting it to an investigation of behavioural surrogates for linguistic
notions like meaning, and linguistic structure.
Chomsky is unmoved by Quine’s indeterminacy thesis. He claims it is no
more than the general and familiar underdetermination of empirical theory by
evidence in the particular case of language.
124 According to underdetermination,
there are always at least two theories in any given domain compatible with the
available evidence. Hence, our choice of theory will be underdetermined by the
evidence. There will always be alternative theories of the speaker’s language
inconsistent with one another but consistent with our evidence; such is empirical
theory in Chomsky’s view. The indeterminacy thesis holds that there is not merely
underdetermination but no ultimate fact of the matter about language.
Indeterminacy about language only follows from the underdetermination of
linguistic theory by behavioural evidence if one assumes that there is no further fact
of the matter about linguistic properties beyond the facts of actual and potential
overt behaviour. Without the behaviourist scruples, there is no justification for the
thesis. In reality, linguists look for other evidence about the properties of languages
that might decide between competing theories. Linguistic theories progress by
gathering more and varied evidence to develop competing explanations of linguistic
phenomena. Chomsky suggests that linguists draw upon their own introspective
judgements and those of native speakers. He also suggests that linguists appeal to
theories of the native’s mind and, in principle, brain to determine his language:
these are empirical hypotheses about the languages humans can acquire and the rich
internal organisation that is engaged in linguistic behaviour.
Quine’s scepticism about linguistic form and meaning does not have many
contemporary advocates. But the background conception according to which
linguistic facts are social facts that must be open to view in social behaviour draws
a lot of support in broadly Wittgensteinian philosophical quarters amongst those
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who think that language ought to be understood in terms of communal practices and
publicly observed norms. John McDowell has been a highly influential source of
ideas in this direction. He seeks to understand language in terms of linguistic
practices and norms.
Language and Practice
McDowell argues that if we understand what is manifest in linguistic behaviour in
terms of “bare behaviour”, physically characterised as Quine assumes, then
linguistic understanding becomes impossible.
125 McDowell’s argument draws on
the idea that linguistic meaning and understanding are normative phenomena: they
depend upon the application of standards of correctness to episodes of verbal
behaviour. For example, McDowell thinks that for a speaker to mean RED by an
utterance “red” and for a hearer to understand RED by that utterance requires a
common commitment to a standard of correctness for the application of the word
“red”. On McDowell’s account this standard of correctness is determined by the
two conversants’ participation in colour related linguistic practices.
These standards of correctness are required to secure a distinction between
the correct application of linguistic expressions and what merely seems correct to
participants in linguistic activities. McDowell thinks that a grasp of such a
distinction is required for one to mean or understand something determinate by a
linguistic expression for the following reason. The lack of a distinction between
what is and what merely seems to be a correct use of an expression compromises
any particular content being expressed by its use. For if anything counts as the
correct use of an expression then an expression can mean anything at all. If
whatever seems to be a correct use is correct, then my utterance of an expression
would fail to mark out any distinctive content, the expression in question could
apply to anything and any way of taking the expression would serve to have
understood it.
McDowell argues that if we accept, with Quine, that verbal behaviour
described in purely physical terms is all that is available to speaker-hearers in
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communication then we would never be able to reconstruct the normative
dimensions of meaning and understanding. For Quine, behavioural dispositions are
all there is to language; behavioural dispositions have replaced meanings.
McDowell denies that behavioural dispositions should replace linguistic meanings.
He believes that linguistic meanings exist but that we cannot ascertain such
meanings on the basis of speakers’ dispositions to verbal behaviour because
meaning and understanding involve commitment to determinate standards. Patterns
of physical behaviour can inductively confirm the attribution of behavioural
dispositions. If a speaker utters the term “red” in the presence of certain physical
objects we can inductively infer on this basis that he has a behavioural disposition
to so apply the term. But, McDowell asks: “[H]ow can we extrapolate to a
determinate conception of what the disposition is a disposition to do?”
126 In other
words, how does the physical behaviour make manifest a commitment to a
determinate pattern of use?
According to McDowell, such physical behaviour does not make manifest a
commitment to the determinate patterns of use that are required of meaning and
understanding. Behaviourism, McDowell argues, cannot explain speakers grasping
a determinate pattern that extends indefinitely beyond finite instances of behaviour.
So it cannot explain there being correct and incorrect ways of apprehending
speakers’ meanings. McDowell reasons as follows. If understanding is possible,
then meaning must be manifest to speaker-hearers, but no determinate pattern is
manifest in physically characterised behaviour – so more than physical behaviour
must be manifest to speakers in episodes of understanding. Hence, a behaviourist
conception of language is deficient as it cannot account for meaning and
understanding.
What McDowell advocates is not that we give up on the requirement that
linguistic properties be manifest in linguistic behaviour and adopt a psychological
conception of language. McDowell, rather, suggests that we characterise the
relevant linguistic behaviour in a different way to Quine. To make room for
understanding, linguistic behaviour must be characterised in meaningful terms
rather than physical terms; such that linguistic properties are there to be perceived
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on the surface of behaviour along with its other perceptible properties. These
perceptible properties are not available to just any old observer. Our ability to speak
a language and to perceive linguistic properties in the verbal behaviour of others is,
on McDowell’s conception, grounded in our participation in a linguistic practice.
According to this view, speakers can traffic in the linguistic properties of their
language because they have been inculcated into a practice, a practice shared with
other members of a linguistic community. Without the relevant training in a set of
norm-governed behaviours and inculcation into a group practice, observers are
blind to these properties and lack linguistic understanding. For McDowell the
central issue about language is how “drilling in a behavioural repertoire” can enable
one to perceive linguistic properties of which “one would not otherwise be
aware.”
127
Hence, though he has a very different view of the nature of linguistic
properties, McDowell agrees with Quine that language is to be understood as a
social art rather than in terms of our possession of a special psychological faculty.
McDowell offers us an account of normative aspects of meaning and
understanding. Whatever the merits of McDowell’s conception of language it is
unlikely that grammatical properties fall within its scope. If the grammatical
properties of speakers’ languages were amongst those that become available to
speakers in virtue of their inculcation into communal, normative practices, then we
should expect these properties to vary with the social behaviours that are involved
in training and in the achieved communal practices. But empirical investigation of
grammar acquisition suggests, firstly, that grammatical properties do not vary in
this way, and secondly, that training plays a very limited role, if any, in our
acquiring a grammar (see my §5.4).
Sapir endorsed the view that grammatical properties vary from community
to community. He said:
Speech is a human activity that varies without assignable limit as we pass from social group
to social group, because it is a purely historical heritage of the group, the product of long-
127 McDowell (1998a) p.333 See Smith (2006) for discussion of McDowell’s account and its
limitations.71
continued social usage. It varies as all creative effort varies – not as consciously, perhaps,
but nonetheless as truly as do the religions, the beliefs, the customs, and the arts of different
peoples. Walking is an organic, an instinctive function…speech is a non-instinctive,
acquired, ‘cultural’ function.
128
But it is false that the grammatical properties of speech vary “without assignable
limit as we pass from social group to social group”. And there are no known
explanations of grammatical principles, such as binding principles, in terms of
“historical heritage”. Unless, that is, we pervert the meaning of “historical heritage”
to include Universal Grammar (UG): the rich grammatical principles which assign
unobservable structures to speech in the absence of “creative effort”. Katz rightly
points out, that this underlying grammatical uniformity greatly reduces “the
significance for the nature of language of the surface aspects of sentences which
most reflect cultural and historical accretions.”
129 By “surface features” of sentences
Katz means more superficial features affected by culture, like stylistic features.
While grammatical properties do vary across human languages, the variance
is within strict limits. They do not vary as “all creative effort varies”. The
postulation of training and adherence to community norms in our acquisition of
language, central to McDowell’s conception, does not fit the facts about our
acquisition of grammar. Grammatical principles, like those of binding theory, are
not practical accomplishments: perceptual skills that children develop as they find
their way in the social world. I argue (§5.4) that explicit instruction and implicit
guidance play a very limited role in their acquisition. We don’t observe the
variation in the structural properties of language that one would expect if the
grammatical knowledge were “the product of long-continued social usage…a non-
instinctive, acquired, ‘cultural function’”.
So whatever the strengths of McDowell’s conception of language it is
important to recognise that it is limited when we consider grammar. Collins
expresses the point at which we have arrived in very clear terms:
128 Sapir (1921) p.4
129 Katz (1981) p.872
Why do competent speakers recognise that himself in Bob expects to wash himself is Bob,
while in Bill wonders who Bob expects to wash himself, the reflexive is neither Bill nor
Bob? What convention might govern this? How might one be induced into this practice?
How did you recognise that the stated relations hold, even though the sentences were new to
you? Such questions arise with every construction and philosophy has not been forthcoming
with answers. The moral here is not that the study of language should just amount to the
investigation of the cognitive structure behind reflexives, wh-movement, etc. but that an
account of language that does not factor in such structure will be demonstrably
inadequate.
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We can allow that there are normative aspects to the public use of language, whilst
insisting that this norm-based conception falls well short of accounting for the
grammar that we know. Knowledge of a grammar is required by individuals to
successfully structure the expressions which the community uses. Smith makes the
sensible point that whatever our view of public language use, we need to know how
individuals combine the words of their language into grammatical structures.
131 A
much better explanation of the grammatical properties that speakers recognise than
training, involvement in a practice or the recognition of community norms, is his
knowledge of an underlying grammar with recursive procedures for building a
discrete infinity of structures out of finite parts.
Language and History
David Wiggins attacks the psychological conception of language and defends a
social conception of language different to that of Quine or McDowell. His view is
that linguistic properties are properties of social objects. Wiggins thinks that
languages like English and Polish are such objects. These are public objects, whose
properties are irreducible to the psychologies or behaviours, of speakers. Wiggins
thinks we can identify these social objects as follows:
English is a language arising under the influence of Norman French from the West
Germanic language, Anglo Saxon; it is the language possessed of many forms and dialects
130 Collins (unpublished ms.) pp.3-4
131 Smith (2006) p.94473
spoken in the British Isles, North America, etc; it is the language in which you can say
‘Fear no more the heat of the sun’... If you disjoin enough true statements, each having the
form ‘at time t sentence s means in English that p’, then you will easily manufacture a
complex sentence that you or I could not possibly deny of English without putting in
jeopardy our claim to know what the English language is.
132
Wiggins finds little value in the psychological conception. He does not find it “at all
credible” that in virtue of our differing I-languages we may not share a language –
namely, English – with Dr. Johnson “the first lexicographer of that very
language”.
133 We can make sense of there being one and the same language we
share with Dr. Johnson if we think of that language as a malleable, social object.
Wiggins thinks that it is via these social objects that we express our
meanings in speech:
A language is an instrument by which speakers may frame their thoughts, something not
concrete, yet ‘out there’ and wide open to be encountered in the human world.
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These social objects are enduring, having “an origin, a past, a present and a
future”.
135 But, interestingly, on Wiggins account they are not essentially defined by
sets of lexical items and grammatical and semantic rules. So the scope of Wiggins’
attack actually extends beyond psychological conceptions of language, to all
conceptions that characterise languages by constructing a grammar or semantic
theory. On Wiggins’ view no specific grammar that generates the sentences of a
language is an essential property of that language.
136 Rather Wiggins’ languages
are “historically given” objects “changing or changeable and possessed of sentences
that have, as a matter of history, such and such meaning at this, that or other time
132 Wiggins (1997) p.500
133 ibid.
134 Wiggins (1997) p.499. Wiggins owes us an explanation of how we make use of this independent,
“instrument” in “framing our thoughts” in language.
135 ibid.
136 Wiggins’ claim is that no specific grammar is an essential property of a language, but it may be
that it is essential that at any point in time a language has a grammar.74
and place.”
137 Although Wiggins presents his conception of a language as a piece of
refined commonsense and not a theoretical construct, it is his intention that his
social object conception be considered as in competition with the psychological
conception.
But it is not clear that there is friction between Wiggins’ conception and the
psychological conception. As HCF are happy to concede:
The word “language” has highly divergent meanings in different contexts and disciplines.
In informal usage, a language is understood as a culturally specific communication system
(English, Navajo, etc.) [But] in the varieties of modern linguistics that concern us here, the
term “language” is used quite differently to refer to an internal component of the mind/brain
(sometimes called “internal language” or “I-language”).
138
HCF point out that different investigations of language adopt restricted senses of
“language” suggesting different demarcations. And they think this is a good thing,
with different conceptions of “language” to be judged on their fruits.
The dispute over language acquisition and our knowledge of grammar, on
which Quine and McDowell’s conceptions come into conflict with Chomsky’s,
does not surface on Wiggins’ conception. Most adherents to the psychological
conception are committed to a view of grammatical properties that conflicts with
them being properties sentences have as a matter of history. But Wiggins is not
conceiving of languages in terms of these grammatical properties that individual
speakers recognise. On his view there can be different grammatical properties
recognised by speakers of the very same language at different points in time
because he does not conceive languages as essentially sets of grammatical
properties. Moreover, proponents of the psychological conception are not
committed to denying the existence of any of the special properties of languages to
which Wiggins appeals, or even their determination by historical fact. So the
disagreement is not over the alleged existence of the historical and cultural
properties that Wiggins says that languages have.
137 ibid.
138 HCF (2002) p.157075
One might speculate that Wiggins finds something to disagree with in the
methodology behind the psychological conception, which aims to sharply
distinguish the grammatical properties of languages from their historical and
cultural properties. However, suppose we do separate out the phenomena along the
lines grammarians suggest. It is then consistent with that fractionation of the
linguistic phenomena that there are other properties of languages beyond their
grammatical properties. These properties might well include aesthetic and
normative properties which Wiggins mentions. If these properties are susceptible to
systematic explanation, then perhaps their explanation will appeal to such social
objects as Wiggins calls languages. Generative grammar would then be that part of
a package for explaining “language”, exploring a range of core properties amongst
“the past and present attributes of languages”.
The phenomena that interest Wiggins concern language as a historical
accretion with “achievements and latent resources…something that influences
normatively, by its palpable presence in the social world, the linguistic strivings of
children, adults, foreigners, poets, writers, politicians and the rest.”
139 Wiggins takes
it that proponents of the psychological conception, indeed all those generative
grammarians who consider languages as grammatical systems, disagree with him.
But there is no disagreement because they are not committed to denying the
phenomena he highlights. The disagreement then must be over methodology.
To explain, Wiggins finds it “strange” to exclude phenomena including
“culture, mores and social institutions” from the theoretical picture, and focus
instead on the grammatical properties of individual speaker’s languages (properties
of I-language on the psychological conception). But linguists think you have to
divide and conquer the linguistic phenomena. For an all inclusive conception of
language would be so overwhelmingly complex that the demands placed on
delivering explanatory theory would be impossible to meet. Generative grammar is
a particularly fruitful avenue of inquiry because the phenomena do look susceptible
to some isolation. Here, the scientific linguist can effect some separation amongst
the motley of contributing factors that we pre-theoretically class as language. An
aim of generative grammar is further fractionation amongst the phenomena
139 Wiggins (1997) p.500-176
intuitively classed as grammatical, not reintegration with little understood, perhaps
scientifically intractable, social and normative forces. In my view, Wiggins is
confusing the methodological limitations of generative grammar for philosophical
shortcomings.
1.3.2 Physicalist Conceptions
On a physicalist conception of language, grammatical properties are properties
located in our physical environment. On this conception, linguistics is the study of
such properties, external to the mind. Though the physicalist and social conceptions
are not necessarily mutually exclusive – for example, Quine’s conception could be
classified as falling into both categories – there are cases where the distinction is
clear. For example, McDowell denies that linguistic properties are physical, holding
that they are normative properties of social practices. One can hold a physicalist
conception without any commitment to the social character of linguistic properties.
Devitt’s linguistic conception is a species of physicalism. For on the
linguistic conception, grammatical reality is a non-psychological reality consisting
of expressions understood to be “physical entities forming representational
systems” with phonetic, grammatical and semantic properties.
140 Devitt’s
explanation of his technical term “expressions” is that they are physical entities, like
acoustical signals and written marks, and this is intended to contrast with
Chomsky’s use of the term “expression”, where Chomsky intends a mental
representation pairing information on sound and linguistic form. Devitt says the
grammatical properties of expressions are “high-level relational properties” of the
physical entities.
141
Devitt describes grammatical properties like c-command as “high-level”
because they have multiple physical realisations: “Although formally so different, a
written and spoken token…might share all their syntactic properties. Sentences that
140 Devitt (2006) p.27
141 ibid.77
‘look different’ might be syntactically alike.”
142 C-command relations can be
realised by pretty much any physical medium, as is apparent if one considers all the
conceivable orthographies, acoustical signals, hand gestures and - as I’ll discuss in
Chapter Five - the apparent amodality of language. Devitt thinks that grammatical
properties are “relational” properties of expressions because properties like c-
command are properties that hold between constituents, or “symbols” in Devitt’s
terminology, in virtue of relations amongst elements in a structure: “Syntactic
properties are ones that reflect a token’s relations to other tokens in the
language”.
143
Devitt’s conception of grammatical properties is similar in some respects to
views prominent immediately prior to Chomsky’s conceptual innovations. It is
worth considering the views of Leonard Bloomfield and Chomsky’s teacher Zellig
Harris as they provide an important background to both Chomsky’s psychological
conception and Devitt’s revival of physicalism.
144 On their view, as on Devitt’s,
grammatical properties are properties of the physical sounds and marks we find in
our environment, properties that the physical entities have in virtue of certain
relations they stand in to one another.
Bloomfield was committed to a view of scientific theory according to which
any scientifically meaningful statement reports a physical movement in space and
time. This was closely related to a view about scientific method, called
operationalism, according to which all science must be framed in terms of
statements that describe basic operations, recorded in reports about measurements
of time and distance. Bloomfield took it that these doctrines had been established by
the philosophers of the Vienna Circle such as Rudolf Carnap and Otto Neurath.
From these views, Bloomfield inferred that statements about linguistic
‘ideas’ – where his notion of ‘idea’ covered mental organisation and content –
should be translated into statements about speech-forms. Bloomfield’s speech-forms
were physical categorisations of acoustical disturbances. This programme in
142 Devitt (2006) p.154
143 Devitt (2006) p.154
144 Bloomfield (1936), Harris (1985)78
linguistics was part of a larger vision of science and, in particular, the human
sciences:
Linguistics as actually practiced employs only such terms as are translatable into the
language of physical and biological science; in this linguistics differs from nearly all other
discussion of human affairs. Within the next generation mankind will learn that only such
terms are usable in any science. The terminology in which at present we try to speak of
human affairs – the terminology of ‘consciousness’, ‘mind’, ‘perception’, ‘ideas’, and so on
– in sum, the terminology of mentalism and animism – will be replaced in minor part by
physiological terms and in major part by terms of linguistics.
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Bloomfield believed that this course of action was not only desirable but also
possible. He believed that Carnap and Neurath had already laid the foundations for
this project by discovering that all scientifically meaningful statements could be
translated into physicalist statements about observable movements and space-time
co-ordinates. This estimation of what Carnap and Neurath had shown will seem too
optimistic to those familiar with Quine’s attack on reductionism in epistemology
and the philosophy of science, and Carnap’s own later moderation of these views.
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But as Bloomfield saw it, statements in linguistics or any other special science that
could not be so reduced were either scientifically meaningless or were statements
about the language employed in the theory.
Bloomfield’s statements about the language employed in theories included
statements like “In the English language the word redness is a noun” and the
explication of these statements would draw upon the resources of linguistics.
According to Bloomfield, the term “noun” must be defined as must wordhood in
general. Bloomfield said of nouns that:
A noun is a word which enters centrally into endocentric phrases with preceding adjective
modifiers, serves as an actor with a finite verb, as the goal of a verb or preposition, and as a
predicate complement, appears always in one of two sub-classes, singular and plural.
147
145 Bloomfield (1985) p.19
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For Bloomfield a word was the smallest linguistically significant unit that could be
uttered alone.
148 According to Bloomfield’s strategy, wordhood had to be
characterised in terms of the fundamental notions and definitions of linguistics.
These fundamental linguistic terms were thought to admit, ultimately, of reduction
to physicalist vocabulary. They were not taken to involve any appeal to meanings or
“metaphysical” notions.
Bloomfield foresaw that his physicalist hypothesis about such linguistic
categories would be tested by the generation of linguists that followed him:
If the description so revised [in a physicalist vocabulary rid of ‘ideas’] is better than the old
– simpler and fruitful of sounder and easier prediction – then the hypothesis will have been
confirmed and mankind will accept it as we accept the Copernican astronomy.
149
But he was sanguine about the prospects of his hypothesis and warned against
linguists who, unless they are physicalists, “constantly forget that a speaker is
making noise, and credit him, instead with the possession of impalpable ‘ideas’”.
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Bloomfield felt that linguists could play an important role in science, and in
particular psychology, by showing that speakers do not have ‘ideas’ guiding their
linguistic performance; that the noise is sufficient for linguists’ purposes. He argued
that the noise was sufficient to account for communication because “the speaker’s
words act with a trigger-effect upon the nervous systems of his speech-fellows.”
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But he did not consider the study of the nervous system receptive to such triggers,
and the mental structures it supports, to be a part of the explanation of language.
The focal point was the noise itself.
Like Bloomfield, Harris thought that linguistic theorising should begin with
attention to speech sounds. Both supposed that linguists must start with a set of
observed utterance as their data. These utterances form a stream of speech on which
linguists then perform basic operations: they can segment an utterance into
148 Quine (1985) argues that the inclusion of linguistic significance in the definition of wordhood
makes it hard to see how linguistics will be purged of ideas and meanings.
149 Bloomfield (1985) p.23
150 ibid.
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individual sounds, or phones, and they can classify phones into phonemes.
Phonemes are the smallest units of sound in a language that are capable of
conveying a distinction in significance, such as the b sound in bat and the m sound
in mat. These operations can then be repeated at higher levels of analysis. Strings of
phonemes can be segmented and classified into morphophonemes, a level of
classification in between phonemes and morphemes. Morphophonemes are made up
of the allomorphs – the phonetic variants - of a single morpheme. A morpheme is
the smallest grammatically significant unit of the language, constituting a word or
meaningful part of a word, that cannot be split into a smaller grammatically
significant unit. So, for example, the phonetic (s) of cats pronounced (kats), the
phonetic (z) of pigs pronounced (pigz) and the phonetic (iz) of horses pronounced
(horsiz) are all allomorphs of the English plural morpheme.
Harris suggested that investigation of fragments of natural language reveals
it to have a distributional structure.
152 Harris used the term structure such that a set
of linguistic elements e is structured with respect to some feature f to the extent that
we can form an organised system of statements describing e and the interrelations
of its members in terms of f. It can then be decided by inspection of a corpus of
utterances in respect of which features language is structured – whether historical
features or social features or semantic features and so on. Harris thought that
languages are structured in terms of their distributional features: “in terms of the
occurrence of parts (ultimately sounds) relative to other parts”.
153
The distribution of a particular linguistic element was understood as the sum
of all the environments in which it occurs. A linguistic environment, within Harris’
approach, is just an array of co-occurring elements each in a particular position and
which taken together make up an utterance. The first step in a distributional analysis
is to divide the fragment of speech into segments to determine the regularity of the
occurrence of one of those segments relative to the others. This must be done on
grounds that are independent of the distributional analysis so Harris looked for the
divisions that were “phonetically more obvious”.
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The segments are then compared and statistically similar segments are
grouped together. These similarity groupings themselves occur in partially similar
and partially different environments so that we can in turn compare the distributions
of the initial groupings. By such processes, Harris built up his linguistic elements.
As the analysis developed, Harris could alter the original segmentations to the less
phonetically obvious so as to achieve more regular distributions. The analysis
proceeded by tweaking the underlying similarity groupings and framing a variety of
more complex relations between the linguistic elements.
Harris felt confident in finding a distributional structure to all natural
languages because he thought that: “All elements in a language can be grouped into
classes whose relative occurrence can be stated exactly.”
155 He was confident in this
because the elements of a language do not occur arbitrarily with respect to one
another but only in certain positions relative to other elements. He saw these facts
about occurrence as shaping our powers of expression:
The perennial man in the street believes that when he speaks he freely puts together
whatever elements have the meanings he intends; but he does so only by choosing members
of those classes that regularly occur together, and in the order in which these classes
occur.
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Moreover, these grammatical restrictions on distribution hold fairly uniformly.
They are rarely, if ever, disregarded for reasons such as semantic needs. Harris
thought that these statements about distributional regularities could descriptively
cover the whole of a language without drawing on further types of information such
as “normative rules” or “historical derivation”.
Harris’ view was that the structures he described genuinely exist in the
languages in question “in as much as any scientific structure really obtains in the
data which it describes”.
157 But though he believed that distributional facts
somehow guide “the perennial man on the street”, he thought that the question of
whether the structure of a language, conceived as a distributional structure amongst
155 Harris (1985) p.27
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157 Harris (1985) p.3082
physical elements, is realised in speakers’ minds is a further question that linguistics
does not address. Speakers’ outward behaviour suggested to Harris that they
perceive something like the distributional structure. But he was ambivalent about
the idea that the structure is psychologically realised by those who are sensitive to it:
A reasonable expectation is that the distributional structure should exist in the speakers in
the sense of reflecting their speaking habits…Concerning any habit, i.e. any predisposition
to form new combinations along particular distributional lines rather than others, we know
about its existence in speakers only if we have some outside evidence (such as association
tests)
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Notice how close this pre-Chomskian view is to Devitt’s position, according to
which whatever exists in the speaker should reflect the language they produce, in
the sense that their competence respects without realising the structures of the
language they produce. Harris’ use of “reflect” here seems to parallel Devitt’s use
of the term “respect”. Both Harris and Devitt, conceiving of grammatical properties
as properties of sounds, suggest that no more than the speaker’s mind reflecting or
respecting the produced language can be reasonably inferred. It is a further question,
by their lights, how the speaker is cognitively organised.
Historically, physicalist conceptions of linguistic properties, such as those of
Bloomfield and Quine, have been coupled with behaviourist theories of language
acquisition which involve learning language by generalising from the properties of
observed verbal behaviour. This is also true of Harris:
[T]he position of the speakers is after all similar to that of the linguist. They have heard
(and used) a great many utterances among which they perceive partial similarities: parts
which occur in various combinations with each other. They produce new combinations of
these along the lines of the ones they have heard. The formation of new utterances in the
language is therefore based on the distributional relations – as changeably perceived by the
speakers – among the parts of the previously heard utterances.
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This historical connection between physicalism and a behaviourist view of grammar
acquisition may not be a necessary connection. There seems no principled reason
why one could not hold a physicalist view of grammatical properties together with
the nativist view that our acquisition of grammatical competence is an instance of
growth under heavy innate constraint.
Chomsky thinks that Harris was more concerned with the description and
classification of fragments of language, and the usefulness of such classification for
other tasks such as machine translation, than with the explanation of the facts about
speakers’ languages.
160 However, there is a well-known sense in which describing
and classifying languages so as to bring out distributional regularities, and then
drawing inferences from these regularities, might be a form of explanation. On
Hempel’s deductive-nomological model, systems of regularities and entailments
can be explanations.
161 Hempel characterised scientific explanations as deductive
arguments with at least one natural law statement amongst the premises. On this
model, we have a statement that describes the phenomenon to be explained E and a
set of statements S that “explain” E. At least one member of S must be a universal,
or law-like, statement of the form All Fs are Gs. If the members of S are all true and
the argument from S to E is deductively valid (as with All Fs are Gs, x is an F,
therefore x is a G) then we have an explanation in the proposed sense. On this
model, Harris’ theories would count as forms of explanation because they involve
statements of law-like regularities and deductions from them.
So why does Chomsky think that Harris was not so interested in explanation?
Chomsky has a more substantial sense of explanation in mind than that supported
by Hempel’s model. Hempel’s model does not appeal to notions of best
explanations, causation or simplicity. But Chomsky is interested in why the
sentences of speaker’s languages take the special forms that they do, so he will
therefore be interested in producing the best explanation of why the linguistic facts
are as they are. In constructing a theory of language, Harris sought a “simple set of
ordered statements that would express the empirical facts” but not explain them at
160 See my Chapter Two.
161 Hempel (1965)84
any deeper level.
162 Chomsky treats linguistics as an attempt to muster the most
explanatory theory of the properties of speaker’s languages. It is to this end that
Chomsky argues for the integration of linguistic descriptions with theories of
psychological structure and language acquisition (see my Chapter Two).
The focus on operations and physically characterised evidence by
Bloomfield and Harris suggests that linguistics is about observable matters, rather
than about the underlying principles and unobservable entities of nature that other
sciences discover. Such a focus on the observable is now thought to place overly
narrow limits on the sorts of theories that can be entertained by scientists, and
incapable of capturing the content of successful scientific theories which make
inferences to unobservable entities and principles. Chomsky argues that this focus
on observables in linguistics made manifest a commitment to unmotivated a priori
restrictions on scientific inquiry. This serves to restrict the options for evaluating
how successful theories are at capturing significant generalisations about
language.
163
Linguists like Bloomfield and Harris took the operationalist approach
further than it had been taken in other fields. They made it an aim of linguistic
theory to devise discovery procedures that would automatically apply the
techniques of segmentation and classification to any corpus and produce a correct
analysis. Chomsky argued that no other science, not even the most developed of the
hard sciences, has developed such procedures. Discovery procedures would, in
effect, be an algorithm for automatically arriving at the correct theory in a particular
domain drawing upon only the restricted data that physicalist ideology allows.
Chomsky begins with the weaker assumption that a linguistic theory, like other
scientific theories, is an attempt to explain some phenomena. What can be expected
from linguistic theory is not a full account, or justification, for how its theories are
produced but some explanatory perspective from which one can evaluate how good
a linguistic theory is. Rather than discovery procedures, Chomsky aimed for
competing grammatical theories, explicit explanations of the grammatical properties
162 Harris (1985) p.28
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of languages which could be tested by whatever relevant data could be found so as
to determine the best theory.
So for physicalists in the first half of the 20
th century, grammatical
properties were to be reduced to physical properties of uttered sounds and marks.
Grammars were conceived as theories of this reality: theories of disturbances in the
air or marks on surfaces. Chomsky began work on linguistics within this physicalist
tradition before proposing a new way of exploring grammatical properties and a
new conception of grammatical reality. Before we subject Chomsky’s own
conception of linguistic theory to scrutiny, it is worth noting an apparent limitation
of reductive physicalism. Chomsky was struck early on by the abstractness of the
categories and principles that grammatical theories seemed to be committed to.
164
Even fairly crude categorisations of sentence form are more abstract than physical
descriptions in that they employ general categories like Noun, Verb, Sentence and
the like. Moreover, a single physical string such as “Flying planes can be
dangerous” can be more than one sentence form. Initially Chomsky accepted that
these abstract categories could be explained away as the physicalist machinery for
linguistic analysis is developed and sharpened. Just as Bloomfield had conceived of
the order of application of his linguistic rules as a convenient fiction, so the
categories might be construed as a way of speaking and not as categorisations that
must match reality in a true linguistic theory.
But Chomsky felt compelled to recognise the importance of grammatical
categories at a level abstracted from the physical disturbances in the air for theories
of grammatical structure. Prior attempts to derive the phonological and grammatical
categories from the physical properties of a corpus according to explicit procedures
achieved little success. Chomsky found the inductive inferences from the corpus to
phonological and grammatical categories to be unclear. The theoretical inferences
relied on abstract categories and intuitions about the grammatical categories
instanced in the corpus material. As Chomsky struggled to frame generalisations on
the basis of the physical properties in the corpus, he continued to define
grammatical categories at this more abstract level and then used these abstract
164 See Katz (1981) pp.33-34 for discussion of Chomsky’s pre-generative grammar view.86
categories to examine languages, thereby giving up on the physicalist agenda that
preceded him.
165
When all the interesting constructs of the developing theories involved
abstract grammatical categories, and no explanatory appeal was being made to
physical categories, Chomsky began to rethink the prevalent conception of
grammatical reality. The abstract grammatical categories seemed so indispensable
to these theories that he thought it disingenuous to hold that they could be explained
away as convenient fictions. Chomsky inferred that the special structures that
natural languages instantiate are abstract categories at the level of linguistic form
rather than the level of physical occurrences. Although more abstract than the
physical utterances and marks, Chomsky argued that grammars could be
empirically tested according to whether their predictions about grammatical
structure could explain the judgements of native speakers. He then developed a
methodology within which a wide range of empirical evidence might bear upon
hypotheses about the grammar of a speaker’s language.
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The view that theories of the grammatical properties of languages are
“theories of speech-produced, physical disturbances in the communication medium”
or that a theory of language is “a theory of the common distributional patterns in
such physical disturbances” does not currently have many supporters amongst
grammarians. Successes in generative grammar have been perceived to discredit the
view that grammatical properties can be reduced to physical properties, because the
categories that generative grammars appeal to are so much more abstract.
The early transformational grammars reflected the concern with more
abstract categories because they investigated underlying levels of sentence structure,
unobservable in the merely physical properties of utterances. Transformational
grammars were able to overcome many of the objections to the idea that there were
universal grammatical principles at work across languages. These objections were
based on superficial, physical properties of structures in different languages such as
the different sound patterns and orthographies. Transformational grammars were
also able to capture relations in meaning between such structures as active and
165 See Chomsky (1955/75) pp.30-33
166 See Chomsky (1965) and my Chapter Two.87
passives at a level of deep structure determined prior to the application of
transformational rules that determine a sentence’s surface structure. The
transformations served to explain these differences in appearance evidenced by
sentences of similar structural interpretation.
Once it was appreciated that the transformational grammars could capture a
deeper level of similarity between linguistic structures, in terms of more abstract
properties, it began to seem compelling that there might be such abstract
uniformities across the languages people speak. For example, there are agreement
relations in natural languages, but if this agreement relation is common between
languages then it can’t be reducible to the physical properties of the words because
languages exhibit different physical patterns of sounds and written marks. The
agreement relation is more abstract; it can be instanced in all these different sound
patterns and written systems. The more abstract properties needed are
morphosyntactic features that relate word shapes to grammatical properties. These
abstract grammatical features permit the formulation of general hypotheses about
grammatical structure. As Katz puts it:
Taxonomic constraints on the admissibility of constructs – imposed to ensure that
everything at higher grammatical levels can be reduced back down to the physical events at
the lowest level – precluded grammatical categories that are required to satisfy even
minimal standards of grammatical explanation.
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Chomsky’s problem with the, once prevalent, reductive physicalism as a conception
of grammatical properties is that it has no resources to characterise the special
grammatical structures of speakers’ languages. Neither does it explain why the
amorphous noises, marks and signs exhibit the very special grammatical structures
that cross-classify physical properties.
In summary, Chomsky abandoned three features of the physicalist
conception: (1) that there is a specific, set data base for linguistics antecedent to
theory construction, namely, corpuses of utterances consisting of emissions of noise,
(2) that the scientific content of grammatical theories consists solely in what they
say about this data base, and (3) that a linguistic theory was a theory about the
167 Katz (1985) p.19488
noises. To be clear, Chomsky’s reasons presented thus far do not demonstrate the
failure of even the reductive physicalist conceptions of grammatical properties
associated with Bloomfield and Harris. At most, they suggest that Bloomfield and
Harris offered unconvincing arguments for physicalism and highlight that early
attempts to explain grammatical properties in reductive physical terms were not
successful. One should not interpret Chomsky as offering a knock-down argument
against such conceptions. The real issue for Chomsky is about explanation, and
which conception of language promises richer and deeper explanations of the
properties of speakers’ languages.
Devitt attempts to revive a physicalist conception of grammar. On his
linguistic conception, the properties described by generative grammars are high-
level properties of physical entities in our environment. So, Devitt is not committed
to the reduction of grammatical properties to physical properties that characterised
pre-Chomskian physicalism. Yet Devitt agrees with Bloomfield and Harris that,
ultimately, linguistic reality is to be located amongst the physical sounds and marks.
Devitt’s linguistic reality consists of “certain sounds in the air, inscriptions on
paper”
168, “like the very words on this page”.
169 Yet, Devitt is a non-reductive
physicalist who thinks grammatical properties supervene on physical properties
(inter alia). On Devitt’s view, linguistics is a special science with its own
proprietary domain of laws and generalisations, notwithstanding its supervenience
on the physical. Devitt says that the outputs of a linguistic competence are “physical
sentence tokens” and being a sentence for Devitt is a property that his symbols have.
170 As sounds and marks are only symbols and sentences insofar as they form parts
of representational systems, Devitt’s conception works at a higher level of
generalisation than a reductive conception limited to physical disturbances.
A noteworthy feature of Devitt’s view is that though he thinks that
grammatical properties are themselves non-psychological properties, he is clear that
he believes they have psychological determinants. He says:
168 Devitt (2006) p. v
169 Devitt (2006) p. 31
170 ibid.89
(T)he grammar is describing the syntactic properties of (idealised) linguistic expressions,
certain sounds in the air, inscriptions on paper, and the like. These items are produced by
minds, of course, and presumably get many of their properties somehow from minds, but
they are not themselves mental.
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So, Devitt’s non-psychological conception of grammatical properties is not a
commitment to the mind-independence of grammatical properties.
One immediate question for Devitt’s proposal is how a study that focuses on
actual “physical sentence tokens” can account for the infinite number of sentences
never uttered or written down: non-actual but possible sentences. To this Devitt
responds:
The truth behind the talk of the nonactual can be simply that the grammar is lawlike. And
the truth behind the talk of the infinite can be simply that there is no limit to the number of
different sentence tokens that might be governed by the rules the grammar describes.
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But Devitt doesn’t want to merely repackage Chomsky’s commitment to the infinite
generative capacity of the language faculty. Devitt’s idea of the grammar being
lawlike and infinite in its generative capacity refers to the properties of a set of
recursive rules that are realised in the physical environment and govern physical
entities.
In my view, Devitt creates a difficulty for his account by saying that
generative grammars are about tokens in the physical environment rather than types.
If grammars are really just about physical tokens rather than more general types
then it is more difficult to explain how the same structured expression could crop up
in many places at the same time, or even multiple times. Devitt thinks that all talk of
grammatical types can ultimately be cashed out in terms of tokens. But as Smith
points out, if the same grammatical properties can be assigned to a wide variety of
sounds, written marks and instances of signing, then it is difficult to see the sense in
which linguists are studying physical tokens rather than the grammatical types that
171 Devitt (2006) p. v
172 Devitt (2006) p.27 fn.1390
these otherwise disparate tokens instance.
173 However, this aspect of Devitt’s view
need not be adopted by all those who look to locate grammatical properties in the
environment. A physicalist might instead hold that there are grammatical types
located in our physical environment and that it is these environmental types that
grammars are about.
1.3.3 Platonist Conceptions
Platonists about language conceive of languages as abstract rather than concrete
objects.
174 According to Katz, a foremost proponent of a Platonist conception of
grammatical theory: “Grammars are theories of the structure of sentences,
conceived of as abstract objects in the way that Platonists in the philosophy of
mathematics conceive of numbers.”
175 Katz conceives the grammar of a language as
an objective, eternal, and immutable structure which is independent not only of
speakers’ minds but of the whole spatio-temporal causal order.
176 Conceived in this
way, particular grammars are theories about the sentences of natural languages,
which are abstract objects. General linguistic theory states invariances over all such
abstract objects. Katz thereby interprets UG as a theory of what is common to the
structures of all such abstract objects and not as a theory of the uniform biological
endowment that serves as a basis for language acquisition.
Katz claims that despite our feeling that “our language is more a part of us
than it would seem to be on a Platonist conception” this is a mistake. What we have
this feeling about, Katz claims, is not really our language which is mind-
independent and abstract but rather “something closely related to language”:
Whatever it is that we have these feelings about is what we acquire in the process called
“language learning”. Since in this process we do not acquire English itself but rather
173 Smith (2006) p.439
174 Katz (1981, 1985, 1996).
175 Katz (1985) p.173
176 See Katz (1981) for a clear statement of his Platonism.91
knowledge of English…there is a distinction between a speaker’s knowledge of a language
and the language itself.
177
For Katz, processes like language acquisition do not actually involve any changes in
a speaker’s language but only changes in their knowledge of language and their
relationship to an infinite range of abstract grammatical structures.
Katz was himself once a proponent of the psychological conception.
178 But
he noticed that even if we give up on the reductive physicalist conception that
preceded Chomsky, there is nothing to necessitate the choice of the psychological
conception. Katz thinks that Platonism is “a real, if undeveloped, alternative”.
Although I’ve classified the views of Bloomfield and Harris as varieties of
physicalism, Katz describes them as nominalist because they hold that grammatical
properties are token dateable, placeable parts of the physical world rather than
abstracta. Katz’s idea in describing these views as nominalist is that, just as
nominalists deny the existence of abstract objects, these views deny the existence of
abstract grammatical categories, treating grammatical descriptions as naming the
physical occurrences. Conceptualism is Katz’s name for the psychological
conception. In explaining why Platonism constitutes a genuine alternative to the
psychological conception, in light of the rejection of Bloomfield and Harris’ views,
Katz says:
Whatever Platonism’s defects, they are surely not those of nominalism. Nominalism’s
defects stem from the insufficient abstractness of the interpretation of grammars as theories
of sound waves and orthographic marks, while Platonism provides interpretations that
accommodate the highest degree of abstraction. Since Platonism cannot be rejected for the
same reasons as nominalism, new and different reasons are required to justify
conceptualism over this third ontological position.
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Katz infers from the demise of reductive physicalism that abstraction is a theoretical
virtue in grammatical theory. It is a cornerstone of his position that grammatical
theory ought to aim for the maximum level of abstraction. Katz argues that
177 Katz (1981) pp.8-9
178 Katz (1964), Chomsky and Katz (1974)
179 Katz (1981) p.4592
grammars ought to abstract away from the psychological states of speaker-hearers,
as well as from physical occurrences, so that there are no substantive, non-
grammatical constraints on grammars imposed by psychology. Though proponents
of the psychological conception conceive of grammatical reality at a level of
abstraction from the brain and from processing mechanisms, they still conceive of
grammars as theories of speakers. So although the psychological conception allows
for more abstract categorisations than reductive physicalism, Katz thinks it still
constrains grammatical theory beyond the maximum level of abstraction. Katz
claims that further abstraction from psychology is necessary to meet “intrinsic
constraints concerning the successful description and explanation of grammatical
structure.”
180 On the basis of this maximum abstraction principle, Katz argues that
no interpretation of grammars other than the purely mathematical one will do.
Platonism about grammatical theory follows if, like Katz, one thinks that
mathematics should be understood as about Platonic objects.
So Katz denies that linguistics is an empirical science. He also claims that
choosing between the psychological conception and the Platonist conception is an a
priori issue about what a theory of language is. He argues that it would make no
sense to construe their competing claims as empirical since Platonists deny that
empirical matters are relevant to linguistic theory at all.
181 So, any empirical
evidence that was offered in favour of a psychological conception would beg the
question against Platonism.
Katz’s argument here is problematic because one could equally well say that
it made no sense to construe the competing claims as a priori claims because one
side to the disagreement denies that non-empirical matters are relevant to linguistics.
As Katz’s opponents think linguistic theory is an empirical theory, they might deny
that a priori considerations are relevant and so hold that any a priori claims would
beg the question. Even if it is true that on the Platonist conception no empirical
evidence is relevant to the investigation of grammatical properties, this places no
restriction on the considerations we might appeal to in deciding between
conceptions of grammatical theory.
180 Katz (1985) p.195. I address Katz’s arguments for this claim in §3.4.
181 Katz (1981)93
It is anyway unclear that Platonist views cannot be motivated by empirical
evidence. If we consider the case of mathematics, a Platonist conception of
mathematics might be motivated because it is the best explanation of our scientific
practices.
182 Here the inference to Platonism would be going via empirical evidence
from examining scientific theories. Even though mathematical knowledge is gained
by a priori means that doesn’t entail that one’s theory of the ontology of
mathematics must be a priori.
The important point is that is that it doesn’t follow that it’s nonsense to think
of the competing claims of the Platonist and the psychological conception as
empirically decidable, simply because one side says that grammatical theory is a
priori. Suppose I thought that whether God exists can only be known empirically
and I argue with a theist who claims it can be known only by a priori reasoning.
Would we be begging the question against one another? It seems like we can still
have a disagreement, and that it is not nonsense for me to think that the matter is
empirically decidable though I may turn out to be wrong. Even assuming that the
answer to the question we disagree over can be known only a priori or empirically
and not both, we can disagree about which way it can be known without that
making nonsense of our disagreement.
But Katz is happy to couch the issues in terms of explanatory coverage so
long as the explanatory issues are put in terms that are neutral between conceptions
of linguistics as an empirical or a mathematical science. His view is that Platonism,
unlike the psychological conception, has explanatory benefits for the linguist
because it places no restrictions on the degree of abstraction that grammatical
theory can work at. This seems to commit him to a claim about the relation between
grammars and speakers’ knowledge of a grammar. For the benefit to accrue to
Platonism, the facts about the grammars of natural languages and the facts about
speakers’ knowledge of a grammar must come apart. The speakers’ knowledge of
his language must be partial or distorted with the abstract grammatical structures
extending beyond the subset of structures generated by the speaker’s grammatical
competence. For this is the only obvious way in which the psychological conception
182 Putnam (1975) makes the case for abstract objects on the grounds of their indispensability to
empirical science.94
could place unwarranted restrictions on the theory of language: limiting generative
grammar to a psychological reality that grammatical reality outstrips.
However, there are infinitely many languages conceived as mathematical
objects. If linguists are concerned to study the natural languages acquired in first
language acquisition and spoken by humans then the Platonist needs to answer to
two questions. Firstly, he needs to know how, on a Platonist conception, to
determine in general which structures, amongst this infinite range, are structures of
natural languages of the sort that concern the linguist. Secondly, he needs to know
how, in any particular case, to determine which one of the infinitely many
grammars is the grammar of a speaker’s language.
183 If grammatical theory is
concerned with infinite sets of abstract objects then to produce a grammar for a
particular speaker’s language we need to work out which of the sets is the one that
characterises his language, and which is the grammar that generates it.
The psychological conception has ready answers to both these questions.
According to the psychological conception, the linguist is concerned with the facts
about the natural languages that speaker’s acquire competence with and put to use
in speaking and understanding. The linguist determines the grammar of a particular
speaker’s language by investigating the speaker’s grammatical competence to see
which grammar he has realised internally. Without answers to these questions the
Platonist will be unable to motivate his conception of grammatical theory as an
alternative to the psychological conception because he will be unable to constrain
his “maximally abstract” inquiry to account for the grammatical properties of the
natural languages of speakers, generally or in particular cases. The Platonist’s
maximum abstraction is a vice rather than a virtue if he cannot fix the target domain
of inquiry. If the Platonist uses the psychological facts about speakers’ acquired
grammatical competences to answer these questions then it will be unclear that the
conception he defends poses a genuine alternative to the psychological conception
rather than presupposing the explanatory commitments of the psychological
conception. There is no obvious reason why the “maximally abstract” theory,
abstracted from facts about human cognition, should target all and only the
183 This is the problem that Schiffer (2006) and Smith (2006) describe as “defining the actual
language relation”.95
grammatical properties of the languages that humans acquire and speak, i.e. the
properties of the natural languages.
Fodor puts this challenge to the Platonist in characteristically sharp terms:
In principle, he might just as well attend to the construction of grammars that predict only
intuitions about sentences with more than seven vowels, or sentences whose twelfth word is
‘grandmother’, or sentences that happen to be uttered on Tuesday. Once you start to
stipulate it’s Liberty Hall.
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If the Platonist view is that grammatical theory is a theory of the common properties
of sentences then it is underspecified. Grammatical theory focuses on only a highly
constrained range of the properties of sentences that are part of natural languages.
Abstracted from the facts about what humans immediately cognise in speaking and
understanding, there are infinitely many languages, and an infinite number of
structural properties that we might find amongst the expressions of those languages.
Amongst the infinite set of conceivable languages, including the natural languages
but infinitely more languages besides, expressions will have a vast range of
properties. There are properties like the spurious properties that Fodor highlights.
We could also imagine extra, invented relations of structural command amongst
constituents. Grammarians working within the Generative Enterprise are clearly not
interested in these properties. The Platonist needs to explain what motivates their
particular interest in just this subset, restricted in such highly-specific ways. The
Platonist is stipulating because he is not committed to explaining any particular
range of linguistic facts such as, for example, the facts about the linguistic
structures that speakers actually know.
What Platonists have to provide is motivation for thinking that the relevant
grammatical facts outstrip the facts about what is licensed by speakers’ grammatical
competences (I examine Katz’s attempt to provide such motivation in §3.4). In the
case of arithmetic there is a great deal of initial plausibility to the Platonist view
because:
184 Fodor (1985) p.17796
[T]ruths of arithmetic are what they are, independent of any facts of individual psychology,
and we seem to discover these truths in the way we discover facts about the physical world
[i.e. by examining a mind-independent reality] … knowing everything about the mind/brain,
a Platonist would argue, we still have no basis for determining the truths of arithmetic.
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Chomsky’s view is that, by contrast, we have not been given “the slightest reason”
to suppose that if we knew all the truths about the human mind/brain there would
still be truths about human language that escape our grasp.
It is important to note that the position that Katz endorses is that
grammatical structures are abstract, rather than concrete, objects. This is what
motivates his choice of the Platonism/nominalism terminology. But there is a
second sense of abstract, having to do not with whether the objects being described
are abstract or concrete in the sense outlined, but with the level of abstraction
involved in a description.
The point against reductive physicalism was that grammatical descriptions
require a higher degree of abstraction than the physical descriptions, often cross-
classifying physical descriptions so that the former properties cannot be reduced to
the latter. In this sense of abstract, grammatical descriptions are more abstract since
they have a greater level of generality. One can, however, abandon the reductive
physicalism without conceiving of grammatical structures as abstract objects. The
point about the insufficient abstraction involved in physical descriptions and the
requirement for more abstract grammatical categories does not in itself suggest
Platonism. To say that grammatical categories are more abstract could merely be to
say that they are non-reducible types because they cross-classify the physical
properties, with fundamental physical differences between instantiations of the
same grammatical property and fundamental grammatical differences between
instantiations of the same physical properties. In order to meet such requirements of
abstraction one might employ the notion of a grammatical type rather than Katz’s
Platonic objects. A non-reductive physicalist, who locates grammatical properties
in our physical environment, could appeal to grammatical types that are not
reducible to the physical properties.
185 Chomsky (1986) p.3397
Katz fails to distinguish these two senses of “abstract” when he suggests that
the requirement of grammatical types is support for the view that grammatical
structures are Platonic objects. Katz’s claim is that grammatical structures are a
special sort of entity. But the issue about generality and types of things is distinct
from the issue about the space-time location and causality of a set of objects.
Though Katz defines his position in terms of the aspatiality, atemporality and
acausality of grammatical structures
186, he also frequently appeals to a type-token
distinction to support his Platonism:
As C.S. Peirce drew the type/token distinction, and as everyone since understands it, types
are abstract objects.
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As Peirce understood the type/token distinction:
There will ordinarily be about twenty ‘the’s on a page, and of course they count as twenty
words. In another sense of the word ‘word’, however, there is but one ‘the’ in the English
language…it is impossible that this word should lie visibly on a page or be heard in any
voice.
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Peirce, like Katz, suggests here that types are not located in the physical world to be
“visible on a page” or “heard in any voice”. Katz takes the type-token distinction to
entail the existence of Platonic objects because he fails to distinguish these two
senses of “abstract”: for him “abstract” and Platonic are one and the same. But, as
Strawson points out, this doesn’t follow, for one can quite plausibly endorse
abstract types without the Platonist ontology:
Let it be granted that spatio-temporal particulars – or spatio-temporal particulars of certain
sorts – are model cases of what really exists or occurs. The fear is that a theoretical
commitment to the existence of universals amounts to a confused half-assimilation of the
general to the particular, accompanied perhaps by a confused analogical picture of the
186 Katz (1981)
187 Katz (1996) p.274
188 Peirce (1958) p.42398
relations of these spurious quasi-particulars, the universals, to actual objects to be found in
space and time.
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Katz’s reasoning seems to be that if types are not physical objects then they are not
in the physical world. But this doesn’t necessarily follow. Supervenience
physicalism, according to which everything supervenes on the physical, would be
one position that admits types into the physical world without claiming that they are
physical objects.
The view that grammatical categories are more abstract than particular
physical tokens then might appeal only to the idea that there are grammatical
categories or types which cross-classify the token, physical phenomena. One
needn’t arrive at the kind of two-world model (physical and Platonic) that Katz’s
talk of aspatial, atemporal and acausal objects suggests.
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1.4 Argument Summary
My thesis meets Devitt’s challenge to the psychological conception of generative
grammar by building a positive case for that conception over its non-psychological
competitors. My argument for the psychological conception consists of four parts.
First, I defend a set of psychological goals for generative grammars (Chapter Two).
Second, I argue that generative grammar makes an explanatory commitment to a
psychological distinction between grammatical competence and linguistic
performance (Chapter Three). Third, I argue that evidence from speakers’ linguistic
189 Strawson (1979) p.3
190 Amongst those who believe in Platonic objects not everyone accepts each of the aspatiality,
atemporality and acausality. Frege (1956) believed that Thoughts were aspatial and atemporal. He
also held that though we cannot causally affect Thoughts, they can have a causal impact on the
material world by being grasped and taken to be true. He compared Thoughts to the stars that we can
apprehend in the night sky though we have no reciprocal powers to affect them. Frege held that
Thoughts, though abstracta, could be a part of our mental life, the objects of our attitudes and that
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intuitions is used to investigate this psychological distinction (Chapter Four). In the
final part of my argument, I defend the view that the explanatory goals of
generative grammar can be met by the theory of grammatical competence to which
grammarians are committed (Chapter Five). Consequently, non-psychological
grammatical properties are explanatorily dispensable to generative grammar, and
grammatical theory is best interpreted as a theory of the psychological properties of
grammatical competence.
In Chapter Two, I clarify Chomsky’s methodological framework for
generative grammar (§2.1), before defending the explanatory goals of descriptive
adequacy (§2.2) and explanatory adequacy (§2.3). I then reject arguments against
explanatory adequacy from Devitt and Katz (§2.4). In the Appendix I discuss recent
developments in grammatical theory in which grammarians seek to justify
generative grammars at a level beyond explanatory adequacy.
In Chapter Three, I first distinguish between the theoretical notion of
competence and the commonsensical notion of competence (§3.1). I then argue that
linguistic theory requires a theory of grammatical competence in order to determine
the generative grammar of a speaker’s language (§3.2). I then clarify the distinction
between theories of grammatical competence and theories of processing which
Devitt conflates (§3.3). At the end of the chapter, I defend the grammarian’s use of
a theory of grammatical competence to determine the generative grammars of
natural languages against two arguments from Katz (§3.4).
In Chapter Four, I explain the role of evidence from speakers’ linguistic
intuitions in grammatical theory (§4.1). I outline and defend an orthodox model of
the intuitions evidence according to which linguistic intuitions are psychological
data, used to investigate the grammatical competence system (§4.2). I then reject
Devitt’s model of linguistic intuitions as speakers’ theoretical beliefs about their
language (§4.3). In the final section, I describe an alternative model of linguistic
intuitions on which they constitute evidence for hypotheses about non-
psychological grammatical properties located in speakers’ environments (§4.4).
This alternative model raises the question of how best to interpret the hypotheses on
which the intuitions evidence is brought to bear, to which I turn in the final chapter.100
In Chapter Five, I first consider arguments that non-psychological
interpretations of generative grammar are inconsistent with the structural
complexities that grammars detail and find them inconclusive (§5.2). I argue that
the theory of the grammatical competence system to which generative grammar is
explanatorily committed serves to meet the conditions of adequacy on a
grammatical theory, and develop a parsimony argument against non-psychological
interpretations of generative grammars (§5.3, §5.4). Finally, I consider and reject
Devitt’s claim that non-psychological grammatical properties are indispensable to
theories of communication (§5.5).101
2. What does Generative Grammar Explain?
2.1 Goals and Interests
Chomsky (1965) set out a new methodological framework for the study of language,
which supplanted the frameworks of Bloomfield and Harris described in §1.3.2.
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Work on the properties of languages that was carried out within this new framework
came to be known as Generative Grammar, a part of the Generative Enterprise.
Chomsky’s new methodological framework was continuous with its
predecessors in one broad sense. Like his predecessors, Chomsky was concerned
with the structure of natural languages and to specify rules that operate on the
minimally functioning linguistic elements so as to determine the linguistic
structures. Though Chomsky conceived of theories of grammatical structure in a
very different way, broadly speaking, his predecessors shared this aim.
But in a number of crucial respects the new methodological framework was
a radical break with the assumptions that had gone before it. Perhaps most strikingly,
generative grammars, as Chomsky conceives of them, are theories of the speaker-
hearers who speak and understand languages. Chomsky says:
Linguistic theory is concerned primarily with an ideal speaker-listener, in a completely
homogeneous speech-community, who knows its language perfectly and is unaffected by
such grammatically irrelevant conditions as memory limitations, distractions, shifts of
attention and interest, and errors (random or characteristic) in applying his knowledge of
language in actual performance.
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The methodology of his predecessors had focused on the study of utterances,
conceived of as physical occurrences, and how the uttered sounds could be
classified and compounded so as to reconstruct linguistic structures. What Chomsky
suggests in the above passage is that the linguist re-orientates his attention away
from the uttered speech sounds and towards the speaker-hearers whose knowledge
191 Chomsky (1965) pp.3-62
192 Chomsky (1965) p.3102
of a language shapes those utterances and allows them to recognise structure in the
utterances of others.
Part of the rationale for this suggestion is that utterances are complex
interaction effects, the results of our putting the language we know to use in verbal
behaviour. They are a reflection not just of the languages that speakers know but of
the interaction of a wide variety of factors; Chomsky mentions memory limitations,
distractions, shifts of attention and interest, and errors, but there are more besides.
Amongst these factors, the language that a speaker knows is only one. What
Chomsky proposes is that the study of complex linguistic phenomena, such as
utterances, requires a divide and conquer strategy; just like the scientific study of
other complex phenomena. The variety of factors that enter into verbal behaviours,
like utterances, motivates Chomsky to draw a fundamental distinction between the
language a speaker knows and the rest of the factors that enter into the etiology of
linguistic behaviour. This is the provenance of the distinction between competence
and performance (the topic of my Chapter Three).
A central fact motivating Chomsky is that by targeting the language a
speaker knows, rather than the utterances and marks they produce, linguists get a
clearer reflection of the grammar of their language. For as Chomsky notes, a record
of what is produced will include false starts, deviations from rules, changes of plan
in mid-course, failings of short-term memory and so on. These performance factors
are not properties of the speaker’s language; they might be quite general cognitive
conditions or reflections of other cognitive demands on the speaker. So Chomsky
suggests that generative grammars target the language that speakers know (or in
which they are competent). This knowledge encompasses a system of rules
underlying the observed linguistic behaviour (their linguistic performances). The
system of knowledge is considered independently of extraneous limitations on a
speaker’s use of their language. Chomsky’s suggestion is that generative grammars
can use data from the linguistic performances, along with data from speakers’
judgements about their language, as evidence to construct theories about the
systems of rules that characterise the known languages. So as Chomsky originally
conceived of generative grammar it is the study of rules of language that are
realised by the mental states of speakers.103
At the time this conception was taking shape, Chomsky claimed that “the
issue of mentalism versus antimentalism in linguistics apparently has to do only
with goals and interests, and not with questions of truth or falsity, sense or
nonsense.”
193 Chomsky thought that the dispute over the mentalistic framework he
was proposing amounted to a “rather idle controversy”.
194 He thought the dispute
came down to three non-issues.
The first issue involved Bloomfield’s contrast between mentalism and
mechanism. In drawing this contrast, Bloomfield suggested that mentalism is
dualistic because it assumes a mental medium or substance distinct from physical
mechanisms. But Chomsky was quick to point out that he is not committed to the
system of knowledge being realised in a non-physical substance. So Chomsky
claimed that Bloomfield’s distinction is misleading and irrelevant to the issue at
hand. The theories of mental systems that Chomsky has in mind are framed at a
level abstracted from physical mechanisms but this involves a commitment to a
level of psychological explanation rather than to non-physical substance. The same
holds true of the more recent notions of FL or I-language, which are theories of the
mind/brain. More recently, Chomsky has argued that the special problems
associated with locating the mind in a mechanistic world have effectively collapsed
since Newton’s forces were accepted over the mechanistic philosophy, “exorcising
the machine but leaving the ghost intact”.
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The second issue involved his opponents’ commitment to behaviourism;
which Chomsky characterised as the view that the data of linguistic performances
exhaust the linguist’s domain of interest. Chomsky’s generative grammars are a
partial explanation of those performance facts in terms of “deeper systems that
underlie behaviour.”
196 As such Chomsky thought that the disagreement was not an
arguable matter but “simply an expression of lack of interest in theory and
explanation… [For a behaviourist] the enterprise has no point because all that
interests him is the behaviour itself.”
197
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195 See (Chomsky 2000, 2002)
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Chomsky thought it characteristic of this “lack of interest in theory” that
behaviourist linguistics is limited to a summary and systematisation of the data on
verbal behaviours, like utterances. By Chomsky’s lights these systematisations of
the data do not constitute explanatory theory and he claims that it is unclear what
sense of “theory” those behaviourists who proposed to limit themselves in this way
had in mind.
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The third issue concerned the use of data from our intuitive judgements to
ascertain the structure of the known language. Generative grammars draw on
evidence from native speaker’s intuitive consideration of linguistic material and the
reports they would make of what was acceptable and unacceptable to them, as well
as the ways the material could be interpreted or construed. Chomsky classed these
judgements as a form of introspection. He thought that if we reject the behaviourist
strictures then there is no good reason why linguists shouldn’t make use of evidence
from introspection of their own linguistic intuition, as well as from other speakers’
reports of their intuitive responses to linguistic material. To disregard the
judgements of native speakers would serve to limit the linguist to the performance
data. Given the limitations of performance data for determining what constitutes a
part of a speaker’s language and what is an effect of extraneous factors, Chomsky
claims this would lead to “utter sterility” in grammatical theory.
The view that choosing between psychological and non-psychological
conceptions of generative grammar, between “mentalism” and “antimentalism”, is a
matter of “goals and interests” is a recurrent theme of Chomsky’s writings. In
defending his view that generative grammar is a part of psychology, Chomsky often
returns to the theme that generative grammar, psychologically conceived, is “a topic
which one may or may not choose to study.”
199 Collins, echoing Chomsky, says:
As I understand it [the generative grammarian] has presented a research program guided by
questions about our knowledge and development of language. By the terms of this program,
198 As discussed in §1.3.2, there may be weaker notions of explanation according to which
identifying regularities and making deductions from these regularities does count as a form of
explanation. Such explanations do not give deeper answers to “why” questions or appeal to best
theory criteria as Chomsky requires of explanations.
199 Chomsky (1986) p. 4105
linguistics is a branch of psychology. There is no fancy a priori argument here, just an
invitation to look at language as a cognitive capacity. This might turn out to be the wrong
way of approaching things, but it is, pro tem, a coherent way of proceeding.
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Chomsky notes that the decision to study a system of grammatical competence does
stake out positions on matters of fact. It commits Chomsky to the existence of
mental structure that shapes our production and comprehension of language. It is a
condition on sustaining the psychological conception that one remains committed to
such broad hypotheses about the psychology of language, although the content of
those hypotheses may change drastically, according to developing theories of the
language faculty and its role in the cognition of language.
However, Chomsky’s claims about the psychological conception of
generative grammar being a direct consequence of “goals and interests” need some
careful handling. Unlike Bloomfield, who challenged mentalism across the board,
not all opponents to Chomsky’s psychological conception deny the existence of a
mental reality underlying linguistic behaviour. In broad terms, to deny that there is
some special cognitive organisation responsible for the patterns that we observe in
speakers’ linguistic behaviour is implausible. But opponents need not deny the
existence of such cognitive organisation or that it constitutes a very good subject
matter for a science. So they need not disagree with Chomsky over the coherence of
the goal of understanding this mental reality or the interest in doing so. Rather what
such opponents deny is that generative grammars themselves have this mental
reality as their subject matter.
Opponents argue that Chomksy is mischaracterising the explanatory aims of
generative grammarians. They agree that the “goals and interests” Chomsky
describes are good ones, but think that attention to grammatical work and the
theoretical framework in which it is carried out reveals that generative grammarians
do not have the psychological aims Chomsky describes. Opponents claim that
generative grammar does not have as its goal a theory of the speaker’s knowledge
of language, or grammatical competence. According to Devitt, this lack of self-
understanding on the part of Chomsky, and other linguists, reflects a failure to
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recognise some general distinctions separating psychological theories from theories
of the outputs of psychological processes (§1.3). Once we recognise these
distinctions, Devitt thinks it clear that generative grammars are theories about
properties located in our physical environment. For Katz, Chomsky’s psychological
conception is a kind of bad faith: a failure on Chomsky’s part to exercise the full
freedom offered by a Platonist conception of grammars as Platonic objects, instead
choosing to labour under the stultifying constraints imposed by psychological
theories about speakers (§1.3.3).
Chomsky claims that there are a number of levels of adequacy that
grammatical theories should aim to achieve. Grammatical theories should be
extensionally or observationally adequate, meaning that they generate the
grammatical strings of a language, the right words in the right order. But Chomsky
claims that they should also aim for descriptive adequacy, meaning that they assign
the correct structural description to each sentence of a language indicating how the
sentence is understood. Descriptive adequacy requires that the theory contains
sufficient means to correctly describe all the different structures of the language
under investigation and the interactions between them, thus providing analyses of
all the possible sentences of the language. This is a more stringent condition than
observational adequacy which only requires that the grammar generate the right set
of strings and not that it assign the correct structure to the sentences in question.
Descriptive adequacy applied to grammatical theory as a whole requires that this be
done for all natural languages.
Chomsky also claims that there is a further level of adequacy that
grammatical theories should meet, “a much deeper and hence much more rarely
attainable level” of justification - explanatory adequacy.
201 This further condition of
adequacy serves to determine one grammar, amongst the possible descriptively
adequate grammars (DAGs), as the grammar of a speaker’s language. To do so, an
explanatorily adequate grammatical theory (EAG) will explain how, given a
particular course of experience, a speaker acquires the grammar that they do. An
EAG serves to capture the commonalities that all languages share and incorporates
only those grammars that are humanly acquirable. Hence, it is “an explanatory
201 Chomsky (1965) p.27107
hypothesis about the form of language”; explaining what the grammar of a
speaker’s language is in a principled way. General grammatical theory then
embodies an empirical theory about our psychological endowment for language and
the way it interacts with experience. These commonalities to all natural languages
are called Universal Grammar (UG).
Generative grammarians have developed a theoretical framework for
meeting explanatory adequacy called Principle and Parameters (P&P). Within P&P
there are a set of commonalities across all acquirable languages (the principles of
UG) and a number of ways in which individual grammars may vary whilst
according with these common principles (the parameters of variation within UG).
An important feature of P&P is that interaction between only a few parameters can
yield the observed divergent structures in the sentences which individual grammars
generate. Since the P&P framework has become relatively stable Chomsky has gone
on to propose that there might be further conditions of adequacy on grammatical
theory, beyond explanatory adequacy. This further condition of adequacy involves
providing some explanation for why UG takes the form that it does. This would
constitute an even deeper explanation of the properties of natural languages.
In this chapter, I aim to defend Chomsky’s claim about the explanatory
goals and interests of the grammatical theories he has been at the forefront of
developing. The central argument of this chapter is that generative grammars should
meet conditions of descriptive adequacy (§2.2) and explanatory adequacy (§2.3,
§2.4) and that these conditions impose psychological goals on grammatical theories.
In my Appendix, I describe recent attempts to integrate grammatical theory with
theories of the evolution of language, as grammatical theory moves beyond
explanatory adequacy. In the Appendix, I aim only to explain the proposals that
have been developed in this direction rather than attempt any assessment.108
2.2 Descriptive Adequacy
2.2.1 Prescriptive Grammars
One way to approach the explanatory goals of generative grammarians is to
consider how they differ from those of prescriptive grammarians. The notion of the
grammar of a language is often associated with the idea that there is a set of correct
prescriptions for speaking good French and English, and so forth. One might
wonder how these prescriptive rules targeted by institutions like the French
Academy differ from the rules targeted by generative linguists.
The rules that the French Academy decide upon are supposed to make
prescriptions to French-speakers. When the Academy considers the French
language they dictate that French is to have a certain set of properties covering the
French lexicon, pronunciation and more besides. For example, in 1997 it was
decided that the masculine form of the word “minister” (“le minister”) must be used
for ministers of either gender, even though members of the French government had
been using the feminine form to refer to female ministers.
Yet the French Academy doesn’t dictate as much about the languages of
French-speakers as one might think. The kinds of rules that the Academy dictate are
quite superficial from the generative grammarian’s perspective. The Academy
specifies how French speakers ought to use the French language that they know.
But a French speaker’s being able to put these instructions into action relies upon
their knowledge of a bewildering range of linguistic constructions. These
constructions are determined by underlying principles which “provide the substrate
upon which those prescribed rules are parasitic”.
202 Even if the Academy provided a
full list of official forms and provisions for style “they provide only examples and
hints concerning the regular and productive syntactic processes.”
203 Compare this
with a generative grammar, which aims to be “perfectly explicit…it does not rely
on the intelligence of the understanding reader but rather provides an explicit
analysis of his contribution.”
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What the Academy offers is a set of proclamations about what the sounds
and structures French speakers utter should be; something that would be palpably
insufficient as an attempt to describe the full structure of the French language.
These prescriptions don’t cover the most basic properties of any language. Amongst
those properties, perhaps the most fundamental is that human languages encompass
an infinite variety of expressions, where each such expression is a sound-meaning
pairing:
Human language is based on an elementary property that also seems to be biologically
isolated: the property of discrete infinity, which is exhibited in its purest form by the natural
numbers 1, 2, 3... There are three and four word sentences but no three and a half word
sentences, and…they go on forever, it is always possible to construct a more complex one,
with a definite form and meaning.
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This is a feature of all natural languages. The science of generative grammar aims
to give some account of the membership of the class of this infinite variety of
natural language expressions. A generative grammar is a fully explicit means of
structurally describing the sentences of a language.
206 A generative grammar for a
language adequate to this task would “assign to each of an infinite range of
sentences a structural description indicating how [the] sentence is understood” by
speakers of the language.
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So generative grammars are supposed to correctly describe and explain the
structural properties of sentences rather than prescribe what they ought to be.
Generative grammars are not concerned with the linguistic proclivities speakers
ought to have but with the full range of facts about the structures of natural
languages as they actually are.
205 Chomsky (2000) p.4
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2.2.2 Observational Adequacy
A generative grammar is observationally, or in Quine’s terms “extensionally”,
adequate if it generates the right strings of words. A grammar that satisfies this
condition for a particular language is also sometimes said to have weak generative
capacity. But with perhaps one early exception
208, the aim of generative grammars
has always been something more than weak generative capacity. Rather the aim has
been strong generative capacity. A grammar with strong generative capacity should
include a generative procedure that assigns correct structural descriptions to the
expressions of the language. If a grammatical theory correctly characterises the
strong generative capacity of a language then it is said to be descriptively adequate.
Chomsky argues that:
A fully adequate grammar must assign to each of an infinite range of sentences a structural
description indicating how this sentence is understood.
209
In this way, generative grammar differs from merely extensional approaches, like
Quine’s, which aim to characterise a language in terms of a set of well-formed
strings. Such extensional approaches are indifferent to the generative procedure
involved and the structural descriptions assigned, so long as the right set of strings
is generated. Quine’s extensional adequacy condition for grammars - that they
generate the right strings - stops short of the aims of generative grammars. As
Chomsky observes, generative grammars do not “keep to the only entities
admissible from Quine’s ‘realistic point of view’, namely ‘the right totality’ of well-
formed English sentences”.
210 Appealing to best theory arguments, generative
grammars propose that some particular account of sentence generation is correct.
This made little sense for Quine, given his view that the only reality to grammar is
the totality of well-formed strings. From Quine’s point of view, procedures of
assigning grammatical structure are a kind of choice, like the choice of one or
another set of axioms for a formal language. According to Quine’s criterion of
208 Chomsky (1957)
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adequacy one can choose whatever set of rules for generating well-formed strings
that one likes, chopping up the strings in whatever way these rules do, so long as
one preserves the same totality of well-formed strings.
As Quine thought that the proper concern of linguistics was only extensional
adequacy, he thought that two grammars which generate the same set of well-
formed strings are empirically equivalent even if they differ in their generative
procedure and the structural descriptions they assign. Two grammars that share
weak generative capacity could only differ, for Quine, in terms of their simplicity.
Where two different but extensionally equivalent grammars were equally simple,
Quine deemed them grammatically equivalent.
Chomsky claims that Quine’s approach simply ignores a basic fact about
languages, namely, that they provide speaker’s with a finite means to generate an
infinite class of structurally articulated expressions. What the grammarian is
concerned about is these structures rather than strings. The strings do not cut finely
enough to tell which structures are part of a speaker’s language. For example, the
same string can be more than one structure of a speaker’s language if it is
ambiguous. Grammarians want to know how each string is structured as a sentence
of the language. So they want grammars to strongly generate the language by
assigning sentences their proper structural descriptions. Insofar as Quine was
prepared to specify such a finite means for generating the structural descriptions,
Chomsky thought Quine to be speculating about strong generative capacity:
hypothesising about the generative procedure and not merely the set of well-formed
strings that a language encompasses.
Quine claims that the choice of grammars to generate the well-formed
strings of a language is indeterminate because the “business of syntax is the
demarcation of strings of phonemes proper to the language” but “more than one
battery of grammatical constructions and vocabulary will probably be capable of
generating the same total output of strings.”
211 However, Quine wants to distinguish
the indeterminacy facing grammatical theory from that facing translation: “there is
no indeterminacy analogous to that of translation. Indeterminacy of translation
211 Quine (1990) p.49112
consists rather in conflict between the outputs themselves.”
212 For Quine the
inscrutable differences between grammars that engender indeterminacy do not
consist in their outputting different strings but in their doing so according to
different procedures. By contrast, the difference between empirically equivalent
translation theories consists in the translations that they output.
Chomsky agrees with Quine that formal languages don’t have a designated
syntax. He claims “they just have a set of well-formed expressions; the syntax can
be anything you like”:
There’s no right answer to the question: what are the true rules of formation for well-
formed formulas of arithmetic? What are the axioms of arithmetic? The answer is: any set
of axioms you like to generate all the theorems. It’s the theorems that are real, not the
axioms; the axioms are just a way of describing them, one of many ways. Similarly, if you
invent a computer language, it doesn’t really matter which rules you pick to characterize its
expressions; it’s the expressions that are the language, not the specific computational
system that characterises them.
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But Chomsky denies that this is true of natural languages which are naturally
occurring objects. With natural languages we do care about their structural
complexity and the correct structural descriptions of their expressions. Natural
languages have this structural complexity independently of our choosing a rule
system to characterise them. The only argument that Quine has for limiting
grammatical theory to weak generative capacity is an indeterminacy claim about the
grammars of languages. Chomsky thinks that grammatical theory faces the same
underdetermination of theory by evidence as other empirical theories. But Quine’s
indeterminacy thesis only follows with the addition of behaviourist restrictions on
the relevant evidence; restrictions which I argued in §1.3.1 that Quine fails to justify.
So there is no cogent argument for the indeterminacy of grammatical theory that
restricts it to considerations of extensional adequacy. It is Chomsky’s positive view
that in the case of natural languages, there is something ‘in the head’, our
212 Quine (1990) p.49
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knowledge of language, or grammatical competence, that is the computational
system and determines the structural properties of our language.
2.2.3 Descriptive Adequacy and Productivity
A DAG assigns structural descriptions to the sentences of a language indicating
how they are understood. A sentence, but not a mere string of words, is a
grammatically structured object. Generative grammar then is really the study of
grammatical structures rather than strings. It must account for the grammatical
structures of sentences, and explain the grammatical relations that we recognise
between them as well as explaining why certain structures are ruled out of speakers’
languages.
To take a classic example, an observationally adequate grammar will count
the strings John is easy to please and John is eager to please as amongst the well-
formed strings of English. But it will not explain why these strings, which are
observationally very similar arrangements of words, are structured quite differently.
The different structures of these two sentences can be brought out by considering
their relations to other sentences. We can paraphrase John is easy to please as It is
easy to please John. But we cannot paraphrase John is eager to please as *It is
eager to please John. John is easy to please is structured so that it is John that is
being pleased. This is not true of John is eager to please in which it is John that is
doing the pleasing.
214 This example shows that there are grammatical facts that
observationally adequate grammars will not reveal.
DAGs are required to assign structural descriptions to an infinite range of
sentences. Given any finite collection of sound-meaning pairings of a natural
language, we can always construct another such pair using the finite stock of
214 The analyses of these sentences fill the subject and object positions of the infinitival clauses with
empty categories. “John” is interpreted in object position in “John is easy to please”, which is
understood as “John is easy (someone) to please (John)”. Whereas, “John” is interpreted in subject
position in “John is eager to please”, which is understood as “John is eager (John) to please
(someone)”.114
vocabulary and procedures for grammatical combination. This fact is often referred
to as the productivity of language. To explain the productivity of the languages
speakers know, generative grammarians postulate grammars with a finite number of
recursive rules and a finite stock of lexical items.
If a grammarian were simply concerned with a language as a set of objects
independent of speaker’s knowledge, then there would be less motivation to assign
languages recursive, combinatorial structure acting upon finite elements. We could
think of the language as a set of structured sound-meaning pairings - (S1, M1), (S2,
M2) ... (Sn, Mn) - with an infinite number of members. There is no motivation to
think that such independent sets must be built out of a finite number of elements
and recursive procedures. One could just postulate the infinite pairs without
postulating a recursive procedure. The idea that languages involve a finite basis is
connected to their being known by speakers with finite limitations. The best
explanation of the productivity of languages that speakers know, given speakers’
finite limitations, is the recursive operation of grammatical rules on a relatively
fixed stock of lexical items. So, it is only if one is interested in the known languages
- in what speakers know - that the issue of productivity becomes an explanatory
goal and receives an explanation.
The fact that speakers of productive languages have the potential to produce
and understand an infinite number of new expressions is sometimes referred to as
the creativity of our use of language. Language users can get a sense of the
channelled but infinite expressive power that their language provides:
The core property of discrete infinity is intuitively familiar to every language user.
Sentences are built up of discrete units: There are 6-word sentences and 7-word sentences
but no 6.5 word sentences. There is no longest sentence (any candidate sentence can be
trumped by, for example, embedding it in “Mary thinks that…”), and there is no non-
arbitrary upper bound to sentence length.
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Chomsky thinks that the normal use of language is creative in the sense “that much
of what we say in the course of normal language use is entirely new, not a repetition
of anything that we have heard before and not even similar in pattern…The number
215 HCF (2002) p.1571115
of sentences in one’s native language that one will immediately understand with no
feeling of difficulty or strangeness is astronomical.”
216 If a grammar permits the
generation of all and only the infinite grammatical expressions of the language, then
a speaker’s knowledge of such a grammar can be used in explaining the creativity
exhibited in their linguistic behaviour. It is a primary concern of the generative
enterprise to account for the productivity of the languages we acquire, and thereby
explain this creativity in our use of language, on the basis that the productive
languages are mentally realised.
Chomsky, and others, made this explanatory connection explicit from the
beginning of generative grammar. Lees says that the explanatory goals of generative
grammar ought not to be restricted to characterising the properties of some finite
corpus “else it could not account for the fact that speakers are able to extend the
corpus indefinitely.”
217 Chomsky’s stated aim in investigating generative grammars
was to account for “a large store of knowledge…and a mass of feelings and
understandings”.
218 The “mass of feelings and understandings” Chomsky wanted to
explain can be investigated via speakers’ conscious awareness of their language and
judgements. It is, in a sense, misleading to describe grammars that attempt to meet
this condition as meeting only “descriptive” adequacy, and contrast this with
“explanatory” adequacy, for grammars that aim to meet these conditions are already
pursuing explanatory aims.
This is a sharp departure from the views of Bloomfield and Harris. Harris
was sceptical of attempts to explain the creativity of language users in terms of their
standing knowledge of a productive grammar. He writes:
[E]ven when our structure can predict new utterances, we do not know that it always
reflects a previously existing neural association in the speakers (different from the
associations which do not, at a given time, produce the new utterances)… [It] means only
that the pattern or habit existed in the speakers at the time of the new formation, not
necessarily before: the ‘habit’ – the readiness to combine these elements productively –
216 Chomsky (1972) p.10
217 Lees (1957) p.382 my italics.
218 Chomsky (1955/75) pp.62-3116
may have developed only when the need arose, by association of words that were partially
similar as to composition and environment.
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In contrast, Chomsky takes the creative aspect of language use as evidence that
speakers of a language have enduring mental structures with the potential to
generate the relevant novel sentences. Harris assumes an associationist psychology
according to which human “habits” are shaped by indefinite processes of
association. If one replaces the associationist psychology that Harris assumes with a
cognitive psychology of enduring mental structures and principles then Harris’s
point looks far less plausible. Where generative grammars predict the new
utterances that speakers produce and comprehend, the natural cognitive explanation
is that speakers have some corresponding cognitive structure in place, not that they
develop capacities as required on each occasion.
It was a distinctively new concern of Chomsky’s conception of grammatical
theory to produce DAGs for speakers’ languages, and to offer some explanation of
the creativity of language use on the basis of their knowledge of a productive
grammar. Attention to the grammars that speakers know raises further questions. A
human child is exposed to only a finite amount of linguistic material; yet, barring
environmental or developmental problems they all acquire such a grammar. A
natural question is how our finite exposure to linguistic data can be squared with
our infinite variety of expressions. We need to discover how the grammars speakers
know are structured so as to make an infinite variety of expressions available. But
such a theory of grammatical structure must be supported by an acquisition model
on which speakers can acquire such grammars. The actual DAG that assigns
structural descriptions to the sentences of our language over an unbounded range
must be acquirable in first language acquisition if it is to constitute an explanation
of our infinite expressive capabilities. Not all the possible DAGs for a speaker’s
language are plausible candidates for the grammar the speaker knows. This is where
explanatory adequacy comes in.
219 Harris (1985) p.31117
2.3 Explanatory Adequacy
2.3.1 Further Conditions of Adequacy?
A generative grammar is explanatorily adequate if it serves to determine which
grammar the speaker actually knows from amongst the DAGs for his language.
Insofar as an EAG is a hypothesis about which grammar a speaker actually knows it
involves hypothesising about grammar acquisition. We know that speakers of all
languages acquired in first language acquisition (i.e. the natural languages) develop
the competence to extend their recognition and production of grammatical
structures indefinitely. As a matter of course we all recognise sentences that may
never have been uttered before by anyone, such as:
(6) Anyone who has been to Barry Smith’s philosophy of linguistics seminar
in London, at Stewart House, on Wednesdays, from two until four, more
than once, and paid attention, has had the recursive aspect of grammar
drummed into them.
Beyond this general recursive aspect of human language, there are other significant,
language-specific generalisations that hold across all natural languages (see §5.4). It
is a goal of generative grammar to explain the properties of linguistic structures in
terms of these deeper principles.
One might wonder why Chomsky thinks that grammatical explanations will
involve us in theorising about our acquisition of grammatical principles.
Explanatory adequacy has always been a long range goal of generative grammar.
But as Stephen Stich puts it, once we have achieved a DAG:
It might seem our job is finished. We set ourselves to giving an account of the
grammarian’s doings in building a grammar, and this we have done. But…such accounts go
on to talk of linguistic theory, acquisition models, evaluation measures and other notions
related to the question of how a speaker acquires his grammar. Moreover, the discussion of
these notions is not a simple addition to the account of the grammarian’s work in
constructing a grammar. Rather it is an intrinsic part of that account. Yet why this is so is
far from obvious. Constructing a theory of grammar acquisition is surely a fascinating
project and one which would naturally catch a grammarian’s eye. But at first blush at least,118
it would seem to be a new project, largely distinct from the job of constructing grammars
for individual languages. Why, then, do Chomsky and others view the study of acquisition
as intrinsic to the construction of grammars for individual languages?
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In what follows I want to explain and defend Chomsky view that hypotheses about
language acquisition are an integral part of the best grammatical theories of
speakers’ languages.
2.3.2 Grammar Acquisition and Universal Grammar
A cursory inspection of the properties of human languages reveals that there is
much apparent variation as one compares different languages, such as English and
Japanese. Yet speakers of each language are born with a uniform endowment for
language. As Chomsky conceives of explanatory adequacy it is the attempt to
explain the observed variation in acquired languages on the basis of a uniform
endowment. This uniform endowment for language, UG, is hypothesised to admit
only limited options:
[F]or H to know L is for H to have a certain I-language… UG is now construed as the
theory of human I-languages, a system of conditions deriving from human biological
220 Stich (1985) pp.132-3 Stich agrees that the notion of explanatory adequacy has an important role
to play in grammatical theory, he says that it is the EAG “which the linguist seeks to uncover.”
(p.136) But Stich gives an account of the role of explanatory adequacy which invokes an unjustified
indeterminacy thesis about grammar and a general scepticism about mental representation. He sees
explanatory adequacy as a practical measure for cutting down on indeterminacy and not as a means
to the truth about the grammar the speaker mentally represents. Stich claims that though a grammar
can be “true of” the speaker, there is no fact of the matter about which of the many grammars true of
the speaker is the actual grammar of his language, and the speaker does not mentally represent any of
them. Moreover, Stich construes the properties of UG as properties common to all possible DAGs
rather than as those properties common to all the grammars that speakers have actually acquired.
Stich effectively replaces the requirement that an EAG selects a DAG, on the basis of the primary
linguistic data, with the requirement that it provides all the DAGs. See Chomsky and Katz (1974) for
a critique of Stich’s proposals.119
endowment that identifies the I-languages that are humanly accessible under normal
conditions.
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Constructing a theory that is explanatorily adequate requires developing an account
of UG, the innate grammatical principles common to all the languages that speakers
acquire, and of how the parameter values of those principles are determined by
experience. Building such a theory of grammar acquisition into generative grammar
serves to explain in any particular case which grammar a speaker actually knows
amongst those DAGs that might cover his language:
To the extent that a linguistic theory succeeds in selecting a descriptively adequate grammar
on the basis of primary linguistic data, we can say that it meets the condition of explanatory
adequacy. That is, to this extent, it offers an explanation for the intuition of the native
speaker on the basis of an empirical hypothesis concerning the innate predisposition of the
child.
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EAGs offer an explanation of the native speaker’s judgements about the sentences
of their language on the basis of their having acquired a grammar of a particular sort.
Explanatory adequacy provides a reason for thinking that one particular account of
sentence generation is the correct one because it is the one that the speaker has
acquired and so it is the one involved in the provenance of their judgements.
As theories that aim for explanatory adequacy involve an empirical
hypothesis about grammar acquisition, they can be falsified by showing that they
fail to provide a DAG for a child who receives primary linguistic data from a
particular human language. For children are not innately constrained to acquire one
natural language rather than another. A theory is more explanatorily adequate when
it provides more far reaching explanations of the natural languages.
Though this approach is radical in the context of pre-Chomskian linguistics,
Chomsky suggests it is partly a reinvention of an old approach to language, as
proposed by Beattie in 1788:
221 Chomsky (1986) p.23
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Languages, therefore, resemble men in this respect, that, though each has peculiarities,
whereby it is distinguished from every other, yet all have certain qualities in common...
Those things, that all languages have in common, or that are necessary to every language,
are treated of in a science, which some have called Universal or Philosophical grammar.
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The generative grammarian attempts to describe the facts about human languages
rigorously and provide support from a theory of UG for theories of speakers’
languages. As such, the grammar of a particular language is underwritten by UG,
which:
accommodates the creative aspect of language use and expresses the deep-seated
regularities which, being universal, are omitted from the [particular] grammar…It is only
when supplemented by a universal grammar that the [particular] grammar of a language
provides a full account of the speaker’s competence.
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The aim of correctly describing the properties of any and all human languages
means that generative grammarians make universal claims: in their fundamentals
the theories must be adequate for any language that a human can acquire in first
language acquisition. The perspective is one from which there is just one language,
or just language, with lots of dialects or variations. Linguists immediately prior to
Chomsky had not recognised the need to add a universal grammar to particular
grammars in order to explain creativity and other deep principles of language.
Chomsky thought such grammars were thus descriptively, as well as explanatorily,
inadequate.
2.3.3 The Role of Explanatory Adequacy
Chomsky claims that aiming for explanatory as well as descriptive adequacy is
critical if linguistics is to advance as a science. Just as descriptive coverage can be
achieved by a large number of conflicting theories in other sciences, so descriptive
223 Beattie (1788)
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coverage of the data on languages might be achieved by large numbers of
conflicting grammatical theories. DAGs state a procedure that generates the
structured sentences of a speaker’s language. As Stich points out, we might expect
that in the absence of hypotheses about the grammar that a speaker has actually
acquired, there will be more than one procedure that can achieve these structural
descriptions. Stich says of a DAG that it is merely an axiomatised theory, and:
[I]t is a truism that a theory that can be axiomatized at all can be axiomatized in radically
different ways… When the job has been done there are indefinitely many variants each of
which captures the known intuitions equally well and predicts unprobed intuitions equally
well (or poorly). Somehow the grammarian does come up with a single theory.
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Stich wonders “What principle can he use to guide his choice?”
226 Chomsky agrees
that if we consider languages as axiomatised theories then “it doesn’t really matter
which rules you pick to characterize its expressions.”
227 But he denies that this is
true of natural languages which are naturally occurring objects. The grammarian
wants to know about the actual structural complexity of natural languages and the
correct structural descriptions of their expressions. To this end, Chomsky integrates
the study of linguistic structure into a complex of empirical studies focusing on our
acquisition and cognition of grammar. An explanatory benefit of doing so is that
amongst the conflicting theories which can cover the data, a theory that can explain
the data on the basis of an empirical hypothesis about the form of known languages
is supported by more evidence than one that can only explain the data by ad hoc
means. Chomsky’s claim is that there is something ‘in our heads’, (namely, the
grammar we have acquired) that determines the structure of our language and
thereby determines which theory of our language is correct from amongst the
DAGS.
Purely descriptive coverage of a language could be attained by postulating
rules on a datum-by-datum basis, yielding DAGs that offer no theoretical insight.
225 Stich (1985) pp.133-4
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Chomsky notes that coverage of data alone is not in itself “an achievement of any
particular theoretical interest”.
228 He goes on to claim that:
A theory of generative grammar may be descriptively adequate and yet leave unexpressed
major features that are defining properties of natural language and that distinguish natural
languages from arbitrary symbol systems. It is for just this reason that the attempt to
achieve explanatory adequacy…is so crucial at every stage of understanding of linguistic
structure, despite the fact that even descriptive adequacy on a broad scale may be an
unrealized goal.
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So Chomsky conceives of grammatical theory as appealing to a complex of data in
order to decide between competing theories of the grammars speakers know and the
innate information that provides a basis for all natural languages.
From this perspective, considerations of explanatory adequacy are vital to
constructing grammatical theories. Suppose we have two theories T and T’. Both T
and T’ can adequately describe the intuitions data. T adequately describes the data
but is not supported by an empirically confirmed theory about UG and the
mechanisms for selecting a UG language. T’ adequately describes the data and is
supported by an empirically confirmed theory about UG and the mechanisms for
selecting a UG language. T’ affords us the more insight into the structure of the
naturally occurring languages speakers know. Therefore, T’ is more empirically
justified. Fodor puts the point starkly:
[N]obody is interested in grammars that demonstrably could not be learned, though there is
no reason why some such grammars shouldn’t be [descriptively adequate grammars].
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228 Chomsky (1965) p.26. Chomsky (1965 p.36) says: “Although even descriptive adequacy on a
large scale is by no means easy to approach, it is crucial for the productive development of linguistic
theory that much higher goals than this be pursued.” Similar considerations might apply in the case
of Devitt’s example of bee dances (§1.3). The theorist does not just want any possible descriptively
adequate rule system for the bee’s dance of which there may be many, but rather that system of rules
and properties which the bee is sensitive to.
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As Fodor suggests, generative grammarians would not consider a theory that is
inconsistent with known facts about grammar acquisition. More moderately put,
generative grammarians aim to discover the facts about the languages that speakers
acquire and as such seek integration with empirical studies that investigate language
acquisition (but also language processing, language deficits, and other branches of
empirical theory). This is a consequence of targeting the natural languages: those
languages that speakers actually acquire.
The interaction of descriptive and explanatory adequacy has been a driving
force in developments in generative grammar. In order to accommodate the
complex facts about particular languages, generative grammarians were driven to
posit more rules and descriptive technology. In early generative grammars, prior to
P&P, the transformational rules thought essential to meeting descriptive adequacy
proliferated. These transformational rules in question helped explain the relation in
meaning, but difference in structure, between sentences like (7) and (8):
(7) The dog chased the cat.
(8) The cat was chased by the dog.
Sentences (7) and (8) have the same interpretation but look and sound different. The
proposed explanation was that sentences have more than one level of structure. It
was hypothesised that sentences have a deep structure that fixes the interpretation
of the sentence, as well as a surface structure that is much closer to the structure of
the sentence that we hear.
231 Generative grammars were hypothesised to have two
corresponding components: one to generate the deep structures and a
transformational component that maps deep structures into surface structures.
231 These theories were soon elaborated so that both deep and surface structure contributed to
interpretation when it was noticed that transformations into surface structure can have truth-
conditional consequences. This is evidenced in the difference between sentences like “Everyone in
the room knows at least two languages” and “At least two languages are known by everyone in the
room” where the sentences were hypothesised to share deep structure but the latter, unlike the former,
may be false if the two languages known by each person in the room are different. In the “Extended
Standard Theory”, deep structure fixed relations of subject and object whilst surface structure fixed
relations such as scope, anaphora, focus and presupposition.124
Sentences like (7) and (8) were thought to share a deep structure but map onto
different surface structures; (8) involves a permutation of dog and cat, so that they
are pronounced in different positions from those in which they are interpreted, and
the insertion of further lexical items.
There were many other linguistic phenomena that could be accommodated
with new transformations, including question-formation and structural ellipsis. But
such phenomena were so widespread in languages and so complex that generative
grammars began to posit more and more transformational rules and descriptive
technology of a sort that was highly intricate and peculiar to each language. This
gave rise to a puzzle:
The paradox was that in order to give an accurate descriptive account it seemed necessary
to have huge proliferation of rule systems of a great variety, different rules for different
grammatical constructions. For instance, relative clauses look different from interrogative
clauses and the VP in Hungarian is different from the NP and they are all different from
English; so the systems exploded in complexity...still, somehow children are reaching these
states of knowledge which have apparently great complexity, and differentiation and
diversity – and that can’t be. Each child is capable of acquiring any such state; children are
not especially designed for one or the other... But in that case it appears to be inconsistent
with observed diversity and proliferation.
232
It became implausible that children were determining amongst these highly intricate
rule systems in acquiring their grammar. Simplification of the descriptive
technology was a substantial step towards answering the question of how the child
could select the grammar from an otherwise bewildering range of choices.
Generative grammars expanded the phrase structure component of the grammar that
generated the deep structures and greatly reduced the number and complexity of the
transformational rules by subsuming them under more general principles. The new
theories were more explanatorily adequate but also grammatically deeper because
their principles were fewer in number and more unified, covering a greater range of
phenomena than the proliferating transformations. The paradox was resolved by
showing that:
232 Chomsky (2002) p.93125
the diversity of rules is superficial, that you can find very general principles that all rules
adhere to, and if you abstract those principles from the rules...then the systems that remain
look much simpler. That’s the research strategy...that went on for a long time with efforts to
reduce the variety and complexity of phrase structure grammars, of transformational
grammars, and so on.
233
In place of the large number of highly specific transformations (complex rules for
complex constructions in different languages), generative grammars now appeal to
a very small number of grammatical operations, extremely general principles with
parametric options.
234 The old rules have become artefacts of these deeper
principles.
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The fact that there can be more than one DAG for a language is not a special
problem for grammatical theory. It is the same situation that exists in other sciences
where there are conflicting theories compatible with the evidence and the scientist
looks for more evidence to decide between the theories from whatever sources are
available. Beyond the intuitive judgements of native speakers, choices between
DAGs can be justified on the basis of evidence from psychological theories of
acquisition and, in principle, the brain sciences. Explanatory adequacy makes it a
condition on an adequate grammatical theory that it meets this further evidence.
236
233 Chomsky 2002 p.93
234 See my Appendix for a discussion of minimalist theories which attempt to explain grammatical
structures in terms of the interaction of the properties of lexical features with some very simple
structure building operations.
235 To take another example of explanatory adequacy at work, learnability arguments have been
developed in favour of the widespread adoption of uniform binary branching, see Haegeman (1992).
236 Chomsky (1965 pp.35-36) points out that as well as considerations of explanatory adequacy being
necessary to obtain a revealing DAG, some grip on descriptive adequacy is a prerequisite on an EAG
because a theory of grammar acquisition requires we have some plausible theory about the properties
acquired.126
2.4 Arguments against Explanatory Adequacy
The goal of explanatory adequacy has been met with some philosophical resistance.
The resistance builds on the thought that theories about language acquisition and
theories about languages themselves are distinct theories. There is more than one
way of developing this thought.
One way is to claim that theories about grammar acquisition, which are
theories of how we acquire grammars, do not inform grammatical theories, which
are theories of what the structural properties of languages are. This is the position
that Katz holds. He says:
If, by some chance, one linguistic theory were to coincide to a greater extent than others
with a psychological theory, this would have no more significance for linguistics than the
coincidence of Riemannian geometry with physical theory has for pure mathematics.
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As discussed in §1.3.3, Katz does not think that any empirical evidence, such as
evidence from grammar acquisition, is relevant to grammatical theory at all. He
holds that grammatical theory is an “intuitional science” and that grammarians rely
on rational intuition in the same way that he thinks mathematicians and logicians do.
There is a second, more moderate, view that offers resistance to adopting
explanatory adequacy, according to which there is an evidential connection between
generative grammars and theories of grammar acquisition, but it is not a criterion of
adequacy on grammatical theory that it involves a theory of grammar acquisition.
The idea behind this second position is that, whilst facts about grammar acquisition
can inform grammatical theories, grammatical theories do not incorporate theories
of acquisition. This is the position that Devitt endorses. Devitt wants to
accommodate the important role of evidence from grammar acquisition within his
linguistic conception without admitting that grammatical theories aim to
incorporate psychological hypotheses about grammar acquisition. He says:
Concerning acquisition, evidence about nature and nurture showing that a language with a
certain structure could or could not have been learnt by a person from the “primary
237 Katz (1981) p.238127
linguistic data” is direct evidence for or against any theory that ascribes such a structure to a
language that has been learnt by the person... But this does not make the theory of language
psychological. It is one thing for a theory to have psychological evidence, it is another for it
to be psychological. Any theory about anything can have evidence from anywhere.
238
So Devitt wants to draw a distinction between a theory having psychological
evidence and that theory being a psychological theory. The problem with Devitt’s
view is that he has not provided us with a distinction of substance in the case at
hand. The key question is whether the theories aim to determine the grammars that
are actually acquired. If the answer is “Yes” then they have a theory of grammar
acquisition as a goal. According to the view I defended in §2.3, it is not just the case
that generative grammars can draw on evidence from grammar acquisition, rather
they need to make hypotheses about grammar acquisition if they are to progress
beyond mere descriptive coverage.
By drawing the distinction, Devitt thinks he can deny that it is an
explanatory goal of grammatical theory to determine a grammar from amongst the
possible DAGs on the basis of a theory of acquisition. He thinks he can deny this
whilst also allowing that theories of acquisition are of “direct” relevance. Devitt
maintains that “a grammar tells us absolutely nothing” about the facts in virtue of
which speakers acquire the grammars that they do. But nevertheless, he suggests
that generative grammars are constrained so that the hypothesised grammatical
properties of a speaker’s language are ones he acquires.
Even supposing Devitt is right in the very general claim that “Any theory
about anything can have evidence from anywhere”, that does not help him to make
the substantive distinction he wants to make in the case at hand. If the very general
claim is correct then the weather on Mars could be evidence for a grammatical
theory and of course we do not want to hold that grammatical theory has as a goal a
theory of the weather on Mars. But nothing follows from this very general claim
about the role of theories of acquisition within generative grammar. The connection
between a theory of grammar acquisition and a grammatical theory of a speaker’s
language is clearly a lot closer than the connection between the weather on Mars
238 Devitt (unpublished ms. b) pp.9-10128
and a grammatical theory. Devitt agrees with Chomsky that it is an important
constraint on grammatical theories that they meet evidence from hypotheses about
acquisition. Devitt requires some reason to resist the move to justify grammatical
theories in terms of their explanatory adequacy. The only reason that Devitt has
provided is that the latter goals would be psychological ones. But this is only a
reason if, like Devitt, one already endorses a non-psychological conception of the
goals of generative grammar. Without a further reason, it is unclear that there is any
substance to Devitt’s distinction and the consequent position on explanatory
adequacy. After all, Devitt agrees with Chomsky that the theories must meet the
psychological evidence or be deemed inadequate.
In the explanatory framework Chomsky proposes grammarians investigate
the structure speakers intuit, imposing formal conditions on grammars that can
generate these structures and proposing hypotheses about which of the possible
grammars that generate the intuited structures has actually been acquired. The
combinations of formal conditions and hypotheses about the grammars that are
acquired can be empirically confirmed by their success in dealing with a range of
natural languages. It is not merely the case that evidence from acquisition could be,
or can be, evidence for grammatical theories because (as I argued in §2.3), the
appeal to hypotheses about grammar acquisition is the central means of determining
the actual grammar of the speaker’s language.
Chomsky anticipated the kind of criticism of explanatory adequacy that
Devitt offers. He thinks it apparent that the discussion over whether a theory of
acquisition is a “‘necessary’ part of linguistic theory” is “quite without substance”.
239 The substantive issue is whether grammarians should be content to formulate
their theories with “little concern for justification” from psychological theories of
UG and the way in which a grammar is selected from amongst the options UG
makes available. The Chomskian alternative is that the grammarian intends to
proceed from the study of facts about particular languages to explain the properties
of the natural languages; those languages acquired in first language acquisition that
humans speak.
239 Chomsky (1965) p.41129
If the grammarian takes the former path, Chomsky argues that “since
interest in justification has been abandoned” then “neither evidence nor argument
(beyond minimal requirements of consistency) has any bearing on what the linguist
presents as a linguistic description.”
240 But if on the other hand, grammarians want
to discover the actual grammar of the language a speaker is competent in, as
Chomsky and Devitt do, then “he must concern himself with the problem of
developing an explanatory theory of the form of grammar, since this provides one
of the main tools for arriving at a descriptively adequate grammar in any particular
case.”
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For this reason Devitt’s position on explanatory adequacy does not
constitute a genuine alternative to Chomsky’s. So I’m now going to consider Katz’s
argument for his more radical position according to which we have two distinct and
evidentially isolated theories: one of grammar and one of grammar acquisition.
Katz argues that Chomsky’s criteria of adequacy are question-begging
against his Platonist conception because they include psychological objectives. Katz
agrees with Chomsky that grammarians seek to explain the structural properties of
natural languages and that an adequate grammar for a speaker’s language ought to
explain linguistic intuitions. But Katz claims that the further condition of
explanatory adequacy is question-begging as it can only be satisfied by an empirical
theory of the speaker-hearer’s psychology: to meet explanatory adequacy we have
to incorporate an empirical hypothesis about language acquisition.
Strictly speaking, Chomsky’s conditions of adequacy do not “beg” any
questions as such because they reflect explanatory goals rather than substantive
assumptions about any matter of fact. It does not beg a question to aim for theories
that are not merely descriptively but also explanatorily adequate. But one can see
what Katz has in mind. The inclusion of explanatory adequacy favours the
psychological conception, yet Platonists claim to offer the right interpretation of
generative grammars and Platonist theories need not be constrained to enumerate
only those structural properties of languages acquirable by humans. So Katz rejects
240 ibid.
241 ibid.130
what he calls the “learnability constraint” which “imports” psychological
hypotheses into generative grammar.
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Katz proposes an alternative set of conditions of adequacy on generative
grammars which is intended to be “theoretically neutral” between competing
conceptions and which he claims “conforms closely to our ordinary pre-theoretical
conception of what we want a theory of language to be.”
243 According to Katz’s
criteria, a grammar G is an optimal grammar for a language L if and only if:
1. G implies every true evidence statement about L.
2. G provides the grammatical basis for explaining all grammatical
phenomena in L that merit explanation.
3. There is no simpler grammar G’ which satisfies 1 and 2.
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Crucially, Katz classes speakers’ linguistic intuitions amongst the true evidence
statements about L and thinks the intuited properties are amongst the “grammatical
phenomena” that merit explanation. But for Katz, explaining speakers’ linguistic
intuitions is not a psychological objective, because he thinks that the intuited
properties that the grammarian ought to explain are properties of mind-independent,
Platonic objects. The primary explanatory goal on Katz’s conception is to predict
properties and relations, such as well-formedness and synonymy. A grammar
predicts the fact that a sentence has a grammatical property just in case it defines
the property and the structural description of the sentence by the grammar, together
with the definition of the property, implies that the sentence has the property. Katz
construes this as an explanation of logical and mathematical properties rather than
psychological or causal properties.
Katz does see it as a goal of generative grammar to characterise UG. He
thinks that a linguistic theory will be correct and complete only if it recursively
enumerates the generative grammars for each natural language so that all the
universal grammatical principles appear as clauses in the theory. But he construes
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UG such that these universal facts are not facts about what competent speakers of
languages are endowed with and determine the languages they acquire, but rather as
grammatical facts that “in general merit explanation”.
245 For Chomsky UG includes
"those properties that must be assumed to be available to the child learning a
language as...innate endowment.”
246 For Katz the question of UG is "the non-
psychological question of what are the essential properties of the languages that
grammatical knowledge on the part of any intelligent creature is knowledge of.”
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Katz’s case against explanatory adequacy is weak. To do the argumentative
work that Katz requires, his criteria ought to exclude considerations of explanatory
adequacy. Katz himself does exclude the acquisition of grammar from the
grammatical phenomena that “merit explanation”, but he does so on the grounds
that acquisition is a psychological phenomenon. So it is unclear how Katz’s criteria
are any more “theoretically neutral” than Chomsky’s if they must be interpreted so
as to exclude explanatory adequacy on just such grounds. This is made apparent by
the obvious availability of an interpretation of the criteria so as to admit grammar
acquisition amongst the “grammatical phenomena”. Hence, the proposed criteria do
not rule out explanatory adequacy unless interpreted from the outset so as to
exclude psychological phenomena from amongst the “grammatical phenomena”.
But this reasoning is entirely circular because it relies on excluding psychological
phenomena rather than providing an independent basis for doing so.
What Katz wants is to establish a distinction between, on the one hand,
grammatical phenomena and evidence that is directly relevant to generative
grammar, and, on the other, psychological phenomena that are irrelevant. This is
supposed to make palpable that the primary goal of generative grammar is to
explain the “grammatical phenomena” and that any psychological import that the
investigation has is merely derivative. But the only way to arrive at Katz’s
conclusion on the basis of his criteria is to assume a proprietary sense of the
grammatical or linguistic phenomena such that they are restricted to non-
psychological phenomena. Thus, there are no “impartial rules of the game” that can
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be extracted from Katz’s criteria and which help us to decide between competing
conceptions of the goals of generative grammar. Chomsky and Katz agree that
generative grammar has descriptive adequacy as a target and that the linguistic
intuitions of native speakers provide an important source of evidence for
constructing DAGs. But there are no materials here to build an argument against the
further justification that can be achieved by meeting the condition of explanatory
adequacy that Chomsky motivates.
Suppose that there are a number of equally simple, but differently structured,
DAGs for a speaker’s language g1, g2 ... gn. They each offer structural descriptions
of the sentences of a language consistent with a native speaker’s intuitions. The
grammarian could decide to be satisfied with the DAGs he has constructed. But he
might want to know, further, which of the grammars characterises the language that
the speaker actually knows. This interest will be particularly well-motivated if, as
Chomsky claims, mere coverage of the data is not “in itself, an achievement of any
particular theoretical interest”.
248
We might imagine that amongst the equally simple explanations of a
speaker’s linguistic intuitions, g1...gn, there is one g3 that contains three rules.
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Tomorrow the grammarian might discover a good reason to believe that speakers
acquire the language in question in three distinct stages. In stage 1, the speaker
recognises just those structures licensed by rule 1 of g3. Whilst in stage 2, he
recognises just those structures licensed by rule 1 and rule 2 of g3. In stage 3, he
recognises the full structure of the language. On the face of it, this provides us with
evidence that g3 rather than g1, or some arbitrarily selected grammar, g12, is the
grammar of the known language. We have evidence that it is the grammar acquired
rule-by-rule: the language is acquired in three distinct stages, each seeming to
correspond to the acquisition of a rule of the grammar.
The only move open to Katz is to deny that there is any evidence that we
should opt for g3 over the other DAGs. Katz would be making this move not
because he has a saving hypothesis about how the language is acquired, or because
he has a conflicting hypothesis about the speaker’s grammar, but because he has
248 Chomsky (1965) p.26
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placed an a priori limitation on the relevant data; placing the grammar that the
speaker has actually acquired beyond the grammarian’s sphere of interest. The
theoretical interest is obviously a coherent one but one beyond Katz’s proprietary
sense of “grammatical phenomena”.
Fodor suggests that we should be happy to grant Katz the term linguistics or
generative grammar for the discipline that adheres to such explanatory limitations.
But, as Fodor points out, “just down the road, there must be another science just like
linguistics except that it does care about empirical truth because it cares about how
the mind works.”
250 We might call this latter scientific enterprise ‘generative
grammar*’, noting that it has the explanatory goals that Chomsky outlines for
generative grammar. Generative grammar* aims for theories that do more than
assign structural descriptions to all the sentences of a language. It aims to determine
the actual grammar that a speaker knows, by characterising the structural properties
of the possible human languages acquired by speakers in first language acquisition.
It will be a condition of adequacy on a theory within generative grammar* that it
offer an explanation of the intuition of the native speaker on the basis of an
empirical hypothesis about language acquisition. Generative grammar* is inherently
concerned with Katz’s contingency: whether it is the case that “by some chance,
one linguistic theory [coincides] to a greater extent than others with a psychological
theory.”
Katz claims that generative grammar* is an incorrect characterisation of
generative grammar. He maintains that generative grammar has non-psychological
goals and should be assessed according to non-psychological conditions of
adequacy. So he needs to offer an account of the phenomena grammatical theories
are explanatory of. Katz has to motivate the grammarian’s appeal to properties of c-
command, binding and the like as part of an explanation of some non-psychological
phenomena. He cannot appeal to human cognition of these properties to motivate
their interest, because citing our psychological capacities and their development
would be to betray psychological goals. Consider sentence (9).
(9) Bill’s brother loves himself.
250 Fodor (1985) p.160134
As Collins puts the challenge to such conceptions, unless we are interested in what
speaker’s immediately and unreflectively cognise:
that Bill’s brother c-commands himself is no more interesting a property of our example
sentence than that the pairs <h, h> ad <e, e> are cross-serial. The only conceivable reason to
pick out c-command as opposed to any other conceivable property is that it, as opposed to
an indefinite number of others, enters into an explanation of human cognition.
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Those who oppose explanatory adequacy and avoid questions about the grammars
that humans actually acquire have to offer reasons for the grammarian to focus on c-
command, binding and the other properties that generative grammars appeal to as
opposed to a range of other structural properties possessed by (9). Their reasons
can’t be that those properties are the ones that humans acquire and enter into an
explanation of the cognition of language. But without appealing to these cognitive
reasons, we need to know what makes such properties salient. What are salient to
generative grammarians, looking at sentences like (9), are certain relations of
command between constituents of specially categorised types. The generative
grammarian is not so interested in many other properties and relations that can
easily be found in linguistic material, and we could easily invent relations of
structural command that are not the focus of generative grammar. There is no
obvious reason, in choosing a domain for the theory, why grammarians need to
attend to those properties of linguistic material that competent speakers of natural
languages recognise, except for the grammarian’s interest in the languages that
speakers actually know.
Speaking of the putative linguist who eschews generative grammar*, Fodor
says:
In principle, he might just as well attend to the construction of grammars that predict only
intuitions about sentences with more than seven vowels, or sentences whose twelfth word is
‘grandmother’, or sentences that happen to be uttered on Tuesdays.
252
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Fodor’s thought is that linguistic material has a range of properties that generative
linguists are clearly not interested in such as the number of letters in a sentence, or
the relative number and position of vowels and consonants. Some of these are
structural properties, such as the relative position of the sentences vowels and
consonants. So there must be some Platonist suggestion about the target of
explanation that motivates the selection of the properties that actually animate
linguistic theory and according to which generative grammar is not targeting the
language a speaker knows. As Collins remarks: “The very point of explanatory
adequacy, as a condition on general linguistic theory, is to constrain the grammars
speakers can know, to distinsguish natural language from arbitrary symbol
systems.”
253 If the Platonist cannot motivate the focus on these special properties
then our No Violence Principle (§1.3) is flouted.
Perhaps the Platonist answer is that generative grammar just explains
grammatical properties period - Katz’s “grammatical phenomena that merit
explanation” - and nothing more should be said. On this suggestion, properties like
c-command predict grammatical properties like binding which linguistic structures
have. This is correct, as far as it goes. Sentences have certain striking structural
properties and the properties uncovered by the generative grammarian are
explanatory thereof. There are two issues with this response, however, if it is being
presented as an alternative to the psychological conception of the goals of
generative grammar.
The first point is that it does not answer the question concerning the salience
of the properties that grammarians focus upon so much as postpone it. The question
for the Platonist was why certain grammatical properties such as c-command and
binding were of special theoretical interest. These properties are of a different sort
of interest to other properties that structures have, such as the number of vowels and
consonants they contain, or properties that we could imagine or stipulate linguistic
structures to have as they differ from those we immediately cognise. The proponent
of the psychological conception says that we target these properties because they
enter into an account of a range of cognitive phenomena centring on our immediate
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and unreflective cognition of language and how we acquired this competence. If the
alternative is that grammatical theories aim to explain grammatical properties of
linguistic structures, this is something that all parties (whether proponents of a
psychological or Platonist conception) can agree with. But we wanted to know what
makes these properties of linguistic material salient. Proponents of the
psychological conception answer this question by conceiving of grammatical
properties as those properties that the human faculty of language makes available to
us.
The second point is that if generative grammar is understood to contain the
theories offered within the generative enterprise then proponents of the
psychological conception might claim with much plausibility that, de facto,
generative grammar does not just explain the grammatical properties of linguistic
structures period. Generative grammar offers some explanation of a range of
cognitive phenomena and hence is pertinent to other questions “in particular those
pertaining to the deeper systems that underlie behaviour.”
254 Generative grammars
aim to assign structural descriptions to an infinite range of sentences indicating how
they are understood. Our linguistic judgements show evidence of productivity and
special hierarchical structures. As such, generative grammars explain our linguistic
intuitions, the productivity and the special organisation of the language we know.
Like our generative grammar*, generative grammars will bear on empirical
hypotheses about language acquisition, and the deep similarities between speakers
of superficially different languages. Generative grammars are also part of the
explanation of language use, insofar as an underlying knowledge of the
hypothesised grammar is integrated with performance systems of perception and
production.
The upshot of these two points is that the view that generative grammars
explain the grammatical properties of linguistic structures period is uninformative
and seems false if read prohibitively so as to exclude the psychological significance
of grammar. The prohibition might serve to express a lack of interest in certain
questions to do with natural language. But if Chomsky is right that descriptive
adequacy by itself achieves “no particular theoretical purpose” then Katz’s proposal
254 Chomsky (1965) p.193 fn.1137
amounts to a restriction of “generative grammar” to mere organisation of the
intuitions data – the only data that Katz believes is relevant to the investigation of
grammar. Generative grammarians, following Chomsky, typically ignore Katz’s
restriction. The problem with the restricted conception of the goals of generative
grammar that Katz is interested in may be, as Fodor once put it, that “deep down no
one is remotely interested in it” because they are interested in the languages
speakers actually acquire.
255 The response I have considered on Katz’s behalf fails
to motivate the linguist’s focus on the special properties of natural languages that
speakers know and fails to accommodate the wider explanatory importance of
generative grammar.
255 Fodor (1985) p.159138
3. The Competence-Performance Distinction
In the last chapter, I examined the explanatory goals of generative grammar. I
defended the view that the central explanatory target of grammatical theories is a
generative grammar that meets conditions of descriptive and explanatory adequacy.
In this chapter, I look at how grammarians investigate the generative grammars for
speakers’ languages. What grammarians require is a means to determine the
grammatical properties of speakers’ languages. The means suggested by Chomsky,
and now widely adopted amongst generative grammarians, is to draw a fundamental
distinction between a speaker’s knowledge of a grammar, realised in a system of
grammatical competence, and a speaker’s use of the grammar he knows, which
involves further systems of linguistic performance. This is a distinction between
two aspects of a speaker’s psychology. By seeking to isolate the speaker’s
grammatical competence from the extraneous performance factors, grammarians
hope to get a much clearer reflection of the grammar of a speaker’s language.
Theories of competence and theories of performance offer different kinds of
explanation. As Fodor points out, competence theories look to account for facts
about the organisation of a speaker’s linguistic behaviour and capacities by
reference to properties of his internalised grammar. Performance theories look to
account for facts about a speaker’s behaviour and capacities by reference to
interactions between the internally realised grammar and other aspects of the
speaker’s psychology.
256 For example, the linguist might look to explain a
speaker’s ability to understand or produce a novel linguistic form, embedding one
sentence within another - as with The man, the dog bit, died - by reference to the
productive operations of the speaker’s grammatical competence. But linguists might
want to explain the speaker’s inability to understand centre-embeddings of an order
of two (The man, the dog, the cat scratched, bit, died) or three (The man, the dog,
the cat, the wasp stung scratched, bit, died) by reference to interactions between
what the productive grammar allows and what non-grammatical resources, such as
short term memory, the speaker employs in parsing the sentence.
256 Fodor (1985) pp.154-5139
An inspection of speakers’ abilities with respect to sentences like (10) is
enough to suggest a difference between the grammars we know and our abilities to
use those grammars in real-time comprehension and articulation.
(10) The man the cat the dog bit scratched died.
Sentence (10) strikes me, over and again, as lacking a full grammatical structure
even once some prompting, extended attention or the explanations of others have
led me to believe otherwise. After some concentration on (10), or some thoughtful
prompting, I can recognise that it is a sentence of my language though I would
never use it and struggle to understand it at normal speed. Once I recognise that (10)
is a double centre-embedding, I can peel away the embeddings and its structure
becomes apparent to me. It is structured so that the dog bit the cat that scratched the
man that died. We can see this if we start with the sentence the man died and then
embed the clause the cat scratched, which describes the man, to give us the man the
cat scratched died. Then we can embed the dog bit, which describes the cat, into the
embedded clause yielding (10). Running through that procedure as I read (10) I can
keep its grammatical structure firmly in view but as soon as my attention lapses I
lose that structure and (10) again strikes me as lacking it.
What’s stopping me recognising the sentence as part of my language is the
lack of attention and other resources required to process the embedding. In the case
of (10), and a vast range of other cases, it is not the language I know that rules out
the structure but the extraneous factors involved in using such grammatical
information, in this instance to repeatedly centre-embed.
257 The explanation on offer
is that my use of language sometimes masks my standing knowledge of centre-
embedded structure. The distinction is suggested by a wide range of phenomena
concerning what one can immediately parse and what one can come to recognise
with added performance resources such as time, extended attention or bracketing.
But it is also suggested by such crude facts as that it’s hard to see how I could speak,
understand or judge of sentences of my language without such a body of standing
information in place. Though I can decide what I want to say, I cannot decide to
257 I expand on this point in §3.3, §3.4.140
speak and understand sentences of Arabic without drawing on some standing
information that shapes my speech and understanding.
The key idea is that linguistic performances are the upshot of a number of
factors amongst which grammar is only one. Grammarians name that aspect of the
speaker responsible for the grammatical properties of performances, the system of
grammatical competence. The competence system is considered as part of a parser
for processing language that also includes distinct mechanisms for perceiving
language. The perceptual mechanism works according to different principles to the
grammar and the parser is subject to a variety of non-grammatical limitations.
Insofar as a speaker’s linguistic performances in uttering and parsing language
obscure or deviate from the grammar they know, they constitute a kind of linguistic
debris from the grammarian’s perspective. As well as these systems for speaking
and perceiving speech, grammatical competence is also integrated with conceptual-
intentional systems for using language in thought. The narrow operation of the
recursive grammatical competence, FLN (see §1.2), can be distinguished from the
whole, broad package involving the performance mechanisms and systems for
using language in thought, FLB.
In this chapter I argue that grammarians need a distinction between that
aspect of the speaker’s mind responsible for grammar, the competence system, and
those other aspects of the mind that enter into the speaker’s behaviour and
capacities in order to determine the generative grammar of his language. On the
basis that grammarians require a competence-performance distinction to investigate
a speaker’s grammar, I argue that it is theoretical apparatus that all conceptions of
generative grammar must commit to. A conception of generative grammar that did
not appeal to the competence-performance distinction to determine what amongst a
speaker’s behaviour and capacities reflects grammar and what reflects independent
features of language use, and offered no other means to effect the disentanglement,
would flout the No Violence Principle. For such a conception would have no
resources to determine what amongst a record of speech, or amongst the intuitions
data, is a reflection of the grammatical properties of a speaker’s language and what
is not. I thereby provide an argument that generative grammar is committed to a
psychological distinction between different aspects of the mind/brain responsible
for our linguistic behaviour and capacities, and that it attempts to characterise a141
psychological system of grammatical competence. The fundamental importance of
the competence-performance distinction suggests that grammatical theory is guided
by psychological commitments and as such “is concerned with discovering a mental
reality underlying actual behaviour.”
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3.1 Competence and Use
The notion of competence employed in generative grammar is not one that applies
to our proficiency in using a language. Ordinarily, we talk about someone being
competent at doing something or having the competence to perform a certain task.
If we say that someone is a competent golfer, this is usually understood to be
roughly synonymous with their playing golf well. Although, we might maintain that
someone is a competent golfer when an injury or a bad set of clubs temporarily
masks their abilities.
Possessing a grammatical competence, in the sense pertinent to generative
grammar, is not meant to mark someone out as having an ability or doing something
well. It is not meant to mark that someone is good at constructing and
understanding grammatical sentences, for instance. Rather, in generative grammar,
“competence” is used to designate a special psychological state: the structural
organisation of the human mind that explains our potential for speaking and
understanding language. Though possession of this psychological state, the
“competence” system, is one of the enabling factors in our being competent users of
a language, the ordinary notion of competent use is not what is being targeted.
In the linguist’s sense, two individuals might share exactly the same
grammatical competence but differ greatly in their capacities to use it. And a person
might increase their abilities to use their language whilst adding nothing to their
grammatical competence. Not only in principle, but in real cases, subjects can
possess this underlying system of knowledge whilst their ability to speak and
understand language is impaired so that they are not proficient language users:
258 Chomsky (1965) p.4142
Ability to use language may improve or decline without any change in knowledge. The
ability may also be impaired selectively or in general, with no loss of knowledge, a fact that
would become clear if injury leading to impairment recedes and the lost ability is
recovered.
259
This is because further psychological systems enter into the use of the information
supplied by the competence system. With “competence” so conceived, a person
who knows English but suffers cerebral damage - leaving the underlying knowledge
intact but impairing their use of language in speech, comprehension or thought -
retains their competence. We can imagine the effects of the brain damage receding
and the person recovering the capacity to use their language. Though the person has
no capacity to speak or understand in the interim, a certain mental structure that
underlies speaking and understanding must have gone undamaged; unless the
person re-learnt the language from scratch after the injury.
Such aphasias are real phenomena.
260 Aphasia is the loss of the ability to
speak or comprehend language due to damage to the brain areas responsible for
these functions. The recovery of aphasics who lose the ability to speak and
comprehend provides evidence for the integrity of the competence system, though
none of the aphasic’s linguistic behaviour up to the point at which recovery begins
evidences competent language use. It is this retained structure to the mind/brain that
the grammarian wants to distinguish from the capacity to use language.
Further evidence for the distinct system designated as the competence
system comes from the different modalities and mechanisms engaged in putting our
knowledge of language to use in speaking and understanding. Pettito reports that
grammar acquisition occurs in profoundly deaf children exposed only to sign, in
hearing bilingual babies that acquire a sign language and a spoken language, and in
259 Chomsky (1986) p.9
260 There are well attested aphasias resulting from damaging to Broca’s area, which is responsible for
the production of language, and to Wernicke’s area, which is responsible for language interpretation.
Aphasia’s are not the result of general sensory, intellectual or psychological malfunction. Depending
on the severity of the brain damage involved aphasics may be able to produce language but not
comprehend it or even sing but not speak. Certain chronic neurological disorders such as epilepsy
and severe migraines can also have transient aphasia as a symptom.143
hearing children without any spoken input whatsoever, only signed input.
261
Hearing children exposed exclusively to sign exhibit normal development of a
grammatical system, albeit that they put it to use in signing rather than speaking.
They do so without using the brain’s auditory and speech perception mechanisms
and without the use of motor mechanisms involved in producing speech. They even
babble using gestures. What this suggests is that this grammatical competence
system is not primarily a set of mechanisms for producing and comprehending
speech or sign. There is the same underlying grammatical competence across
variations in the production mechanisms and behavioural capacities “all the while
preserving linguistic structure across the [different] modalities.”
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The charge might be levelled at the grammarian that he should not use the
term “competence” if what he has in mind is a mental state and not an ability to
exhibit a certain range of behaviours. The term “competence” was originally
introduced to “avoid entanglement with the slew of problems relating to
‘knowledge’”.
263 Chomsky has noted that “competence” is itself misleading insofar
as it suggests an ability, and this is an association that he hopes to sever by pointing
out that it is a technical term, encompassing:
all those aspects of form and meaning and their relation, including underlying structures
that enter into that relation, which are properly assigned to the specific subsystem of the
human mind that relates representations of form and meaning.
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Though the integration of the competence system with wider psychological systems
for using language does support (roughly speaking) commonsense exercises of
linguistic “competence”, Chomsky could just as well talk about a component of I-
language or invent some other technical term. The competence system clearly does
bear on what the speaker can do, though it is not a characterisation of what he does.
The key point is that the competence system shapes behaviour only insofar as it is
integrated with systems for linguistic performance.
261 Pettito (2005) pp.90-1
262 Pettito (2005) p.92
263 Chomsky (1981) p.59
264 ibid.144
3.2 Why Generative Grammar Needs a Competence-
Performance Distinction
In Chapter Two, I alluded to the fact that both linguistic behaviour and linguistic
intuitions are the upshot of an ensemble of distinctive underlying psychological
systems. The problem that faces the linguist is how to focus on those aspects of
linguistic intuitions and behaviours that reflect the grammar of a speaker’s language.
Stanley describes the linguist’s predicament in the following way:
Ordinary discourse often involves the use of complex expressions which would be counted
as ungrammatical even by the utterer’s own lights. For example, some people regularly start
a new sentence halfway through an utterance of another sentence… It is absurd to suppose
we should count such discourse as grammatical, and thereby modify syntactic theory to
account for it, and this despite its (statistically speaking) relative normalcy.
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It would be “absurd” because such discourse is clearly affected by factors other than
the speaker’s language; to incorporate all the factors that enter into a speaker’s
linguistic behaviour would expand the domain of linguistic theory indefinitely. The
grammarian would be left with the thankless task of trying to explain all the
properties of linguistic behaviour concurrently. For, presented with a record of
speech, he would have no resources to distinguish the false starts, the deviations
from rules, the changes of plan in mid-course or even the hiccups from the enduring
linguistic forms that speakers recognise. So, it is a sensible theoretical move to
separate out the factors responsible for linguistic behaviour so as to get a clearer
reflection of the speaker’s language.
The competence-performance distinction is just such a theoretical move to
differentiate amongst the complex factors responsible for linguistic behaviour and
judgement. As Chomsky puts it:
265 Stanley (2000) p.408145
To study actual linguistic performance, we must consider a variety of factors, of which the
underlying competence of the speaker-hearer is only one. In this respect, the study of
language is no different from the study of other complex phenomena.
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Speaking very broadly, our use of language involves our pairing the sounds that we
hear and utter with linguistic forms. So there is some core linguistic system, or
ensemble of systems, responsible for integrating the two sets of structures. It is this
system that is called the grammatical competence system. In order to isolate aspects
of our use of our language in behaviour and judgement that reflect the grammatical
forms of our language, linguists can investigate this pairing of sounds and linguistic
forms that our grammatical competence licences. The linguist can then try to
distinguish this project as sharply as is possible from the investigation of whatever
other factors affect our use of these grammatical forms.
So understood, the competence-performance distinction is to be drawn a
posteriori. The distinction is an inference to the best explanation of our linguistic
judgements, as with our explanation of (10), and of the organisation of our
behaviour. The linguist discovers which aspects of speakers’ capacities and
behaviours fall within the domain of a theory of grammatical competence, and
which within the theory of performance, by fashioning the best explanations of the
speaker’s capacities and behaviours.
267 Hiccups do not turn out to be part of the
theory of grammatical competence, even though they occur within a record of
speech, because they are produced by the interaction of the language mechanisms
with other mechanisms that are known to operate independently of language. So an
adequate theory would have to treat speech that contains hiccups as an interaction
effect of the language systems and something else rather than attribute them to the
speaker’s grammatical competence.
It might be suggested that this explanatory commitment to the competence-
performance distinction as the method to discern the grammatical properties of a
speaker’s language is overly hasty. The problem we started out with was that
linguistic behaviour and intuition are complex interaction effects involving a range
of factors other than grammar. It might be suggested that this only implies that
266 Chomsky (1965) p.4
267 Fodor (1985) pp.154-5146
judgements, speech and comprehension are a noisy guide to grammatical properties.
The fact that these phenomena are a noisy reflection of grammar, so the thought
goes, is just the same situation as occurs in other sciences where the data are noisy.
What is required of the linguist then is that he set aside the data that are too noisy,
idealising away from the noise so as to get a clearer reflection of the underlying
grammatical regularities.
This proposed alternative denies that the complexity of factors that enter
into linguistic intuition and behaviour calls for the grammarian to develop a theory
about the underlying grammatical competence system. The proposed alternative is
that the complexity and noise only require the linguist to set aside seeming
anomalies and to regiment the observed phenomena in such a way that grammatical
generalisations can be extracted. On this alternative view, the grammarian need not
theorise about an underlying grammatical system of the mind, as distinguished from
performance factors, in order to reveal grammar. Rather the grammatical properties
are discernible amongst the data once it is systematised and the noise is set to one
side.
However, the grammarian who makes an explanatory commitment to the
competence-performance distinction is not denying that the usual situation obtains,
whereby there are aspects of the phenomena scientists observe that are relevant to
their investigation but there is also noise. The purpose of making an explanatory
commitment to the competence-performance distinction is to give some substance
to the question of what amongst the observed linguistic phenomena reflects
grammar: of what is relevant to grammatical investigation and what should be
counted as “noise”. For any set of observations, from some explanatory perspective,
there are properties of the observed phenomena that are noise. So, the grammarian
needs some explanatory perspective from which to ascertain what amongst the
observed phenomena reflects grammar, the underlying pairings of sounds and
linguistic forms, and what is noise. The competence theory commits the
grammarian to there being an aspect of the speaker responsible for the sound-
linguistic form pairings, and by investigating that aspect of the speaker we
determine what in his behaviour and capacities reflects his grammar. We can fix up
messes, regimenting our observations, in any number of ways. But not all147
systematisations of the observed phenomena will be revealing of the grammars of
speakers’ languages.
Devitt’s view is that grammarians should study properties of outward
linguistic behaviours, such as utterances, the “outputs” of the psychological systems
for language, rather than study an underlying system of grammatical competence.
He recognises that these linguistic outputs are not an unproblematic reflection of
grammatical properties. Accordingly, he suggests that the grammarian is only
concerned with a subset of the outputs. Just as “sometimes what a blacksmith
produces is not a good horseshoe” so Devitt reasons that sometimes the
psychological systems for language will produce utterances that are not well-
structured grammatically. What he suggests is that “[t]he theory is only concerned
with the nature of the outputs of a competence when it performs as it should” and
“performance errors” should be “set aside”.
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The weakness in Devitt’s suggestion, considered as an alternative to the
competence-performance distinction, is that he clearly uses the theoretical notions
of competence and performance to discern amongst the relevant properties of the
outputs. Devitt says:
[Chomsky] draws attention to the fact that many factors can enter into any performance
other than underlying competence: there can be “noise”, limitations of memory, etc. The
theory of competence abstracts from that. And so does the theory of expressions that the
Respect Constraint distinguishes from the theory of competence.
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But the only means Devitt offers to sort amongst properties of outputs, the outputs
that result when the competence “performs as it should” and the “performance
errors” that should be set aside, is the competence-performance distinction. His
“theory of expressions” abstracts from “performance errors” that enter into the
outputs. But to do that one needs a hypothesis about which factors enter into the
performance events, his “expressions”: about which aspects of utterances are the
reflection of performance systems and which reveal grammar. Once one has made
this distinction amongst the factors that enter into the etiology of outputs, i.e.
268 Devitt (2006) p.18
269 Devitt (unpublished ms.) p.16148
between what is a reflection of performance systems (Devitt’s “performance errors”)
and what is a reflection of the speaker’s possession of a grammatical system, then,
and only then, can one go about abstracting from performance factors.
Contrary to what Devitt supposes, our felt grasp of which behavioural
phenomena are a reflection of “performance errors” and which a reflection of a
speaker’s grammar will only take us so far. In order to discern in an empirically
motivated way what amongst the phenomena constitutes “performance error”, we
require an empirical theory of performance, as this is distinguished from a theory of
the grammatical system of competence. So Devitt is anyway relying on a theory of
grammatical competence and its interaction with performance systems. The notion
of grammar is a highly theoretical one, and ultimately our theory of what a
speaker’s grammatical system licenses is going to inform our conception of what
phenomena fall within the scope of grammatical theory and which are Devitt’s
“performance errors”. A theoretical focus on the competence-performance
distinction is an attempt to get some empirical purchase on what amongst the data
reflects what; on what is a reflection of a speaker’s grammar and what is just
“noise” from the grammarian’s perspective.
So the question of what is “messy data” or “noise”, from the point of view
of grammatical theory, is non-trivial. Devitt wants us to distinguish between the
rules that characterise a speaker’s grammatical competence and the structure rules
“respected” by that competence. But, as should be apparent, adopting the
competence-performance methodology, we find out about the rules that characterise
a speaker’s language by theorising about their grammatical competence and how it
informs their linguistic performances. Devitt himself is explicitly committed to a
theory of performance in appealing to “performance errors”, and so, in my view, he
tacitly supposes, the competence-performance distinction and a conception of
grammatical competence as that which the performance factors are to be
distinguished from. His “theory of expressions” relies on our finding out what
constitutes “performance error” and what reflects the rules of a speaker’s language.
But the only way we know how to do that is to find out how the grammar which a
speaker has internalised interacts with the performance mechanisms involved in
language use.
Chomsky suggests that grammatical theory is primarily concerned with:149
[A]n ideal speaker...who knows its language perfectly and is unaffected by such
grammatically irrelevant conditions as memory limitations, distractions, shifts of attention
and interest and errors (random or characteristic) in applying his knowledge of language in
actual performance.
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So conceived, grammatical theory focuses on the language a speaker knows. As
Fodor notes, it is the competence-performance distinction that Chomsky draws
upon to introduce the idea of an idealised speaker.
271 Chomsky is imagining what a
real speaker would be like if the grammatical system engaged in his behaviour was
not constrained by other psychological states and processes. Of course, without the
further states and processes there would not be any behavioural output at all. But we
might imagine a speaker with infinite time, attention and short-term memory and so
on. Then assuming, artificially, a theory of processing that appealed to only these
three factors, we might suppose that the speaker would be able to interpret centre-
embeddings of an arbitrary number, always tell whether a string, however long, was
grammatical and so on. The theory of the ideal speaker is then really a theory of
grammatical competence idealising away from the interaction of the competence
system with other psychological factors:
We can even add this: grammars per se are theories about Ideal Speaker-Hearers. This
sounds wildly deep and ontological and sexy, but actually it is trivial and harmless. All it
means is that grammars are not, per se, theories of the interaction effects.
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The questions of fact are whether this broad division of theoretical labour is an
explanatory one, and, if so, what the correct division of explanatory labour between
grammatical competence and the other systems really is.
But a competence theory doesn’t just abstract from the performance
limitations. The theories of competence and performance appeal to different
systems which exhibit different principles. Competence Theories do not ignore
270 Chomsky (1965) p.3
271 Fodor (1985) p.155
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these performance factors or simply idealise performance. They are supposed to gel
in some way with theories of the different performance systems insofar as
competence is one of the factors that, along with linguistic performance systems
and other cognitive factors, offer some explanation of our language use and
judgements. Competence is not just idealised performance: when we leave
performance limitations out of the picture this is really to idealise performance not
to offer a theory of grammatical competence. The competence system generates
linguistic forms that cannot be simply read off performance events, however
idealised, because the performance systems work according to different principles.
As we saw with (10), linguists need both sorts of principles to explain the data.
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Chomsky initially conceived of his “ideal speaker” as situated within a
“homogenous speech community”.
274 One might wonder whether the speaker’s
place within such a community, rather than his individual competence, might help
the grammarian determine what the grammar of his language is. The idea might be
that the aspects of a speaker’s judgements and behaviours relevant to the
grammarian are those that obey the grammatical principles of the speech
community, whilst the rest, where the speaker is out-of-step with his community, is
just noise.
Chomsky never foresaw the notion of a speech community playing this
theoretical role. It is noteworthy that he has subsequently given up altogether on the
idea that the notion is of any use to grammatical theory, adopting a thoroughgoing
individualist perspective on grammatical theory (§1.2).
275 Chomsky originally
employed the notion of a homogeneous speech community as to abstract away from
the differences between speakers of relevantly similar languages. The theory of a
speaker’s competence was never informed by a theory of his membership of a
speech community. Rather the object of inquiry has always been any individual
speaker’s endowment for grammar and the way that their mature grammar is
determined by a course of experience. Though grammarians talk about English-
273 I develop this point in §3.3, §3.4.
274 Chomsky (1965) p.3
275 Chomsky (1987) says: “The notion of ‘community’, in fact, requires clarification that has never
been given.”151
speakers, French-speakers and so forth, these communities are abstractions from the
competences of collections of more or less similar individual speakers. To work out
the grammatical principles that characterise the language spoken within a speech
community, one needs to investigate the principles that characterise the grammars
of its individual speakers.
Chomsky’s view is that languages such as English, and speech communities
such as the English-speaking community, are not only more abstract but also less
well-defined that the grammatical competences of individual speakers. It is a well
known quip of Max Weinrich’s in linguistics that languages are dialects with armies
and navies; interest-relative demarcations made according to historical, sociological
or power interests.
276 Much the same view is taken of linguistic communities. If one
wanted to use the idea that there were grammatical rules that characterised the
English-speaking community in generative grammar then one would first have to
draw a boundary around English-speaking communities. The widely held view is
that there is little empirical substance behind any such boundaries beyond the unity
provided by similarities in speakers’ grammatical competences. Moreover, it is
widely assumed that there is nothing to be learnt about grammatical structure by
drawing such boundaries.
For instance, a marginally different set of rules may underlie the English
that one hears in the Highlands of Scotland, Glasgow, Newcastle and South
London.
277 We could classify all of the speakers in these regions as members of the
same speech community, even if some of them are mutually unintelligible, or we
could say that these marginal differences are sufficient to distinguish amongst the
dialects giving us three speech communities. We would not have learnt anything
about the grammars of speakers’ languages by doing so.
278 It is well known that
276 Compare Chomsky (1987 p.170): “[My speech community] is taken to be the community of
speaker of ‘my language’ but here ‘language’ is understood in the unanalysed sense of ordinary
usage, with its socio-political and normative-teleological dimensions, a notion that is obscure and in
any event has no status in an inquiry into language and the use of language.”
277 Kayne (2000 p.7) suggests that: “it is entirely likely that no two speakers of English have exactly
the same syntactic judgements.”
278 In this vein, Chomsky (1987 p.170) says: “Thus is George, or Kripke, or a speaker of Oxford
English, or of Cockney, or of German, etc., a member [of my speech community]? There is no152
grammatical differences in idiolects and dialects amongst the speakers of one
“language”, such as Chinese, can outstrip the differences between dialects of
different languages, such a Dutch and German. There are speakers of dialects of
Dutch and German that are mutually intelligible whilst there are speakers of dialects
of Chinese that are mutually unintelligible. Settling the boundaries between these
commonsensical languages and the respective speech communities would not help
us in investigating linguistic form because the answers to such questions seem to be
a matter of decision or perspective, arbitrary from the grammarian’s point of view.
3.3 Grammatical Competence and Linguistic Processing
Theories of grammatical competence attempt to specify a function that our
production and consumption of language meets. Our production and consumption
of language meet this function insofar as the function yields the sound-linguistic
form pairings that are partially explanatory of our linguistic judgements and
behaviour. But such models of our grammatical competence are to be contrasted
with processing models because they are not attempts to specify how, by what
effective real-time procedure, we process linguistic material. Chomsky has always
been clear that:
When we say that a sentence has a certain derivation with respect to a particular generative
grammar, we say nothing about how the speaker or hearer might proceed in some practical
or efficient way, to construct such a derivation. These questions belong to the theory of
language use – the theory of performance… No doubt a reasonable model of language use
will incorporate, as a basic component, the generative grammar that expresses the speaker-
hearer’s knowledge of the language; but this generative grammar does not, in itself,
prescribe the character or functioning of a perceptual model or a model of speech
production.
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known way to answer these questions in any useful manner; note that the issue is not whether the
terms are usable in ordinary informal discourse – of course they are – but whether they can be made
clear in a way that will contribute to the effort to understand language and the use of language.”
279 Chomsky (1965) p.9. Radford (1988 p.132) offers the following analogy: “Municipal regulations
specify certain structural conditions that houses must meet…What they do not do is tell you how to153
Theories of grammatical competence investigate a structured state of the human
mind/brain, its growth and maturation. One might think of this state as a more over-
arching structure to the mind/brain than the mechanisms effective in speaking and
understanding. The grammarian imputes existence to this abstract structure of the
brain in “the same sense as we impute existence to a program that we believe to be
somehow represented in a computer”, hoping to find further evidence about the
physical states that implement the program.
280 The investigation of these states is
informed by the more abstract study and, in principle, the converse is true.
There are phenomena that pervade language processing that do not directly
concern the grammarian. Though people sometimes plan their utterances to some
extent, typically they don’t fully formulate sentences before they begin uttering
them. This is evident from the existence of disfluences such as “uh...ums”,
repetitions and false starts. People often say things like:
(11) Because…you see I, uh, didn’t want to go because, uumm, I don’t
really like it there.
There are aspects of (11) such as the pause after Because and the “uh...uummm”
sounds that are processing effects, which are not of direct relevance to linguistic
structure. But there are processing effects where grammatical structure does look to
be directly relevant. For example, agreement errors are more common after
embedded that-clauses. Errors like (12) are significantly less commonly produced
than errors like (13):
(12) *The claim about newborn babies were rejected.
(13) *The claim that the wolves had raised the newborn babies were rejected.
go about building a house…Phrase structure rules should be thought of as analogous to municipal
building regulations: they lay down certain structural conditions which sentences must meet.”
280 Chomsky (1979) p.3154
The relation between grammatical competence and parsing/production mechanisms
is a huge area of empirical research. There exist a very wide range of suggestions
about the role of competence theories in understanding language processing.
281 To
take an illustrative example of the issues involved, some early work sought to build
transformational grammar directly into the parsing mechanism. This was called the
derivational theory of complexity: the theory that the processing complexity of
sentences increases as a function of the number of grammatical transformations
involved in their derivation. There were some initially promising results suggesting
a correlation between the amount of memory required to process a sentence and the
number of transformations involved.
282 The proposed deep structure for sentences
like (14) had three occurrences of the detective whilst the proposed deep structure
for (15) had only two:
(14) The governor asked the detective to cease drinking.
(15) The governor asked the detective to prevent drinking.
And in recall experiments, the detective was significantly more effective in
prompting people to remember (14) than (15) which seems to correlate the higher
number of transformations into surface structure with the memory resources drawn
upon. But later work undermined the theory.
283 The derivational theory of
complexity predicts that subjects should find (17) and (18) more complex to process
than (16) because they involve extra deletion transformations.
(16) Pat swam faster than Chris swam.
281 See Neeleman and van de Koot (2008) for a recent discussion of the issues. They argue the
grammatical system should not be understood as a knowledge base consulted by the performance
systems in language use but rather as a more abstract description of the structure of the brain (at a
cognitive level) distinguished from language computation. For a discussion of some of the wider
explanatory issues implicated in whether we see the competence-performance distinction as a
distinction between two (Marrian) levels of description of a single system or two distinct but
interacting systems on one level, see the debate between Franks (1995) and Patterson (1998).
282 Miller (1962)
283 Fodor, Bever and Garrett (1974)155
(17) Pat swam faster than Chris did.
(18) Pat swam faster than Chris.
But in fact subjects process (16) more slowly than (17) or (18). This indicates a
more complex relation between grammatical competence and the processing
mechanisms than the derivational theory of complexity suggests.
Ultimately, we want to know what the relation is between a subject’s
competence, the structured information they possess, and their use of language in
speaking and understanding. As Garrett puts it, we want to know “what relation
holds between formal theories of grammatical structure and theories of real-time
computational processes that underlie human language use.”
284 There are some
broad features of the distinction that I want to press without pre-judging the
empirical issues too much.
The fact that the competence system and the processing mechanisms work
according to different principles can be illustrated by appeal to a few famous
examples. We struggle to process doubly centre-embedded structures like (10) that
we can come to recognise as part of our language. But self-embedding contributes
far more radically to our inability to parse structures than applications of
grammatical principles of similar complexity like nesting. Consider that sentence
(19) is fairly comprehensible:
(19) Anyone who feels that, if so many more students whom we have not
actually admitted are sitting on the course than ones we have that the room
had to be changed, then probably auditors will have to be excluded, is likely
to agree that the curriculum needs revision.
Sentence (19) contains six nestings but no self-embeddings, and compares
favourably in how easy it is to parse with (10) where two centre-embeddings cause
us a lot of trouble.
285 We often fail to process such grammatical “garden path”
284 Garrett (1990) p.139
285 Chomsky (1965 p.196 fn.6) suggests that these phenomena provide evidence about the
organisation of the parser beyond the triviality that it has finite available memory. The problem with156
structures as The horse raced past the barn fell, where raced past the barn is a
relative clause. And we systematically misconstrue such “depth charge” sentences
as No head injury is too trivial to ignore, which consideration reveals to mean that
however trivial a head injury is it should be ignored, rather than that that no head
injury, however trivial, should be ignored. Speakers can recognise these special
processing effects on what we say and hear, when we attend to them carefully, often
appreciating fairly immediately upon intuitive consideration what we never notice
in production and consumption.
When speakers produce or parse speech in ways that diverge from what their
grammatical competence licenses, they are often then able to come to the right
arrangements of words, rearranging them to form an acceptable sentence. Such
judgements are not merely a matter of firing up the processing system again,
running it as before and seeing what comes out. Something, a body of information,
guides a speaker’s judgement of a more acceptable result.
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How might a grammatical principle like Principle A act as a constraint on
linguistic processing? We know that by and large speakers do not produce sentences
with reflexives that lack local antecedents and that if the parser tries to construe a
reflexive as referentially bound by a non-local antecedent then this violates
Principle A and the proposed structure will strike us as deviant in some way. We
can observe quite radical divergences from what competence licenses when
speakers are inattentive, extremely tired or suffer strokes that damage their ability to
speak and understand. But we can also get good evidence for such principled
constraints on what we produce and comprehend which are reflected in our sense of
what constitutes a good sentence of our language.
These questions are obviously worth pursuing as we have real phenomena
here that require an explanation. Smith argues that the explanation will require a
two-tier architecture.
287 His own tentative suggestion about that architecture is that
we might think of the parser as a “fast and dirty” connectionist system trained up on
self-embedding might suggest that the perceptual device has a stock of procedures available to it, and
that it finds it hard to execute a procedure P whilst it is already in the course of executing that same P.
286 See Smith (unpublished ms.) p.13 for discussion.
287 Smith (unpublished ms.) p.14157
the parameterised principles of a grammar, which provide “templates” according to
which parses can be checked and the parser can “correct or fine tune its outputs”.
He offers the comparison of the process of shaking something through a sieve:
Were we to shake a jar of lexical items through a sieve – the templates...if a selection
violates at least one of the principles, or if at least one lexical item fails to have its
requirements met, then it fails to be a grammatical structure. On the other hand, if a
sequence passes through the sieve untrapped it is a grammatical structure… What matters is
that the expressions the quick and dirty processor puts together get checked against the
conditions imposed by the grammar. In this sense, the principles can have an influence on
output and input without being part of the processing.
288
So understood, the competence does not produce outputs in any stage of a process
but the generative procedure encodes structural constraints against which possible
outputs of processing might be compared. One virtue of this sort of model is that it
suggests how the competence system (at one level) constrains the performance
systems (at another), whilst allowing that processing is governed by different rules
to the competence.
289
Devitt’s “minimal position on psychological reality”, (M), stated that all a
grammatical theory tells us about grammatical competence is that there is
something inside a speaker “we know not what” that is responsible for producing
outputs. This something “we-know-not-what” is, on Devitt’s account, the
competence system which is governed by a set of processing rules that respect the
grammatical rules of a language. We can now see that this is to mistake the theory
of competence for a processing theory, for the grammatical competence system
does not produce outputs, at least not of the externalised sort Devitt suggests. The
competence system shapes our performance but does not serve to process language
and produce anything like utterances or parses, this being a performance matter. If
we think of the structured state of grammatical competence as having “outputs”, in
an extenuated sense, then these are the structured LF and PF representations. LF
288 Smith (unpublished ms.) p.17
289 Though see Neeleman and van de Koot (2008) for a critique of similar architectural proposals.158
and PF are internal, mental structures not Devitt’s outputs, which are performance
events.
This distinction between the competence system that encodes grammatical
structure and the processors is set out in Collins’ Revised Distinctions I – III (§1.3)
which distinguish a theory of the language faculty, revealing of grammatical
structure, from a theory of the processors involved in performance events. The
structures encoded by a speaker’s grammatical competence, and targeted by
generative grammarians, are distinct from processing mechanisms. Hence, a theory
of competence is not a processing theory. But however the brain does process
linguistic material, we expect it to be constrained by the conditions that our
competence theory specifies, insofar as we take that competence theory to be part of
the best explanation of our intuitive judgements and linguistic behaviour.
Hence, it is perfectly possible for Chomsky to adhere to Devitt’s distinctions
I – III that distinguish the investigation of grammatical structure from the
investigation of language processing whilst maintaining that generative grammar
involves investigating grammatical competence. Chomsky urges us to distinguish
the study of the grammatical categories and relations to which the competence
system is sensitive from the rules of language processing. With the competence-
performance distinction in place, Devitt’s distinction between a theory of the
structure rules of a language and a theory of the processing rules involved in
outputting utterances could be a distinction amongst theories of the mind/brain,
marking a distinction that animates the psychological conception he is attacking.
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290 This is why Slezak (unpublished ms. p.12) claims that “Devitt is merely restating Chomsky’s own
competence/performance distinction as though he has advanced some novel insight.” Slezak asks us
to note the similarity of the following passages. Devitt (2006 p.38) says that it is not sufficient for
knowing the processing rules that we know “there is something-we-know-not-what within a speaker
that respects the rules of her language…We would like to go beyond these minimal claims.” Whilst
Chomsky (1986 p.197) says “we are keeping to abstract conditions that unknown mechanisms must
meet. We might go on to suggest actual mechanisms, but we know that it would be pointless to do so
in the present stage of our ignorance concerning the functioning of the brain.” Both think that
grammatical theory specifies abstract conditions that unknown mechanisms meet. This is Devitt’s
respect constraint and Chomsky’s point about unknown ways in which grammatical principles are
met by mechanisms. However, Slezak is wrong to suggest that Devitt’s distinctions must be
Chomsky’s restated. Devitt thinks that grammarians theorise about the environmental outputs of159
So if Devitt’s view is that “a theory of a competence must posit processing
rules that respect the structure rules of the outputs.” then this is either an error or
Devitt is using “competence” in a non-standard way to include grammatical
competence and the processing mechanisms.
291 As Smith has pointed out:
Confusion arises…because Devitt glosses the claim that a grammar is about a speaker’s
linguistic competence as the claim that the grammar is about the processing system
responsible for the speaker’s performance. And this is clearly not what Chomsky means by
‘competence’.
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The fact that Devitt is adopting a non-standard conception of grammatical
competence is suggested by the following remark:
What more is there to linguistic competence than the state of embodying the remaining
processing rules that are centre-stage in performance? If the grammar is not supposed to be
about that state, what other mental state could it be supposed to be about?
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The answer to Devitt’s first question is that the issue is about the role competence
plays in processing not about whether the competence system “embodies”
processing rules. An answer to Devitt’s second question is that the competence
theory is about a structured state of the mind/brain organised by parameterised
principles. The theory of grammatical competence specifies what constraints the
mind/brain of a competent language user realises. It internally determines
conditions on the processes. We know that there are sounds and linguistic forms,
and that the mind/brain serves to pair these structures recursively and over an
unbounded range. The theory of grammatical competence investigates these
systematic pairings, without specifying how the brain actually operates so as to
solve this integration problem effectively. But the competence theory states precise
linguistic cognition distinct from psychology. Whilst Chomsky argues that we need a distinction
between psychological systems of competence and performance to determine the grammars of
languages, with the competence system specifying the structure of the mind responsible for grammar.
291 Devitt (unpublished ms.) p.23
292 Smith (unpublished ms.) p.8
293 Devitt (unpublished ms.) p.10160
structural conditions, abstracted from the brain’s behaviour, which any theory of
what the brain does will have to take on board. There is no reason to take seriously
the idea that the grammatical structure our competence system licences is a kind of
epiphenomenon compared to processing, because grammatical structure is evident
in our judgements and behaviour.
294 The principles of this state are an inference to
the best explanation of intuitions and the organisation of behaviour, as is the fact
that this state is not the processor though it plays some role with respect to
processing. We need both the competence system and the performance systems for
the best explanation of judgements, production and comprehension. Moreover,
grammarians have discovered a lot about the grammatical structures speakers
acquire. So there is no plausibility to the claim that grammatical competence is
more mysterious or less easily explicable than processing. Beyond these broad
features of the competence-performance distinction which suffice to answer
Devitt’s rhetorical questions, the issues are to be answered by the best empirical
theories of the distinction and of the respective contributions of competence and
performance.
Though Chomsky holds that generative grammar is a part of psychology, he
has never professed that grammatical theory is an investigation of psychological
processing as such. Chomsky distinguishes theory of the grammatical structures
recognised by competent speakers from theories of psychological processing whilst
holding that both describe an aspect of our psychology. In a sense, Chomsky’s
aspirations have always been more modest than those Devitt attributes him. Even if
we knew all the facts about the grammatical competence or information that
speakers possess, we still wouldn’t know exactly how they put it to use in speaking
and understanding, how it is engaged in processing, and outside of these “online”
processes in judgement.
Devitt could claim that investigating such grammatical structure to the
mind/brain is not really a part of psychology. But this is highly problematic, for
whatever theory of language processing is offered, we seem to require a theory of
294 Similarly, Neeleman and van de Koot (2008) conclude that the higher degree of abstraction
involved in the theory of grammar as compared with the parser is no reason to question the reality of
the grammatical code.161
the grammatical structure to which the mind/brain is sensitive, more abstract
conditions which the processing events meet and which explain our judgements.
These conditions are the special recursive and hierarchical principles of our
grammatical system. Such a theory is just what the theory of grammatical
competence, required to determine the grammar of a speaker’s language, provides
us with.
Accounts of processing are informed by this account of grammatical
structure. But one could maintain that only processing theories, and not theories of
the structural constraints to which competent speakers are sensitive, constitute
genuine psychology. However, one then has to defend an a priori conception of
psychology as extending only to processing mechanisms, and not to states of
knowledge and more over-arching structure. Moreover, if this is Devitt’s view, then
he is not attacking the more modest psychological conception that Chomsky
defends. And prima facie, this would be to ignore an important class of cognitive
states. Principle A characterises a state of grammatical competence insofar as
speakers are sensitive to reflexive structure. But it is not a processing rule telling us
how the constraint is effectively adhered to by the brain in parsing or producing
sentences. It is sufficient for theories of grammatical competence to characterise an
aspect of speaker’s psychology that their acquisition of such a grammatical
competence is part of the best explanation of such intuitive judgements and our
adherence to such constraints in our behaviour.
Devitt’s view is that generative grammarians impute “psychological reality”
to generative grammar without sufficient explicitly psychological evidence. Though
the phenomena I have discussed in this chapter would serve to falsify Devitt’s claim,
his claim suggests he has misunderstood the methodology of generative grammar at
a more fundamental level. Generative grammarians investigate a speaker’s system
of grammatical competence in order to determine what the grammar of their
language is. Without the insight into a speaker’s grammar that our theoretical
conception of the competence-performance distinction provides, we have no
generative grammar to impute anything to. To suggest there is a prior question
about the “psychological reality” of the grammarian’s theories is misleading, for
prior to developing a theory of the speaker’s grammatical competence there is no
generative grammar to impute any sort of reality to or to legitimate with evidence.162
To summarise, generative grammarians, drawing on the competence-
performance distinction, aim to tell us what categories and relations the mind/brain
is sensitive to as it is responsible for linguistic production, consumption and
judgement. These are abstract conditions that unknown mechanisms meet but
revealing explanations can be framed at this abstract level. It is a further project to
determine how exactly these conditions constrain processing and to determine the
principles of biophysical organisation that allow us to speak and understand, of
which we are currently ignorant.
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295 It is also noteworthy that there are other non-grammatical systems beyond the grammar, the
parser and the production mechanism that are engaged in linguistic performances. Pragmatics aims
for an explicit account of the further sub-personal systems involved in utterance interpretation (for an
influential relevance-theoretic account see Sperber and Wilson (1986)). Sperber and Wilson (1996
p.461) suggest that amongst its fundamental tasks pragmatics must “explain how hearers resolve
ambiguities, complete elliptical or otherwise semantically incomplete sentences, identify intended
references, identify illocutionary force...and recover implicit import.” These are just some of the
ways in which context-independent grammatical structures fall short of determining the
interpretation of utterances in context. Like the parser, the pragmatic systems are generally
considered from the perspective of real-time performance systems subject to non-linguistic
constraints. But unlike the grammatical parser they are sensitive to all sorts of non-linguistic stimuli.
See Carston (2000) for an illuminating discussion of the relation between generative grammars and
pragmatic theories. Pragmatic theories are usually considered as cognitive theories that attempt to
account for our performance of these extra-linguistic tasks in interpretation, building on the
structures our grammatical system makes available. In some of Chomsky’s remarks on pragmatic
systems (see Chomsky 1980), he talks about a pragmatic competence as a system of knowledge
pertaining to conditions of the appropriate use of lexical and conceptual resources, and integrated
with grammatical competence. What Chomsky suggests is a distinct kind of pragmatic system to the
kind of processing systems that much of pragmatic theory focuses on (but see Horn 1988 and Prince
1988 for discussion of pragmatic competence systems). It is worth remarking that the role that results
from grammatical theory have been afforded in these pragmatic investigations is in keeping with the
idea that generative grammar targets a system of grammatical competence integrated with wider
performance systems.163
3.5 Katz’s Case against “Competencism”
Amongst the conditions that a grammatical theory must meet are that it includes a
description and explanation of all the grammatical properties of the sentences of
natural language. Katz argues that a lack of abstraction from the psychological
states of speakers means that a theory of grammatical competence will fail to meet
these conditions on an adequate grammatical theory. Katz concludes that we should
reject what he calls Competencism: the view that generative grammar should aim to
characterise grammatical competence. Katz’s thought is that although a theory of
competence can accommodate the properties of the sentences that we might
produce and recognise, it will make false predictions about the properties of
sentences that lie beyond our psychological capacities for production and
recognition.
Katz claims that, even if we set aside constraints on real-time performance,
only the sentences that it is within our human capacities to produce or hear will be
structured in the way that a psychological theory of competence predicts. He thinks
that the competence theory will falsely predict facts about those sentences that it is
beyond our psychological capacities ever to produce or hear because they are too
incredibly long or complex. Katz says:
[T]he internalised rules might convert all strings of words above a certain very great length,
n, into word-salad, so that the best theory of the speaker’s competence falsely predicts that
strings of English words exceeding length n are ungrammatical.
296
What Katz is suggesting is that if the competence system might fail to
accommodate a significant range of the sentences of natural language, for instance,
turning all sentences over a certain length into word-salad, then it would be a
mistake to make this a feature of grammatical theory. Given this possibility, Katz
argues that we should understand grammatical rules not as the internalised rules
governing a system of grammatical competence, which is Chomsky’s view, but as
rules defined over Platonic objects (see §1.3.3).
296 Katz (1985) pp.198-9164
Though Katz professes to be setting performance issues aside in considering
competence theories, in my view he is conflating an account of the structure of the
mentally realised grammatical system with an account of what humans have the
psychological capacities to utter and recognise. One consequence of the distinction
between grammatical competence and the performance systems involved in putting
that competence to use is that there can be grammatically structured expressions
generated by the competence system that are completely unusable in performance.
This is ensured by the recursive nature of the competence system which is
structured so as to generate an unbounded number of sentences of indefinite length
and the limited resources available to the performance systems involved in uttering
and parsing sentences.
297
The best theories of grammatical competence are structured so that the
system licences an unbounded number of expressions without limits on their length
or complexity. In doing so the grammarian allows that there are an infinite number
of grammatical expressions that meet the grammatical constraints determined by a
speaker’s grammatical competence but which he will never speak or hear, their
being unusable by him, and which the speaker would find unacceptable as sentences
of his language. What the recursive principles, which ensure this result, achieve for
the grammarian is an explanation of the special productivities distinctive of human
language.
As Stich notes, one might think that we ought to restrict the account of what
our grammatical competence licenses by “simply cutting off the class of sentences
generated by a grammar at an appropriately high point.”
298 But there is no natural
point to draw such lines, for there is no point at which the addition of another
297 Equally, there are usable forms that are not grammatical. Perfectly good meanings can sometimes
be expressed by linguistic utterances that are not structures that the competence system licences, as
with (a) and (b).
(a) He seems sleeping.
(b) No head injury is too trivial to ignore.
A speaker might assign an interpretation to (a) though it is not a full grammatical structure of their
language and might assign a rather different structural interpretation to (b) than the one their
grammatical competence determines.
298 Stich (1985) p.131165
conjunct or another clause consistently turns a structure that a speaker recognises
into one that they don’t; this being a matter of their motivation, attention, memory
and other processing resources that they apply on particular occasions. As linguists
come to understand the factors involved in processing, it is apparent when these
factors, which are independent of the structure of competence, are masking the
grammar that the speaker knows.
One could pick an arbitrarily high cut off point but “this would leave the
grammar as before with generated sentences that are unacceptable” to speakers.
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Any account that we provide of why the upper reaches of this cut off point are never
produced and not parsable will appeal to factors other than the structure of the state
of competence and would also serve to account for our inability to produce or parse
sentences beyond the proposed cut off point. But then it seems clear that we are
appealing to performance factors to explain the relevant facts about what speakers
can produce and parse, rather than appealing to the underlying structure of the
language that speakers know being insufficient. If we have such an explanation of
why the grammatical structures licensed by competence diverge from the structures
produced and parsed, then it will cover both the unacceptability of sentences of
short length and also those of great length. The package of competence and
performance can then explain all the broad data including productivity, special
structures of branching, embedding and conjunction, and what speakers can come to
recognise with extended attention and prompting (their powers of recognition
extending with the addition of performance resources but within the structural
constraints provided by competence).
So, the length and complexity of expressions may mean that speakers are
unable to put them together in production or assign them structural descriptions in
parsing but this does not imply, as Katz claims, that “the best theory of the
speaker’s competence falsely predicts that strings of English words exceeding
length n are ungrammatical.” The competence is a structured mental state that
encodes pairings of sounds and linguistic forms over an unbounded range, whilst
the issues concerning our capacity to recognise very long or complex grammatical
structures fall clearly on the performance side of the competence-performance
299 Stich (1985) p.131166
distinction. What can be uttered or parsed is not a direct reflection of the structure
of the system of knowledge that shapes these processes.
Hence, whilst it is true that processors fail to output a structure in
production , or assign a structural description in parsing, for sentences of very long
length this does not suggest that the underlying system of competence deems them
ungrammatical or turns them into “word-salad” for it is not a mechanism for
processing. To get a sense of why this is so consider (20).
(20) [[[[[He caught the rat]1 that bit the child]2 that ate the food]3 that cost
five pounds]4…]n
For extremely high n, English-speakers cannot utter or hear such sentences. In the
most extreme case, they might die before getting to the end. But it would be a
mistake to attribute this inability to the structure of our knowledge, which makes
provision for the branching at each step, when we know that they are depleting
other resources that are in finite supply such as time, attention and memory. It is
interesting that while we can easily generate unacceptable but grammatical
structures using basic constructions of nesting and self-embedding
300, multiple
branching structures
301 create far less trouble, being nearly perfect in their
acceptability at extremely long lengths.
300 Phrases A and B form a nested construction if A falls completely within B, with some non-null
element within B to its right and some non-null element to its left, as where who wrote the book that
you told me about is nested in I called the man who wrote the book that you told me about up. Phrase
A is self-embedded in B if A is nested in B and A is a phrase of the same type as B. So who the
students recognised is self-embedded in who the boy who the students recognised pointed out.
Nesting of a long and complex element reduces acceptability. Repeated nesting contributes tends
more definitely to unacceptability. Self-embedding contributes still more radically to unacceptability.
301 A multiple branching construction is one with no internal structure as in the subject noun phrase
“John, Bill, and Tom” in “John, Bill and Tom saw the film last night”. It has no internal structure
because “John”, “Bill” and “Tom” are immediate constituents and stand in no further structural
relations amongst themselves. Left-branching structures include indefinitely iterable structures such
as “John’s brother’s father’s uncle’s friend went” and right branching structures go the other way as
in “this is the cat that caught the rat that stole the cheese...”. There are no clear examples of167
One could postulate that human beings have a huge number of ready-made
sentences in their head rather than a recursively structured grammar with infinite
generative capacity. But this would serve only to replace an explanation that
attributes humans a finite stock of lexical items and recursive procedures with one
that attributes to them an infinite memory (which we know they don’t have). To see
that the memory resources required would be infinite, consider that my desire to
own books, however insatiable, can be matched by the sentences I can form to
describe that desire.
(21) Gareth desires a book.
(22) Gareth desires two books.
(23) Gareth desires eighty billion, seventy-five million, three hundred and
fifty-two thousand and eight books.
Our recognition of sentences containing the natural numbers illustrates the point
that the number of sentences I have at my disposal extends indefinitely. But the
point can be equally well illustrated without appealing to the natural numbers by
embeddings in the context of a propositional attitude verb.
(24) Gareth laughed.
(25) Simon thought that Gareth laughed.
(26) Craig knew that Simon thought that Gareth laughed.
(27) Sophie wondered whether Craig knew that Simon thought that Gareth
laughed.
(28) Jim didn’t care that Sophie wondered whether Craig knew that Simon
thought that Gareth laughed.
The embedding needn’t end here because we can keep going like this, in principle,
forever. In reality, we will be hampered by exhaustion, boredom or death. But the
unacceptability involving only left or right-branching constructions, although these constructions are
unnatural in other ways, and can require special intonation.168
point is that there is no upper limit on the number and length of such sentences that
we could understand if exhaustion, boredom or death could be kept at bay. Each
time we embed we form a longer sentence. Since the embedding could continue
indefinitely, there are infinitely long sentences licensed by our competence system
which encodes the grammar the speaker knows. Our ability to embed like this, in
principle, comes from our grammatical competence which is structured so that we
could keep on putting the embeddings together. So Katz is mistaken in his claims
about what a competence theory would predict because competence theories do not
predict that extremely long and complex sentences are ungrammatical or “word
salad”.
But Katz has a second argument against competencism.
302 The argument
starts not from the potential length of grammatical structures but from the fact that a
grammar must assign an infinite number of structural descriptions:
(P1) Grammars must generate infinitely many structures.
(P2) There are only a finite number of linguistic tokens in the universe.
Katz concludes from (P1) and (P2) that:
(C1) Grammatical theory must be an investigation of types and not
tokens.
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Katz then makes a general claim about mental states:
(P4) Mental states are physical objects and not abstract types.
302 Katz (1996) p.278
303 This conclusion doesn’t immediately follow. What the premises entitle Katz to is the claim that
the infinitely many structures licensed by the rules are not identical to the finite tokens, not to the
positive claim that they are types. See Devitt’s response to such a challenge to his view that
linguistics studies tokens in §1.3.2. Devitt appeals to the notion of lawlikeness to explain talk of
infinitude. Katz argument turns on taking the appeal to either finite tokens or abstract types to be
exhaustive. Katz (1996) has further arguments for this step. I’m happy to let this step in the argument
stand, though it requires further defence, because the premise relevant to the issue at hand is (P4).169
From (C1) and (P4), Katz draws the target conclusion that:
(C2) Grammatical theory is not an investigation of mental states.
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In support of the crucial premise (P4), Katz says that: “Given the finiteness and
discontinuity of matter, of brain-matter in particular, there can’t be an infinity of
mental/neural objects.”
305 Katz takes talk of infinite collections to be a mark of a
requirement for types, and as he thinks that there can’t be an infinite number of
mental objects be surmises that mental states must be tokens rather than types.
Katz is right that proponents of the psychological conception think of the
state of grammatical competence as physically realised in the brain. Chomsky holds
that generative grammar investigates such I-language states, which are real objects,
an aspect of the human mind/brain. But Chomsky is explicit (see §1.2) that he is
conceiving of the relevant mental states as abstract types. He claims that the
generative grammarian is working at a level of abstraction from physical objects,
such as neural mechanisms. So Katz’s (P4) does not accurately represent
Chomsky’s view that the relevant states of the mind/brain are abstract types, the
architecture of the brain described at a level of abstraction. In this vein Chomsky
says that it is quite true that “I-languages are not parts of brains; rather they are
components of the mind...That is, they are elements of the theory of mind abstracted
from [such] states.”
306
Chomsky argues that issues regarding the abstraction involved in theories of
grammatical competence raise “no conceptual or other problems beyond those
familiar in discourse involving theoretical entities, which are not relevant here.”
Problems concerning the notion of abstraction in science are not relevant here
because, to the extent they are genuine, they pervade the whole of empirical science,
even the hard sciences. Chomsky invites us to consider by analogy theories of
neural nets that describe the brain in terms of net-like connections between neural
304 George (1996) construes the argument slightly differently.
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points. Neural nets are abstractions in the sense that when we claim that a particular
type of neural net is a part of the theory of mind, we are not concerned with
particular molecules or the precise orientation of the connections between neurons,
i.e. the physical objects Katz claims the theory of mind is about in (P4). Chomsky
says:
A theory of neural nets is part of a theory of the mind, in my sense, and we can look
forward to progress in the brain sciences that will discover the physical mechanisms that
exhibit the properties of neural nets. I-languages are in the mind (abstracted from the states
of the brain, as explained) in the same (appropriate) sense...The issue of so-called
‘Platonistic linguistics’ does not arise in this connection.
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Katz thinks that Chomsky overlooks that there “cannot be enough mental/neural
sentences for all the generated structural descriptions”
308 and ought to concede that
grammatical theories are about abstract types and not about the mind which is
realised in the “finiteness and discontinuity of physical matter.” Katz claims that
given the infinite structural descriptions assigned by the grammars, the view that
each of these structural descriptions is a “distinct mental/neural object” will have to
be given up. All but finitely many of the structures assigned by the grammar must
be abstract types, so Katz argues.
But with Chomsky’s actual conception of the mind/brain now accurately
represented, it is clear that Katz has erected a false dichotomy. On Chomsky’s view,
theories of the mind are theories of abstract types. Katz claims that Chomsky faces
a problem because of the finitude of the concrete neural state tokens that Chomsky
is supposed to be appealing to, whilst Chomsky in fact insists that competence
theories proceed at a more abstract level: a level of explanatory generalisation in
terms of types of cognitive structures rather than token neural objects.
But it is not even clear that the linguist’s concern with types rather than
tokens should concern physicalists about language. Tokens of physical objects, such
as the neural objects, are finite in number. But the physicalist might hold that
theories about the properties of the physical world appeal to types of properties.
307 Chomsky (1987) p.182
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These types will be framed at a more abstract level than their realisation in finite
matter. Katz’s reasoning would mistakenly suggest that, as these theories are
concerned with types, none of them are concerned with physical objects.
Katz’s two objections to “competencism” in generative grammar both
involve imagining that we have two grammatical theories, G and G*. G would be a
correct grammar for natural languages whilst G* would make false or insufficient
grammatical predictions though it is a correct theory of grammatical competence.
He invites us to note that proponents of the psychological conception:
have to prefer G* insofar as the psychological evidence has shown it to represent the
cognitive structures underlying the speaker-hearer’s use of language. Yet in forcing them to
prefer G*, the philosophical commitment [to competencism] forces them to accept a false
theory needlessly.
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But as yet we have been provided with no other way of determining the grammar of
a speaker’s language, other than by theorising about that speaker’s grammatical
competence. Hence, without such means, the situation that Katz envisages is
illusory and the broad thrust of his objections is misguided.
Devitt seems to make a similar assumption to the effect that we have a way
of determining what the grammatical properties of natural languages are
independent of a developing theory of grammatical competence. He says that:
“explaining the syntax of sentences is a prerequisite” for a theory of grammatical
competence.
310 But the opposite is true: the generative grammarian needs a theory
of grammatical competence to determine what aspects of performance events and
linguistic judgements are a reflection of the grammar of a speaker’s language.
Moreover, once we move to a level of explanatory adequacy (§2.3), we need a
theory of the grammar that a speaker has actually acquired in order to justify a
choice amongst the possible DAGs for a speaker’s language.
Developing a closely related point, Smith notes that without a theory of a
speaker’s knowledge of language, there are infinitely many rule systems that could
account for the regularities among any sample of a speaker’s language that we
309 Katz (1981) p.88
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happen upon.
311 Without a theory of a speaker’s knowledge, the theorist must first
discover the rules governing the fragment and then extrapolate to the sentences
outside the fragment – the rest of the language. But these rule systems may extend
beyond the sample in quite different ways:
Each language is infinite in expressive capability. But speakers only produce a finite
number of sentences. So our way of resolving this question must yield verdicts that extend
beyond the produced fragment of the language. How are we to determine what the actual
language spoken by a speaker is?
Smith points out that this is the philosophical problem of defining the “actual
language relation” between a speaker and the language that he knows, with which
David Lewis was concerned. Smith continues:
In a slightly different context, Lewis suggested that if there are rules governing the
meanings of sentences and how they are paired with sounds in the used fragment of the
language then these could be extended to generate the sentences of the language as a
whole.
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The central problem for Lewis’s method is how we could know that the grammar
for the fragment of the language used would serve to generate all and only the
sentences of a speaker’s language. Having grappled with this problem, Schiffer has
come to the view that there is no method to come to correct hypotheses about the
syntax and semantics of observed fragments of speakers’ languages without
appealing to facts about a speaker’s grammatical competence of the sort theoretical
linguistics uncovers.
313 So one clear way of defining the actual language relation,
the one that Smith defends, is to develop a theory of a speaker’s linguistic
competence. By discovering the rules governing linguistic competence we get an
311 Smith (unpublished ms.) p.33
312 Smith (unpublished ms.) is referring to Lewis (1983, 1992). The context is different because
Lewis is concerned with sound-meanings pairings conceived as properties of convention-bound
public languages and not with the pairings of sound and grammatical forms that concern the
grammarian.
313 See Schiffer (2006).173
answer to the question of which are the actual rules to generate the expressions of a
speaker’s language.
Devitt, like Katz, seems to assume that no such difficulties arise in the case
of grammatical theory. But the philosophical problem of the actual language
relation mirrors those practical problems which would be faced by the grammarian
unless he appeals to a theory of the language a speaker has actually acquired, a
theory of the structures that the principles of grammatical competence prescribe.174
4. Linguistic Intuitions as Evidence for Generative
Grammars
In order to determine what the grammar of a speaker’s language is, generative
grammarian’s draw upon a distinction between what is licensed by a speaker’s
grammatical competence and what is an effect of extraneous performance factors
engaged in putting that competence to use. In this chapter I want to examine how
grammarians get a grip on this distinction empirically, what sort of evidence is
brought to bear in generative grammar and what sorts of hypotheses it is brought to
bear on. My primary aim is to defend what I take to be an orthodox model of
linguistic intuitions as they form a central source of evidence in generative grammar.
According to this orthodox view, linguistic intuitions are the reflection of a
dedicated system of grammatical competence as it interacts with performance
systems for perceiving and articulating language. So conceived, evidence from
speakers’ linguistic intuitions allows the grammarian to investigate the competence-
performance distinction empirically and thereby determine the grammars that
speakers are competent in. This orthodox model has been attacked by Devitt. In its
place, he advances a model of linguistic intuitions whereby they are speakers’
theoretical judgements about the properties of languages.
314 I aim to make clear the
rationale behind the orthodox model and the inadequacy of Devitt’s proposed
alternative.
4.1 Intuitions as Evidence
Both psychologists and philosophers are sometimes interested in people’s intuitions.
But it seems that the locus of their interest may differ. Psychologists are interested
in gathering data on subject’s intuitions, sometimes in elaborately designed
experiments, because they reflect the workings of the psychological systems of
314 Devitt (2006, 2006a, 2006b)175
subjects that have them. Philosophers may also be interested in people’s intuitions
because of what they reveal about the psychological states of people that have them.
But philosophers sometimes seem to be interested in people’s intuitions because
they are revelatory of facts independent of those psychological states. This interest
is well-motivated where there is good reason to think that the subject is well-
positioned with respect to the facts in question, perhaps because he has some special
knowledge.
Generative grammarians draw upon the intuitions of competent speakers.
We all have such intuitions. If I say to you “John posted the letter to Bill” you
immediately recognise that as a part of your language. If I were to ask you whether
it was ok, a perfectly good sentence of your language, then, no doubt, you would
say that it was. However, if I say to you “to posted Bill the John letter” you are
likely to recognise the words as part of your language but recognise that there is
something amiss in the way they have been put together to form a sentence. In fact
we have very intricate intuitions about the linguistic forms of our language and their
meanings. Grammarians use these intuitions to investigate grammatical structure.
Harris seems to have held that linguists cannot investigate the structure of
languages by examining speakers’ intuitions. He said:
We do not ask a speaker whether his language contains certain elements or whether they
have certain dependencies or substitutabilities…they (speaker’s habitual judgements) are
not sufficiently close to the distributional details, nor is the speaker sufficiently aware of
them. Hence we cannot directly investigate the rules of ‘the language’ via some system of
habits or some neurological machine that generates all the utterances of the language.
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Harris surmised that, rather than investigate speakers’ linguistic judgements about
their language, the grammarian has to investigate “some actual corpus of
utterances” from which we derive “such regularities as would have generated those
utterances”.
316 But current scientific practice suggests that Harris was wrong about
what could be learnt from speakers’ judgements. Though the questions are not
framed in the metalinguistic way that Harris considered, it seems that grammarians
315 Harris (1985) p.45
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do investigate grammatical structure by probing intuitions. The orthodox view is
that these intuitions are yielded by special cognitive systems responsible for
recognising and shaping grammatical categories in speakers’ utterances.
Although there are a wide variety of intuitions brought to bear on generative
grammars, I want to focus on one illustrative example of how intuitions have been
exploited for theoretical hypotheses. It concerns null expressions, elements of
linguistic structures that are hypothesised to constrain our interpretation of linguistic
material but have no phonological properties and so are not pronounced. Here are
some prima facie considerations in favour of positing PRO, an empty pronoun,
taken to occur in structures like (29):
(29) I would like [PRO to be on the beach]
In (29), PRO is dependent on “I” for its interpretation, so that (29) is understood
roughly as with (30) or (31), by analogy with (32):
(30) I would like [I to be on the beach].
(31) I would like [me to be on the beach].
(32) He would like you to be on the beach.
One piece of prima facie evidence for PRO is that English-speakers have the
intuition that (29) gets roughly the same interpretation as (31) and certain other
related strings of borderline acceptability such as “I would like, for me, to be on the
beach”. Another is that English-speakers interpret it on analogy with (32). But we
can offer far more evidence from speakers’ intuitions to buttress PRO. As we saw in
§1.1, a general requirement on reflexives is that they must have a local antecedent.
In contrast, a general requirement on pronouns is that they are not dependent on
local antecedents. We can gather evidence for hypotheses about locality and
referential dependence by probing the following sorts of intuitions. Consider (33)
and (34).
(33) Arthur believed that Lee shaved himself.
(33a) *Arthuri believed that Leej shaved himselfi.177
(34) Arthur believed that Lee shaved him.
(34a) *Arthuri believed that Leej shaved himj.
Why don’t we hear (33) so that himself is Arthur rather than Lee as in (33a)? Indeed
(33) is only acceptable under the interpretation on which himself means Lee.
Compare (34) and (34a) where we don’t hear (34) such that Lee means him. We
might recognise the alternative interpretations as possible in principle but not part of
our language. But why aren’t they? One hypothesis is that Arthur is not local in (33)
where the reflexive needs a local antecedent but Lee is local in (34) where him can’t
take a local antecedent. So the interpretations suggested in (33a) and (34a)
contravene these binding principles.
The requirement on reflexives explains why we have the intuition that (35)
is acceptable whilst (36) is much less good.
(35) They want [Gareth to take himself to the beach].
(36)*They want [Gareth to take themselves to the beach].
The square brackets mark the local domains for the reflexives – roughly the
smallest clause which includes the reflexive. The reflexives himself and themselves
must find antecedents within the square brackets if we are to find them acceptable
and this turns out ok in (35) because himself agrees in number with Gareth and so
can take Gareth as its antecedent being understood as in (37):
(37) They want [Gareth to take himself (Gareth) to the beach].
But unless Gareth is understood as a plurality in (36) then it fails to agree in number
with themselves and so can’t serve as its antecedent. Hence, we don’t understand
(36) on the model of (38):
(38)*They want [Gareth to take themselves (Gareth) to the beach]
The only antecedent available for themselves is they. Why don’t speakers find (36)
perfectly acceptable with themselves bound by they? The explanation is that they178
falls outside the local domain, so fails to provide an antecedent for themselves, and
hence themselves does not meet the requirement on reflexives that they are locally
bound.
Now consider (39):
(39) Gareth wants [to sun himself on the beach]
English-speakers have the intuition that (39) is perfectly ok. But himself requires a
local antecedent to bind it, and the only possibility seems to be Gareth which falls
outside the local domain. The proposed solution is that (39) really has the structure
given in (40) with the null expression, where PRO is interpreted as dependent on
“Gareth” and “himself” as dependent on PRO, as in the paraphrase in (41):
(40) Gareth wants [PRO to sun himself on the beach]
(41) Gareth wants [(that) he (Gareth) sun himself (Gareth) on the beach]
That’s how intuitions data can issue in such theoretical postulates as PRO and the
hypothesis that a bit of structure that must be visible to the conceptual-intentional
system, must also be invisible to the perceptual-articulatory system. PRO is
supported by the intuitions data to the extent it’s the best available explanation of
that data. The aim of the theory is to explain these intuitive judgements of
acceptability and unacceptability, and the structural interpretations that speakers
come to.
317
317 The discussion of how intuitions data might be used to support PRO is intended to be
illustrative of the methodology. I am not arguing for the claim that PRO is, in fact, the best
theoretical explanation of these phenomena. See Jacobson (1999) for an alternative account
of bound and unbound dependencies, drawing on the resources of categorial grammar and
type logical semantics, which does not appeal to unpronounced variables. Jacobson argues
that her account simplifies the analysis of a range of constructions and preserves a relation
of “direct compositionality” between the syntax and semantics, whereby the semantic rules
are very close to the syntactic rules. Direct compositionality serves to minimise the
theoretical machinery involved in explaining the interaction of syntax and semantics.179
In classifying the data, the term acceptable is used to refer to utterances that
are relatively natural and easy to comprehend without any paper-and-pen analysis.
Acceptability is a matter of degree. The unacceptable structures are relatively more
difficult though they may be grammatical for all that. Chomsky gave the following
characterisation of acceptability:
(L)et us use the term “acceptable” to refer to utterances that are perfectly natural and
immediately comprehensible... Obviously acceptability will be a matter of degree, along
various dimensions… The more acceptable sentences are those that are more likely to be
produced, more easily understood, less clumsy, and in some sense more natural. The
unacceptable sentences one would tend to avoid and replace by more acceptable variants,
wherever possible.
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We can use the term interpretable to refer to the fact that a string has a natural
interpretation, though it may have more than one such interpretation. Where a string
is associated with more than one structural interpretation, linguists say we have
structural ambiguity. We can also have lexical ambiguity where a single set of
phonetic properties may be paired with more than one set of semantic properties as
in “bank” – the financial institution – and “bank” – the river bank.
Intuitions about acceptability and interpretability can dissociate, for example,
where speakers find a string acceptable in principle but uninterpretable as in (42):
(42) Colourless green ideas sleep furiously.
Although speakers struggle to assign (42) an interpretation and find it odd, they
recognise it is dislike (43):
(43) Ideas colourless furiously green sleep.
The string presented in (43) is “word salad”. Examples like (42) suggest that we can
prise apart speakers’ grammatical sensitivities from their ability to find a literal
meaning for a string. Speakers’ intuitions about (42) suggest that while they may
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not have direct awareness of the underlying structure of (42) they do have a sense of
whether what they are confronted with has the structure of a sentence of their
language.
Acceptability and interpretability as data sources are to be distinguished
from the theoretical notion of grammaticality, and what is generated by a grammar.
Speakers have no intuitions about what a grammar mandates, in the theoretical
sense of a grammar that concerns linguists. This is reflected in the distinction
between grammatical competence and linguistic performance. A speaker’s
grammatical competence is just one component amongst an ensemble of systems
responsible for their intuitions about acceptability and interpretability. Acceptability
elicits or classifies intuitions but it is not something that can get a full explanation
from linguistic theory as it looks to involve a range of factors beyond grammar.
These include processing factors, semantic and pragmatic factors as well as
commonsense knowledge and contextual factors. If I say that I called the man who
wrote the book that you told me about up, this might seem rather unwieldy. But it is
grammatical, where that means that the best generative grammars assign it a
structural interpretation in just the way they do my less unwieldy utterance that I
called up the man who wrote the book that you told me about. As a set of rules the
grammar will generate a set of structures but how that set bears on what we do and
don’t find acceptable is a theoretical matter.
At deeper levels of explanation, where grammarians are concerned with
very abstract principles and aiming for greater generality, they are not merely
checking principles off against the observed intuitions. Though this might trivially
ensure descriptive adequacy, it would be merely to recapitulate the data. The
grammarian is concerned with the explanatory adequacy of his theory and not just
data coverage. At deeper levels of explanation theoretical virtues like the generality
and simplicity of the grammatical principles will be more to the fore. But speakers’
intuitions will still play a guiding role in the investigation insofar as linguists are
concerned to explore the languages that speakers are actually competent in and not
just to come up with simpler and more powerful grammars.
Though intuitions have a central evidential role in generative grammar, there
is no suggestion that other forms of evidence are irrelevant in principle or in
practice. A central component of what Fodor calls The Right View of generative181
grammar is that there is no proprietary body of data such that we can tell a priori
what evidence might bear on grammatical hypotheses.
319 According to The Right
View, not only speakers’ intuitions but also facts about language use, grammar
acquisition, the neurology of speaker-hearers,
320 “or, for that matter, the weather on
Mars” could, in principle, bear on grammatical hypotheses. It is a consequence of
Fodor’s Right View that there is no a priori distinction between a proprietary body
of “linguistic” data and the “psychological” data, or any other kind of data. He says:
Suppose that some very clever astro-linguist were to devise an argument that runs from
observations of the Martian climate to some or other constraint on theories of human
psychology and thence to the proper formulation of the English pseudocleft. Surely we
would say, ‘Bravo and well done’ and not ‘Ingenious but not pertinent’.
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The alternative to The Right View of generative grammar, Fodor calls The Wrong
View, according to which we can stipulate in advance what evidence counts as
relevant to grammatical theory. Fodor finds The Wrong View implausible in light of
the way that science is really conducted; to adhere to it, Fodor claims, would be to
take exception to the methodological principles that characterise the more mature
sciences.
Katz’s view is a species of what Fodor calls The Wrong View: “The
criterion we apply to determine the relevance of a factual source to theories in
linguistics is whether the source concerns the subject-matter of linguistics,
language.”
322 For Katz, the evidence from speakers’ linguistic intuitions has
precedence over all the other sorts of evidence. Katz labels such evidence “direct”,
319 Fodor (1985) pp.147-151
320 Though only a little is known about how I-language is realised in the brain, some aspects of I-
language seem relatively localised. There are two areas of the brain’s left hemisphere which appear
to be particularly implicated in our linguistic abilities: Broca’s area and Wernicke’s area. We know
that these areas are important because sometimes they are affected by some pathology or trauma, and
particular linguistic deficits arise. For example, people with trauma to Broca’s area can have
problems dealing with complex grammatical constructions though their pronunciation may be
normal.
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or “linguistic”, evidence and contrasts it with other forms of evidence, such as that
from grammar acquisition or psychological experiment, which only constitute
“indirect” or “psychological” evidence. By Katz’s lights, a linguist may get clues
about grammar, when the “linguistic evidence gives out, by discovering
psychological or neurological facts about speakers” but “indirect evidence depends
on direct evidence for its legitimization as a relevant source of facts and direct
evidence has a prior claim over indirect evidence.”
323 Katz thinks that empirical
evidence can never compel us to revise or abandon a grammatical hypothesis that is
supported “on the basis of unchallenged direct evidence.”
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By contrast, according to The Right View, there is no distinction between
direct and indirect evidence for grammatical theories. There are just different
sources of evidence that may be more or less useful in our current state of
knowledge. In principle, a psychological experiment or a piece of neurological
evidence might be relevant to working out the form of a speaker’s language, just as
a speaker’s intuitive judgement may be. But in our current state of knowledge,
evidence from intuitions is more readily available than neurological evidence for
grammatical hypotheses. There is no reason that other forms of evidence couldn’t
lead us to disregard particular hypotheses that have been supported by intuitions
data.
If one is a Platonist, like Katz, then one may be unmoved by methodological
morals about general scientific practice because one denies that linguistics is like
the other sciences that draw on empirical evidence. If linguistics is a part of
mathematics or logic, and in these mathematical sciences one can choose what is of
interest, then one can stipulate that only a certain range of data are to be included
amongst the “linguistic” data. Platonists can then focus on the mathematical
problem of formally specifying a grammar that predicts a certain range of data, such
as speakers’ intuitions, insofar as these intuitions are not hampered by memory
limitations, lapses in concentration and other performance factors. However, there
is no particular reason why Platonists should attend to just those grammatical
properties speakers acquire.
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Generative grammarians, according to The Right View, are interested in
explaining and predicting, inter alia, speakers’ intuitions. The difference is that on
The Right View grammarians are interested in intuitions because they hypothesise,
rather than stipulate, that intuitions are revealing of the target of inquiry, the
grammars speakers acquire. On The Right View the intuitions evidence has no
privileged status. So conceived, the grammarian wants to know what sort of
grammars can be acquired and how, how speech is understood, how language enters
into cognition, what aphasics and schizophrenics reveal about language, what we
have that animals lack: “in short, all that stuff that got people interested in studying
languages in the first place”.
325 Fodor warns proponents of The Wrong View that
while they are free to adopt a proprietary, or a priori, conception of the “linguistic”
evidence and pursue such an inquiry, “all the action is at the other end of town”.
To take a schematic example of the sort of evidence that could be useful to
grammarians, consider evidence concerning processing and how it could be used to
help filter out the effects of the parser that exhibits a different organisation to
grammatical competence. Let’s suppose we had two differently structured
grammars, G and G’, that hitherto could both explain a speaker’s intuitions, and a
theory M of the organisation of short-term memory in human adults that has
received some independent confirmation. As Fodor points out, if the conjunction of
M and G predicted that triply self-embedded sentences are not construable by
human adults, whereas the conjunction of M and G’ predicted the contrary then we
have evidence for preferring G to G’; though they might make the same predictions
about the intuitions of speaker-hearers’ independently of the evidence from short-
term memory.
Linguists draw on evidence from grammar acquisition in meeting
explanatory adequacy, evidence from pragmatics in discerning what falls within the
core language faculty and what falls outside, evidence from pathological cases and
evidence from work on the brain.
326 But one might wonder why if linguists are
325 Fodor (1985) p.60
326 For a discussion of evidence from work on impairments to the brain that may support Chomsky’s
postulation of a level of phonological representation common across hearers and signers, see Pettito
(2005) pp.97-8.184
really interested in this broad array of data, they seem to ignore a lot of readily
available psychological evidence from language processing.
The relation between evidence from psychological processing and
generative grammars is delicate. To take an illustrative example, Quine once argued
that the phrase boundaries that grammarians posit are just artefacts of their theories,
as they would be with formal languages, rather than a reflection of anything real.
327
Quine claimed that for formal languages, there is no “right” grammar; one can
arbitrarily pick one that generates the right theorems, and by analogy, that
generative grammarians can just pick a grammar because the only thing that is real
is the set of strings that the rules generate.
328 Quine argued that it was “folly” to
assume that there is a real answer to the question of where the phrase boundary is in
strings of the form ABC. He thought it could be between B and C or between A and
B as one liked, so long as the same strings are preserved.
But later some psychological experiments were carried out called the “click”
experiments which led Quine to change his mind. In the click experiments subjects
were presented with sentences like (44) and (45). With the bracketed material
included we get different readings of the non-bracketed material and seem to
process the non-bracketed material differently.
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(44) [Your] eagerness to win the horse is quite immature.
(45) [In its] eagerness to win the horse is quite immature.
In (44) we leave a main break in between horse and is, whilst in (45) the main break
comes after win. If click noises are placed in the same objective positions (between,
say, the and horse) in the acoustical stream as each of these sentences are uttered,
subjects re-position the clicks in different places to reflect the main phrase breaks.
327 Quine (1972)
328 Of course, those committed to the psychological conception of generative grammar will reject
Quine’s comparison because they think that grammars are psychologically, and ultimately
biologically, realised. They think there is something real in the mind/brain, a particular procedure for
assigning information about sound, structure and meaning to expressions. The choice of a theory will
then be no more arbitrary than that of any other empirical inquiry.
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After the click experiments were devised, Quine changed his mind about phrase
boundaries and said that they are real because the click experiments show how you
could get evidence to decide between the competing rule systems that generate
them.
330
Chomsky thinks that this is a serious misinterpretation of what the
experiments establish. As Chomsky sees it the work on clicks serves only to test an
experiment and not to test for phrase structure.
331 The work on clicks can test
whether clicks are displaced in a way that accords with phrase boundaries. But if
the click experiments had been out of step with phrase structure in clear cases then
it would have suggested not that phrase structure be revised to fit with click
displacement but that the experiment was poorly designed as an indicator of phrase
structure. One would not, for example, hypothesise that phrase boundaries come in
the middle of a word on the basis of click displacements being heard in the middle
of a word. On Quine’s view of the evidential relation between click displacement
and phrase boundaries, in such a case, one would have to say that the phrase
boundaries were in the middle of the word. Chomsky thinks that it would suggest
instead that the experiment is not fit for purpose because the displacements suggest
the wrong structures in clear cases. We make robust judgements about where the
phrase boundaries are and if the click experiments do not gel with these judgements
then the grammarian has a reason to reject the connection between click
displacement and phrase boundaries.
So it is not so straightforward to determine what can be learnt about the
structure of a speaker’s grammar from perceptual experiments. Thinking again
about the click experiments, if the processing goes the way of linguistic judgement
then nothing has been learnt. But if the results of processing and judgement conflict
then it is unclear whether or not the grammarian will have evidence that the theory
which explains our judgements is wrong. The click experiments might not accord
with phrase structure in the best understood cases of phrase boundaries. If so, then
they may not be revealing in the controversial cases. If upon intuitive consideration
of linguistic material speakers make firm judgements of acceptability and
330 Quine (1986)
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interpretability that reveal the structure they assign to sentences, the grammarian
might then reject the connection between particular perceptual results and
grammatical hypotheses.
If the aim of the inquiry is a theory of the grammatical competence system
as it is situated within linguistic cognition then it is natural to seek data from the
subjects whose cognitive capacities are the domain of inquiry, just as in other areas
of psychology. The key issue that Devitt raises is whether generative grammarians,
like psychologists, are interested in speakers’ intuitions because they are data for
theories about speakers, and more particularly their grammatical competence.
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Devitt suggests, to the contrary, that grammarians are concerned with these
intuitions because they are revelatory of a domain of non-psychological facts to
which speakers may have access through empirical reflection. According to the
orthodoxy, PRO is part of an explanation of a range of data concerning the
proclivities of speakers. The data are that they find certain forms acceptable and that
certain interpretations are available to them. On Devitt’s view, the data bear
primarily on the properties of the presented sounds and marks rather than on the
cognitive states of the speakers that intuit them.
The fact that intuitions may have a different significance to psychologists
and philosophers, and the fact that there are competing models of how linguistic
intuitions work, may suggest that the nature of intuition as a general category is not
well enough understood to provide a model of linguistic intuition. The term
“intuition” has been applied across a range of domains and cognitive abilities, and
there may not be the kind of singular phenomenon that the term suggests. As Fiengo
suggests we might do well to focus for now on the question of “what linguistic
intuitions must be like if they are to be the data of Linguistics”
333, and then see how
an answer to this question bears on the subject matter of generative grammars.
332 See Devitt (2006) pp.95-125
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4.2 The Orthodox Model: Linguistic Intuitions as Data for
Psychological Theories
4.2.1 How do Intuitions bear on Competence Theories?
Psychologists elicit intuitive responses to presented material in such diverse areas as
“Theory of Mind”, moral cognition and vision science. Just as reports of visual
impressions constitute data for theories of the visual system that processes visual
information, so, on the orthodox model, linguistic intuitions constitute data for
theories of the grammatical competence that constrains the linguistic forms that a
speaker finds acceptable and how they can be interpreted. On this model, intuitions
data are brought to bear on a theory about a core component of the language
speakers have internalised: grammatical competence. The character of a native
speaker’s intuitions leads us to ask:
What must her internalized grammar be like…for her to find these arrangements of words
acceptable but not those; for her to be able to interpret a sentence in this way but not in that.
To arrive at specific hypotheses about the internalized grammar we reason counterfactually:
had the grammar been different, had it not respected a particular constraint then it would
have been possible to hear certain utterances differently.
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One of Devitt’s charges against this orthodox model is that there is currently “no
account of how the rules embodied in the language faculty could provide intuitions
about syntactic facts”.
335 In one sense, Devitt is correct. The orthodox model
provides only a very partial explanation of how grammatical competence could
issue in intuitive judgements of acceptability and interpretability. There is no
complete explanation of how intuitions are produced available, only a partial
explanation of the character of those intuitions in terms of an underlying system of
grammatical information and systems for putting that information to use. As
334 Smith (2006) p.959
335 Devitt (2006a), see also Devitt (2006, 2006b).188
Chomsky has pointed out “we do not, of course, have a clear account, or any
account at all, of why certain elements of our knowledge are accessible to
consciousness whereas others are not, or of how knowledge, conscious or
unconscious, is manifested in actual behaviour.”
336
The structure of the competence system provides some explanation of the
form and character of the intuitions, and the performance mechanisms are intended
to provide some explanation of how the linguistic forms licensed by the competence
system are employed in judgement, speaking and understanding. But Devitt is right
that there is no complete theory of how competence and the language mechanisms
issue in linguistic intuitions. The explanation of this is that, for the reasons outlined,
intuitive judgements of acceptability and interpretability (or indeed, conscious
awareness) are not phenomena that can get a full explanation from a theory of
grammatical competence. The broader empirical challenge is to try and understand
all the different factors involved in linguistic judgements, in the same way that we
might try to understand the factors that shape judgements in other areas of
psychology. After all, there is currently no account of how the computations of the
visual system issue in intuitive judgements about the properties of a presented scene.
So, it’s not clear that there is a special problem.
Speakers’ linguistic intuitions are far more discriminating than one might
expect. Take the following illustrative example. Sentence (46) is ambiguous
between a reading on which duck and swallow are both nouns and one on which
they are both verbs.
(46) I saw her duck and swallow.
Interestingly it is two ways and not four ways ambiguous in natural language. We
can hear (46) as containing the two verbs duck and swallow. We can also hear it so
that duck and swallow is an NP containing the nouns duck and swallow. But no
speakers hear it as having mixed readings on which duck is a verb and swallow is a
noun, or vice-versa, and it is never uttered with this meaning. It is logically possible
that the sentence should have the mixed readings. And we could artificially stipulate
336 Chomsky (1986) p.270189
that the sentence was to be understood in such ways. This would be to create a piece
of artificial language, since no one naturally acquires such a language. The fact that
English-speakers don’t recognise these mixed readings can be taken as evidence
concerning the organisation of their grammatical competence.
The explanation of the relevant intuitions is that the competence system is
structured according to a co-ordination constraint. The constraint determines that
we can only conjoin constituents of the same grammatical category. This hypothesis
about grammatical competence, supported by the evidence from intuitive
judgements about forms like (46), explains why speakers are unable to hear such
logically possible, mixed readings. The interpretations that speakers can
consciously hear, and then judge, such expressions to have, are crucial evidence for,
or against, this hypothesis about their grammatical competence. I only hear (46) two
ways, and I can only consciously hear, or attend to, one of those interpretations at a
time. Once I recognise that (46) has these two readings I can consciously switch my
attention back and forth between them. Though, in one sense, nothing in the sounds
themselves or the written marks changes, something in my conscious experience
changes as I shift my construal of (46) back and forth.
Though grammarians do not tend to distinguish explicitly between intuitions,
judgements and intuitive judgements, it may be that intuition and judgement are
picking out distinct aspects of speakers’ engagement with language. The term
“intuition” seems to refer to the unreflective take or awareness that the speaker has
of linguistic form, whilst “judgement” seems to refer to the formation of a belief or
report on the basis of that intuitive take or impression.
337
It also seems that nothing very intellectualised is meant by intuitive
judgement in this context. Intuitive judgement might suggest that the data take the
form of a speaker-hearer judging that a linguistic form is grammatical, ambiguous
337 Fiengo (2003) makes a distinction between linguistic “intuition” as that access we have to the
structures of sentences that involves no conscious reasoning and linguistic “judgement” as our
evaluation of that to which we have the immediate access. I model linguistic judgements as
involving a straightforward report on what we are aware of rather than evaluating the intuited
properties. Of course, it might be that informants do both. But it seems to me that there are a core of
cases where the speaker intuits some properties and reports on what they intuit without evaluating
the intuited properties as such.190
and so on. But in proffering their linguistic judgements speakers are not generally
required to have linguistic concepts with which to express the status or structural
interpretation they have assigned to linguistic material. As Collins notes:
We are interested in how speaker/hearers interpret strings, either their own or those of
others. This covers a panoply of different attitudes. Most often, the data are simply that
speaker/hearers find a string unacceptable. Period… Other times, we might be after a more
explicit judgement, and so we ask, ‘How many ways ambiguous is the sentence, I had the
book stolen?’. Other times we might ask, ‘Who is fixing the car in the sentences Bill told
Sam to fix the car and Bill promised Sam he would fix the car.’
338
To be capable of interpreting linguistic material, speakers need not have any
metalinguistic concepts with which to categorise the material or any special
expertise beyond competence in their language. No expertise is required, only an
honest report of how things strike one. In this respect, the linguistic intuitions data
is analogous to the data for other psychological theories, where “there is no relevant
expertise about the data beyond the authority of the subject’s own perceptions.”
339
On the orthodox model, a speaker’s intuitions are simply data to be
explained and eliciting a speaker’s linguistic intuitions does not require attributing
them any of the theoretical concepts that animate grammatical theory. If a linguist
says that a speaker has the intuition that a reflexive must be locally bound, this is
just a shorthand way of saying that a speaker has linguistic intuitions that can be
explained on the basis of his possessing a grammatical competence, organised
according to principles involving reflexives, locality and binding.
4.2.2 Linguistic Intuitions and Visual Impressions
Much of the evidence for computational theories of vision has come from subjects’
responses to presented material, either in the form of reports on the way that things
338 Collins (2006) pp.7-8
339 Slezak (unpublished ms.) pp.33-34191
appear or seem to them, or their use of such appearances to carry out visual tasks.
Chomsky suggests a comparison between the way that speakers’ intuitive responses
to linguistic material are brought to bear on generative grammars and the way that
subjects’ reports in visual experiments are brought to bear on theories of vision:
A generative grammar attempts to specify what the speaker knows, not what he may report
about his knowledge. Similarly, a theory of visual perception would attempt to account for
what a person sees and the mechanisms that determine this rather than his statements about
what he sees, and why, though these statements may provide, useful, in fact compelling
evidence for such a theory.
340
Chomsky takes the study of the computational operations of grammatical
competence to be the study of “mental representations and computations, much like
the inquiry into how the image of a rotating cube in space is determined from retinal
stimulations.”
341
One similarity between the experimental investigation of vision and the
investigation of speakers’ linguistic intuition is that the intuitive takes speakers have
on linguistic material are pre-doxastic in a way that compares with visual
appearances. And the pre-doxastic nature of linguistic intuitions and visual
appearances is of interest to the grammarian and vision scientist respectively. Upon
presentation of a Kanizsa triangle as in Fig. A, subjects report an impression of an
equilateral triangle with its corners in the circular (pacman-like) elements of the
presentation.
Fig. A
340 Chomsky (1965) pp.8-9
341 Chomsky (2000) p.125192
This impression of a triangle exhibits belief-independence because it can be had
even by subjects who do not believe that there is a triangle there and who have seen
how the illusion is created by comparing the two boxes in Fig. B.
Fig. B.
There are a large number and variety of visual illusions such as the Necker Cube
and Muller-Lyer lines which can be enjoyed or suffered, even by those who do not
believe in the veridicality of the appearances. They provide important evidence
about how the visual system fills in and processes the information which is input to
it. These visual seemings or impressions that are generated in the course of visual
processing clearly encode more information than is given to the senses, and are of
particular interest for precisely that reason. They are sometimes called percepts to193
highlight that they are impressions or seemings, and distinguish them from genuine
perceptions.
Such mental capacities as vision, which exhibit independence from belief
and general intelligence are said to be encapsulated. As Fodor originally employed
this notion, informational encapsulation meant that the computations which a
system carries out are defined over a restricted base of information and not
penetrated by central cognitive processes, such as those involved in belief-
formation.
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Linguists’ interest in speakers’ intuitions is comparable along this dimension.
With strings like (47), an impression of full structure can persist despite our coming
to believe that (47) does not have a full structure:
(47) Many more people have been to France than I have.
If we try to fill in the structural ellipsis, we see that the sentence makes no sense:
Many more people have been to France than I have (been to France?) Strings like
(47), particularly if read at sufficient speed, can strike us over and over as having a
full structural interpretation even once careful inspection has revealed to us that
they have none, or we have come to believe as much on the basis of testimony.
Equally, (48) and (49) can strike me, again and again, as lacking a full
structure even once prompting, extended attention or the testimony of others has
issued in contrary beliefs:
(48) The man the cat the dog bit scratched died.
(49) The horse raced past the barn fell.
(49a) The horse raced past the barn.
The intuitions data suggest hypotheses about our grammatical competence and our
ability to use it in real-time. As I suggested in Chapter Three, given some
concentration, time or prompting, speakers can come to recognise (48) as a sentence
of their language, though they tend to find it unacceptable at first blush and never
342 Fodor (1983)194
use that structure. Once I know that (48) is a double centre-embedding then I can
pair off the embeddings and the structure becomes apparent: the dog bit the cat that
scratched the man that died. What stops me recognising (48) as part of my language
is the lapse of attention and ability to process the embedding. As I argued in
Chapter Three, in this and a vast range of other cases, it is not the language I know
that rules the structure out, but the extraneous factors involved in using the
grammatical information that stop me from repeatedly centre-embedding. In
performance something occludes with my standing knowledge of centre-embedded
structures.
Sentence (49) strikes many English-speakers as leaving the verb “fell”
dangling off the end of an otherwise good sentence (49a). The process by which I
come to notice that the dangling verb is the main verb and raced past the barn is an
embedded clause may forever erase this impression that fell is dangling. But it
needn’t. The intuition can be robust and a parse of (49) on which The horse raced
past the barn is a sentence rather than a determiner phrase can continue to suggest
itself. Such structures “lead us up the garden path” and there is a residual
impression of unacceptability. Though a parsing explanation is available on which
speakers first find the tensed phrase (49a) and so do not structure (49) such that fell
is the main verb, the explanation may in fact be partly grammatical. Compare (50)
and (50a):
(50) The paint daubed on the wall stank.
(50a) *The paint daubed on the wall
Sentence (50) is not grammatically ambiguous in the way that (49) is. The paint
can’t daub whereas the horse can race. The subject’s grammatical proclivities can
be probed in this way by varying the presented material and seeing how the
immediate intuitive take varies.
These examples suggest that linguistic intuitions provide evidence for
investigating an encapsulated grammatical system and a distinction between a
system of grammatical competence and integrated performance systems.195
As with visual experimentation, there can be priming effects. If an
ambiguous sentence such as (51) is presented in a certain context, the hearer may
take it in a unique way and fail to see the ambiguity.
(51) Flying planes can be dangerous.
In such instances speakers may even reject the second proposed interpretation as
unnatural or contrived. Nevertheless, the speaker’s “intuitive knowledge is clearly
such that both interpretations are assigned to the sentence by the grammar he has
internalized in some form.”
343 This knowledge can be drawn out, sometimes in
quite subtle ways to determine the actual form of the underlying competence. We
can see this by taking a less transparent ambiguity like (52):
(52) I had a book stolen.
Few hearers will notice the fact that this structure is three ways ambiguous. But the
fact that their internalized grammar provides three structural descriptions for the
sentence (corresponding to my having the book stolen from me or for me, or my
stealing the book myself) can be brought out by providing elaborations of (52).
(52a) I had a book stolen from my car when I stupidly left the window open.
(52b) I had a book stolen from the library by a professional thief who I hired
to do the job.
(52c) I almost had a book stolen but they caught me leaving the library with
it.
In bringing out the three-way ambiguity of (52), we do not have to present the
speaker with any new information about his language, we only need to arrange
linguistic material in such a way that the structures his grammatical competence
affords him become available.
343 Chomsky (1965) p.21196
Linguists have clever ways of controlling for pragmatic effects on linguistic
judgements. Consider “minimal pair” experiments.
344 Speakers in these experiments
are presented with strings which are hypothesised to differ only in that one fails a
certain grammatical constraint. The speakers are asked, simply, which is a worse
sentence of their language. Naturally, such controls do not eliminate the intrusion of
pragmatic factors, but rather aim to marginalise them. They reflect the fact that the
grammarian is not so much concerned with what might be conveyed or implied by
using a string in a particular communicative context. The experimental setting
serves to strip away some of that context and leave the speaker to make a report
revealing of the structural materials that are immediately available to them on the
basis of the linguistic material alone.
There is evidence that the orthodox model I’ve outlined is precisely the
model of linguistic intuitions as psychological data, analogous to visual reports,
which Chomsky has in mind:
A grammar is a system of rules that generates an infinite class of “potential percepts”… In
short, we can begin by asking “what is perceived” and move from there to the study of
perception.
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The comparison has been noted by others. Slezak thinks that the familiar perceptual
phenomena involving Kanizsa illusory contours and the like, where visual percepts
are used to investigate perceptual constancies, are just like the intuitions reported on
in linguistic judgement. He remarks that:
The two interpretations of the Necker cube known intuitively to a ‘visual virtuouso’ are
closely analogous to the two meanings of an ambiguous sentence known as the percepts of
the native speaker.
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Longworth has developed the same theme, comparing visual reports with reports of
one’s intuitive take on linguistic material. He compares “quasi-perceptual”
344 See Crain and Thornton (1998).
345 Chomsky (1972) p.168
346 Slezak (unpublished ms.) pp.34197
grammatical appearances with the role of perceptual appearances in vision science.
Longworth considers visual experiments where subjects are presented with various
patterns of printed marks and asked what they can make of those marks, whether
some seem closer together than others, and so on. The key point is that the reports
that subjects are requested to make are not reports on the properties that they believe
the marks to have, for:
One may very well know that the marks are equally well spaced on the page. What one is
asked for are reports about how the marks strike one, or how they seem to one, where how
they seem to one is typically impervious to how one believes them to be.
347
The reports are reports on one’s experience. On this model, the intuitions data do
not target grammatical properties conceived as properties of the extra-psychological
environment. They serve as mental meter readings.
4.2.3 Are Linguistic Intuitions the “Voice of Competence”?
Devitt’s main bone of contention with this orthodox model is highlighted by the
name he gives it – the “voice of competence” view. Devitt construes the model such
that it is committed to speakers having a direct access to the principles that organise
their grammatical competence. He calls this “Cartesian access”, comparing it to the
sort of direct access Descartes thought we had to the contents of our own minds.
Devitt then wonders why, if linguistic intuitions are the voice of our grammatical
competence, we cannot read off the properties of the grammar we are competent in
from our intuitions. As he puts it, “if competence really spoke to us why would it
not use its own language and why would it say so little?”
348 Devitt thinks that if the
source of linguistic intuition were our grammatical competence then we should
have intuitions that give articulation to the very properties that characterise our
competence. But our intuitions do not seem to give articulation to those
347 Longworth (unpublished ms.) p.11
348 Devitt (2006) pp.100-3, (2006a)198
grammatical properties which are only revealed by the theoretical inquiry into
grammar.
Devitt is correct that we do not have the kind of direct awareness of the
underlying grammatical properties licensed by our competence system that he
thinks the orthodox model appeals to. Fiengo’s attitude to the idea that we have
such direct awareness seems to me to be representative:
[I]t goes without saying that we have no such awareness. If one is in any doubt, all one need
do is reflect on the fact that syntactic proposals for even the simplest sentences are often in
debate... [If we had such awareness] much that is debated in Linguistics could be settled by
appeal to the intuitions of speakers. We could ask them what the structures of sentences
should be, and they could tell us.
349
But there is a way to answer Devitt’s question about why linguistic intuitions do not
“use their own voice” and why they “say so little” that is suggested by the orthodox
model. Grammatical competence does not “use its own voice” insofar as the
properties of the sub-personal competence system are not available to mere
personal-level reflection. We have to make a theoretical inference from a speaker’s
judgements of acceptability and interpretability to the structure of the underlying
competence and its place within wider performance systems. The competence “says
so little” because grammatical competence is not the only factor involved in
linguistic judgement which engages systems of linguistic performance and more
besides. Grammatical competence is not all that speakers bring to bear on presented
strings. This has always been Chomsky’s view:
The unacceptable grammatical sentences often cannot be used, for reasons having to do not
with grammar, but rather with memory limitations, intonational and stylistic factors,
“iconic” elements of discourse (for example, a tendency to place logical subject and object
early rather than late) and so on...we cannot formulate particular rules of grammar in such a
way as to exclude them.
350
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We don’t know how conscious judgements are derived, or what causal role the
linguistic systems play in issuing in these judgements. Linguists infer that a
grammatical competence system shapes these intuitions but we know that linguistic
intuitions are not an unproblematic reflection of the underlying competence.
In that sense, Devitt is correct that intuitions are not the “voice of
competence”. But then he is wrong that this is a commitment of the orthodox model.
If grammarians do routinely think that linguistic intuitions are the “voice of
competence”, then it is apparent that they must think the voice is very muffled. The
relation between the intuitive judgements and the structure of competence is not
transparent; it is a highly theoretical matter to determine what it is.
351 As Fodor
notes, in offering their intuitive takes on strings, subjects have access only to the
upshot of their linguistic systems including the grammatical system and the
performance systems. So their intuitive judgements will not give voice to the
internal organisation of those systems. The internal organisation of the competence
and performance systems, the yields of the systems taken individually and their
manner of interaction will all be “completely opaque” to speakers as they respond
to linguistic material.
352 So there is no reason, on the orthodox model, to expect a
speaker’s judgements to give “voice” to their competence in the way Devitt
suggests. The intuitive judgements target the very broad properties of acceptability
and construal, so do not “say” anything about the deeper, general and highly
intricate properties of the competence system involved in their etiology. We may
conclude, as Fiengo suggests that the fine-grained grammatical properties are not
accessible to conscious intuition, keeping distinct “intuitions, which are conscious
states, and those processes of which we are unconscious that perhaps underlie our
intuitions.”
353
351 This would involve, for starters, an account of the role of competence with respect to linguistic
performance.
352 Fodor (1983) p.60
353 Fiengo (2003) p.257200
4.2.4 Are Linguistic Judgements and Visual Reports
Disanalogous?
Devitt argues that there is an important disanalogy between linguistic intuitions and
the perceptual reports drawn upon in vision science. He thinks that what the visual
module delivers to the central processor is the impression on which a judgement
about what is seen can be formed whilst what is delivered to the central processor
by the linguistic systems is an impression of what is said.
354 The important
difference, according to Devitt, is that whereas judgements about what is seen are
the ones of interest to the vision scientist, judgements of what is said are not the
ones that concern the grammarian.
355 The grammarian, Devitt claims, is interested
in the grammatical properties of expressions and so he is not interest in speaker’s
intuitions about what is said. So, Devitt denies that the intuitions that concern the
grammarian are derived in a way analogous to the way perceptual judgements are
derived from the outputs of the visual module.
This argument against the orthodox model is unconvincing for two reasons.
Firstly, it is unclear why the only intuitive materials made available to judgement by
the linguistic systems are intuitions about what is said rather than intuitions about
the acceptability of linguistic forms and their possible structural interpretations. The
examples I’ve considered in this chapter suggest the contrary.
Secondly, it is unclear why intuitions about what is said are not of interest to
the grammarian. These interpretability intuitions are revealing of linguistic form,
because linguistic form acts as a constraint on speakers’ interpretation of what is
said, though these interpretations are informed by more besides, in particular by
semantic and pragmatic information. The sorts of intuitions drawn upon by
grammarians and pragmatists are not sharply discontinuous in the way Devitt
suggests. The speaker has intuitions about what is said on a given occasion which
are partially determined by his immediate recognition of the structure of the
expressions of his language. It may be that Devitt thinks that such intuitions are of
354 It may be inaccurate to say that the visual module delivers an impression of what is seen to the
central processor. Depending on how “what is seen” is to be understood, it may be that the visual
module delivers something shallower than that.
355 Devitt (2006) p.24 fn.25201
no use to the grammarian because they do not involve speakers’ having intuitions
about theoretical properties like c-command and binding, in the sense of making
explicit mention of these theoretical properties. But if the intuitions are being used
as evidence about the internal structure of grammatical competence and how
competence is organised in terms of such properties, then the intuitions are of
obvious use though they do not involve speakers’ overtly considering such
theoretical properties. The informant need have no way of describing sentences; he
need only associate various first-order meanings with sentences. As structure
constrains interpretation, it is then a theoretical matter to determine what reflects
grammatical competence as opposed to other competences and performance factors.
4.2.5 The Orthodox Model and Introspection
On the orthodox model, the linguist is not asking speakers about their conception of
their own language. But in asking them to report on their intuitive responses he is
drawing upon evidence that goes beyond mere observation of their behaviour.
Ludlow has raised the following concern for the orthodox model.
356 As the
orthodox view has it, the speaker is reporting on whether a string seems acceptable
to him, which readings are available to him or how the material strikes him. One
natural way of understanding this model of linguistic judgements is to think of the
judgements as self-reporting or introspection. Moreover, it is very common for
grammarians to consult their own intuitive takes on pieces of their language
independently of the judgements of informants or publicly observable behaviours. If
the intuitions themselves are private, then one might wonder if they are a suitable
source of scientific evidence. The intuitions can be reported on by the linguist, or
by his informant. But isn’t the publicity of the data a requirement in science?
It seems to me that even if the grammarian is committed to linguistic
intuition being a kind of introspection and to the publicity requirement, though he
may not be, the worry about intuitions data can be allayed. The intuitions are
publicly available and shared in at least three ways. Firstly, a range of speakers of
356 Ludlow (forthcoming) ch.3. Ludlow has his own way of dealing with the concern.202
the same native language can report the same intuitive take. Second, the
experiments can be reproduced. There is a regularity and robustness to the reports
that is in keeping with underlying patterns in the speakers’ interpretations. Thirdly,
the intuitive takes are publicly reported on, and these reports are made in
circumstances where we have no reason to suspect informants of misleading us.
It cannot be the unobservable nature of intuitions in and of itself that is a
source of concern because, ultimately, linguistic behaviour is going to require
explanation by unobservable states – inferred theoretical entities - just as scientists
appeal to unobservables in the hard sciences. Of course someone might challenge
the proposed connection between the unobservable intuitions and the reports but
then they would require a saving hypothesis about the source of the reports.
We could imagine an extreme case where a linguist is faced with a
pathologically dishonest subject. The dishonest subject reports that him must be
John in John shaved him and that himself can’t be John in John shaved himself. In
practical terms, the dishonest subject throws a temporary spanner in the works
because his intuitive reports are not a good guide to his grammar. But though the
linguist could face such local issues about the reliability of his data, the possibility
of such a subject does not threaten the broader methodology. There may be factors
in the judgement, such as dishonesty, that it falls to other parts of psychology to
explain. But at some level the subject’s behaviour is just data to be explained, if not
perhaps by the resources of generative grammar. The grammarian may be interested
in aspects of the dishonest subject’s behaviour, as his deliberately skewed
pronouncements may still be revelatory of his competence, if we knew how to
isolate the skewing mechanisms. The point is that while the situation is more
awkward in this case, it is not different in kind: we have a number of cognitive
factors, of which one is grammatical competence, interacting to yield a higher-level
behaviour effect. And it’s is the goal of the psychological sciences very broadly
conceived to offer some explanation of such complex behaviour.
To summarise, Fodor argues that an adequate conception of generative grammar
“should explain why it is that the intuitions of speaker/hearers constitute data203
relevant to the confirmation of grammars.”
357 We have seen that, on an orthodox
model of linguistic intuitions, the psychological conception of generative grammar
fulfils this condition:
It says ‘We can use intuitions to confirm grammars because grammars are internally
represented and actually contribute to the etiology of the speaker-hearer’s intuitive
judgements.’
358
4.3 Linguistic Intuitions as Theoretical Judgements
4.3.1 Devitt’s Model and Belief-Independence
Devitt lists as the third major conclusion of his book, “Speakers’ linguistic
intuitions do not reflect information supplied by the language faculty. They are
immediate and fairly unreflective empirical central-processor responses to linguistic
phenomena. They are not the main evidence for grammars.”
359 Devitt has argued
that speakers’ linguistic intuitions are not the upshot of a dedicated system of
grammatical competence interacting with linguistic performance systems. Rather,
on his account, linguistic intuitions are fairly unreflective or “low level”, theoretical
beliefs about the grammatical properties of languages. They are “low level” in that
speakers do not typically enter into much serious reflection upon the properties of
their language or have knowledge of any scientific linguistics. They are
“theoretical” in the sense that they involve central processing, or general
intelligence, in working out the properties of external linguistic stimuli, albeit
relatively immediately.
Devitt rejects the theoretical inference from the character of our intuitions to
a competence system organised according to grammatical principles. He claims that
his own explanation is more “modest” in appealing only to the generation of
357 Fodor (1985) p.152
358 Fodor (1985) p.152
359 See the glossary of Devitt (2006) and (2007a p.2).204
intuitive judgements by central processing. And he points out that everyone should
be committed to the existence of central processing.
But Devitt’s view that linguistic intuitions are theoretical beliefs, derivative
of central processor responses to external stimuli, is inconsistent with the pre-
doxastic nature of linguistic intuition and its encapsulation, discussed in the
previous section. The view that linguistic intuitions are amongst our theoretical
beliefs seems unable to accommodate the persistence of impressions of
grammaticality and ungrammaticality through contrary beliefs. So Devitt would
have to try and explain these phenomena away somehow. Devitt would also have to
explain why these intuitive impressions seem to be more than just “relatively
unreflective”. They seem to be mandatory. We can’t help but hear the sounds of our
language as structured and meaningful, forming an intuitive take on their form and
interpretation independently of our choosing to reflect upon them.
360 Further, our
linguistic intuitions evidence special hierarchical and recursive principles that are
highly language-specific. Devitt’s view that these intuitions are central processor
responses would have to accommodate these facts and compete with explanations
that appeal to a dedicated competence system.
361 I’ll now argue that the failure of
Devitt’s account reinforces the orthodox inference to the best explanation to the
properties of the dedicated grammatical competence system.
4.3.2 Devitt’s Model and Folk theory
Devitt’s view of intuitions is “based on a view of intuitions in general”; that they
are conditioned by empirical theory.
362 Intuitions, on Devitt’s model, differ from
other such theoretical beliefs “only in being fairly immediate and unreflective.”
363
360 The idea that the operations of a cognitive system are mandatory is often associated with the idea
of a Fodorian module (Fodor 1983). Though the parser may behave like a module, Collins (2004)
argues that it is wrong to think of FL itself as a module in this sense.
361 Devitt (2006 chs.8-10) argues that these grammatical rules are psychologically real to the extent
that they are rules of a more general language of thought.
362 Devitt (2006) p.10
363 ibid.205
Consequently, for Devitt, the grammarian is a good source of intuitions because he
has spent a lot of time reflecting on language and has more theoretical knowledge:
If the person is a linguist then she will of course deploy her concepts from her linguistic
theory... I think we should generally prefer the intuitions of linguists to those of the folk in
seeking evidence.
364
Ordinary informants are not such good sources of data, on Devitt’s model, because
they don’t possess scientific theories involving concepts like c-command and
binding; perhaps having only a little knowledge of verbs, nouns and the like. This is
in stark contrast to the orthodox model, according to which speakers are not being
asked for their opinions about such properties of linguistic material at all. They are
being asked only to respond to linguistic material in terms of such broad categories
as how acceptable and intelligible they find it, which interpretations of it they come
to and how difficult it is for them to achieve certain readings. On the orthodox
model, the intuitions gathered by linguists are just data to be explained. Once
gathered they form the grammarian’s observations rather than being statements of a
theory. In contrast, for Devitt, a speaker’s linguistic intuitions are amongst their
theoretical beliefs and these beliefs constitute a less powerful theory than the
linguist’s.
To explain how ordinary speakers’ theoretical beliefs could count as
evidence for the science of language, Devitt once drew an analogy with our
intuitions about physical reality:
Just as physical intuitions…can be produced by central processor responses to appropriate
phenomena, so also can linguistic intuitions. These linguistic phenomena are not to be
discovered by looking inward at our own competence but by looking outward at the social
role that symbols play in our lives. When linguists do this now, they do not start from
scratch. People have been thinking about these matters for millennia. The result of this
central processor activity is folk, or otherwise primitive theory: the linguistic wisdom of the
ages. The wisdom will be a good albeit not infallible guide to the nature of linguistic
symbols.
365
364 Devitt (2006a) p.22 fn.22
365 Devitt and Sterelny (1989) p.522206
The analogy is unhelpful for Devitt. If it were good then our ordinary beliefs about
physical reality could play an important evidential role in physics. But in physics
one does not expect the folk’s opinions to inform scientific theory, and there is no
reason to assume that the concepts and constructs of ordinary thinkers carry over to
scientific debate. Equally, there’s no reason to expect folk opinion to constrain
linguistics. As Neil Smith remarks:
In physics one does not expect folk views to inform the expert’s theory construction, and
while ethnoscience is itself an interesting field of inquiry, there is no reason to assume a
priori that the concepts and constructs of pre-scientific debate should carry over unchanged
into formal theories of I-language.
366
In my view, it is therefore a consequence of Devitt’s model of linguistic intuitions
that speakers’ intuitions should not be afforded the central evidential role that they
are afforded.
Devitt might try to soften this result by maintaining that speakers’
theoretical beliefs about grammar are largely correct. But if this were true then
much that is debated by grammarians could be settled by appeal to speakers’
intuitions, requiring little scientific theorising. Despite Devitt’s previous
commitment to “the linguistic wisdom of the ages”, he has now recognised that his
model would require some revision of existing methodology:
Where the judgements are those of the ordinary speaker, the theory will be folk linguistics.
We do not generally take theory-laden folk judgements as primary data for a scientific
theory. So we should not do so in linguistics.
367
As Devitt agrees, it would be irresponsible to attribute so much significance to the
folk’s theoretical beliefs.
366 N. Smith (2000) p.xv
367 Devitt (2006) p.102207
4.3.3 A modification to Devitt’s Model
Devitt has modified his view that linguistic intuitions are like theoretical beliefs
about other aspects of the world in two ways. Firstly, he now stresses that they are
most comparable to intuitions we have about the outputs of other human
competences such as “touch-typing and thinking”.
368 Secondly, he now allows a
role for grammatical competence in linguistic intuition. On Devitt’s model, a
speaker asked about a string of words first simulates the behaviour of attempting to
produce or comprehend a string, and in doing so engages their grammatical
competence. There is then some quick central processor reflection upon this
experience in which speaker’s employ their grammatical concepts to arrive at a
judgement.
But even this modified version of Devitt’s model is inadequate. Smith brings
out the problem that remains with Devitt’s model using the following example.
369
(53) Bill believes that Bush is dangerous.
(54) Bill believes Bush is dangerous.
If we were to ask a speaker, presented with cases like (53) and (54), to do some
quick reflection and say whether they believed the that in sentences containing
believes is optional, they would probably say that it was entirely optional. But it is
clear that this reflection is not what grammarians are targeting in probing a
speaker’s intuitions. When we elicit speaker’s intuitive responses to strings like (55)
we get an intuitive judgement which reveals their grammar but is indifferent to such
central processor, theoretical judgements.
(55) *Bill believes that Hilary to be intelligent.
It is the language that speakers are immediately cognitively sensitive to, data of the
latter sort, and not the irrelevant theoretical reflections that the generative
grammarian is targeting. In plumbing the speaker’s intuitions we want to find out
368 Devitt (2006a) pp.593-4
369 Smith (unpublished ms.) p.37208
what the speaker can immediately recognise as part of his language, what
interpretations he can get and what he will immediately produce. As Longworth
puts it:
The subject may be especially well placed to report on how things seem to them, but should
not be taken to be authoritative about whether apparent properties are determined by their
language systems...In short, the linguist for the most part aims to treat subjects as objects of
inquiry, rather than fellow inquirers.
370
It is Devitt’s false assumption, not shared by the orthodox model, that linguistic
intuitions are a speaker’s beliefs or opinions about grammatical matters that causes
much of his consternation with the orthodox view. He asks us to compare the
linguistic case to other cases of cognitive capacities, where a set of rules is
somehow encoded in us such as thinking and typing. As Devitt rightly points out,
there is no path from the embodiment of these rules in a subject to that subject’s
having correct beliefs about these rules.
371 Devitt infers that there is no such path
from the grammatical rules encoded in the competence system to theoretical beliefs
expressed in linguistic judgements. But as Longworth rightly notes, the orthodox
model does not treat speakers as authoritative theoreticians about their grammatical
competence because it does not treat them as theoreticians, the grammarian’s
“fellow inquirers”, at all. The commitment to a theoretical model of intuitions is
Devitt’s own: not one the orthodox model shares. To be clear, proponents of the
orthodox model should agree with Devitt that there is no path from the encoding of
rules of grammatical competence in a speaker to their having correct beliefs about
those rules. Correct beliefs about the principles of grammatical competence are
what grammatical theory aims for, not what speakers are taken to provide for the
grammarian. Therefore, the orthodox view creates no mysterious access to the
principles that characterise speakers’ competences.
370 Longworth (unpublished ms.) p.11
371 Devitt (2006) p.118209
4.3.4 Devitt’s alternative view of the Evidence
Ultimately, Devitt’s model of linguistic intuitions leads him to the following
conclusion: “we do not generally take theory-laden folk judgements as primary data
for a scientific theory. So we should not do so in linguistics”.
372 Devitt argues that
we should not give the linguistic judgements of ordinary native speakers a central
evidential role in grammatical theory. Rather he claims we should seek evidence
primarily amongst corpuses, what speakers would say and understand in linguistic
contexts, and the intuitions of linguists. He says:
The main evidence for grammars is not found in the intuitions of ordinary speakers but
rather in a combination of the corpus, the evidence of what we would say and understand,
and the intuitions of linguists.
373
Although linguists, like other scientists, have theoretical hunches (a sense of the sort
of explanation certain phenomena might receive) that is not what they are interested
in probing their native knowledge of language. Theoretical hunches, whatever role
they do play in theory construction, are not treated as evidence. As Fiengo notes:
[W]e say, perhaps of a linguist, that the linguist has the theoretical intuition that that is the
analysis which should be given of the sentence in question. The term ‘intuition’, in this case,
has a sense rather like that of ‘hunch’. Linguists say they have such intuitions or hunches,
but they never constitute the data of Linguistics, rather they apparently occur among
linguists during the practice of Linguistics, as they do among physicists during the practice
of physics... And on the other hand, my intuition that the sentence ‘Flying planes can be
dangerous’ is ambiguous is nothing like a hunch.
374
Moreover, an investigation of the “evidence of what we would say and understand”
upon presentation of linguistic material is part of the intuitions evidence on the
orthodox model. Gathering evidence about what speakers would say or understand
upon the presentation of linguistic material just is part of probing their linguistic
intuitions, via the production and perception of speech. So I’m going to focus on
372 Devitt (2006) p.102
373 Devitt (2006) p.100
374 Fiengo (2003) p.256210
Devitt’s suggestion that the corpus should be a central source of evidence for
generative grammars.
The suggestion fits with Devitt’s linguistic conception of generative
grammars as theories of physical entities that form representational systems. For in
suggesting that the linguist focus on the corpus rather than linguistic intuitions,
Devitt is seeking to re-orientate the grammarian’s attention away from speakers’
proclivities towards properties of external outputs as the locus of grammatical
reality. Devitt thinks the richest source of evidence for grammatical hypotheses is to
be found in corpuses. But there are major problems with Devitt’s suggestions that
the corpus can play the central role in grammatical theory that has been played by
the intuitions data.
I noted (§2.1 and §3.2) the problems with a focus on performance events for
determining the structures of a speaker’s language. For these reasons, speakers’
intuitive judgements have been considered crucial data for generative grammars.
Chomsky says:
Linguistics is characterised by attention to certain kinds of evidence…largely, the
judgements of native speakers.
375
Chomsky thinks we cannot determine the grammatical structure of languages on the
basis of gathering corpuses of performance events. Why does Chomsky think that
the intuitions of speakers are so central to investigating the grammars of languages?
Rather than drawing on corpus data in isolation from speakers’ intuitions,
corpus data are employed as part of a complementary package with speakers’
intuitions. Depending on the hypothesis that one is investigating, one might, for
example, want to examine a corpus to see if a certain construction ever occurs or for
evidence about what is available in acquisition. As Collins suggests:
For example, take the hypothesis that children don’t make ‘errors’ of a certain kind, say,
‘Children don’t move auxiliary verbs from relative clauses in the attempt to form
interrogatives’...one can look at databases of child speech to test this. One can also look at
375 Chomsky (1986) p.36211
adult speech to see how common certain constructions are, or whether children receive
‘negative data’
376
But it is crucial to hypotheses about grammatical structure that one uses pieces of a
corpus in tandem with linguistic judgements, so as to work out how the expressions
are actually structured rather than simply whether they occur or not. The mere
occurrence of an expression by itself doesn’t tell you about its grammatical
properties. If one wants to know how it is structured that requires speakers making
judgements about its interpretation. To this end, the grammarian’s use of corpuses
involves him, or his native informant, making intuitive judgements too. Insofar as
Devitt’s model ultimately suggests a preponderant role for corpus data over
speakers’ intuitions, it is mistaken.
Devitt rightly points out that linguistics textbooks are full of sample strings
described as unacceptable, ambiguous and so forth. These notions have a cognitive
ring to them but Devitt thinks they are best interpreted as marking properties of the
written strings. When linguists say that English-speakers have the intuition that a
string is ambiguous, Devitt thinks that this is employed as evidence that the string
has the property of structural ambiguity. But as Devitt thinks that ordinary speakers
are a fallible guide to grammatical properties, he suggests that we should go straight
to the corpus: straight to the uttered and written strings, which he thinks are the
primary focus of grammatical inquiry, and survey their properties rather than the
properties of speakers’ intuitions.
A corpus is a list of strings that have been uttered or written down.
377 This
description of corpuses might be challenged on the grounds that it is unnecessarily
austere. Perhaps we should think of corpuses as imbued with all sorts of other
interesting information about grammatical structure. But it is difficult to see how
linguists could so imbue corpuses without drawing on evidence from the
judgements of native speakers. Grammatical structures involve special hierarchical
dependencies amongst constituents. We can’t determine these special structures of
376 Collins (2006) p.7
377 A typical written corpus might be The Times or The Wall Street Journal. Spoken corpuses are
collected in acquisition studies, sometimes capturing everything a child hears and utters over the
course of months.212
speakers’ languages simply by enumerating the strings that they produce, where the
latter are flat lists of words. This is one reason why intuitive judgements are so
important in gathering evidence for generative grammars: because they can be used
to determine the way that speakers structure linguistic material. Consider (56) and
(57).
(56) Mary expected to leave by herself.
(57) Bill wondered who Mary expected to leave by herself.
The individual who is leaving can differ between the cases, as we can tell by the
acceptability of substituting herself for himself in (57) but not (56). But the fact that
the underlined material has different structural articulation in (56) and (57) is not
obvious from looking at the strings themselves without bringing such judgements
about their interpretation to bear.
378 From looking at this mini-corpus, one might
think that (56) is simply embedded as the wh-complement in (57) and retains its
structure. Examining a corpus may not suffice for determining the difference in the
structures. The difference in structure between the two occurrences of the
underlined material is usually explained in terms of the difference in the empty
categories, where a copy of Mary is the subject of the infinitival clause in (56)
whilst a copy of who fills that position in (57). Linguists determined this by
investigating the different interpretations speakers give these strings.
Moreover, an uttered string may have been an “error”, an ungrammatical
utterance. If the linguist were to count these strings as part of the language then they
would be counting in too much in constructing their grammar. So linguists and their
informants make judgements to discern amongst the produced utterances. As
Stanley observes: “Ordinary discourse often involves the use of complex
expressions which would be counted as ungrammatical even by the utterer’s own
lights.”
379 Corpora contain no explicit information about which are the
ungrammatical utterances, and such information is crucial to developing
grammatical theories. The same is true in principle of written strings. We might
378 The example is from Collins (2006) p.8.
379 Stanley (2000) p.408213
have reason to think that people are more careful about what they write than what
they say. Yet we don’t want them to be too careful. There are lots of things that
speakers easily recognise as linguistic forms but wouldn’t write down. Contractions
of “want to” to “wanna” may be one such example. We would miss these forms if
we relied solely on written corpus data.
And it would be a waste of time to wait until the strings of theoretical
interest happened to just turn up in written or spoken corpuses when the linguist can
construct them himself or enlist the judgements of a native informant when the
language is not his own. The crucial cases to test the theory may not be in the
corpus. Chomsky recognised these problems with relying on corpuses in the
absence of judgements early on, saying:
A corpus may contain examples of deviant or ungrammatical sentences, and any rational
linguist will recognise the problem and try to assign to observed examples their proper
status…insofar as a corpus is used as a source of illustrative examples, we rely on the same
intuitive judgements to select examples as we do in devising relevant examples with the aid
of an informant or ourselves.
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Further, an uttered or written string, like “Flying planes can be dangerous, that turns
up in a corpus, may instantiate more than one grammatical structure of a language.
Sentences are structured objects but “do not wear their structures on their sleeves,
so it can easily happen that distinct structures sound the same.”
381 In such cases, the
linguist limited to inspecting corpuses may miss out on structures that are part of the
language.
The point is that a corpus contains a great deal of what is, for the purposes
of investigating speakers’ grammars, linguistic debris. This includes ungrammatical
but interpretable utterances, false starts, mistakes, slips of the tongue, half-
expressed thoughts, unfinished sentences, interruptions, and utterances affected by
deficits in memory, attention and motivation. So corpuses taken in isolation don’t
provide a perspicuous guide to the linguistic forms that speakers recognise or the
construal that they put upon them. Chomsky’s suggestion (see Chapter Three) is
380 Chomsky (1965) pp.198-9
381 Fiengo (2003) p.255214
that to get some explanatory perspective on such a record of performance events,
requires not only the further evidence of speakers making judgements but also a
distinction between speakers’ grammatical competence and the other factors that
enter into these linguistic performances.
Devitt’s products, the utterances and inscriptions that make up corpora, are
an interaction effect amongst which only one factor is grammar. In arguing for the
primary importance of corpuses, Devitt misses the point that generative
grammarians look to separate out the different factors that contribute to
performance events rather than study the properties of the corpus as they result from
the motley. That is the point of the theoretical distinction between competence and
performance: to try and determine the grammar of the language that a speaker has
actually acquired. The broad target is the system responsible for our sensitivity to
linguistic form. This system can be explored by probing speakers’ intuitive
responses to linguistic material (as I described in §4.2).
To summarise the major problems with Devitt’s model of linguistic intuition:
(1) It is unable to accommodate the pre-doxastic nature of linguistic intuition
(§4.3.1). (2) Such folk theoretical judgements would not be afforded an evidential
role in a science (§4.3.2). (3) In practice linguists do not target speakers’ reflective
judgements (§4.3.3). (4) The model has the consequence that a central evidential
role should be afforded to corpus data which it cannot bear. Corpus data works as a
complementary package with intuitive judgements (§4.3.4).
By contrast, if a major source of evidence for generative grammars is native
speakers’ pre-doxastic linguistic intuition, then a major source of evidence bears on
the grammars that speakers have internalised in a system of grammatical
competence. The orthodox model of linguistic intuitions and the evidential role they
play looks in good shape.215
4.4 Linguistic Intuitions as Observational Judgements
382
4.4.1 The Observational Model
A third model of speakers’ intuitive linguistic judgements that we might consider is
one according to which they are judgements based on observation of non-
psychological linguistic facts. On this model, linguistic intuitions are observations
of non-psychological facts and the reports formed on these intuitions are akin to
observational judgements. So conceived, linguistic intuitions are gathered in much
the same way as that in which scientists in other fields gather their observations,
namely, by observing facts in our environment. These observations are then
employed as data for a theory about grammatical facts located in our environment.
On this observational model, the linguist is not interested in gathering
evidence from speakers’ intuitions because they can be brought to bear on a theory
of grammatical competence. But neither is he plumbing a speaker’s theoretical
beliefs about language. On the observational model, the linguist collects the linguist
facts that he observes, and those observed by his native informants; facts especially
accessible to observation by those that know a language.
383 Grammatical theory
then aims for a theory of why those linguistic facts are as they are.
On this model, when all goes well with a speaker, a speaker’s intuition that a
string is a good sentence of his language is his observation of the fact that this is so.
Hence, a speaker’s intuition that a string is a good sentence is, unless we have
reason to think that the speaker has made an error, evidence that the string is a good
sentence of his language.
The key difference between the orthodox model and the observational model
is over the form that the intuitions data takes. On the orthodox model, the datum is
that a speaker finds a certain utterance or written string to be acceptable or
382 Timothy Williamson suggested a view along these lines to me.
383 The view that grammatical properties are especially accessible to be observed by those that know
languages, has a point of contact with McDowell’s view (§1.3.3) that meaning properties are
especially perceivable by speakers who have a special sort of practical knowledge. The observational
model under consideration here, however, makes no appeal to McDowell’s notion of a practice.216
interpretable in certain ways and so forth. On the observational model, the evidence
takes the form that a certain utterance or written string is a good sentence of the
language or n-ways ambiguous and so forth. On this observational view, the
speaker’s proclivities are not the salient data which is rather the non-psychological
fact that the native speaker observes for the linguist. The grammarian’s evidence
consists in non-psychological facts that suitably equipped speakers can observe and
is not to be confused with the data that speakers’ linguistic intuitions simultaneously
provide about those speakers’ grammatical competences.
The proponent of the observational model might try to develop the analogy
with observation in the non-psychological sciences in the following way. They
might claim that the grammarian is no more seeking to gather data on the properties
of a speaker’s intuitions as they reveal his psychological organisation, than a
physicist is seeking to gather data on the properties of an observer’s judgements as
they are revelatory of his mechanisms of observation. Making observations in the
physical sciences requires an observer whose eyes function properly and who has an
ability to read the instruments that he makes use of. Applying the analogy to
linguistics, we might think of the native speaker as, so to speak, looking down the
microscope at the facts about their language but making use of a special instrument,
their grammatical competence.
384
384 If, as Devitt holds, the non-psychological grammatical properties are partly determined by
psychological facts, then the linguist’s access to the grammatical facts about speakers’ languages
looks rather different to the physicist’s observation of physical facts. The linguist's access to the
grammatical facts is dependent on her access to speakers in a quite different way to that in which a
physicist’s access to physical facts is dependent on someone observing the physical facts. The
linguist doesn’t depend on the speaker merely because she, again so to speak, needs someone to look
down the microscope but because the facts in question are determined by the psychology of the
speakers under investigation. There would be no grammatical facts determined independently of
speakers for the observer to observe in the way that there are independently determined physical
facts for the physicist to observe. So conceived, if one takes speakers out of the experimental
situation the linguistic facts vanish along with their determinants. The physicist needs someone to
make observations of the pertinent facts but he doesn’t need a human being in situ for there to be
such a determinate set of facts. So the analogy works better with a mind-independent conception of
non-psychological grammatical properties.217
To take an example, suppose the presented linguistic material is (58) which
is two ways ambiguous.
(58) I saw her duck and swallow.
On the observational model, the grammarian’s data are not that speakers find (58)
two ways ambiguous and can’t hear it four ways ambiguous, leading us to ask how
those speakers must be configured for this to be so. On the observational model, the
data relevant to grammatical hypotheses are simply that the sentence is two ways
ambiguous, an observation that can be made by English-speakers.
385
4.4.2 Error, Belief-Independence and Types
It is a feature of the model that there can be errors in linguistic observation, where
performance factors interfere with our capacity to observe the linguistic facts.
Proponents of the observational model might claim that this is much the same
situation as occurs in non-psychological sciences where an observer’s inherent
limitations cause them to make various sorts of errors and faulty observations.
Though such errors in linguistic observation require explanation, proponents of this
model will discard them as evidence for generative grammars, just as a physicist
discards his observation when he mistakes a scratch on his particle detector for a
real particle.
385 There is a difficult question about the necessity of observation to linguistic intuition. For, on the
face of it, there need not be any external material at all presented to the subject for him to consult his
linguistic intuition. Much of the data seem to be available to introspection and reflection on the
contours of one’s own language. And even where some initial observation is involved, once I have
observed the string in (58), I can then fast-switch back and forth in my head between the two
linguistic structures it instantiates without further observation of external material. In one sense we
observe the same thing, the string that was presented to us in (58), though the grammatical properties
of our experience change. We experience changes in the grammatical properties that we are
attending to, though the object of our initial observation stays the same. I will not be able to give this
issue the full treatment it deserves here. One thing that proponents of the observational model might
suggest is that cases of linguistic intuition where external objects of observation play little or no role
are akin to imagining observing something.218
The observational model has a significant advantage over the theoretical
belief model. The observational model can accommodate the pre-doxastic nature of
linguistic intuition by allowing that the mechanisms of linguistic perception,
including the grammatical competence system, are encapsulated.
To fill out the observational model a little, we need to say something about
what is observed. What is observed in the hypothesised cases would have to be
more than the physical entities, their physical properties and magnitudes. For I can
hear the words produced by Arabic speakers, or see the marks produced by Chinese
speakers, without observing any of the linguistic facts about their language.
386
Moreover, in observing that something is a sentence of my own language, I would
not be simply observing the familiar sounds or marks but observing it, so to speak,
with a tick by it – as a sentence of the language that I know. To see or hear that
something is a good sentence is to see or hear that it is a certain type of thing, a
linguistic type.
These observed linguistic types would have to be fairly broad categories
such that something is or is not a sentence of the speaker’s language, that it is
ambiguous or unambiguous, that it has a certain interpretation and so forth. It is
clear that the fundamental structural properties of languages do not lie open to view
to be observed in the strings that are outwardly presented to us. No one observes c-
command relations and the other hierarchical dependencies, or the empty categories.
Such grammatical properties make up a level of unobservable grammatical structure.
The proponent of the observational model would hold that the observed linguistic
facts receive their explanation in terms of a level of unobservable grammatical
structure.
386 As Smith (2006 pp.949-50) observes: “We have difficulty even recognising the word boundaries
in a foreign language since they do not correlate to breaks in the acoustic signal.”219
4.4.3 Grammatical Variation
There are arguments from different sorts of grammatical variation that might put
pressure on the observation model.
387 The external materials in which grammatical
properties are discerned can vary widely, with much less constraint from their
physical instantiation than one might expect. The grammatical relations are
instantiated in the speech sounds of the different natural languages, in their different
written forms – some of which mark word boundaries, some of which do not – but
also across the sign languages, and are even recognised in patterns of vibration by
subjects with large scale sensory deficits.
388 If linguistic intuition is a matter of
observation then it is a form of perception that is invariant across different sensory
modalities.
But there is not only variation in the modalities involved in the perception of
language whilst the grammatical intuitions remain invariant, there is also variation
in grammatical intuitions amongst speakers. This raises a question mark over how
analogous linguistic intuition really is to observation in the non-psychological
sciences. For it is taken by some to be criteria of genuine observation that the facts
observed must not vary from observer to observer. The thought that genuine
observations must be such that they could be made by any observer, independent of
their particularities, is clearly articulated by Tyler Burge:
Any observer could have been equally well placed to make any observation. Others could
have made an observation with the same type of presentation of the scene, if they had been
in the same position at the relevant time... Even though empirical commitments must be
made by persons, nothing relevant to the justification of any empirical commitment
regarding the physical world has anything essentially to do with any particular person
making the commitment.
389
However, the apprehension of grammatical properties in linguistic intuition cannot
be enjoyed by all observers. Not all subjects are “equally well-placed”
390 to intuit
387 See, for instance, Rey’s (2006) argument against linguistic realism.
388 Chomsky (2000) pp.121-2
389 Burge (1988) p.475
390 ibid.220
particular grammatical properties. There are grammatical properties that English-
speakers intuit upon presentation of the sentence “John shaved himself” that will
not be available to speakers with their parameters set to Chinese upon “the same
type of presentation of the scene, if they had been in the same position at the
relevant time”. The grammatical properties that speakers can intuit are dependent
upon the “particular person making the commitment”, for as Smith notes “Only
those with a certain competence will have a richly articulated linguistic experience
in response to the natural speech sounds of Chinese or Arabic speakers.
391 The
grammatical structures of a particular language, and their instantiation in speech
sounds, may be available to only a very small proportion of speakers. We know this
from our own experiences, and equally linguists require native speakers to intuit the
properties of a language unless it happens to be their own.
So the intuited grammatical properties vary across speakers as their
particularised grammatical competence systems vary. The dependence of which
properties are intuited on highly specialised cognitive organisations might suggest,
if we accept Burge’s criterion, that linguistic intuition could not be observation. The
fact that so much more is “experienced in speech sounds by those that know the
language than those that don’t” has suggested to some linguists that the words,
phrases and sentences that we intuit are inner, mental objects.
392 Harris and Lindsay
conclude from the dependence of intuited grammatical properties on our special
psychological systems that what is experienced by one who knows the language is
not something that is there in the sounds emitted by its speakers, rather it is
“projected by means of articulations but is not embodied in them. The linguistic
information read into, or onto, those sounds is simply part of ‘the specifically
human way with sounds.’”
393
There are, however, means by which the observational model of linguistic
intuition might be sustained despite grammatical variation. As Longworth points
out, the argument from variation in the intuited grammatical properties to the
conclusion that linguistic intuition is not a matter of observation is “a reflex of
391 Smith (unpublished ms.) p.21
392 Smith (2006) p.951
393 Harris and Lindsay (2003) p.203221
sensitivity to the modal dependence of the range of manifest grammatical properties,
available to each of us, on the particularity of our language systems.”
394 If we could
show that the modal dependence of the intuited grammatical properties on the
particularity of our competence system is at least consistent with the mind-
independence of grammatical properties then the observational model could be
sustained in the face of grammatical variation.
There are two broad ways of understanding Burge’s condition on
observation. One could interpret it so that it is a condition on observation that an
individual needn’t be the particular person who made the observation; it was
available in principle to other individuals, though those other individuals would
have to be of the same physical or psychological type. But a stronger interpretation
is that it is a condition on observation that for any genuine observation, an
individual needn’t be of the same physical or psychological type in order to make
the observations, beyond the minimal requirement that they have observational
powers at all. On the first interpretation Burge would be laying down a very
plausible condition on observation. But if we combine it with variation it doesn’t
suggest anything about whether there is observation taking place in linguistic
intuition: it would be unsurprising if different subjects with the same physical and
psychological constitution were capable of making the same observation whilst
differently physically or psychologically constituted subjects had different
observational powers.
But the second interpretation of Burge’s condition yields a far less plausible
condition. Why should the observational be restricted to that which could be
observed by anyone however constituted? This would mean that colour was not
observable as one could have minimal observational capacities but lack colour
perception.
395
What is required to make variety and observation consistent is to drop this
latter criterion for genuine observation and adopt a pluralist view of the observed
394 Longworth (2007) p.407
395 This condition has been called the “Martian Principle” by Travis (2002), it is targeted by
Kalderon’s work on colour pluralism (see Kalderon 2007) and Longworth’s work on grammatical
properties (2007, unpublished ms.)222
grammatical properties. According to a pluralist view of grammatical properties, the
environment sustains an abundance of grammatical properties; and different
properties are selected by the different psychological systems of the speakers whose
intuitions conflict. On the pluralist view, a given environmental item can sustain a
plurality of grammatical properties and the instancing of a set of grammatical
properties by an item does not serve to exclude its instancing other sets of
grammatical properties. On such a view, the possibility of genuine conflict arises
only where an environmental item is required to sustain incompatible properties
drawn from the same family of grammatical properties; for it is amongst these
families of properties that relations of exclusion hold. If amongst this plurality of
grammatical properties there is a sufficient range then instances of variation could
be explained in terms of what is available in the environment for different speakers
to perceive on the basis of their “special psychological design.”
396
If a pluralist view of grammatical properties could be sustained then the
observational model would not be inconsistent with grammatical variation. So,
although some have made a case against the observational model on the basis of the
variety in speakers’ linguistic intuitions, that case is incomplete. Pluralism offers a
defence of observation of non-psychological properties given variety. The next step
in my argument is to determine which sorts of properties make up the grammarian’s
explanans: the properties of grammatical competence revealed by speaker’s
intuitions as per the orthodox model or properties observable in the external
environment as per the observational model.
But two things are worth noting before we proceed. First, the possibility of
an observational model in no way impugns the orthodox model, according to which
speakers’ linguistic intuitions can be used to investigate the competence-
performance distinction, a distinction which I argued (Chapter Three) the
grammarian is required to investigate. Secondly, as on the observational model,
which grammatical properties speakers observe is dependent on the particular
configurations of their grammatical competence system, to determine what the
396 See Travis (2002) for this idea. See Longworth (2007, unpublished ms.) for discussion in the
context of grammatical properties.223
grammatical properties of speaker’s languages are, the grammarian would still need
to investigate the properties of their particularised competence system.
What we need to determine is what sort of properties – properties of a
grammatical competence system or properties of a non-psychological domain - the
generative grammarian is focused upon and are appealed to in grammatical
explanations. It is this crucial issue to which I’ll now turn.224
5. Explanation in Generative Grammar
5.1 What sort of properties do Generative Grammars appeal
to?
In the last chapter I defended an orthodox model of the linguistic intuitions
evidence. Linguistic intuitions can be employed as evidence for investigating the
competence-performance distinction as a means to constructing a theory of
grammatical competence. I rejected an alternative model according to which the
intuitions data should be treated as speaker’s theoretical beliefs about language. On
the orthodox model, grammarians are interested in linguistic intuitions because of
what these intuitions reveal about speakers and their psychological system of
grammatical competence. I also considered an observational model of linguistic
intuitions, according to which linguistic intuitions serve as observations of linguistic
facts located in the external environment and are used to support hypotheses about
that non-psychological domain.
In order to determine which of these models is most appropriate to
generative grammar, I will examine the question of what sorts of facts and
properties generative grammars make explanatory appeal to in constructing their
theories. Are they psychological properties of a speaker’s grammatical competence
system, as per the orthodox model? Or are they non-psychological properties of the
external environment that might be observed by competent speakers? Or do
grammarians require some combination of psychological and non-psychological
grammatical properties in order to make their explanations work? In this chapter, I
consider the theoretical constructs of generative grammar. I argue that the sorts of
properties that must be part of the grammarian’s explanans, if he is to meet the
explanatory goals defended in Chapter Two, are psychological properties of the
grammatical competence system, which I argued in Chapter Four can be
investigated via speakers’ intuitions. I claim that the grammarian’s goals can be met225
by a theory of grammatical competence to which grammarians make an explanatory
commitment (as I argued in Chapter Three). Further, I argue that with respect to
these explanatory goals, non-psychological grammatical properties external to our
grammatical systems would be explanatory danglers, which would commit the
theories to additional properties for no corresponding explanatory benefit.
5.1.1 Explanation and Supervenience
Though Devitt argues that generative grammar describes a non-psychological
reality realised in our physical environment, he does not think that the reality the
grammarian describes is mind-independent. Devitt is attracted to the idea that if
there were no minds then there would be no c-command, binding principles, lexical
features and so forth. He thinks that minds provide some of the unity to those
entities which we categorise as c-commanders, pronoun and reflexives. So Devitt
wants to accept that grammatical properties have psychological determinants. But
he distinguishes between grammatical properties having psychological determinants
and their being psychological properties. Devitt’s view is that non-psychological
grammatical facts supervene on a combination of psychological facts, social facts
and environmental facts.
397 So Devitt’s “linguistic reality” is mind-dependent,
though it constitutes a non-psychological domain of facts. In defending his
linguistic conception, Devitt points out that this dependence on psychological
determinants, “does not make linguistic facts psychological.”
398 Devitt argues that:
Even if symbols had their properties in virtue of certain mental facts that would not make
the theory of those symbols about those facts and so would not make the theory part of
psychology. Indeed, consider the consequences of supposing it would, and then
generalizing: every theory – economic, psychological, biological, etc. – would be about
physical facts and part of physics because physical facts ultimately determine everything. A
special science does not lose its own domain because that domain supervenes on another.
399
397 Devitt (2006) p.39
398 Devitt (unpublished ms. b) p.10
399 Devitt (2006) p.40226
This is an important point because a number of Devitt’s critics have highlighted the
apparent dependence of grammatical properties on the psychological systems of
speakers and pressed Devitt’s view on this basis.
Smith argues that what transforms the physical entities (sounds and marks in
our environment) into a representational system is not something located in the
environment but something internal to the speakers who encounter the sounds and
marks.
400 Smith claims that a sound having the grammatical properties it does
“consists in there being a relation between the sound and features of a speaker’s
mind/brain.” Smith suggests that if the sounds do not have their grammatical
properties in and of themselves, but only as they stand in a relation to speakers’
minds, then facts that determine the “fine-grained linguistic detail and richness” the
grammarian wants to capture, are psychological facts. Smith then questions:
Why not then concede that it is these domain-specific features of a speaker’s cognitive
organisation...that the linguist most needs to focus on. Sure, we can say that physical tokens
of sound have linguistic properties, but crucially they do so because they stand in important
relations to the psychological states of language users.
401
Smith is challenging Devitt’s linguistic conception on the grounds that the major
determinants of grammatical properties are on the psychological side of Devitt’s
distinctions. So, we might then wonder, as Smith does, why the grammarian should
focus on what’s going on over on the non-psychological side of the distinctions.
Even if one grants Devitt’s distinctions then one might think it reasonable for a
linguist to focus on one side of them, the side where all the action is.
Devitt denies that the grammatical facts are determined solely by
psychological facts because he thinks there is also a role for social and
environmental facts. In §5.4 I offer a nativist argument against Devitt’s claims
concerning the role of social and environmental facts in determining the
grammatical properties of speakers’ languages. But Devitt’s main line of defence
against Smith’s argument from the supervenience of grammatical facts on
psychological facts, is to point out that even if grammatical properties are so
400 Smith (unpublished ms.) p.27
401 Smith (2006a) p.11227
determined “this would not make linguistics part of psychology any more than a
similar determination makes psychology a part of physics.”
402
Devitt thinks this challenge rests on a wrong-headed philosophy of science.
Even if all the determination is on the psychological side of his distinctions, Devitt
maintains that linguistics could still be about non-psychological facts. This is
because the supervenience of one domain of facts on another does not suggest that
we have only one domain of inquiry rather than two. If it did then, on the
assumption that everything supervenes on the physical, we would have just one
domain of inquiry: namely, physics. But all parties agree on the existence of the
special sciences, so the argument from supervenience doesn’t go through.
Devitt’s general point here is sound.
403 We cannot infer from the
supervenience of grammatical facts on psychological facts alone to generative
grammar being a part of psychology, any more than we could infer that the
psychological sciences were a part of physics from the supervenience of the
psychological facts on physical facts. Devitt argues that his critics mistakenly infer
from the supervenience claim to a claim concerning linguistic explanations and
what sorts of facts they traffic in. As Devitt notes, there is no such entailment. There
are many scientific domains that supervene on lower levels. Ultimately, we might
think they all supervene on physics. But that does not imply that these sciences have
no proprietary domain of laws and generalisations or that they are all really about
physical facts. Like Devitt, his critics are committed to the existence of the special
sciences, such as psychology and linguistics.
402 Devitt (2006a) p.11
403 Although I would question whether Devitt’s critics, such as Smith, are making the straightforward
supervention argument, Devitt is right that such an argument would not go through. The
supervenience of one domain of inquiry on another does not suggest we have only one domain of
inquiry and not two. It is unlikely, however, that his opponents would commit to any such general
principle. The suggestion is rather that in the case of grammar the revealing generalisations can be
captured in psychological terms. Though Smith, in particular, presses on the supervenience claim,
his argument (2006a, unpublished ms.) ultimately rests on the explanatory credentials of the
proposed non-psychological properties. His focus is on whether the explanatory generalisations of
generative grammar apply to Devitt’s non-psychological phenomena or to a level of psychological
organisation.228
As Devitt suggests, questions about the proprietary domain of a science are
not so easy to answer and cannot be inferred from supervenience claims. But we
might try to answer such questions by making explanatory claims rather than
supervenience claims. If the science of generative grammar states explanatory
generalisations that can all be captured in psychological terms then we might
wonder whether there is an explanatory domain of non-psychological grammatical
properties. If such an argument could be supported then we would have good reason
to think that generative grammar is a study of the psychological facts which
determine the grammatical facts. This argument could go through even if we grant
Devitt his point about supervenience and special sciences. We might hold that there
is a special science of psychology, that captures generalisations that cannot be
stated in the terms of physics or biology, and at the same time that generative
grammar is a part of this special science of psychology.
What Devitt needs to argue is that there is a failure of explanatory
determination between psychology and generative grammar.
404 It might be true that
everything supervenes on physics and yet also true that there are independent
sciences of biology, psychology, geology and so forth, whose generalisations
cannot be conjured from the resources of physics. But that doesn’t in itself provide
any reason to think that there are interesting grammatical generalisations that cannot
be stated in psychological terms as generalisations about speakers that ought instead
to be stated as generalisations about a non-psychological domain. I’ll argue that
Devitt has provided no reason to think that grammatical reality has an explanatory
integrity that is lost at a psychological level of explanation.
It is important to emphasise then that my claim is an explanatory claim
about the sorts of properties appealed to in grammatical explanations. It is a claim
about what sorts of properties are required by theories that meet the generative
grammarian’s goals. My case for the psychological conception of generative
grammar doesn’t rest simply on the supervenience claim that grammatical
properties supervene on psychological properties, but rather on the explanatory
claim that it is psychological properties that do the explanatory work in grammatical
theories.
404 Longworth (forthcoming) makes this point.229
5.1.2 Psychological Reality, Linguistic Reality and Grammatical
Explanation
A number of philosophers have raised concerns about Chomsky’s proposal that the
structures described by grammarians are realised in the mind; that they have
“psychological reality”.
405 Chomsky’s attitude to this question builds on his views
about the psychological goals of grammatical theory and his employment of a
competence-performance distinction amongst psychological machinery to
determine the generative grammars of speakers’ languages. Against this background,
Chomsky appeals to a general scientific realism to defend his claims about the
psychological realisation of the structures described in generative grammars.
Chomsky’s thought is that the psychological targets of the theories
(descriptive and explanatory adequacy) and the adoption of the competence-
performance distinction ensure the “psychological reality” of the theory’s posits,
insofar as the theory is a true theory:
[W]e impute existence to certain mental representations and to the mental computations that
apply in a specific way to these mental representations... We attribute “psychological
reality” to the postulated representations and computations. In short, we propose
(tentatively, hesitantly, etc.) that our theory is true.
406
Chomsky notes that there is no hesitation in according “physical reality” to the
theoretical constructs employed in physics to explain physical phenomena. Equally,
he claims that there should be no question about according “psychological reality”
to the theoretical constructs postulated in generative grammar, given that
grammarians attempt to explain psychological phenomena: our best ideas about
what is psychologically real being simply a reflection of our best theories of
psychological phenomena like grammatical competence and its acquisition.
405 See, for example, the discussion of Searle’s view in §1.2.
406 Chomsky (1976) p.3230
As such, it is reasonable for Chomsky to be unmoved by scepticism about
whether the structures described by generative grammars are “psychologically real”.
If the theory has such psychological targets, then such scepticism is either general
scepticism about scientific realism or it is unwarranted. Chomsky likens such
scepticism to doubting an astrophysicist who develops a theory of the interior of the
sun on the basis of observations of light at the sun’s periphery. Our sceptic might
question the astrophysicist about the “physical reality” of the structures that his
theory describes. He might accuse the astrophysicist of having explained the
available evidence for his theory but having failed to provide any further ratification
that the structures he describes have any “physical reality” in the sun. As Chomsky
argues, this would amount to no more than a roundabout way of questioning
whether the astrophysicist’s theory really was a good explanation of the evidence
because:
It is senseless to ask for some other kind of justification for attributing “physical reality” to
the constructions of the theory, apart from considerations of their adequacy in explaining
the evidence and their conformity to the body of natural science, as currently understood.
There can be no other grounds for attributing physical reality to the scientist’s
constructions.
407
As Chomsky argues, given the psychological objectives of generative grammar, his
position with respect to “psychological reality” is not different in kind to the
astrophysicist’s with respect to “physical reality”. The only substantive difference,
as far as the reality of their respective posits goes, is that the astrophysicist is
“actually postulating physical entities and processes, while [grammarians] are
keeping to abstract conditions that unknown mechanisms must meet.”
408 Though
the grammarian might suggest actual physical mechanisms, Chomsky thinks “it
would be pointless to do so in the present stage of our ignorance concerning the
functioning of the brain.”
409
407 Chomsky (1976) pp.4-5
408 Chomsky (1976) p.9
409 Chomsky (1980) p.197231
Stich argues that attributing a psychological realisation of grammatical
structure to speakers is little more plausible that attributing an internal realisation of
the laws of physics to a projectile when those physical laws hold true of its
behavior.
410 By analogy, Stich supposes that the grammatical laws do apply to
speakers, and are true of them just as the laws of physics are true of the projectile.
But Stich argues that the grammatical laws do not characterise any internal structure
to the organism, they are only true of the organism.
The difference between the cases is that the grammatical laws, postulated to
explain speakers’ intuitive judgements, only apply to an organism and explain the
data insofar as that organism is postulated to have an internal realisation of the
principles of grammar.
411 The grammatical laws of a particular speaker’s language
explain his linguistic judgements and so apply to him, or are “true of” him in Stich’s
phrase. But they do not apply to a rock, a chimpanzee or a speaker of a different
language, so it is necessary to attribute to the speaker some internal linguistic
structure not possessed by a rock or a chimpanzee. This is what is meant by an
internal realisation of grammar. We do not have to attribute an internal realisation
of the laws in the case of the physical laws which apply to all physical objects and
can explain their behavior without being realized as internal structure.
So the analogy with a projectile is misconceived because, at least as far as
Stich’s example goes, there is no requirement that the projectile has a particular
internal structure in order for the laws of physics to apply to it. However, we can
imagine situations in which we would need to attribute special internal structures to
the projectile. If we obtained evidence that the projectile’s course was being
adjusted, honing in on a particular target, or moving according to complex patterns,
we might need to postulate that the projectile possessed some special internal
structures in addition to its adhering to the laws of physics. We might then try to
determine the character of this internal structure by modifying the projectile’s
environment, if this were possible, and seeing how the projectiles movements vary
so as to make a theoretical inference to its internal structure.
410 Stich (1985)
411 Chomsky and Katz (1974) p.362232
The existence of a dedicated grammatical system as a part of human
psychology, its nature and its role in cognition are all empirical issues. But no
particular problem has been raised about the “psychological reality” of grammatical
structure that does not depend on the kind of unwarranted methodological dualism
discussed in §1.2. Moreover, there is a de facto argument that, as Collins puts it,
“the best way, at present, of studying linguistic cognition is just to do linguistics as
currently practiced”, i.e. within the methodological framework Chomsky has
proposed.
412
So given the cogency of the theoretical inference from speakers linguistic
intuitions and behaviours to an internal structure for grammar, we can return to the
question at hand: is this internal structure, the system of grammatical competence,
the subject matter of generative grammars as Chomsky claims it is?
Devitt argues that the strategy Chomsky proposes for learning about
linguistic cognition is not at odds with his linguistic conception of generative
grammar. But he proposes that non-psychological grammatical properties are the
grammarian’s primary focus and have an “explanatory priority over a theory of the
psychological reality underlying language.”
413 As described in §1.3, Devitt argues
that generative grammars are better interpreted as being about something other than
the psychological structure of speakers. He claims that they are best interpreted as
being about a non-psychological domain of grammatical facts, which he calls a
linguistic reality. On the linguistic conception, the grammatical reality that
generative grammarians target is not a psychological reality underlying the sounds
and marks we produce but rather consists in properties that are realised in the
sounds and the marks themselves. Devitt draws his distinctions I – III in order to
separate psychological and non-psychological linguistic phenomena. He claims that
the properties appealed to in generative grammars, the explanans of the theories, fall
on the non-psychological side of the divide.
For Devitt’s argument to be convincing, he needs support for the claim that
the explanatory work in grammatical theory is done by the properties of a non-
psychological domain. Then we would have a motive for thinking that grammatical
412 Collins (2007) p.2
413 Devitt (unpublished ms. b) p.18233
theory falls on the non-psychological side of Devitt’s distinctions and, hence, that
we should adopt a non-psychological conception of generative grammar over
Chomsky’s psychological conception.
Devitt claims to adduce just such reasons. He claims that non-psychological
grammatical properties are required as part of grammatical theories that aim to meet
descriptive and explanatory adequacy. And further, he claims that non-
psychological grammatical properties are part of the explanation of linguistic
communication (a view that I’ll consider in §5.5).
But Devitt also makes a claim for the fundamental explanatory precedence
of non-psychological grammatical properties over the psychological properties that
Chomsky claims to be describing. Devitt asks: “How could we make any progress
studying the nature of competence in a language unless we already knew a good
deal about the language [conceived non-psychologically]?”
414 Devitt’s claim is that
we could not investigate a speaker’s grammatical competence without first knowing
what the grammatical properties of his language are. For, Devitt asks, how else
would we know which grammar a speaker is competent in?
Given my argument in Chapter Three, Devitt has things back-to-front. The
grammarian tries to ascertain the grammar of a speaker’s language by investigating
his grammatical competence. In doing so, he need make no prior theoretical claims
about the language a speaker is competent in. We do not know by what prior means
he might do so. He simply probes the speaker’s grammatical competence and
constructs a theory of the language that the speaker knows. There is no mystery to
this. I have argued that the grammarian requires a theory of grammatical
competence to construct a generative grammar for a speaker’s language. To obtain a
revealing theory of the speaker’s grammar, grammatical theories must aim to go
beyond descriptive coverage of the speaker’s intuitions and be justified as an
account of the grammar a speaker has acquired. Within the methodological
framework I’ve defended, theorising about a speaker’s language is not a task that is
fruitfully undertaken antecedently to theorising about acquired grammatical
competence. If this is correct then there is no basis to Devitt’s argument that we
414 Devitt (2006) p.29234
must first have a theory of a speaker’s language before we can develop a theory of
their grammatical competence.
So proponents of the psychological conception should be unmoved by
Devitt’s claims to this effect. Their view is that if we follow Devitt in construing
“language” and “the syntax of sentences” so that they are phenomena external to the
grammatical competence system then such phenomena are neither targeted, nor
presupposed, by generative explanations. In what follows I aim to adjudicate
between psychological and non-psychological conceptions of the explanatory posits
of grammatical theory and determine the correct conception of the grammatical
reality that grammarians describe. My argument is that generative grammarians
need a competence-performance distinction and that the associated theory of
acquired grammatical competence serves the goals of meeting descriptive and
explanatory adequacy (§5.3 and §5.4). I argue that, as a consequence, the proposed
non-psychological grammatical properties become dispensable to grammatical
theory, they are “explanatory danglers”. I then consider and reject Devitt’s
argument that non-psychological grammatical properties are indispensable to an
explanation of communication (§5.5).
5.2 The No Violence Principle
Before developing my explanatory argument, I’d like to assess Devitt’s claim that
his linguistic conception is consistent with the empirical status and results of
generative grammar. For if Devitt’s linguistic conception of generative grammar
flouts the No Violence Principle described in §1.3, then we have a clear argument
against that conception. An account of what generative grammar is about ought not
to impugn its empirical successes. If Devitt’s conception does, then we have an
inference to the best explanation for the psychological conception (assuming for the
moment that these two options are exhaustive). But a number of difficulties suggest
themselves when we try to construe the explanatory properties described in
generative grammars as properties of Devitt’s “products”. These difficulties have
suggested to some proponents of the psychological conception that the properties235
described in generative grammars cannot be realised in the physical environment as
Devitt’s conception presupposes.
On Devitt’s linguistic conception, the grammarian describes properties that
are realised in physical sounds and marks. They are high level, relational properties
of the sounds and marks but are realised in the physical environment. In claiming
that they are high level, Devitt is claiming that they are not brute physical properties.
What makes them relational for Devitt is that they are not intrinsic to any physical
symbol but rather are determined by structural relations between the symbols and
the relations in which these symbols stand to psychological states.
To take an example of what Devitt has in mind, a grammatical property that
is realised by structural relations amongst linguistic elements is the property of c-
command (described in §1.1). Devitt’s claim that c-command is high level is
motivated by the fact speakers recognise the property in multiple and heterogeneous
physical elements. C-command relations can be discerned amongst a wide range of
elements in the physical environment. This is apparent when one considers all the
conceivable acoustical signals, orthographies, hand gestures, and other entities in
which we might discern such tree-like structures. As the Saussurean linguist
Hjelmslev put it, speaking of the structure of Danish:
Danish when spoken, Danish when written, Danish when telegraphed by means of the
international flag code of the navies, is, in all these cases essentially one and the same
language, and not essentially four different languages. The units of which it is composed
differ from one of these cases to another, but the framework of relations between these units
remains the same and this is what makes us identify the language…the actual
manifestations of the framework are immaterial to the language.
415
Devitt accommodates this fact by conceiving of grammatical properties as high
level properties realised in the variety of physical symbols. What make an element a
c-commander, for Devitt, is that it is part of a representational system partly
determined by relations to psychological states. Being a c-commander is a property
an element has in virtue of relations it stands in to other linguistic elements in the
system, or “symbols” in Devitt terms. So, on Devitt’s view, grammatical properties
415 Hjelmslev (1985) p.164236
are relational properties of sounds and marks; properties of the way in which the
symbols that make up the representational system are arranged in the physical space
of uttered noises and inscriptions.
Devitt’s grammatical properties of symbols are configurational properties.
A configurational property of a constituent is one that is determined by the
constituent’s position with respect to other constituents. One constituent c-
commanding another is a configurational property because it is determined by the
respective positions of the elements in a hierarchical structure. Devitt’s view is that
these configurational properties are realised in “the very marks on this page” or the
corresponding sounds, when we utter the sentences.
Amongst Devitt’s opponents there are those who deny that properties like c-
command could be realised in the sounds and marks we produce. Rey is sceptical
that grammatical structures are environmentally realised:
[W]hat thing in space and time possesses such structure? Not, evidently, any noises anyone
makes: none of the wave forms produced by people when they speak have a tree structure in
the way that, for example, a real tree, or river, or network of neurons might.
416
Upon consideration of the kinds of properties that generative grammars appeal to,
Smith draws much the same conclusion as Rey: that generative grammarians are not
talking about properties realised by physical entities.
The physical sounds we produce have none of this articulation. They do not even include
word boundaries or the distinct articulation of phonemes that enable us to identify words.
417
If it is true that the physical sounds we produce could not realise such grammatical
articulation as linguists describe then this would serve to undermine Devitt’s
linguistic conception.
416 Rey (2006) p.5. Rey’s own view is that nothing in the world – physical or mental – realises
linguistic structures. Rey thinks standard linguistic entities are intentional inexistents like Pegasus or
Hamlet.
417 Smith (unpublished ms.) p.19237
If generative grammars appeal to properties that cannot be sustained by
external speech and written systems, then a natural alternative is to locate the
required structure that generative grammars postulate in the mind of speakers. And
here we have an argument for the psychological conception of generative grammar
according to which the relevant grammatical structure is cognitive structure,
involved in assigning structural descriptions to sounds and marks. This argument
against Devitt can be formulated as follows.
P1: Grammatical structures S ... Sn are essential to generative grammars
correctly characterising languages. (For these structures are part of the
identity of sentences that occur in natural languages.)
P2: These structural properties S ... Sn described by generative grammars cannot
be realised in the physical environment.
P3: The structural properties described by generative grammars are either
realised in the physical environment or they are only realised in the part of
the speaker’s mind responsible for grammatical structure.
From P2 and P3,
C1: The structural properties described by generative grammars are realised in
the speaker’s mind.
From P1 and C1,
C2: The psychological conception of generative grammar according to which
grammars describe mental structures engaged in speaking and understanding
is true.
Support for the crucial premise P2 is supposed to come from the fact that when we
examine the noises that people produce, considering them as physical events, they
lack the required articulation to be the realisers of grammatical structures. Though
speakers find grammatical structure in sounds and marks, so the argument goes, the
more fine grained grammatical properties that explain the structures that speakers
intuit, are not realised in the sounds and marks considered as physical events.
Devitt’s response is to deny P2. He admits that grammatical properties, like
c-command, cannot be determined from inspecting the physical properties of238
sounds and marks, but he denies that this implies grammatical structures are not
realised by the sounds and marks. Devitt’s move is afforded him by his further
claim that grammatical properties are high level, relational properties. Devitt claims
that the grammatical properties cannot be read off the physical occurrences because
the structures relevant to grammarians fall into higher level categories, partly
determined by psychological states, which include such hierarchical dependencies
amongst constituents. The argument assumes that for grammatical properties to be
physically realised there would have to be type correlations between grammatical
properties and the lower physical levels; an assumption which would be hard to
justify.
418 Devitt compares high level grammatical properties to the non-obvious,
relational property of being Australian. The property of being Australian is
instantiated by heterogeneous physical objects and cannot be determined from an
object’s physical characteristics, though there is a unity at a higher level amongst all
those physical entities that fall under the category Australian.
Perhaps the most difficult cases for Devitt’s claim that the grammatical
properties are realised in a non-psychological domain by the physical sounds and
marks, arise on consideration of the empty categories, such as PRO (discussed in
Chapter Four).
419 These are constituents of grammatical structures generative
grammars posit which have no phonological properties at all. Hence, it is natural to
think they have no realisation in sounds and marks, even as those sounds and marks
stand in relation to each other or to psychological states.
As described in Chapter Four, the subjects and objects of English infinitival
clauses are thought to be such empty categories, as in (59) and (60).
(59) Simon is easy [e1 to please e2]
(60) Simon is eager [e1 to please e2]
We need the empty categories in these structures to explain why (61) and (64) but
not (62) or (63) are acceptable to English-speakers.
418 See Fodor (1974).
419 See Collins (unpublished ms. a, 2007a, 2008a) and Smith (2006, 2006a, unpublished ms.) for
arguments from Copies and PRO. See my Appendix for discussion of Copies.239
(61) It is easy to please Simon.
(62) *It is eager to please Simon.
(63) *Simon is easy to please Jim.
(64) Simon is eager to please Jim.
In (59) Simon has moved out of the object position and hence Simon can replace the
empty category as in (61). But Jim cannot as in the unacceptable (63). In (60) Simon
has moved out of the subject position so Simon cannot take up object position as in
the unacceptable (62) but Jim can as in (64). Devitt must accommodate the empty
categories if he is to adhere to the No Violence Principle. So he has to explain how
the empty categories, constituents that have no phonological properties, are realised
in sounds and marks to sustain his account.
The argument against Devitt’s linguistic conception that exploits the nature
of PRO is supposed to run as follows:
P1. No Violence Principle: An account of what linguistics is about ought not
to jeopardise its explanatory successes.
P2. The explanatory successes of generative grammar are dependent upon
positing empty categories.
From P1 and P2,
P3. An account of what generative grammar is about must explain how
empty categories can figure in generative grammar.
At this point there are two possible continuations of the argument. The first goes via
P4a and concludes with Ca.
P4a. Devitt hasn’t sufficiently explained how empty categories can figure in
what generative grammar is about.
Therefore,
Ca. Devitt hasn’t done enough to show that his account of what generative
grammar is about is acceptable.240
The second stronger continuation goes via P4b and concludes with Cb.
P4b. We cannot explain how PRO can figure in what generative grammar is
about on any account according to which generative grammars are about the
physical environment.
Therefore,
Cb. No such account of what generative grammar is about is acceptable.
There is a case for Ca on the basis of the prima facie considerations about PRO
raised above. But it seems to me that it is far easier to make a case for Ca than a
convincing case for Cb. The case for Ca can be made as follows. There are
grammatical properties possessed by the constituents of linguistic expressions; these
properties include properties like carrying singular number, being a nominal and so
on. According to Devitt, grammatical properties are realised configurationally by
physical entities that form representational systems. But the empty categories are
not themselves constituents that are realised by elements of utterances or written
strings since they are phonetically null. So, it is difficult to see how they are realised
configurationally in the physical environment. Hence, Devitt appears to have a
problem on his hands with the empty categories and needs to offer some further
explanation beyond the materials he has offered thus far.
But it would be unsatisfactory to leave things here. Unless there is some
reason for thinking that proponents of views like Devitt’s couldn’t easily fix or
supplement their view in order to accommodate the empty categories, then we
haven’t advanced much of an argument against the linguistic conception so much as
presented some challenging cases.
The challenge for Devitt is that on his account grammatical elements are
realised, somehow or other, by physical entities. This must be true of all
grammatical elements; otherwise the linguistic conception cannot accommodate the
full range of generative grammar’s results. So Devitt must account for how the full
complement of grammatical properties of the phonetically real elements are realised
in the sound stream, and whatever problems he has in doing so will be more acute
where the elements are null so are not even phonetically articulated by any of the
elements of physical strings. Though empty categories seem especially problematic241
for someone who holds a view like Devitt’s, no arguments have been presented that
categorically rule out placing the empty categories in our physical environment.
Here’s one way that Devitt could elaborate his view. He says that the
grammatical properties of symbols have complex determinants. The symbol’s place
within a representational system is partly determined by relations it bears to
psychological states. But the grammatical properties the symbol has are also
determined by its configurational properties determined by its relations to other
physically realised symbols. Notice that these two aspects of Devitt’s view do not
commit him to each constituent of a grammatical structure mapping onto a discrete
element of the physical occurrence that realises that structure. Otherwise Devitt
would be committed to the view that there are type correlations between the higher
grammatical levels and lower physical levels, but this is not generally true with the
special sciences, so the relevant notion of realisation is not type correlation. Perhaps
there could be constituents of grammatical structure that are realised by relations
amongst phonetically overt elements though they themselves are not phonetically
overt. Devitt gestures at such a possibility in a reply to his critics, when he says:
There is nothing to prevent one of those other properties, arising from a particular
arrangement, being one that the larger part has as if it had a part with a certain property
even though it does not in fact have a part with that property.
420
In this passage Devitt also says that it is possible for there to be grammatical
elements that are not overtly realised because “there is nothing to stop there being a
convention of this sort.”
421 Devitt’s view that grammatical properties are
determined by convention raises further problems which I’ll discuss in §5.4.
422 But
without appealing to conventions, here is a rough suggestion on Devitt’s behalf
about how he might develop his account to accommodate the empty categories. The
420 Devitt (2006a) pp.599-600
421 Devitt (2006a) p.599
422 In my view, Devitt actually weakens his case by claiming that the realisation of empty categories
in physical elements should be explained by appeal to ‘grammatical conventions’ whereby the
multiple copies and empty categories in grammatical structures are conventionally associated with
strings. He himself is clear that he has no explanation for how this could be so (Devitt 2008).242
issue with the empty categories is that they appear not to be realised by any element
of a physical string. A natural suggestion, then, might be that empty categories are
not realised by any particular element of the sound stream or written text but instead
by relations amongst a collection of produced symbols taken as a whole. By way of
analogy, consider a square. Then consider the amodal completion in the diagram
below as it contrasts with a full square.
423
One can see that with the lines completed appropriately, the diagram would realise a
square. We might think of these missing corners as occluded in the diagram by the
smaller squares. Although no parts of the physical lines in our diagram correspond
with the corners of a square, one might still think that the figure realises a square
shape.
If our figure could realise a square shape, though it is not a complete square,
then we might have provided an analogy to the case in which an empty category in
a grammatical structure is physically realised though no physical element
corresponds to that empty category. Just as there are missing physical parts to the
square shape instantiated by the incomplete figure, so there might be absent
physical elements for the empty categories though physical parts realise a
grammatical structure with null expressions. Perhaps such completions could
provide Devitt with a model for how empty categories could be realised by relations
amongst physical sounds and marks.
424
423 From Michael Bach’s collection of optical illusions at:
http://www.michaelbach.de/ot/index.html
424 Though it is not clear to me that any decisive objections from empty categories have been raised
against Devitt, given that such elements are rife in grammatical structure, anyone who wanted to
defend a conception like Devitt’s ought to do more than show that their conception is not logically243
There are further grammatical properties that are difficult to accommodate
within Devitt’s linguistic conception on which grammatical properties are realised
by relations amongst entities in the physical environment. For not all grammatical
properties are configurational in this way. There are grammatical properties that are
not realised by the relative structural positions of constituents, though they do play
a role in determining constituent configuration. As these properties are not
configurational properties of linguistic structures at all, they cannot be realised in
relations amongst physical entities.
Lexical features are such a class of grammatical properties. Two important
sorts of lexical features are those belonging to number, gender and case (called ψ-
features) and those pertaining to the arguments or thematic roles assigned,
particularly by verbs (called θ-features).
425 I’ll focus on number features for the
purposes of illustration.
There are number features on lexical items, such as their being singular or
plural, which are not configurational properties. Whether a lexical item bears the
grammatical property of being singular or plural is involved in determining the
admissible structures into which it can enter. But whether the lexical item has the
grammatical property of being singular or plural is not a matter of its structural
position relative to other constituents. Rather it is a feature specification on the
lexical item. Such lexical features determine the combinatorial possibilities but are
antecedent to grammatical combination and so are not realised by structural
relations. They are lexical features, features that the items which combine to form
structures have. If minimalist theories (see Appendix) are on the right track then
grammatical derivation is driven by just such features.
On Devitt’s account, grammatical properties are realised in relations
amongst symbols and, hence, are extrinsic. As Collins has pointed out, Devitt’s
account struggles to make sense of the lexicon or the fact that configuration is
ruled out by such elements. They ought to make a positive case for how well their conception
accommodates and explains the existence of these elements. See Collins (2008b) and Devitt’s (2008a)
response for discussion of Devitt’s attempt to elaborate his picture by appealing to grammatical
conventions.
425 See Adger (2003) pp.22-52 for ψ-features, pp.77 – 90 for θ-features.244
determined by the properties of Merged lexical items (see Appendix).
426 So Devitt
needs to explain how lexical features are realised in the physical sounds and marks.
Devitt might respond by claiming that there are also difficulties with
locating grammatical features psychologically. Devitt would be right to note that
there are little understood issues about how grammatical properties are mentally
represented, ultimately in virtue of properties of the brain. But these are problems
shared by the whole of cognitive science. As Devitt is an advocate of cognitive
science, he will share these problems because the linguistic conception is committed,
as all accounts are, to there being an explanation of the psychological design that
allows us to recognise and structure grammatical expressions. The best explanations
of how we do this involve our having a mental realisation of grammatical features.
Devitt’s distinctions commit him to the existence of such mental machinery, for he
is committed to the existence of linguistic processing that respects linguistic
structure. Moreover, given the argument of Chapter Three, all parties are committed
to a distinction between grammatical competence and performance in investigating
generative grammars, where the grammatical competence encodes the speaker’s
sensitivity to grammatical features and categories.
Proponents of a non-psychological conception of generative grammar might
point out that this difficulty with lexical features only arises for the configurational
view that Devitt suggests. It only follows that lexical features aren’t physically
realised by being configurationally realised. For the difficulty is generated by the
claim that grammatical properties are realised in relations amongst symbols, and
not by the claim that they are realised non-psychologically as such. Of course, we
still need an explanation of how the properties are realised in the external
environment. But one cannot claim to have established the inadequacy of such non-
psychological conceptions without a more principled and thorough-going argument.
The line of argument that I’ll develop against non-psychological
conceptions does not challenge the possibility of such non-psychological
realisations of grammatical properties but rather challenges their explanatory
credentials. My claim is not that it is impossible to account for the realisation of
grammatical properties in the physical sounds and marks but rather that there is no
426 Collins (2007) p.3245
explanatory pay-off for grammarians in so conceiving them. Generative grammars
have to meet certain conditions of adequacy. To construct a generative grammar
that can meet these conditions, grammarians require a distinction between
grammatical competence and linguistic performance, where the theory of
grammatical competence reveals the grammar of the speaker’s language. I’ll argue
that this required psychological theory of grammatical competence is sufficient to
meeting descriptive and explanatory adequacy and that no explanatory benefits
accrue to grammarians from the postulation of non-psychological grammatical
properties beyond the properties of the competence system. As Collins remarks of
his conclusion in favour of the psychological conception, it is “not premised upon a
rejection of the idea that linguistic properties are realised by external concreta.”
427 It
rather turns out that the properties that successful grammatical explanations trade in
need not be conceived as realised externally to the mind.
5.3 Meeting Descriptive Adequacy
The condition of descriptive adequacy requires that “A fully adequate grammar
must assign to each of an infinite range of sentences a structural description
indicating how this sentence is understood.”
428 In Chapter Three I argued that in
order to determine the infinite range of structural descriptions assigned to the
sentences of a speaker’s language we need to develop a theory of their grammatical
competence. Proponents of the psychological conception argue that such a theory of
grammatical competence, revealing the infinite range of structural descriptions
assigned to the sentences of the speaker’s language by his internalised grammar,
serves to meet this requirement of descriptive adequacy. But proponents of non-
psychological conceptions of generative grammar deny that a DAG should be
conceived as a theory of grammatical competence. They argue that a generative
grammar describes an infinite range of non-psychological grammatical properties.
427 Collins (2007) p.2
428 Chomsky (1965) p.5.246
Given my argument in Chapter Three, generative grammarians need to
appeal to a theory of a speaker’s grammatical competence in order to determine a
DAG for a speaker’s language. But do generative grammarians also need to appeal
to a domain of non-psychological grammatical properties to meet descriptive
adequacy, as proponents of non-psychological conceptions claim? In this section I
want to argue that they do not. My broader aim in this section and the next is to
develop a parsimony argument against non-psychological conceptions of generative
grammar.
A parsimony argument in favour of the psychological conception can be
developed as follows. We require a theory of a speaker’s grammatical competence
to work out what the grammar of his language is and thereby construct a theory that
meets descriptive adequacy. Moreover, whatever non-psychological realisation of
grammatical structure we posit, the competence systems of those that speak and
understand the language must be organised so as to licence and be sensitive to just
those structures. The speakers require an internal realisation of the grammar in
virtue of which they are able to recognise such structures as part of their language.
But, at least as far as meeting descriptive adequacy is concerned, once we have such
a theory of grammatical competence, to then posit a non-psychological realisation
of the properties would accrue no further explanatory benefit beyond that which
accrues to the theory of grammatical competence. For it is that theory of
competence we use to construct a DAG. So, a generative grammar, as far as
descriptive adequacy goes, is best construed as the psychological theory of
grammatical competence, and the putative non-psychological grammatical
properties are theoretically dispensable.
It is a general maxim is to keep theories as simple as possible, without
losing any explanation, so as to see what is really important to theories and what is
not. Accordingly, a scientific theory ought to posit as few objects and properties as
it requires. This is the familiar principle of Ockham’s Razor. This principle is
important within linguistic theory itself (see Appendix) but its application is just as
apt at a meta-theoretical level.
429 Linguistic theories should be interpreted so as to
429 However, the import of the principle as applied theory internally is different to its import at a
meta-theoretical level. Parsimony within linguistic theory means appealing to the fewest247
explain a complex of phenomena, but our conception of the sorts of properties they
appeal to should be kept as lean as possible consistent with their explaining these
phenomena.
I should emphasise that I’m not concerned to deny the very existence of
non-psychological grammatical properties. It may be that there are grammatical
properties ‘out there’. But I will argue that they are of no theoretical significance, at
least as far as generative grammar goes. They are theoretically dispensable, and so
are not what generative grammars are about.
I assume the following general principle for discerning what theories are
about, which I’ve called the parsimony principle.
Parsimony Principle: If one set of properties P is required by a theoretical
explanation, and P can explain the targeted phenomena as well as the
conjunction of P with another set of properties P’, then an interpretation of
the theory in terms of P is preferable to an interpretation of the theory in
terms of P+P’.
The interpretation of the theory as appealing to P+P’ would be unparsimonious
according to my principle. The theoretical interpretation that appealed to only P
rather than P+P’ would have the following virtues. The notion of simplicity in
theoretical machinery is widely employed within sciences as a way of dealing with
theoretical underdetermination. But just as we could have a number of grammatical
theories, all of which were consistent with the received data, so we could have a
number of interpretations of grammatical theory that might be made consistent with
the details of the theory. Within grammatical theory itself, a maxim is explicitly
adopted not to multiply the theoretical apparatus beyond necessity, so as to choose
between non-equivalent theories that cover the data. This maxim guides the theories
away from mere descriptive coverage of the data towards less numerous but more
unmotivated assumptions rather than the fewest properties per se. This embodies a commitment to
principled explanation. But as Ockham’s Razor is generally understood it guides us not to multiply
entities and their properties beyond theoretical necessity. When considering the meta-theory of
linguistics, it is any theoretically dispensable entities or properties that would be unmotivated
assumptions.248
explanatory principles. The same principle applied to the interpretation of the
theories guides us to the properties that are really doing the explanatory work, and
ascertains which properties are mere explanatory danglers.
Descriptive adequacy can be achieved very naturally by a theory of the
speaker’s grammatical competence because it is this very theory of grammatical
competence that the grammarian uses to determine what the structures of a
speaker’s language are. Suppose we start with some evidence from speakers’
linguistic intuitions.
430 Speakers have the intuition that the reflexive in (65) means
Simon’s father but not on Simon or father alone.
(65) Simon’s father shaved himself.
According to the psychological conception, the explanation makes no appeal to
non-psychological properties and runs as follows. The structural interpretation of
(65) that the speaker’s language assigns is revealed by the organisation of that
speaker’s grammatical competence. The speaker’s grammatical competence is
organised so that the reflexive is dependent for its interpretation on Simon’s father.
The principles of the speaker’s grammatical competence require that the reflexive
must be bound by a local antecedent that c-commands it. To determine which is the
c-commanding constituent, the competence system arranges lexical items into a
hierarchical structure. On the basis of this assignment of hierarchical structure, the
competence system determines that the lexical items Simon and father do not c-
command the reflexive, but Simon’s father does. So the competence system assigns
a structural description according to which the reflexive is referentially dependent
on Simon’s father. As the competence system has infinite generative capacity, such
structures can be assigned for the infinite range of sentences in a speaker’s language.
On the non-psychological conception, the attempt to meet descriptive
adequacy would go as follows. We first discover the relevant language and its
grammatical structures by investigating the speaker’s grammatical competence.
Once we know which grammatical structures he recognises and the structural
interpretations his competence assigns, and what aspects of his linguistic intuitions
430 See Collins (2008) for this style of argument.249
and behaviour are performance effects, we can extrapolate to the grammatical
structures of his language. These grammatical properties are then claimed to be
realised non-psychologically. We can then say that it is a non-psychological
grammatical property of the language that reflexives must be bound by the whole
DP and are not bound by either of the constituents of the DP because the reflexive
must be c-commanded by its antecedent. As (65) is such a sentence, realised in a
non-psychological domain, containing a reflexive, himself must be bound by the
whole DP Simon’s father and not by either of the constituents of the DP, Simon or
father, which fail to c-command the reflexive. Therefore, the non-psychological
grammatical theory will assign (65) such a structure. And speakers that have an
internal realisation of this grammar will be sensitive to the non-psychological
properties so as to make the intuitive judgement that (65) is an acceptable sentence
of the language, with himself meaning Simon’s father.
The theory of grammatical competence assigns the sentence the correct
structural description indicating how it is understood in a speaker’s language. So
does our grammatical theory given a non-psychological interpretation. But notice
that our non-psychological explanation appeals to a theory of grammatical
competence to determine what the grammar of a speaker’s language is. It uses a
theoretical conception of the speaker’s competence, as this grammatical competence
is distinguished from other aspects of linguistic performance, to determine what the
structures of a speaker’s language are.
Moreover, the non-psychological conception then has to appeal to the
speaker’s internal realisation of these grammatical properties, in a system of
grammatical competence, to explain how the speaker can intuit these properties. For
we know that the speaker must be sensitive to the described structure so that they
could come to the relevant interpretation. Even if the grammatical properties are
‘out there’, the speaker must be configured so as to immediately cognise them and
assign them the structural interpretation on which the interpreted elements c-
command one another. The claim that these grammatical properties are realised
non-psychologically adds nothing as far as meeting descriptive adequacy goes. For
the purposes of explaining the evidence from a speaker’s intuitions and assigning
correct structural descriptions to sentences of a speaker’s language indicating how
they are understood, the postulation of non-psychological grammatical properties is250
superfluous. And hence, as Chomsky has argued, a grammar “is descriptively
adequate to the extent that it correctly describes the intrinsic competence of the
idealised speaker.”
431 Though we can and do talk of items in the environment
having grammatical properties, this has no clear consequence for generative
grammar as an explanatory theory; the really interesting question, as Collins
suggests, “is whether linguistic properties so construed enter into theoretical
explanation.”
432
5.4 Meeting Explanatory Adequacy: Nativism
An EAG serves to determine which grammar a speaker has actually acquired, from
amongst the possible DAGs for a speaker’s language. An EAG offers an
explanation of speakers’ linguistic intuitions on the basis of an empirical hypothesis
about grammar acquisition.
433 A theory that meets this condition is justified to a
greater extent as a theory of a speaker’s language than a merely DAG.
Hypotheses about grammar acquisition and the innate grammatical
predisposition of the child are hypotheses about human psychology. So meeting
explanatory adequacy requires a psychological theory about grammar acquisition.
But proponents of non-psychological conceptions might claim that this theory of
grammar acquisition, in turn, requires the grammarian to appeal to non-
psychological grammatical properties. This is part of Devitt’s attack on the
psychological conception. He says:
Some of a person’s language may well be innate but she learns a good deal of it. On my
view, this learning is a matter of acquiring conventions... Once again [non-psychological]
linguistic properties have a causal role... Without those entities, language learning becomes
a mystery.
434
431 Chomsky and Katz (1974) p.348, see also Chomsky (1965) ch.1.
432 Collins (2007) p.419
433 See Chomsky (1965) pp.25-6
434 Devitt (2006) p.189251
For, it is a natural thought that grammar acquisition is a kind of learning.
And if children are to learn their grammar from experience of their linguistic
environment, then one might think that there had better be non-psychological
grammatical properties in that environment from which children can learn. In this
section I want to argue against the view that grammar acquisition involves the child
learning their grammar from experience of grammatical properties in their
environment, and in favour of a nativist view of grammar acquisition. Nativist
theories appeal to an innately determined grammatical framework in explaining
grammar acquisition and make no essential appeal to a domain of non-
psychological grammatical properties.
435
5.4.1 Theories of Grammar Acquisition: Nativist Theories and
Learning Theories
In Chapter Two, I defended explanatory adequacy as a condition of adequacy on
generative grammars. A consequence of this condition is that general grammatical
theory should be regarded as an abstract theory of grammar acquisition. It describes,
at an abstract level, the principles that enable every child to attain their mature
grammar on the basis of primary linguistic data (PLD). As such, generative
grammars are an explanatory hypothesis about the form of naturally occurring
languages and the principles that make their acquisition possible. To meet such
435 Again, I should stress that whilst nativist arguments put pressure on non-psychological
interpretations of the science of generative grammar, which aims to meet explanatory adequacy, they
are not intended as a demonstration that non-psychological grammatical properties do not exist.
There are, for example, nativist arguments regarding geometrical knowledge. But they do not show
that there are no non-psychological geometrical properties. Perhaps there are good philosophical
arguments that might lead us to believe in the existence of non-psychological grammatical properties.
But my point is that, irrespective, non-psychological grammatical properties are not required to meet
descriptive or explanatory adequacy, whereas psychological properties of the grammatical system
are. So, if non-psychological grammatical properties do exist, they are still not an explanatory
commitment of generative grammars.252
explanatory objectives, the grammarian clearly needs a theory of the psychological
properties involved in grammar acquisition. But, in explaining acquisition, does the
grammarian also appeal to a domain of non-psychological grammatical properties,
distinct from the psychological properties? First, we need to clarify what is required
of a theory of grammar acquisition by setting out some broad facts about language
acquisition.
At around six months old children start babbling and recognising the
prosodic properties of words and phrases. At around ten months they begin pairing
words and meanings. Between ten and twenty months they are at the one and two
word stage, showing some understanding of these words and acquiring a large
vocabulary before they are able to structure sentences. Between 20 and 24 months
children enter a period of language acquisition, sometimes called the “syntax spurt”.
By only three or four years, they have developed the full recursive aspects of
grammar and a relatively stable grammatical competence, roughly equivalent to that
of the mature speakers in their speech community. The fact that normal children go
through this rapid period of grammatical development is well attested in their ability
to understand and produce novel sentences, their recognition of acceptable and
unacceptable expressions of their language, their discernment of ambiguities, and
their sensitivity to relations of paraphrase and entailment.
436 These facts suggest that
grammar acquisition begins within a fairly rigid timeframe and that it occurs within
a limited critical period.
437 So we know that as a human child develops, their brain
responds selectively to stimuli from their environment in ways that other animals’
brains do not. The aspect of the human brain responsible for grammatical structure
starts out in some initial state and develops to some steady state of grammatical
competence.
Though exposure to linguistic stimuli in the critical stages of grammar
acquisition is vital, interestingly it seems that the external input need not come
436 See Crain and Thornton’s (1998) 10-year study of the competence of under-fives.
437 That grammar acquisition occurs within a critical period is supported by the case of Genie, and
other similar cases, in which a victim of severe neglect and abuse develops only limited linguistic
abilities and never acquires anything like mature grammatical competence. Genie was discovered
aged thirteen but after eight years of study never developed mature knowledge of grammar. See
Curtiss (1988) for the case of Genie and other important cases which suggest similar conclusions.253
through any particular sensory modality. Blind children and deaf children acquire
languages of the same structural complexity and with much the same ease as other
children. Deaf children exposed to signed languages from birth acquire these sign
languages in the same stages and on the same time schedules that hearing children
acquire their spoken languages. The child sign language exhibits much the same
semantic, discourse and pragmatic complexity as hearing children’s language, and:
[T]heir expressions’ conceptual content, categories, and referential scope demonstrate
unequivocally that their language acquisition follows the identical path seen in age-matched
hearing children acquiring spoken language.
438
Pettito found that bilingual children who can both sign and hear, and are exposed to
both a signed and spoken language from birth, demonstrate no preference
whatsoever for speech. She also found that hearing children exposed only to sign
reached all the same milestones at the same times as their peers, even “babbling on
their hands”.
439 In fact, there is evidence that grammar can be acquired by subjects
“with no sensory input beyond what can be gained by placing one’s hand on another
person’s face and throat”:
The analytic mechanisms of the language faculty seem to be triggered in much the same
ways whether the input is auditory, visual, even tactual, and seem to be localised in the
same brain areas, somewhat surprisingly.
440
We can call the aspect of a child’s brain that is responsible for their acquiring a
grammar, a Grammar Acquisition Device (GAD). The idea that there is a GAD is
itself sometimes regarded as controversial. But this is a mistake: “GAD” just labels
whatever aspects of a child's brain supports their acquisition of a grammar, making
no further assumptions about its specificity or content. The GAD takes the child
from an initial state, which is just an expression of the human biological endowment,
to a steady state of grammatical competence, given some input (PLD). It is then an
438 Pettito (2005) p. 89. See Pettito (2000) for more extensive discussion.
439 Pettito (2005) p.90
440 Chomsky (2000) p.122254
empirical matter to determine the nature of the initial state, the GAD, the steady
state of grammatical competence, the stages in between and the role of PLD.
Nativist Theories
A common theme in arguments for nativist theories of grammar acquisition is that
children ignore a wide range of possible grammatical principles that are suggested
by their PLD, whilst projecting beyond the PLD in ways that it does not suggest. To
explain this, nativists make detailed proposals about a rich UG that excludes an
indefinite number of conceivable grammatical principles and thereby excludes an
indefinite number of possible assignments of structures to expressions. UG is an
innately endowed set of linguistic principles. The broad framework within which
recent nativist theories of UG have been offered is the Principle and Parameters
framework (P&P), in which the initial state of the language faculty consists of a
fixed set of universal grammatical principles with open parameters that require
setting. Grammar acquisition involves the setting of these open parameter values to
one of a limited range of options specified by the principles, but never deviating
from the boundary conditions that the UG principles impose.
The interaction of only a few parameters can lead to a great deal of
divergence in the sentence structures which particular grammars allow. If there are
only a few parameters, then there are only a few possible analyses of the linguistic
stimuli that children are presented with. For this reason, nativists claim that such a
theory stands a good chance of explaining how children acquire grammars so
quickly; on the basis of data which, they claim, does not contain the right
information to learn a grammar of such a very special kind.
The most fundamental commitment of the Poverty of Stimulus (POS)
arguments for nativism, which I’ll defend in §5.4.2, is to the invariance of grammar
acquisition with respect to the richness or poverty of PLD over wide bounds. The
conclusion of the POS arguments is that speakers do not acquire their grammar by
learning from properties that they find in their individually variable PLDs. Instead,
a rich and innate framework of universal, grammatical principles determines the255
humanly acquirable grammars and acquisition involves selecting amongst the
options these innate principles specify.
441
POS arguments for nativism appeal to the impoverished nature of the data
available to children in first language acquisition: ‘impoverished’, if we consider
the data as a basis for learning the principles that children acquire. On the strength
of these POS arguments, Chomsky claims that “in certain fundamental respects we
do not really learn language; rather, grammar grows in the mind.”
442 He compares
the development of a grammar to the development of a visual system and other
physical organs, saying:
In both cases, it seems, the final structure attained and its integration into a complex system
of organs is largely predetermined by our genetic program, which provides a highly
restrictive schematism that is fleshed out and articulated through interaction with the
environment.
443
The comparison with the growth of organs might lead one to wonder in precisely
what sense nativists think that the UG principles are ‘innate’. The most important
point about grammar acquisition from a nativist perspective is the negative one that
the parameterised UG principles are not learnt.
444 The acquisition of a grammar is
argued to be innately constrained insofar as the character of acquired grammars is
441 Traditional UG was a theory of substantive universals, claiming that certain grammatical
categories (like noun, verb, and so on) are found in the grammatical structures of the sentences of
any natural language, and that these categories provide the underlying grammatical structure of each
language. But Chomsky is keen to point out that it is also possible to search for universals of a far
more abstract sort. He calls these formal universals and it is this sort of universal that has come to
play a more prominent role in generative grammar than the substantive sort. Claims about formal
universals are claims that the grammar of every language meets certain specified formal conditions,
which tend to be far removed from the commonsensical grammatical categories. The truth of a
hypothesis about formal grammatical universals “would not in itself imply that any particular rule
must appear in all or even two grammars.” (Chomsky 1965 p.29) The formal universals involve the
character of the rules that appear in grammars and the ways in which they can be interconnected.
442 Chomsky (1980) p.134
443 ibid.
444 This is the point that Chomsky (1986) argues for: that the core grammatical principles are not
learnt by induction, theoretical inference or statistical inference.256
determined by UG principles and the limitations they impose on parameter settings,
rather than by learning from the PLD. POS arguments suggest to the nativist that we
are innately constrained to develop grammatical competence systems with a certain
form, integrated into wider biological systems, in a similar way that we are innately
constrained to grow limbs and bodily organs. This is why some nativists call the
language faculty, the language organ. Chomsky says “Language acquisition seems
much like the growth of organs generally; it is something that happens to a child,
not that the child does.”
445
There are, of course, hard questions about innateness. There are questions
about biological endowment and development generally which obviously fall
outside of the grammarian’s scope. But there are also special questions pertaining to
the human brain and psychological function, and little understood questions about
the neurobiological realisation of computational systems. If asked how the cognitive
structures of the grammatical competence system could be innately endowed, the
nativist grammarian should note that these questions also fall outside the scope of
his inquiry. He might defer to the core biological sciences for some understanding
of biological endowment, and to the neurobiological sciences where investigations
of cognition and the brain are still in their early stages.
It may be that there is more that the nativist grammarian can say about
innateness before he defers to other sciences. The notions of canalisation and
psychological primitiveness have played a part in some nativists’ conceptions of
their theories. A psychological system is canalised if its development is insensitive
to the environment across a very broad range, and relatively insensitive to genetic
variation, hence unfailingly acquired under normal conditions. A psychological
system is primitive if it is not acquired by any psychological process of inference or
perception.
446
We might expect some convergence between the canalised psychological
systems and the primitive psychological systems because primitives tend to grow
and growth tends to canalise. And non-primitive systems may be acquired by
445 Chomsky (2000) pp.6-7
446 POS arguments are directed at the claim that grammatical principles are learnt by inference, it is
assumed that they are not learnt by simple acts of perception of an instance.257
psychological processes that are sensitive to environmental contingency, and hence,
not be canalised. But there may be instances where canalisation and primitiveness
come apart. We might have principles inferred directly from innate principles that
are highly canalised but not primitive. Equally, where there are unstable biological
factors in play there might be primitive systems that are not canalised.
447
In explaining how grammatical parameters are set, some nativist theories
appeal to a distinction between learning from environmental stimuli and triggering
by external stimuli.
448 These are different ways in which PLD might be necessary
for grammar acquisition. The stimuli to which a child is exposed might serve as a
basis from which he could generalise to the grammatical principles of his language.
But alternatively the linguistic stimuli to which the child is exposed might play
merely a triggering role in driving the GAD along predetermined paths. On the
triggering model that these nativists appeal to, PLD plays a role in initiating and
facilitating development of the innate principles and their parameter settings. But
this triggering is a causal process by which one amongst a limited range of highly
organised developmental trajectories is determined. There is no assumption that the
stimulation provided by the PLD shapes the way in which the GAD functions or
plays any role in shaping the grammatical principles that characterise the mature
competence.
The nature of the PLD clearly does matter to which grammar a child ends up
with. Children brought up in Italian speaking environments, acquire Italian
grammar. Children brought up in English speaking environments, acquire English
grammar. Italians can, for instance, use null subject sentences: they acquire a pro-
drop language. But English is not a pro-drop language. But the availability of such
limited options is not an argument against nativism. As Collins puts it:
Obviously, the human mind/brain is not designed to acquire English at the expense of
Japanese, etc. But it does not follow that syntax is not innate; it simply follows that a given
range of parametric values is not fixed, but the range of possible values is fixed. For
447 See Samuels (2002) for more detailed discussion of these matters, and in particular primitiveness.
See Segal (forthcoming) for emphasis on the negative aspect of the nativist’s claim - that grammar is
not learnt – and relevant discussion.
448 See, for example, Gibson and Wexler (1994) or Nowak et al (2001).258
example, if there is a head parameter, then children in London get it set to head-initial,
while children in Tokyo get it set to head-final. The options are innate, the decision is made
by experience.
449
English children settle on a grammar that puts direct objects after verbs in transitive
constructions whilst Japanese and Korean children settle on a grammar that puts
them before. So this aspect of their mature competence seems to be sensitive to the
nature of the PLD, although there appear to be a limited range of options.
450 A
common nativist theme is close attention to cases where the child, on exposure to a
little English, say, tries out options that characterise Korean or another UG language,
even absent evidence of such options in the PLD. What are often described as
childish errors by parents are conceived by nativists as explorations of the limited
grammatical options actually realised by possible human grammars. This is called
the Continuity Hypothesis.
451 For example, English children sometimes try inserting
an extra wh-word in long distance questions as in (66).
452
(66) What do you think what pigs eat?
These structures are well-attested in adult German, Irish and Chamorro though it is
not part of English. The nativist claims that, in such cases, English children adhere
to a constraint from another language, compatible with UG, though they do not try
out UG-incompatible constraints. Other things being equal, learning theories should
predict that “children (insofar as they diverge from adults) will initially employ
449 Collins (2008a) p.30
450 Just as Japanese objects precede verbs, objects of prepositions precede prepositions. Generative
grammarians have come up with a parameter to characterise the VO and OV languages. They claim
that it is a principle of the X-bar theory of phrase structure that every phrase must have a head, but it
is a matter of parametric variation whether the complement of that head follows or precedes the head.
If the language picks the ‘precede’ option, it will be like Japanese. If the language picks the ‘follow’
option, it will be like English. The parameter applies to all phrases, so what is true of VPs will be
true of NPs, PPs and APs. Baker (2001) argues that this sort of explanation can be multiplied to
accommodate all sorts of phenomena across languages.
451 Pinker (1984), Crain (1991), Crain and Pietroski (2001)
452 See Crain and Pietroski (2002) pp.12-14.259
constructions that are less articulated than those employed by adults. Complexity in
the child’s hypotheses about the local language should be driven by what the child
hears; otherwise, complex hypotheses will look like reflections of a mental system
that imposes certain structures more or less independently of experience.”
453
Nativists, who think that the dependence of grammar acquisition on PLD is
a matter of triggering, think that PLD matters because it exerts a brute causal
pressure on the different parameter settings. But there are competing nativist
theories according to which statistical learning rather than triggering is involved in
setting the parameters amongst the predetermined options. Yang has offered a
nativist account which relies on the child’s uptake of statistical information in
parameter setting.
454 According to Yang, the grammatical principles with their open
parameters are innate and highly domain-specific, but the process by which the
parameters are set is domain-general statistical learning. Yang holds that a
grammatical knowledge system develops “in the head”, insensitive to
environmental factors, but an experiential process of examining the environment
(using the innate categories and relations) is involved in shifting the child around
the parameters of the system.
455
It is not my aim to adjudicate between triggering models and statistical
inference models. But one point about Yang’s account requires emphasis. Yang
argues that “a full explanation of children’s grammar development must abandon
the domain-specific acquisition model of triggering, in favour of probabilistic
learning mechanisms that might be domain-general but nevertheless operate in the
domain-specific space of syntactic parameters.”
456 Yang is a proponent of P&P and
453 Crain and Pietroksi (2002) p.11
454 See Yang (2004).
455 Yang’s view is that the presence and effects of universal and innate grammatical principles has
been successfully tested in young children. He says (2004 p.453): “The hypothesis space for
grammatical structure within which that learning takes place is “the grammars and parameters
defined by innate UG”.
456 Yang (2004) p.451 my italics. Yang here draws an important distinction between knowledge and
mechanism. As Fodor (2001 p.85) has pointed out nativists can maintain that we have innate,
domain-specific knowledge of grammatical structure “while remaining entirely agnostic about the
domain specificity of language acquisition mechanisms”. Pinker (1999) defends an associative model
for the acquisition of irregular verbs within a strongly nativist framework.260
makes it clear that the statistical inference involved in parameter setting “does not
refute UG”.
457 Yang defends his view with evidence from children’s setting of the
Pro-Drop parameter, all the while emphasising that grammar acquisition involves
the development of innate grammatical principles. These principles allow learners
to pick up on the specific, relevant aspects of the input, such as expletive subject
sentences in the case of Pro-Drop.
Yang claims that children’s success in statistically inferring particular
hierarchical structures “strengthens rather than weakens" the nativist case.
458 He
thinks that good arguments for nativism can be built on the fact that children must
employ specific types of representation, such as grammatical constituency and
hierarchical phrase structure, rather than generalise over “linear strings of words, or
numerous other logical possibilities.” Yang argues that where children record
statistical information pertaining to hierarchical structure, any conclusion they draw
from the findings “must presuppose that children already know what kind of
statistical information to keep track of.”
459
Learning Theories
The main alternative to nativism is to develop a theory of how the child learns the
grammatical principles from the properties of their PLD. Such theories are usually
called empiricist theories, or learning theories. The central commitment of such
theories is that the child learns its grammar by some form of inductive, statistical or
abductive inference from PLD. On this approach, grammarians examine what is
available in the PLD, using corpus data to ascertain its properties, and then attribute
to the child learning mechanisms by which the grammatical principles could be
extracted.
457 Yang (2004) p.451
458 Yang (2004) p.452
459 ibid. Yang claims that an “infinite range of statistical correlations” exists in the PLD, and hence,
the fact that children can use statistical learning mechanisms to acquire a grammar in the relevant
timeframe requires that “at minimum, they know the unit of information over which correlative
statistics are gathered... the learner is sensitive to specific types of input evidence relevant for the
setting of specific parameters.” (pp.452-4)261
The principles of inference that such theories appeal to are normally called
general purpose learning mechanisms (GPLM). The mechanisms are general
purpose because too much grammar-specific information or bias built into the
learning mechanisms would concede to the nativist that the child comes equipped
with innate grammatical principles that determine his acquisition of grammar.
A conclusion of the POS argument I defend in §5.4.2 is that we lack a clear
idea of how a child might employ GPLM to learn the grammatical principles of
their mature competence, and that nativist theories constitute a better explanation of
grammar acquisition. Without the promise of learning explanations, describing how
children might learn the grammatical principles from PLD, the challenge from
learning theories amounts to only the logical point that alternatives to nativism are
possible.
Lappin attempts to refute claims that in light of POS arguments there is an
absence of promising learning theories.
460 Lappin highlights proposals concerning
machine learning techniques and how theories of machine learning point the way to
alternatives to nativist theories and UG. Lappin concludes that: “Recent research on
unsupervised machine learning of grammar offers support for the view that
knowledge of language can be achieved through general machine-learning methods
with a minimal set of initial settings for possible linguistic categories and rule
hypotheses.” Lappin claims that the learning priors of grammatical categories and
rules required by such machines are more “minimal” than those proposed in nativist
theories of UG (though they do assume binary-branching structure), and that
machine learners have had encouraging successes learning to parse certain
grammatical constructions.
Though the issues Lappin raises concerning what can be learnt from PLD
are interesting, he is yet to tackle the issues about how his findings fit with
children’s actual patterns of grammar acquisition. Given that these issues (which I
discuss in §5.4.2) form the core of the nativist’s case, Lappin has not made a good
case for the relevance of his findings to nativist arguments about the child’s
acquisition of grammar. As he admits, the results he cites “do not, of course, show
us anything about the processes that human learners actually apply in acquiring
460 See, for example, Lappin and Schieber (2007).262
natural language.” A proper assessment of the results he cites would be beyond the
scope of this thesis, but it should be noted that the best mechanisms Lappin and
Schieber discuss currently have a much higher ratio of mistakes in parsing English
sentences than it would be plausible to attribute to a child.
461
Nativists claim that, given compelling grammatical analyses, they have the
best explanations of how suitable grammars were acquired. From their perspective,
the major debates are not between nativist theories and learning theories but
between the dozens of proposals within the P&P framework which offer detailed
and empirically testable proposals about the nature of UG and its role in grammar
acquisition.
One might wonder whether the options of nativism or learning theory are
exhaustive, or whether there are further options for explaining how we acquire
grammar. One possibility, sometimes raised in philosophical discussions influenced
by Wittgenstein, is that grammar is acquired by training or inculcation into a set of
linguistic practices (see §1.3.1). The problem with this suggestion is that there is a
lack of evidence for treating grammar acquisition as the honing of an ability or
practical skill. There is little evidence of training and children who receive no
training acquire grammars. The evidence I’ll present supports Smith’s assessment
that:
The forlorn idea that we do all this by analogy with the repetitious learning of a manual
skill is a non-starter and does not even merit serious discussion. There is no evidence that
such a practice takes place or that mistakes of the kind expected in such training actually
occur.
462
This is not to deny that training or practices have any role in understanding
language more broadly construed, but the evidence I’ll document do not bear out
their involvement in grammar acquisition.
461 Lappin and Schieber (2007) pp.11-12
462 Smith (2006) p.957263
5.4.2 Poverty of Stimulus Arguments for Grammatical Nativism
The argument from POS to grammatical nativism runs as follows.
POS1. All normal children unerringly acquire G, where G is some
grammatical principle or set of grammatical principles.
POS2. They acquire G either via GPLM or using innately specified,
grammatical information.
POS3. The available stimulus – the PLD – is too poor for them to unerringly
acquire G by GPLM.
POS4. So they do not acquire G by GPLM.
So, by POS2 and POS4,
POSC. They acquire G using innately specified, grammatical information.
If the premises of the argument can be defended, the grammarian aiming at
explanatory adequacy should focus on detailing and empirically testing theories of
innately-specified, grammatical information.
Such POS arguments are not used to defend the claim that it is impossible
that the child could learn G given any possible GPLM and PLD. If the linguist can
discover the UG principles, and the parameter settings of the individual languages,
by collecting data and deploying scientific method then, at the very least, it is
conceivable that children do so. We can, however, use grammarians as a measure of
the difficulty of the learning task of recovering some candidate G from PLD.
463 The
grammarian is something like a GPLM but one with significant advantages over a
child. Grammarians already possess a language and can be expected to possess a
high level of general intelligence. They also work in large group enterprises using
focused and systematic data. But the grammarian’s task is incredibly hard and it is
an ongoing project to work out those principles that the child acquires effortlessly.
463 Segal (forthcoming) p.6 makes this suggestion. The obvious reply, which Segal notes, would be
for learning theorists to make a case that children employ a sophisticated and subtle learning
mechanism in language acquisition that is not available to linguists. The evidence I present in
defence of the POS suggests that any such case for a learning theory faces severe obstacles.264
Yet PLD does not provide such targeted evidence as drives grammatical
theory and the child has only a few years to carry out the learning task which has
engaged grammarians for decades. As Chomsky, considering the empty categories,
describes the situation:
It is no simple matter for the scientist inquiring into language to discover that these
elements exist and to determine their properties, and this task requires a broad range of
evidence not available to the child, including evidence from a variety of languages and
evidence acquired by sustained empirical inquiry informed by complex theory
construction.
464
Of course, it might be that young children are very gifted linguists but not gifted
physicists or musicians. All normal children might successfully hypothesise
principles equivalent to UG and the parameter settings of their language. But then
we would want to know why these gifts extend only to the domain of language, and
why they are not available for second language acquisition.
In developing POS arguments for specific clusters of grammatical principles,
the details of grammatical theory matter. A prerequisite for working out whether
grammar acquisition is an instance of learning from PLD is a theory about the
principles that are acquired. But the general form of the problem of language
acquisition is simple. Given a theory of what is acquired, and considering the child
as an empty box, we can ask what would have to be inside the box such that a child
could output their grammar on the basis of PLD as input. Insofar as a theory of
grammar acquisition requires us to attribute grammatical principles to the box
beyond GPLM, there will be POS arguments to motivate nativist theories.
The candidate Gs for POS arguments are abundant. But I’m going to focus
on two illustrative examples of binding principles and Yes/No question formation.
Principle A of binding theory states that a reflexive must be bound by a local
antecedent, ruling in cases like (67) and ruling out cases like (68).
465
464 Chomsky (1988) p.91
465 Segal (forthcoming) notes that Principle A may not be a good candidate for a UG principle as it
appears to be violated by Mandarin, and perhaps Chinese dialects generally. Segal also notes that
there are apparent counterexamples in English like “Phoebe saw Joey’s picture of herself” (which265
(67) Johni likes himselfi.
(68) *Johni thinks that [Mary likes himselfi].
Principle B states that a pronoun is not bound by a local antecedent. It rules in cases
like (69) and rules out cases like (70).
(69) Johni said that [Mary likes himi]
(70) *Mary said that [Johni likes himi]
Principle C says that a referring expression must be free. It rules in cases like (71)
and rules out cases like (72). This prohibits a pronoun or reflexive being structurally
higher than its antecedent.
(71) Shei likes Maryj.
(72) *Shei likes Maryi.
Crain et al have shown that by five years children are effectively adults with respect
to these principles, ruling out, for example, phenomena such as backwards anaphora
in (73) which is blocked by Principle C.
466
(73) *Hei ran while the guardi shouted.
may be of borderline acceptability). These “picture reflexives” may be marginal as counterexamples
to UG but there are further cases of contrastives like “Bill can’t imagine why Mary would want
anyone other than himself”. Even here judgements may be marginal and the sentence may sound
better with “him”. Moreover, whether these cases are genuine counterexamples will depend on their
proper analyses. See Kayne (2002) for further discussion and see Boeckx (2006) pp.105-109 for a
discussion of reconstruction effects that once seemed to violate Principle A.
466 See Crain and Mckee (1985), and Crain and Thornton (1998). A growing body of experimental
evidence indicates that children have substantial knowledge of the three principles of binding theory;
they can distinguish between reflexives and non-reflexives and know the local domain in which
binding conditions apply. See Guasti (2002) ch.8 for discussion of some of the mistakes that children
do make with respect to binding.266
We can take the principles of binding theory to be the G in POS1, a subset of the
grammatical principles that all normal children acquire.
Experimental studies also show that children of a young age have near
flawless grasp of the structure-dependent rules involved in Yes/No question
formation.
467 Yes/no questions are questions of the following form:
(74) Is Gareth gone?
(75) Will you pass the salt?
These questions are clearly related to the following declarative sentences.
(76) Gareth is gone.
(77) You will pass the salt.
Such questions appear in the data to which young children are exposed. So we
might think it is a simple task to work out the rules for forming such questions. But
notice that from the related declarative sentences in (76) and (77), there are any
number of rules that could be used to form the Yes/No question in (74) and (75). To
mention just three, the rule could be (i) swap the first two words around, or (ii)
swap the first verbal element with the first noun phrase, or (iii) front the auxiliary to
the main verb. The correct rule is the third one. If the child were to adopt (i) then
they should form the question (79) from (78).
(78) The field is full of grass.
(79) *Field the is full of grass?
Alternatively, if they were to adopt (ii) then they should form the question in (81)
from (80).
(80) The man who is shouting is angry.
(81) *Is the man who shouting is angry?
467 See Crain and Nakayama (1987).267
However, Crain and Nakayama conducted a series of experiments and showed that
the errors expected under these hypotheses never occurred. This is true for children
as young as three years and two months. All the children used the third and most
complicated rule to produce the correct results, as in (82) and (83).
(82) Is the field full of grass?
(83) Is the man who is shouting angry.
So, there are two candidates for G in POS1: binding and Yes/No question formation.
In each case, as Laurence and Margolis note, “The correct set of principles isn’t
simple or natural in any pretheoretic sense. This means that the empiricist learner
has to rely on there being sufficient environmental information to guide her through
the vast number of competing sets of principles.”
468 That the actual principles are
not simple or natural in a pretheoretical sense is true of grammatical principles and
their interaction across the board. As Chomsky pointed out with respect to empty
categories, no one would claim that they are the most natural generalisations to
arrive at upon presentation of linguistic data. This point becomes clearer as we
move beyond relatively construction-specific rules (like the auxiliary inversion rule
I described above) to more general and explanatory, but highly grammar-specific
principles not suggested by simple analyses (such as the theory of movement that
explains auxiliary inversion and a host of other phenomena).
469
I’ll split the evidence that nativists draw upon to defend the key premise
POS3 into issues concerning the nature of learning and of PLD.
Learning
The first issue I want to consider is what learning theories imply about the errors
that we observe and, in particular, the errors that we do not observe in children’s
468 Laurence and Margolis (2001) p.222
469 These more general principles unify a range of phenomena but work in complex interaction with
one another. So there is more chance of a child learner discarding a correct principle when they
produce an incorrect construction as they hypothesise the other principles and their mode of
interaction.268
linguistic behaviour. Children exemplify competence with the binding principles
but, tellingly, they don’t ever try out certain more simple but mistaken hypotheses
about binding. Children never try out a principle according to which there is no
binding, so that pronouns and reflexives are never bound linguistically. Equally,
children never try out the principle that binding is possible throughout a structure,
independently of local domains. And they never adopt structure-independent rules
for binding based on, say, word order. What strikes the nativist is that if children are
learning from PLD then there should be some stages of exposure to the PLD at
which at least some children take binding to be determined by alternative principles.
But, on the contrary, they take binding to be determined by three principles
involving hierarchical structure and the notion of locality or domain. In the case of
binding, as with a very broad range of grammatical phenomena, children do not
experiment with what might be the most natural generalisations at a given stage in
grammar acquisition.
This is why nativists insist upon the inclusion of all normal children
acquiring G ‘unerringly’ in POS1. The question is why children should converge so
uniformly and unerringly on the correct structure-dependent binding principles
rather than alternatives such as no grammatical principle, permissive grammatical
principles or principles based on word order. If they are generalising from PLD as
they are exposed to it, then we would expect them to try out some incorrect
principles.
470
The nativist’s claim is not that GPLM are incapable of learning any
principles. Rather, the nativist claims that there is a critical issue about why children
would unerringly acquire such structure-dependent principles. Consider (84) and
(85).
(84) Anne asked whether Maryi wanted to shake hands with herselfi.
(85) Anne asked who Maryi wanted e to shake hands with herselfi/j.
The referential dependency of herself on Mary in (84) but not (85) is explained by
Principle A. But consider how hard it would be to induce the referential dependency
470 Laurence and Margolis (2001) and Segal (forthcoming) p.6 press this point.269
of herself on Mary in (84) and the failure of referential dependency in (85) from the
PLD. From the perspective of a learner, strings like (84) have misleading properties
for determining whether there is referential dependency in (85), and vice-versa. In
(85) the verb to shake has a phonetically null subject bound by who (of which it is a
copy). Hence, in (85) herself could be substituted for himself but not in (84). The
nativist insists on ‘unerring’ in POS1 because there is no evidence that we ever try
out other simpler principles with respect to complex structures like (84) and (85), or
ever interpret the latter (85) with Mary binding herself.
The evidence is that mistakes are very rare relative to what we would expect
if the child were using GPLM to develop generalisations and correct the erroneous
generalisations that would inevitably result on the basis of only partial exposure to
PLD. Children make very few systematic errors in acquiring principles of great
subtlety.
This presents a difficulty for learning theories on which the child generalises
from the growing corpus because the child should frequently come across sentences
like (86) and generalise about sentences like (87) on that basis.
(86) Mary wanted to play games by herself.
(87) Jim wondered who Mary wanted to play games by herself.
Sentence (87) looks as if it has (86) in it. But it doesn’t because (87) is actually
structured like (85) with the movement and the empty category which is the subject
of the infinitival clause. From the perspective of a learner, the occurrence of
structures like (85) and (87) revealing of the subtler principles ought, at least
sometimes, to be counted as anomalous by the child. This is especially probable
when the relevant sentences are statistically rare in the corpus, as we should expect
them to be during at least some stages of grammar acquisition for some children.
Wanna-contraction provides a clear illustration of why nativists claim that
misleading properties of the PLD would, at least some of the time, lead GPLM into
error.
471 The contraction in (88) but not (89) is permissible.
471 See Crain and Pietroski (2001) for discussion.270
(88) Who does Arnold want to make breakfast for?
(88a) Who does Arnold wanna make breakfast for?
(89) Who does Arnold want to make breakfast?
(89a) *Who does Arnold wanna make breakfast?
The explanation of these facts about wanna-contraction is that wh-questions are
formed by the movement of the wh-phrase to the position at which they are
pronounced. An empty category is left behind as a record of the position from
which the wh-phrase has moved. This empty category is in object position in (88)
which is interpreted much like Arnold wants to make breakfast for WHO? But the
empty category has been left in the subject position of the clause in (89) which is
interpreted just like Arnold wants WHO to make breakfast? Given their knowledge
of the underlying representations, linguists offer the hypothesis that the empty
categories left behind by subject extractions block wanna-contraction. The
generalisation that subject extractions block wanna-contraction was obscured from
linguists by the fact that the contractions are permissible in structures involving
object extraction. Until a wide range of data was considered systematically, and the
theory of movement and empty categories had been developed, linguists failed to
see how the two phenomena were related. The child learner would be in a similar
position when confronted with contractions like (88) to (88a). Such contractions
should constitute, prima facie at least, evidence that runs counter to the right
hypothesis that contraction is impermissible in (89). But the child doesn’t make the
mistakes we would expect if they were generalising from such cases.
472
Children do sometimes try out alternative, mistaken options concerning a
grammatical principle on their way to mature competence, some of which nativists
have explained as options evidenced in other UG languages. A noticeable feature of
such mistakes is that they do not exhibit principles that are less subtle than the
mature principles. But it might be claimed that the very existence of mistakes
472 Experiments by Thornton (1990) and (1996) confirm children’s early adherence to the constraint.
In a group of 21 children, mean age 4.3, 57% of the time the child chose to contract on the
permissible (88) but less than 10% for the impermissible (89). Thornton’s (1990) elicited production
study on 12 children aged 2-4 evidenced 100% absence of contraction over the wh-trace.271
provides some support for learning theories, according to which the child has made
an incorrect generalisation. This is not so. If the acquired grammar is learnt then it
must not be learnt using GPLM that would lead to mistaken but incorrigible
generalisations.
473 The alternative to nativist explanations of why children do not
generalise from (91) entailing (90), to (93) entailing (92) is that children generalise
from the growing PLD and correct their rules so as to block the entailment.
(90) John ate.
(91) John ate a fish.
(92) John is too clever to catch.
(93) John is too clever to catch a fish.
Sentence (90) means that John ate something. Looking at (90) and (91) one might
naturally conclude that if a verb has both transitive and intransitive forms and
appears without an argument in object position, then it is interpreted as having an
implicit arbitrary object of the appropriate category. But if you applied that to (92)
it would get the interpretation that John is too clever to catch something, which is
wrong because the sentence means that John is too clever for one to catch him.
Standard forms of reasoning would find a rule that applies to the simple cases and
then apply it to the more complex ones. But that’s not what children do.
474 Children
never make the mistake of understanding (92) such that it is entailed by (93). But
suppose they did. The GPLM would have to be such as to correct the entailment
despite the statistical preponderance of examples like the entailment of (90) by (91).
Grammatical principles are not only acquired unerringly, they are also
acquired by all normal children, who all acquire grammars of the same complexity.
If the child is solving a learning problem then it must be insensitive to not only
variation in the PLD, but also to variation in general intelligence and background
culture. Belying the subtlety of the acquired principles, grammar acquisition is
highly insensitive to general intelligence. It is far less elastic with respect to
473 It is worth noting, however, that nativists owe us a detailed account of how children witch back
an incorrectly set parameter where that parameter results in a sub-set language.
474 The example is Chomsky’s (1986) and the explication from Segal (forthcoming).272
intelligence than, say, the child’s scientific, mathematical and musical abilities. In
the most extreme cases, children with William’s syndrome have intact grammatical
competence and severe intellectual impairment. Yet, despite considerable latitude in
intelligence, children all acquire a grammar characterised by principles of the same
depth and complexity.
Moreover, the ‘syntax spurt’ is not correlated with the development in other
areas of knowledge that would be consistent with a rapid improvement in GPLM.
Laurence and Margolis endorse this point:
We are all extremely impressed if a two-year-old figures out how to put the square blocks in
the square holes and the round blocks in the round holes. Yet somehow by this age children
are managing to cope with the extraordinarily difficult task of learning language. If the
empiricist is right, we are to believe that children do both of these things using the very
same domain neutral intellectual resources.
475
Further, any special levels of attention and coaching that are bestowed on only some
children in the relevant window of development can’t be the fundamental
explanation of why all children acquire a complex grammar. This is true even if we
assume that such special attention and coaching are effective aids to learning in the
cases in which they do occur. What strikes the nativist is that a learning explanation
would have to appeal to processes that all children employ.
Nativist explanations predict the unerring nature of acquisition and its
uniformity across all normal children by appealing to innate grammatical principles
that constrain all children’s development of a grammar. Learning theories do less
well on these counts. They predict errors in generalisations and a series of
corrective hypotheses as part of a learning process. And we do not observe such
sensitivity of grammar acquisition and the acquired competence to differences in
general intelligence and aids to learning.
Learning theories also struggle with the structure-dependence of
grammatical principles. Learning theories involve the child relying on cues in the
PLD concerning word order, morphology and semantic plausibility.
476 According to
475 Laurence and Margolis (2001) p.237
476 See, for example, Macwhinney and Bates (1989).273
their frequency in the PLD, the learner is hypothesised to assign different
probabilities to lexical items following one another, and from these resources the
child is supposed to build his grammatical constituents and principles. But such
statistical generalisations struggle to capture the structure-dependent relations that
hold amongst grammatical constituents. Consider the following possibilities for
forming Yes/No questions.
(94) The man is sad.
(94a) Is the man sad?
(95) The man who is beating a donkey is mean.
(95a) *Is the man who _ beating a donkey is mean?
(95b) Is the man who is beating a donkey mean?
(96) The man who is beating a donkey whilst he is shouting and who is
incredibly red-faced is mean.
(96a) *Is the man who beating a donkey whilst he is shouting and who is
incredibly red-faced is mean?
(96b) *Is the man who is beating a donkey whilst he shouting and who is
incredibly red-faced is mean?
(96c) *Is the man who is beating a donkey whilst he is shouting and who
incredibly red-faced is mean?
(96d) Is the man who is beating a donkey whilst he is shouting and who is
incredibly red-faced mean?
The structure-dependent rule requires the child to front the auxiliary to the main
verb in each case. Fronting the correct auxiliary requires the child to see its relation
with the subject NP and main verb and ignore the embedded relative clause. This is
more complicated than the structure-independent rule that says simply front the first
auxiliary, which makes no appeal to verbal domains. This rule itself involves a
grammatical category of verbal structure that would have to be acquired. An even
simpler rule would be to search the declarative until the first “is” (or “can”) is found274
and move that to the front. This latter rule is completely structure-independent in
that it appeals purely to morphology and linear order.
477
The structure-independent rule would cover (94) but fail to cover (95) and
(96), leading to ungrammaticality because the auxiliary that has been moved is not
from the main clause but rather one embedded in a relative clause. Pairs of
declaratives and questions of the form (94) and (94a) are a part of most children’s
PLD. But the declarative and question pairing for forms like (95) might not be part
of the PLD, and this is quite likely for the declarative and question pairs for
sentences like (96) which involve two relative clauses. Yet on the basis of their
exposure to many pairs like (94) and (94a) children never form the structure-
independent rule, they go straight for the structure-dependent rule.
478 Children never
make the mistakes forming questions from sentences like (95), or even (96), that an
attention to patterns of word order would suggest: natural generalisations would
suggest structure-independent rules leading to (95a) or (96a). And there is no reason
that the statistical learner wouldn’t formulate structure-independent rules first,
generating (96b) or (96c).
479 Even if the child were confronted with (95b) and (96d)
we should ask why they were not counted as anomalous on the basis of the
preponderance of structures like (94a).
It is difficult to explain why GPLM, without the antecedent information on
phrasal structure, would support the child’s tendency to immediate plump for
477 Though Crain (1991) notes the presence of errors in child question formation, Crain and
Nakayama’s data do not attest to a single error of the sort that suggests a structure-independent rule,
which is striking. Crain and Nakayama (1987) investigated 3-5 year olds to see whether they made
the sorts of errors that would be expected if they were entertaining structure-independent principles.
None of the thirty children made a single error of the sort associated with the structure-independent
hypotheses. This is strong evidence that the children are not entertaining such principles before
ruling them out with further PLD.
478 Even amongst the structure-dependent possibilities there may be an abundance of alternatives that
associate the movement with a different structural variable. The child also has to discard the
principle that it is optional which auxiliary is moved, which, as Laurence and Margolis (2001 p.229)
point out is “compatible with any sentence that the child is likely to hear, and languages do seem to
contain optional phenomena of this sort.”
479 See Stromswold (1999 p.361) who points out the difficulties of distinguishing these auxiliaries
from lexical verbs.275
structure-dependence, applying it to long distance dependencies in forming
questions from (95) and (96). If the child is innately constrained to develop the
categories and structural principles that underlie the structure-dependent auxiliary
inversion rule then we can explain why they are capable of dealing with both the
monoclausal case of (94), as well as cases like (95) and (96) with embedded relative
clauses.
The last point I’d like to make about learning is that we have independent
reasons to doubt that children acquiring language perform the task of a GPLM.
Simple GPLM can form generalisations that a child cannot. For instance, seven year
old children cannot learn the structure-independent rule drop the first four words of
every sentence. But learning machines can learn such rules easily and humans can
easily grasp structure-independent patterns outside the domain of language. If a
child of seven cannot cope with learning and applying a range of simple structure-
independent procedures (but is highly proficient with structure-dependent
grammatical rules), this casts serious doubt on an account of grammar acquisition
according to which the child uses structure-independent grammatical rules as the
basis on which to learn structure-dependent grammatical principles, and then
expunges the structure-independent rules. Though learning machines can learn
some properties of the languages that children can acquire, this may be as far as the
comparison goes. Such learning machines struggle to learn principles that children
effortlessly acquire and are capable of learning things that children cannot.
480
480 In the context of what children can do that machines can’t, we might also consider what children
can do, that aphasics with language impairment can’t. There are aphasics with extreme limits to their
grammatical abilities who can perform normally in other cognitive domains (see Varley 1998). As
these aphasics are otherwise unimpaired, according to learning theories they ought to be able to
relearn their grammar using GPLM. But they can’t (see Veletti-Glass et al 1973). This suggests that
children acquire grammars with the aid of innate grammar-specific principles. For similar
conclusions on dissociations see van der Lely and Stollwerck (1996), van der Lely et al. (1998) and
(2004). This work suggests that there are severe grammatical impairments (affecting 3-6 people per
1000) that are domain-specific.276
PLD
There have been several recent critiques of POS arguments claiming that they rely
on an unduly pessimistic assessment of PLD.
481 Whilst all parties agree that PLD
provides a finite and individually variable set of utterances, a common theme
amongst critics of nativism is that nativists have not given PLD sufficiently careful
and thorough assessment. Critics take this as evidence that nativists are likely to
have overlooked significant properties of the PLD. Critics, quite reasonably,
wonder how nativists can be confident that children do not learn the abstract
principles of grammar if they don’t know precisely what is in the PLD that could
serve as a basis for learning. It would significantly weaken the POS argument if it
only went through on dogmatic assumptions about PLD.
Nativists do care about investigating PLD, for instance, when investigating
what sorts of mistakes children make. But it is true that nativist theories have
focused more on the details of the grammars that are acquired and less on the nature
of the PLD that a child might be exposed to. This focus might be taken to suggest
that nativists are prepared to grant opponents very generous assumptions about PLD.
For nativists do not think that their arguments are contingent on scouring PLD to
eliminate learning theories on a piecemeal basis.
POS arguments do not generally rely on an inference from no data relevant
for a particular construction turning up in a child’s PLD. The argument that Pullum
and Scholz consider is that children never come across any evidence in their PLD
that would be relevant to ascertaining the correct rule for a particular
construction.
482 Though it is wrong to attribute such an argument to nativists, two
aspects of Pullum and Scholz’s case against this argument are noteworthy. Firstly,
Pullum and Scholz identify evidence that certain constructions do occur in corpuses.
But Pullum and Scholz never consider how the occurrence of particular
constructions would serve as evidence for the principles that generate such
constructions. This may be because, as Crain and Pietroski claim, the construction
rules that Pullum and Scholz seek evidence for are fairly superficial and
481 See Pullum and Scholz (2002) and Cowie (1999). But see also Chouiard and Clark (2003) and
Foraker et al (forthcoming).
482 Pullum and Scholz (2002)277
construction specific.
483 For instance, their rules covering NPIs do not appeal to the
underlying c-command relations that explain why NPIs are licensed. These
principles connect the explanation of NPIs with a host of other phenomena,
including binding principles. Secondly, Pullum and Scholz’s case against the
limited argument they present, involves claims about what is available in the child’s
PLD based on corpuses that are inappropriate. Their claims are based on broadsheet
journalism and classics of 19
th century English literature. They base this selection
on the unwarranted assumption “that research on one kind of text will tell us at least
something about the syntactic structures likely to be found in others.”
484 But one
might be sceptical that such material serves as a guide to the properties which all
children are exposed to or could utilise as a basis for learning. For instance, Pullum
and Scholz appeal to the presence of question formation across more than one
relative clause in an Oscar Wilde play as evidence that young children are typically
exposed to such constructions.
Though some nativist arguments do appeal to principles that occur so early
in a child’s development that there is arguably no corresponding data available in
the PLD, such cases are taken as evidence for nativism, not as the situation that
must obtain for each UG principle for POS to obtain.
485 Nativists do not think their
arguments vulnerable to foraging in PLD because they do not think that learning
constitutes an explanation of the facts about grammar acquisition, as I described
above, but also because of quite broad properties of PLD considered as a basis for
such learning.
POS arguments do not rely on any special claims about the data each child
might encounter. But POS arguments do rely on the claim that if a child were
acquiring its grammar by learning from PLD, without the aid of an innate set of
grammatical principles, then their PLD would have to be “absurdly rich” in ways
that it is not.
486 For a child to learn the specific grammar it acquires, the child
would need data on each choice which would serve to differentiate its target
483 Crain and Pietroksi (2002) pp.9-10
484 Pullum and Scholz (2002) p.23
485 See Crain and Pietroski (2001) for a discussion of cross-linguistically attested constraints that
emerge so early that there is no widespread data in the PLD and arguably no data at all.
486 Collins (2003)278
language from closely related languages it might acquire. The child would also need
to eliminate choices that lead to no human language.
If the child requires information rich enough to eliminate every possible
alternative for the binding principles, for Yes/No questions and for wanna-
contraction at each stage of exposure to PLD; then the nativist might plausibly
claim that children are not exposed to such rich data on each grammatical
construction with which they acquire competence. But equally importantly (as we
saw with binding, question formation and contraction) the PLD serves to cast doubt
on the correct hypotheses. Apart from the presence of perfectly grammatical
expressions that suggest the wrong rules, it can also be the case that, as Chomsky
notes, some of the “observed speech consists of fragments and deviant expressions
of a variety of sorts.”
487 Yet every normal child develops competence with all the
constructions “even though the primary linguistic data that he uses as a basis for this
may…be deficient in various respects.”
488
If we combine the uniformity of the grammars children acquire with the
variation in the quantity and content of their PLD, we can see why the POS
argument does not turn on whether specific constructions do or do not happen to
occur in a child’s PLD, for:
[W]e might not know much about the PLD, but it is patently not uniform in the sense of
every child’s PLD including every potentially falsifying conclusion up to the correct
principle.
489
When we consider the uniformity amongst populations of speakers it seems that
PLD not only needs to be extremely rich, in order to reveal to the child the very
abstract principles, but also highly uniform from child to child. Given the large
variation in the PLD on which each child’s hypotheses would be based, learning
theories predict variation in the mature rules, simply because the generalisations are
based on different data. Though there is limited grammatical variation, even among
speakers in a single speech community, it is highly restricted. Indeed, as Collins
487 Chomsky (1965) p.200 fn.14
488 ibid.
489 Collins (2003) pp.12-3279
highlights, according to recent minimalist theories all variation is morphologically
driven due to differences in lexical features, whilst the grammatical operations and
interface conditions are univocal.
Building a case that broad features of PLD serve to support POS arguments,
the nativist can appeal to striking cases of grammar acquisition where any relevant
PLD seem to be almost entirely absent. Two such cases are that of Creoles acquired
by children brought up in Pidgin speaking communities, and that of sign languages
acquired in isolation from other signers. These are both instances of grammar
acquisition where none of the principles that organise a mature grammatical
competence are present in the child’s PLD.
A Pidgin is a system of verbal communication that develops when speakers
of a number of different languages are brought together, and have to get along using
isolated words and phrases without the full grammatical structure of their native
language. In Pidgin-speaking communities there is no UG language present in the
PLD with the sort of grammatical structure possessed by the individual languages of
the adult participants in the Pidgin. But children brought up in Pidgin speaking
communities do not acquire the Pidgin, or their parents’ native languages, but rather
a Creole. These children are surpassing the Pidgin and “inventing a new natural
language, a Creole, for which they effectively have no model at all.”
490 A Creole is
a parameterised UG language with a full generative grammar. Similarly, there are
deaf children brought up in the absence of other signers who acquire sign languages
of similar grammatical complexity to the spoken languages acquired by their
peers.
491 These cases suggest a preponderant role for grammatical principles
emerging independently of shaping effects from experience. In these cases,
grammar acquisition doesn’t require much of the environment beyond decent
physical conditions, absence of trauma, and some linguistic stimulation. Nativists
argue that this is borne out when we consider the nature of PLD in more mundane
cases.
490 Laurence and Margolis (2001) p.243
491 See Feldman, Goldin-Meadow and Gleitman (1978)280
Early inquiries into PLD suggested a lack of information (explicit or implicit)
about the ungrammatical expressions of natural languages.
492 Learning theories rely
on information being made available, explicitly or implicitly, to all children about
the ill-constructed, non-expressions in the PLD. Accordingly, some nativists have
pressed the point that even if idiosyncracies of a child’s PLD tell them about the
grammatical expressions of their language, then learning theories have to find
corresponding information in the PLD to tell them which expressions within the
PLD are ungrammatical, hence not a part of their target language. Unless such
information is available, then the possibility that all of the utterances within the
PLD are grammatical should at least be open to the child. But this possibility is not
available. Nativists, therefore, challenge learning theorists to provide evidence that
there is sufficient information amongst PLD for effectively ruling out the
ungrammatical expressions, and not an absence of negative evidence.
The issue concerning negative evidence can be developed in the following
way. If the child learner were conservative in their generalisations, admitting into
their grammar principles that generate only those expressions encountered in the
PLD, then the child would massively undergenerate with respect to the sentences of
their target language. So, if the child is to produce and understand a wide range of
novel utterances in the target language, then they must project beyond the PLD. But
then we should expect the child, at least some of the time, to overgenerate and
produce a deviant superset of the expressions generated by the target grammar.
Given that the child does, in fact, acquire the target grammar, any overgeneration
must be corrected for. A major challenge for learning theories of grammar
acquisition is then to explain how children recover from such attested grammatical
errors as “I makes it with water” and “And fill the little sugars up in the bowl”.
493
492 Though more recent work by Chouinard and Clark (2003) serves at least to cast doubt on some of
these early claims about the absence of negative evidence.
493 The examples are taken from Marcus (1993). As Marcus points out (1993 p.80, also Collins 2003)
it is a mistake to see nativist arguments as depending on a lack of negative evidence. For nativists
claim that the many plausible errors, which negative evidence would be required to eliminate, never
in fact occur. The learning theorist has a problem with eliminating these plausible errors, but even if
perfect negative evidence is available, there would still be an argument for nativism on the basis that
the natural errors never occur, as has been well-documented with binding and question formation281
So, we need to consider what would happen if the child really did
overgenerate on the basis of their individual PLD. Nativists claim that, where the
errors are systematic, they are the result of the child switching their parameter
settings so as to generate these errors which are corrected on the basis of internal
mechanisms. According to learning theories, the child uses negative evidence to
eliminate the incorrect principles of their intermediate states. But nativists claim
that while PLD is an impoverished source of positive evidence for the child learner,
it is barely a source of negative evidence at all. The natural assumption is that all
normal children receive an abundance of negative data as part of their PLD in the
form of correction from adult speakers. But this assumption is false. Many of the
world’s children receive no explicit correction at all.
494 Yet, they all acquire a
grammar.
Moreover, the focus and effect of parental correction is far from clear.
Brown and Hanlon carried out two analyses of hundreds of hours of tape of English
children interacting with their parents, in order to determine whether parents
provide feedback contingent on children’s grammatical errors. In the first analysis,
they examined whether parents understand their children more easily if a child’s
question is grammatical. Parents failed to understand about as many grammatical
questions as ungrammatical ones. Parental replies indicating understanding were
equally likely following grammatical and ungrammatical speech. In their second
analysis, Brown and Hanlon examined parental replies indicating approval and
disapproval. Again, there was no relation between parental reply types and child
grammaticality. Brown and Hanlon found not “even a shred of evidence that
approval and disapproval are contingent on syntactic correctness.”
495 The bases they
did find for disapproval were always semantic or phonological. The very rare
approval or disapproval of grammatical form suggests that this is not the force
(see Crain and Mckee 1985, Crain and Nakayama 1987, Crain 1991, Crain and Thornton 1998 and
Crain and Pietroski 2001).
494 Slobin (1972) found that children are not corrected for errors in many of the societies his group
studied. Chomsky (1965 p.200-1 fn.14) made this a part of POS arguments for nativism: “It seems
clear that many children acquire first or second languages quite successfully even though no special
care is taken to teach them and no special attention is given to their progress.”
495 Brown and Hanlon (1970) p.47282
driving children towards their mature grammar. Brown and Hanlon concluded that
“In general, the results provide no support for the notion that there is a
communication pressure favouring mature constructions.”
496
Pinker found that where they exist, both parental sensitivity to grammatical
errors and corrective behaviour are “noisy, indiscriminate and inconsistent from
child to child and age to age.”
497 Moreover, he found that children are persistent in
their errors and remarkably insensitive to the little correction received. Bowerman
found little negative evidence available that was relevant to the specific cases of
overgeneration that occur.
498
Some researchers have disputed that there is a lack of negative evidence.
499
These studies report evidence from the distribution of certain patterns of discourse
between parents and children. As such they provide at least a basis on which to
argue that children make use of negative feedback to acquire their grammar. Cowie
argues that this negative feedback provides a mechanism by which children could
hone a correct grammar.
500
The kind of evidence which these researchers investigated, and which
Cowie claims could serve as a basis for learning grammar, is implicit negative
evidence. This includes a range of different parental behaviours such as repetitions,
questions and recasting that might influence the child but not explicit information
on ungrammatical expressions. For this evidence to provide a basis for acquisition,
it must be ubiquitous and the process by which it is utilised must not rely on any
special intelligence, attention or memory that is not possessed by all normal
children. Cowie claims that there is an abundance of such implicit negative
evidence in the PLD, which could be used to acquire the grammatical principles and
eliminate non-expressions.
Cowie cites studies which show that mothers of two year-olds in some
cultures repeated and corrected their child’s ill-formed utterances 20% of the time
496 Brown and Hanlon (1970) p.45
497 Pinker (1990) p.217
498 Bowerman (1988)
499 Bohannon & Stanowicz (1988), Chouinard and Clark (2003), Demetras, Post and Snow (1986),
Hirsh-Pasek, Treiman and Schniederman (1984), Morgan and Travis (1989).
500 Cowie (1999) ch.8283
but repeated well-formed utterances only 12% of the time. These studies form the
basis of Cowie’s challenge to Brown and Hanlon’s conclusion. But as 20%
correction means that 80% of mistakes go uncorrected, Cowie’s idea is that children
are sensitive to the difference between the 20% of ill-formed utterances repeated
and the 12% of well-formed utterances repeated, and that they are capable of
keeping track and determining what aspects of their utterances a parent is
responding to. However, the studies Cowie cites are not generally considered to
provide evidence of the child’s employment of such negative evidence.
As Marcus details, such implicit negative feedback as exists is noisy: the
differences in parental responses are statistical rather than categorical. Neither
complete feedback where parents provide a corrective signal for all and only
ungrammatical utterances, nor partial feedback where parents provide corrective
feedback after only ungrammatical utterances actually exists. Parents who provide
feedback provide each type of response after both grammatical and ungrammatical
sentences though in different proportions. Therefore, the child would have to
determine the status of responses. For each response, the child has to work out
whether it is a response to grammaticality or ungrammaticality. Marcus cites
Penner’s study which found that parents “repeated correct utterances slightly more
frequently than incorrect child utterances” but that this pattern “was not consistent
for all parents.”
501 Any mechanism that the child employs to effect such
discriminations must not appeal to the child’s prior knowledge of the grammatical
sentences of their language, for this is precisely the knowledge the child is trying to
acquire: “The child cannot simply record how many of her ungrammatical versus
grammatical sentences elicit instances of some reply.”
502
Given the low percentage of errors that are followed by feedback, one might
wonder whether the feedback correlates with recovery from error. Marcus’ study of
negative evidence concludes that where noisy feedback is available, it is too weak
to act as the mechanism for acquiring grammatical principles: “a child would have
501 Penner (1987)
502 Marcus (1993) p.65284
to repeat a given sentence verbatim at least 85 times to decide with reasonable
certainty that it is ungrammatical.”
503
Further, Marcus concludes that no feedback, even of the noisy variety, is
provided to all children, or at all ages. So not only is the noisy negative evidence
very weak but it also only appears in some mothers with young children. It was not,
for example, found in all the pairs studied by Bohannon and Stanowicz, and is most
typical of the Western middle classes.
504 Even if negative evidence is fed back to
some children on an expression-by-expression basis, and we had some evidence of
their sensitivity to it, this could not serve to explain the uniformity of grammar
acquisition across all normal children.
Cowie misses this point arguing, that it doesn’t matter that implicit negative
evidence is not available to all children, as this does not imply that it is not used by
some children.
505 She claims that to ignore the role of implicit negative evidence
would be too heavy-handed because she thinks that for all we know some children
might make use of feedback even if others don’t receive it or make use of it.
There are two problems with Cowie’s response. First of all, implicit
negative evidence was being proposed as the crucial mechanism for children to
correct errors and arrive at the mature competence. Secondly, the claim that
children do exploit different forms of implicit negative evidence is not supported by
the existence of very weak negative evidence in some cultures. There is no basis for
the claim that Cowie uses to supplement this reasoning when she suggests that
where one form of negative evidence isn’t available then another probably is.
506
That most normal children acquire grammar without such evidence is suggestive
that those who do have it do not need it and this is substantiated by Marcus’ results.
Even amongst those children who receive noisy feedback, it is not provided
for all types of errors. Noisy feedback is available to some children in a fraction of
the circumstances in which it would be needed. Moreover, Marcus argues that noisy
feedback may be partly an “artefact of defining parental reply categories relative to
503 Marcus (1993) p.53. Marcus’ study actually used the same data from Hirsh-Pasek et al that Cowie
(1999) appeals to as a basis for learning.
504 Bohannon and Stanowicz (1988)
505 Cowie (1999) p.232
506 Cowie (1999) p.231285
the child’s utterance...because nearly all parental speech is grammatical, exact
repetitions...necessarily follow more of children’s grammatical utterances than their
ungrammatical utterances.”
507 Marcus concludes that there is no evidence that noisy
feedback is required for grammar acquisition.
Marcus also highlights independent evidence that that there is no correlation
between provision of negative evidence and speed of grammar acquisition.
508 At
most, Cowie’s argument could suggest that there might be data in some children’s
PLD to eliminate some false hypotheses. It’s not part of POS arguments to deny this.
What nativists deny is that PLD is sufficiently uniform to always contain enough
crucial data, and that children in fact make use of it.
One proposed substitute for negative evidence is Motherese.
509 Motherese is
simplified, caretaker speech with exaggerated intonation and distinctive prosody
that might make structure more perspicuous, used with young children. Whilst
Motherese certainly makes word boundaries more perspicuous it is unclear that it
makes phrasal categories so.
510 And similar issues apply to Motherese as I raised
about implicit negative evidence. There is evidence in some cultures that adults
simplify their speech and use cues such as rising intonation that might make
structure more perspicuous. But there is also evidence that in some cultures parents
do not talk directly to their children much at all.
511 Of course, sometimes Motherese
will contain grammatical errors precisely because it seeks to simplify and convey a
message rather than maintain grammatical structure. The existence of Motherese for
some children doesn’t mean that all or most of what those children are exposed to
will have the properties of Motherese. There is no evidence that differential
exposure to Motherese is correlated with different rates of grammar acquisition.
512
Cowie thinks that once we come to a more moderate evaluation of the PLD
this will help us see how grammatical principles could be honed using implicit
negative evidence, but the evidence she has provided for this view is insubstantial.
507 Marcus (1993) p.53
508 Newport, Gleitman and Gleitman (1977)
509 Cowie (1999 p.190) appeals to Motherese.
510 See Pinker (1987)
511 Heath (1982)
512 Newport, Gleitman and Gleitman (1977)286
However, motivating her view is a comparison between our knowledge of curries
and our knowledge of grammar. Though the child has to project from PLD in highly
specific ways and find materials amongst that data to correct overgeneration, Cowie
claims there is no special issue here. On exposure to a few examples, and with no
clear errors en route, all normal children will come to know what curries are,
reliably classifying dishes as curries or not. How does the child’s knowledge extend
beyond the primary curry data so that the child counts in all and only the curries?
Learning about curries is possible, Cowie suggests, because there is a vast amount
of implicit negative evidence available from which to generalise. The child might
pick up on the fact that burgers are generally called “burgers” and not “curries”.
This suggests to the child that burgers are not curries. And the same goes for pizzas,
stir-fries and casseroles. This is Cowie’s Curry Argument:
Just as there are many sources of negative evidence in the data concerning curries, so there
must be substantial sources of negative evidence in the data concerning language.
513
Cowie thinks the “poverty” in POS an exaggeration in light of the curry argument.
But of course the nativist about grammar never denied that people can learn things
on the basis of implicit evidence. The question was always about how a child on
exposure to PLD acquires the grammatical principles of binding, movement, empty
categories and so forth. It is the abstractness, specificity and uniformity of what is
acquired that impresses nativists because the principles seem so grammar-specific
and so arbitrary from the perspective of a learner.
The curry argument suggests nothing about grammar acquisition beyond the
fact that children do learn to discriminate between things. It does not engage any of
the special issues about grammar acquisition that I have outlined: (i) the unerring
acquisition of complex and abstract principles, (ii) acquisition by all normal
children, (iii) acquisition irrespective of general intelligence, (iv) acquisition
ignoring the most natural generalisations, (v) acquisition that involves grasping
structure-dependence, (vi) the facts about what learners can do in other domains,
(vii) Pidgins and Creoles, or (viii) the sorts of positive and negative evidence that
513 Cowie (2004) p.222287
would be required to learn grammatical principles. To set the POS apart from the
general problem of making an inductive inference, one has to note not only that
there are innumerable alternative hypotheses from the learner’s point of view, but
also that the correct hypotheses that children readily acquire are so abstract,
arbitrary and languages specific - never the most simple or natural hypotheses that
might to be selected by a learner - and are acquired under special conditions.
Therefore, Cowie’s curry argument doesn’t present much of a challenge to the POS
argument that I have outlined.
To meet explanatory adequacy we require a psychological theory of grammar
acquisition. The best available theories of grammar acquisition are nativist theories
which do not presuppose non-psychological grammatical properties but rather
appeal to an innate psychological system of grammatical principles and parameters.
The non-psychological stimulus (PLD) with which children are presented appears
not to suggest the UG principles and the target parameter settings, but simpler and
incorrect generalisations that children do not adopt. According to nativists, non-
psychological properties act as a trigger for the child’s development along a path
determined by UG and its limited parameters. (Or on Yang’s nativist model, the
child imposes their innate grammatical categorisations on properties of input stimuli
so as to shift probabilities across choices within the innate grammatical schematism.)
The nativist holds out for an account of parameter setting but his opponent, the
learning theorist, holds out for a theory of child learning that we have good reasons
to think will not be forthcoming. As far as we can currently tell, in meeting
explanatory adequacy generative grammarians do not focus upon, or presuppose,
non-psychological grammatical properties.
5.4.3 Conventions
Devitt argues that external grammatical properties, established by convention, are
required to explain language acquisition in the following way:
514
514 Devitt (2006) p.181288
(Pi) Language acquisition requires that the open parameters on the
grammatical principles are set.
(Pii) Parameter setting depends on grammatical conventions.
Therefore,
(C) Grammatical conventions are required to explain language acquisition.
If sound, Devitt’s argument for a role for grammatical conventions in meeting
explanatory adequacy would provide some support for the non-psychological
conception of generative grammar. The required grammatical conventions would
constitute a non-psychological domain of grammatical properties. In my view, (Pii)
is highly doubtful. Setting the parameters on grammatical principles does not
require the child to be sensitive to grammatical conventions. Hence, (Pii) receives
no support from the P&P model on which children have their parameters set in
grammar acquisition. So we do not require grammatical conventions to explain
grammar acquisition, and Devitt has not carved out an explanatory role for non-
psychological grammatical properties within generative grammar.
We can see this if we consider that such conventions are required by neither
the triggering model of parameter setting nor a statistical inference model. The
triggering model requires such causal influence from external stimuli as is required
to set predetermined paths of development in motion but clearly does not
presuppose grammatical conventions. The statistical inference model requires such
regularity in the external stimuli as the child depends upon to regularly impose the
categories of their innate grammatical schematism. It may also be true that the
triggering model requires regularities depending on what level of exposure to
linguistic stimuli is taken to constitute “regularity”. As Collins argues, if
“regularity” means merely “exposure to the relevant stimuli within the relevant time
period” then it is trivially true.
515 But, however specified, mere regularities in the
external stimuli do not equate to grammatical conventions.
Devitt’s main argument for the claim that parameter setting requires
conventions is that a child’s parameter settings are rarely eccentric with respect to
515 Collins (2008a)289
those of their linguistic community.
516 This is true enough. But Devitt infers from
this that to set the parameters for the relevant grammatical constructions non-
eccentrically, the child must pick up on grammatical conventions that are prevalent
in his speech community. On the basis that children are born with some innate
grammatical principles but not born to speak English or Japanese, Devitt concludes
that the grammatical properties of speakers’ languages are “largely conventional
(although partly innate)”
517:
Acquiring a language is almost entirely a matter of moving, under the causal influence of
primary linguistic data that are (performance errors aside) instances of local linguistic
conventions, from an innate “initial state” of readiness for language to a “final state” of
participation in those conventions.
518
That acquiring a grammar is “a matter of moving under the causal influence of
primary linguistic data” to a final state of grammatical competence is
unobjectionable. What is missing from Devitt’s argument, as Collins has argued, is
any explanation of why the child getting their parameters set in the same way as
members of their community requires the child to be sensitive to grammatical
conventions within that community.
519
Members of the population in which the child grows up have their
parameters set in the same way. We can explain the child getting their parameters
set on the basis that there will be regularities in the speech patterns of members of
this population. Such regularities in their speech patterns will serve to determine
future parameter settings: “Children exposed to speakers who have their parameters
516 Devitt (2006) p.181
517 Devitt (2006a) p.562. It is a mistake to suppose, as Devitt does, that because children are not born
to speak a particular UG language, this is a reason to think some of the grammatical principles of
their language are not innately specified and determined by conventions. Variation is perfectly
consistent with the grammatical principles of languages being innately specified and a process of
selection amongst the limited parameter settings.
518 Devitt (2006) p.181
519 Collins (2008a)290
set to X, Y, Z will have their parameters set to X, Y, Z. Mere exposure to
regularities will do the job.”
520
According to Devitt’s view of conventions, a convention is a regularity
where “there is some sort of mutual understanding.”
521 But why should we expect
the setting of grammatical parameters to involve such “mutual understanding”?
There does not appear to be any requirement for the child and his population to be
engaged in any “mutual understanding” over grammatical matters, only that the
population exposes the child to sufficient linguistic material. Hence, we lack a
reason to think that parameter setting requires the child’s sensitivity to grammatical
convention.
But there are further issues with regard to Devitt’s suggestion that parameter
setting involves co-ordination over grammatical conventions, beyond their seeming
dispensability. As the principles that characterise speakers’ grammatical
competences are highly subtle and sophisticated, it is unclear in precisely what
sense there might be a “mutual understanding” between speakers and children. So,
we would want some explanation of the manner in which the relevant population,
let alone the child in the early stages of grammar acquisition, are abiding by such
regularities as the principles determine with “mutual understanding”. The
explanation seems to be individual and cognitive rather than to do with shared
understandings. Of course, Devitt must be supposing that the mutual understanding
is tacit rather than conscious. But he will not want to weaken the notion of “mutual
understanding” so much that external regularities determined by the individual
competence systems could do the job. Devitt acknowledges the “difficulty of
coming up with a satisfactory account” of grammatical convention, but says this
“should not shake our conviction that there are such conventions.”
522
But much more fundamentally, it is unclear that grammar acquisition
requires the child’s presence in a community as might co-ordinate over conventions
or even within a population that includes more members than just its mother. As
Collins notes: “A child could acquire a language from its mother alone,
520 Collins (2008a)
521 Devitt (2006) p.180
522 ibid.291
independently of whether the mother was according with a set of conventions or
not.”
523 Suppose that the child’s mother is acting according to conventions, though
the child only interacts with its mother. We would want to know how the presence
of conventions impacted on the child, and what explanatory or causal role the
conventions were supposed to play in the child acquiring their grammar.
Chomsky argues that the only sense in which such public conventionality is
a requirement on grammar acquisition that is actually supported by the facts, is the
sense in which children in complete isolation do not acquire a grammar. Chomsky
suggests that: “Presumably some interaction is necessary (though no one really
knows, since isolation imposes extreme psychic trauma.)”
524 But Chomsky claims
that there are well-attested cases of grammar acquisition by a few children in the
absence of prior relevant communal experience. Goldin-Meadow et al have studied
children who are congenitally deaf so cannot participate in the spoken language of
their population, and neither are they exposed to sign-language by the communities
in which they grow up. The children develop signed languages with grammatical
structure, which Goldin-Meadow describes as “the resilient properties of
language”.
525
If the conventionality of grammar resides only in the requirement that
children not be isolated from other language users then “conventionality” is a
requirement on grammar acquisition along with “having a sensory system with at
least limited functioning and not too much brain damage, also essential for language
acquisition.”
526 But the requirement for other language users, in itself, is clearly not
a requirement for grammatical conventions and so does not embody an appeal to
non-psychological grammatical properties.
523 Collins (unpublished ms. c) p.25
524 Chomsky (2003b) p.314
525 Goldin-Meadow and Feldman (1977), Goldin-Meadow and Mylander (1990), and Goldin-
Meadow (2005).
526 Chomsky (2003b) p.314292
5.5 Communication
Part of the motivation for Devitt’s commitment to grammatical conventions is his
view that they are required to explain communication. Devitt claims that
communication would be mysterious without the existence of external grammatical
conventions and non-psychological grammatical properties via which speakers co-
ordinate.
527 Compare this with Chomsky’s view of the significance of external
linguistic properties in explaining communication:
Suppose we postulate that corresponding to an element ‘a’ of phonetic form there is an
external object ‘*a’ that ’a’ selects as its phonetic value; thus, the element [ba] in Jones’ I-
language picks out some entity [*ba], ‘shared’ with Smith if there is a counterpart in his I-
language. Communication could then be described in terms of such (partially) shared
entities, which are easy enough to construct ... one could defend such a view, though no one
does, because it’s clear we are just spinning wheels.
528
Chomsky thinks that if one considers the possible role such entities could perform
in a putative theory of linguistic communication their definition and postulation
serves no explanatory end. Given that Devitt thinks external grammatical properties
are theoretically indispensable to whatever account of communication linguists
propose, why does Chomsky claim that such properties are ‘wheel-spinning’ from
the linguist’s perspective?
As discussed in Chapter Three, explaining linguistic communication takes
us well beyond the resources of generative grammars.
529 Both parties agree that no
one has a firm grip how linguistic communication works. But suppose we accept, as
seems reasonable, that generative grammars are part of a much larger project of
explaining linguistic communication.
530 Devitt has to make a case that there will be
527 See Devitt (2006, 2007, 2008 p.220-5)
528 Chomsky (2000) p.129
529 See Breheny (2006) for a discussion of the psychology of communication. Although less is
known about our pragmatic and other communicative abilities than about core linguistic competence,
it is an area of very intense research. See Sperber and Wilson (1986) for an influential account.
530 It should be noted, however, that depending on how the idea of communication is to be clarified,
it may be that linguistic communication is blind to important features of grammatical structure, such
as structural case and the other uninterpretable features described in the Appendix.293
indispensable non-psychological grammatical posits in this theory, appealing to
grammatical structures beyond the psychological systems engaged in language.
The best available accounts of linguistic communication, assume the
integration of an internalised grammar with an ensemble of pragmatic systems. And
given that speakers and hearers employ grammatical structure in producing and
comprehending language, it seems reasonable to assume with Fodor that:
[T]he internal representation of the grammar...is causally implicated in communication
exchanges between speakers and hearers in so far as these exchanges are mediated by the
use of the language they share.
531
Despite our relative ignorance, Devitt claims that whatever account is offered will
require non-psychological grammatical properties to account for speakers and
hearers mapping the same structured meanings onto the same sounds. And he thinks
that conventions will be required to explain the mutual alignment of speakers and
hearers with these non-psychological properties. But, even ignoring the latter claim
about conventions, this former claim seems like a remarkably strong claim to
defend.
Collins has responded to Devitt’s claims by arguing that there is no mystery
to be cleared up about communication in the absence of non-psychological
grammatical properties. There is a perfectly coherent and non-mysterious account
of the role of grammar in linguistic communication which makes no such appeal to
non-psychological grammatical properties. Though communication may be a
complicated and messy affair, we might attribute such grammatical stability as there
is in communication to speakers and hearers success in mapping sufficiently similar
grammatical structure onto external signals that are sufficiently similar to prompt
the mutual mappings (with similarity admitting of degree).
532
This stability is ultimately due to speaker-hearers having their parameters set
in the same way. On this account there is no appeal to non-psychological
grammatical properties or attendant grammatical conventions, and no apparent
explanatory reason to conceive the external signals as possessing grammatical
531 Fodor (1985) p.149
532 See Collins (2006) pp.486-7, (2008) pp.29-31294
properties. The stability in communication, at least in so far as grammar enters into
the explanation, is explained by the similar mappings.
533
We can understand Devitt’s argument from communication as presenting a
challenge to the psychological conception: how do we explain linguistic
communication without non-psychological grammatical properties produced by
speakers and in which hearers partake? This challenge is not a very powerful one.
This is in part because of the possibility that Collins highlights according to which
what is essential to such grammatical exchanges is only that the participants have
similar psychological structure. What mediates the psychological structures for
grammar in communication might be a set of cues and prompts to which the
mind/brain is attuned. Whatever external materials mediate between speakers and
hearers, we need some explanation of how speaker-hearers orientate themselves
with respect to them. A psychological theory would explain such orientation by
appealing to resources that everyone is committed to: the I-language.
But there is another reason why Devitt’s challenge is not very powerful.
Though Devitt does not embed his challenge in any particular account of linguistic
communication, one such influential account that has been offered - the relevance-
theoretic framework - does not seem to appeal to grammatical externalia. Its general
perspective is one from which:
Communication is a process involving two information-processing devices. One device
modifies the physical environment of the other. As a result the second device constructs
representations similar to the representations already stored in the first device ... a language
can be seen as a code which pairs semantic and phonetic representations.
534
Within the relevance theoretic framework, linguistic exchanges involve a process of
grammatical decoding.
535 This is a matter of the grammatical system decoding
533 More generally, Collins is sceptical that communication between A and B will require some third
thing C to which they both stand in a relation. I should make it clear at this point that my issue is
solely about grammatical properties. I am making no claims whatsoever that pertain to the different
issues that might arise with respect to semantic properties, such as sense and reference.
534 Sperber and Wilson (1996) p.461
535 Sperber and Wilson (1996)295
linguistic symbols and assigning them structural interpretations. Relevance theorists
then argue that communication involves much more than grammatical decoding of
linguistic symbols, appealing to inferential processes that draw upon environmental
information. What relevance theorists want to know is how a stimulus can bring
about the required similarity in speaker’s thoughts. But the grammatical part of their
answer is that there is an internal grammatical system pairing external signals with
grammatical forms, enabling the two information processing devices to engage in
linguistic exchanges.
Cognitive pragmatics aims to explain how the gaps between grammatical
form and the thoughts we communicate are filled by inferences that draw on
environmental information. These theories make an explanatory commitment to
information located in the environment upon which communicators draw as part of
an inferential process. But it is unclear why they would appeal to non-psychological
grammatical properties. Such theories seem to constitute just the sorts of theories
that Devitt claims ought not to work. Moreover, it is unclear that any air of mystery
resides with these theories, despite the apparent fact that they make no discernible
explanatory commitment to non-psychological grammatical properties.
Devitt has not provided us with good reason to think that non-psychological
grammatical properties will be theoretically indispensable to theories of linguistic
communication. Therefore, Devitt has still provided no reason to think that
generative grammars appeal to non-psychological grammatical properties.
Linguistics targets psychological properties; in short, linguistics is a part of
psychology.296
6. Conclusion
In this thesis I considered the subject matter of linguistic theory and the question of
whether linguistics is a part of psychology. I argued that linguistics is a part of
psychology. In Chapter One, I outlined the psychological conception of generative
grammar and Devitt’s argument against that conception, in which he argues that
generative grammars and theories of grammatical competence are distinct theories.
I then considered a range of non-psychological conceptions of language as a topic
of inquiry.
In Chapter Two, I considered the explanatory goals of generative grammar
(§2.1). In §2.2 I argued that generative grammars must aim to be more than
observationally adequate if they are to reveal linguistic structure, they must aim to
be descriptively adequate: assigning the correct structural descriptions to sentences,
indicating how they are understood. In §2.3 I argued further that generative
grammars should aim to meet explanatory adequacy: determining the actual
descriptively adequate grammar for speakers’ languages on the basis of a
hypothesis about grammar acquisition. In §2.4 I defended explanatory adequacy
against two counter-arguments from Devitt and Katz. The conclusion of the chapter
is that generative grammar has psychological goals.
In Chapter Three, I distinguished the grammarian’s notion of grammatical
competence from the ordinary notion of competence (§3.1). I then argued that in
order to determine what the grammatical properties of a speaker’s language are,
grammarians need to make an explanatory commitment to a psychological
distinction between a system of grammatical competence and the independent
factors that enter into linguistic performances (§3.2). The commitment to this
distinction is crucial to the argument in the final chapter that the psychological
properties of the grammatical system are explanatorily indispensable in
grammatical theory. I then distinguished competence theories from processing
theories (§3.3) and argued that Katz fails to provide a cogent argument that the
relevant grammatical facts outstrip the facts about grammatical competence (§3.4).297
In summary, generative grammar is committed to the competence-performance
distinction.
In Chapter Four I explained the central evidential role of linguistic intuitions
in grammatical theory (§4.1). I then defended an orthodox model of linguistic
intuitions as evidence for psychological hypotheses about grammatical competence
(§4.2). So there is a defensible model available of how the evidence bears on
psychological hypotheses. I demonstrated the inadequacy of Devitt’s view that
linguistic intuitions are speakers’ theoretical judgements (§4.3) and considered an
alternative observational model of linguistic intuition that might gel with a non-
psychological conception of generative grammar (§4.4).
In the final chapter, I argued that grammatical hypotheses are best
interpreted as psychological hypotheses concerning properties of the grammatical
competence system. I distinguished this explanatory argument from supervention
arguments (§5.1). I then suggested that non-psychological conceptions of generative
grammar which locate grammatical properties in the physical environment might be
made consistent with grammatical results (§5.2). But I argued that the required
psychological theory of competence meets the explanatory goals of generative
grammar (§5.3, §5.4). The psychological conception then fulfils the requirements
on a conception of generative grammar on a more parsimonious basis than non-
psychological conceptions. This argument cuts against each of the non-
psychological conceptions described in Chapter One. Linguistics targets
psychological properties and not non-psychological properties; in short, linguistics
is a part of psychology.
The more recent goal of moving beyond explanatory adequacy that I do not
discuss in the thesis (see my Appendix), is contingent on defending the goal of
explanatory adequacy as I have undertaken to do. These moves beyond explanatory
adequacy more deeply embed generative grammar into the biological sciences.
Consideration of moves beyond explanatory adequacy only strengthens my
conclusion that linguistics is amongst the psychological sciences, offering an
abstract characterisation of the structures of the mind/brain, to be integrated with
studies of the brain and its evolution.298
Appendix. Beyond Explanatory Adequacy
Chomsky now argues that it is an explanatory goal of linguistics, though a nascent
one, to go beyond explanatory adequacy and to seek to explain why the human
language faculty takes the form that it does.
Grammatical theories constructed within the P&P framework provide a
route to resolving the tension between descriptive and explanatory adequacy. The
tension resides in the fact that the languages different populations speak exhibit a
variety of complex grammatical patterns but are acquired by children on the basis of
a uniform endowment for language. So to meet descriptive adequacy grammatical
theories must accommodate this variety and complexity in the possible languages,
but to meet explanatory adequacy they must explain how a child is able to acquire
any of these languages on the basis of the uniform endowment. This is the empirical
problem to which P&P is the proposed solution.
P&P theories postulate a set of innate grammatical principles and a limited
process of selecting amongst predetermined parameter settings on those principles
during a course of experience. The scope and interaction of these parameter settings
is hypothesised to account for the observed variation and complexity in the world’s
languages. The grammatical properties of particular languages might then be
explained by being reduced to the uniform parameterised principles of UG and a
residue of parameter setting. Hence, if the P&P approach is successful then the
goals of descriptive and explanatory adequacy could be met. A recent development
in grammatical theory is the idea that there may be further conditions on adequate
grammatical theories that look beyond descriptive and explanatory adequacy, and
require grammatical theories to offer some explanatory perspective on the form that
UG takes.
To bring out this distinctively new explanatory goal, one might consider a
Martian scientist arriving on earth. Suppose the Martian is presented with a theory
of generative grammar that recursively enumerates all the hierarchical structures
and other grammatical properties of the possible languages, and includes a correct
hypothesis about the UG on the basis of which children acquire particular grammars.
Even with such a theory at his disposal, the Martian might question why humans299
acquire grammars with these properties. The Martian’s question would be beyond
the scope of an EAG that tells us why humans acquire the particular grammars they
do on the basis of a theory of UG. The Martian’s question presses on why the
language faculty takes the initial form that it does; on why it is these UG principles
and not others that characterise possible human languages. Humans develop a
special system of lexical features and recursive principles that relate linguistic
structures to other cognitive systems. But we could easily imagine that the
grammatical system worked according to different universal principles.
Whilst there are clearly coherent issues to be pursued here, one might
wonder whether the form of UG is amenable to further explanation by the
grammarian, or whether his explanations stop there at the level of explanatory
adequacy: characterising UG and the options it allows before handing the job over
to other sciences. It is not immediately clear how the issue of why UG takes the
form that it does could be elucidated by grammatical theory. Questions about the
grammatical structures that speakers know and about the universal grammatical
principles that serve as a basis for their acquisition of such knowledge, both have a
very overt grammatical component. But our new question about the form UG takes
seems to be a question about biology and the evolution of the language faculty.
How then could grammatical theory help to resolve such questions?
HCF argue that if theories of why UG takes the form it does, are to progress
then there is an outstanding task for the grammarian.
536 The primary task of
generative grammar thus far has been to provide a clear explanation of the
computational requirements on the languages that we know: “The computational
system must (i) construct an infinite array of internal expressions from the finite
resources of the conceptual-intentional system, and (ii) provide the means to
externalize and interpret them at the sensory-motor end.”
537 HCF suggest that in
order to understand why UG takes the form that it does, we need grammatical
theories of the computational principles that can be brought to bear on how and
why they have come about.
536 HCF (2002), Fitch, Chomsky and Hauser (2005) and Chomsky, Hauser and Fitch (2005).
537 HCF (2002) p.1578300
1. Questions of Perfection
HCF offer a vision of how this explanatory goal might be pursued. It centres on the
notion of perfection, or optimality. Consider the following passage from HCF:
We may now ask to what extent the computational system is optimal, meeting natural
conditions of efficient computation...To the extent that this can be established, we will be
able to go beyond the (extremely difficult and still distant) accomplishment of finding the
principles of the faculty of language, to an understanding of why the faculty follows these
particular principles are not others. We could then understand why languages of a certain
kind are attainable, whereas other imaginable languages are impossible to learn and sustain.
Such progress would…open the door to a greatly simplified and empirically more tractable
evolutionary approach to the faculty of language.
538
The questions that HCF raise concern the efficiency or “optimality” of the
grammatical system. The guiding idea, connecting such questions to questions
about the evolution of the system, is that if we could get some perspective on how
perfect, or imperfect, a solution the distinctive form of the language faculty is for
achieving some end then this will be revealing of why it has attained such a form.
Whether the language faculty is, in some sense, a “perfect” system depends
on how well or badly the grammatical system is designed for what it does, and “no
matter how well or badly, to answer that question you have to add something:
designed for what?”
539 One can easily imagine criteria according to which the
design of the grammatical system is far from perfect. For instance, the core
recursive operations are less than perfectly adapted to the linguistic performance
systems with their memory limitations and the like; they generate many unusable
structures such as garden paths and multiple self-embeddings. One might also think
of structural ambiguity as a kind of imperfection; if one were thinking about the
grammatical system from the broader perspective of systems involved in
communication. Such phenomena provide support for the view that, understood in
very general terms, the grammatical system is not perfectly designed for use.
538 HCF (2002) p.1578 my italics
539 Chomsky (2002) p.104301
But the thesis that HCF suggest we explore is not that the language faculty is
a perfect system in such a broad sense. The thesis they suggest concerns the narrow
faculty’s interaction with other systems involved in the cognition of language, and
whether the faculty might be optimally designed to meet certain conditions imposed
by the other cognitive systems with which it interacts. HCF note that the
grammatical system has to “report” to other components of the mind that make use
of linguistic structures. This is often described as the grammatical system
interfacing with other cognitive systems, in particular systems for articulating and
perceiving speech and systems for thought and conceptualisation, or sometimes as
the system integrating sound and meaning. The representations that the faculty
makes available at the interface are called PF (roughly, a phonetic form) on the
sound side, and LF (roughly, a logical form) on the meaning side.
540 The language
faculty has to interact with these two systems; otherwise the structures it generates
could not serve to pair uttered and heard sounds with linguistic meanings.
HCF argue that the relevant question about perfection is whether FLN is
perfectly designed for interfacing with these two independent systems; for
integrating these representations of sound and linguistic form. FLN is “perfect”, by
this measure, if it is the most economical possible system for connecting
representations that interface with the sensory-motor systems and the conceptual-
intentional systems.
2. The Minimalist Program
So the research program that HCF recommend is that grammarians seek to
determine to what extent grammatical design is characterised by the most
economical and efficient principles, making the computation that FLN has to
perform as simple and smooth as possible. Grammatical work undertaken in this
540 The existence of LF as a distinct level of representation is a matter of empirical dispute. Some
recent theories dispense with this level of representation and appeal to cyclical derivations in which
the faculty reports to the conceptual-intentional system at several stages (or even each stage) of the
derivation with no single level of interface.302
direction is called the Minimalist Program (MP).
541 MP investigates the strongest
hypothesis that can be envisaged: namely, that the language faculty is a perfectly
designed system for reporting to the external systems of sound and meaning. It is an
open empirical question how close to the truth the strong hypothesis might be. But
spurred on by some initial successes, linguists working within MP think even if the
guiding hypothesis turns out to be false, much will be learnt about grammar by its
falsification and, looking further ahead, the falsification of its weaker variants.
There are many different theories within MP. MP is really a methodological
program guided by a very broad hypothesis, rather than a particular theory. It
focuses on minimising the computational operations and constraints within
grammatical theories to reflect the simplicity in principles and the efficiency in their
operation within the grammatical system.
The methodological commitment of MP is to postulate only what is required
of the grammatical system by virtual conceptual necessity (VCN). One VCN is that
the grammatical system pairs sounds and linguistic forms. We could perhaps
imagine that the core linguistic system did not achieve this task; hence it is only a
virtual conceptual necessity. VCN prescribes that the grammarian attributes the
grammatical system only such structure as is necessary to achieving this very
general task. MP could be seen as a specialised application of Ockham’s Razor; first
narrowing down the focus to what is required of the language system and then
working out what is absolutely required by a system that fulfils this function.
To take an important example of VCN at work within MP, consider that
generative grammars once included the levels of deep structure, or D-structure, and
rules mapping this level into a level of surface structure, or S-structure, and later the
levels of LF and PF too. LF, for example, was postulated to meet such requirements
as that the linguistic system disambiguates “Some student solved every problem”
with operations of quantifier raising performed after surface structure had been
reached. But none of these levels, apart from perhaps LF and PF, are required by
541 See Chomsky (1995). Boeckx (2006 p.83) describes three pillars upon which he thinks MP stands:
(i) the empirical emergence of economy considerations on grammatical derivations and
representations, (ii) a commitment to just what is required of the grammar by virtual conceptual
necessity, and (iii) an intensified search for unity and symmetry amongst grammatical operations and
representations.303
VCN, so minimalists have effectively junked them and tried to capture all their
effects with more general operations and just the two levels of representation that
are required by VCN. PF and LF seem to be required by VCN because if the
grammatical system is to relate sounds and meanings it requires an interface with
the perceptual-articulatory and with the conceptual-intentional systems. But neither
deep structure, nor surface structure, nor operations such as the raising operation
from surface structure to LF, are required by VCN. So minimalists look to account
for the phenomena without appealing to such intervening grammatical levels and
specialised principles.
542
So by VCN the system integrates the conceptual-intentional information
required for meaning and thought with the phonetic information required to speak
and perceive language. To do so, the faculty encodes a set of grammatical features,
along with recursive computational operations and the interface conditions
governing the forms that can be accessed by the interfacing systems. In grammar
acquisition, the grammatical features are organised into lexical items stored in the
lexicon.
By VCN, the grammatical system must bring the features of one lexical item
into combination with others according to recursive principles. To effect this
combination, minimalist theories postulate a single combinatorial operation called
Merge which joins two grammatical constituents together. But Merge is not the
only operation that minimalists think the grammatical system requires. The system
also requires an operation to displace lexical items from one place in a structure to
another. This operation is called Move.
543 Movement is required because it seems to
be a fact that all natural languages involve constituents being interpreted in different
places from those in which they are heard or pronounced. So the grammatical
system must include some operation for moving the items from the position at
542 However, VCN allows for the possibility that there may be many levels of representation, so long
as these are all interface levels and not internal to FLN. See Boeckx (2006) p.75 for discussion.
543 According to the copy theory of movement adopted by most minimalists, this displacement leaves
a copy of the displaced item/s behind in the position from which the item is moved. The copy theory
of movement is more in keeping with minimalism than previous theories of empty categories, such
as the trace theory. This is because it does not involve importing further items into the derivation,
such as traces, that are not determined by the features of the lexical items in the numeration.304
which they are interpreted, to the position at which they are heard. The generalised
Movement operation allows any constituent to be moved anywhere but only subject
to further general economy constraints on the computation such as least effort – do
no more computation than is required – and last resort – only move something as a
matter of last resort.
544
To take the former least effort conditions as an example, within minimalist
grammatical theory, these least effort considerations are stringently applied as
economy principles on derivations. Chomsky describes the organisation of the
derivation in the following way:
the language L thus generates three sets of computations: the set D of derivations, a subset
Dc of convergent derivations of D, and a subset Da of admissible derivations of D. FI [the
principle of Full Interpretation] determines Dc, and the economy conditions [conditions of
shortest movements] select Da.
545
The convergent derivations are those that meet the interface conditions, in particular
they are fully interpretable at the interface in a sense that I will shortly elucidate.
The principle of least effort in grammatical theory restricts the grammar to the most
economical derivations, involving the least Movement required to derive structures
that meet the interface conditions. Suppose we had two possible derivations for an
expression, consisting of the same lexical items and generated by the same
computational operations of Merge and Move. If they can both satisfy the
conditions at the sound-meaning interface, then they are compared with regard to
computational effort, and the one that requires more effort is discarded. To take a
concrete case, the structures in (97) and (98) involve the same lexical items, and
they get the same interpretation:
544 Whenever both Merge and Move are applicable, Merge, the fundamental structure-building
operation, pre-empts Move to satisfy computational needs. Movement is a “last resort” operation:
there is no “free”, in the sense of truly optional, movement. Every bit of movement within a structure
must be motivated by the computation deriving a legible structure at the interface. See Boeckx (2006
pp.67-70) for discussion of last resort grammatical operations including do-support (John left to Did
John leave?) and resumption (the improvement of a structure by insertion of a dummy pronoun,
filling the gap left by illicit Movement out of an island).
545 Chomsky (1995) p.220305
(97) *What did you persuade who to buy <what>?
(98) Who did you persuade <who> to buy what?
The comparison between (97) and (98) serves to rule (97) out, as (98) requires less
computational effort to front <who> the shorter distance than (97) does to front <what>
the longer distance from the starting structure You persuaded who to buy what.
Equally, moving less material is always counted more economical than moving
more material an equal distance. So within grammatical theory the way that least
effort considerations work is by assembling possible derivations and choosing one
according to economy criteria.
546 Minimalist explanation involves different
concepts from explanatory adequacy, for there is no reason why explanatory
adequacy couldn’t, in principle, be met by a system that did not meet the minimalist
desiderata.
At first blush, the very existence of Movement within the grammatical
system might appear to be an imperfection with respect to sound-meaning
integration. One might think that a perfect system, one involving less computational
operations and less computational effort, would not need the Movement operation at
all. The minimalist strategy is to try and show that Movement, take together with
generalised economy conditions on computation, is somehow a perfect solution to
the conflicting demands imposed by the sound and meaning interfaces. If this could
be supported, then rather than providing a clear case against minimalism, the
existence of such constrained Movement would be evidence for the minimalist
thesis.
Generally within MP grammarians seek to identify imperfections in the way
that the computational systems pairs sounds and meanings including Movement
operations but also redundant lexical features and limits on the admissible
combinations of lexical items. The grammarian then tries to trace these apparent
546 These properties of wh-movement can be explained by the more general principle of Relativised
Minimality (Rizzi 1990) which says that if you try to front an element X of type Y to a position Z,
you cannot do this is there is an element W of type Y that is in between X and Z. See Boeckx (2006
pp.103-105) for discussion. See also Carston (2000) for a discussion of the rather different way that
lest effort considerations apply in generative grammar and relevance-theoretic pragmatics.306
imperfections to the competing demands of the systems with which FLN interfaces.
The aim is to show that the apparent imperfections are only apparent, rather
reflecting perfection in the broader accomplishment of integrating representations
of sound and linguistic form.
547
To get a clearer idea, we can see how a simplified minimalist derivation
might look. Minimalist derivations begin with a numeration: a selection of a set of
lexical items from the lexicon. The derivation begins by Merging two lexical items,
creating the most deeply embedded structural unit. The resulting Merged item is
then combined by second Merge with another lexical item to create a larger phrasal
unit.
548 In tree-diagrammatic terms, the Merge operation extends the tree upwards
and leftwards. Movement alters the structures resulting from Merge by displacing
Merged elements to higher structural positions in the tree. There is then a point of
“spell out” for sound, PF, and meaning, LF.
549
The conditions that LF and PF representations must meet are determined by
properties of cognitive systems external to the faculty that it must interface with. A
derivation that is legible to the external systems is said to converge and one that is
not legible to the external systems is said to crash. The possible convergent
derivations that begin from the same numeration are compared in terms of the
number of steps and the length of the required Movements they involve, with the
less economical derivations being rejected in favour of a single maximally efficient
derivation.
Lexical items are composed of features and the driving force behind
minimalist derivations is that some of these features need to be checked off before
the grammatical system reports at the interfaces, otherwise the derivation will crash.
It is this feature checking that sanctions both Merge and Move operations.
In what sense do some of the features on the lexical items in the numeration
need to be checked off? Minimalist theories assume a principle of Full
Interpretation, according to which every grammatical feature visible at the
547 See Chomsky (2000a) for discussion.
548 For an introduction to building grammatical structure in minimalist theories see Adger (2003)
pp.104-52
549 Or on some theories there are cycles with individual reports to the conceptual-intentional system
rather than a single spell-out at LF.307
interfaces must be interpretable by either the conceptual-intentional systems or the
perceptual-articulatory systems. Focusing on the meaning side, Full Interpretation
says:
Full Interpretation: The structure to which the semantic interface rules apply
contains no uninterpretable features.
550
So if the derivation involves uninterpretable features at any point then they must be
got rid of by the point at which LF interfaces with the conceptual-intentional system.
Otherwise, the derivation will crash. Once the uninterpretable features have been
checked they can delete. This is the Checking Requirement.
551 The uninterpretable
features can be checked by being Merged with a lexical item that bears a matching
interpretable feature. This is called Checking under Sisterhood.
552
Consider how the grammatical system then determines the structure of
(99).
553
(99) Bill sleeps
The system begins by enumerating the lexical items in (99), namely the bundles of
grammatical features that constitute “Bill”, “sleep”, and an item responsible for
tense which is pronounced as the s suffixed to sleep. This gives us the numeration in
(100), with some of the features on Bill and tense that are operative in the derivation
subscripted.
550 Adger (2003) p.85. It is noteworthy that the external systems and their requirements are not well-
understood, far less well understood than the core grammar. But as Chomsky suggests (2004 p.396)
“progress in understanding them goes hand-in-hand with progress in understanding the language
system that interacts with them.”
551 Adger (2003) p.85
552 Adger (2003) p.85. Checking under sisterhood is a particular instance, pertaining to categorical
selection features, of the more general principle of checking under c-command as occurs with
relations of Agreement.
553 I borrow the example and its presentation from Collins (2007) and Longworth (forthcoming).308
(100) [Bill {+3
rd Per, +Sing Num}, sleep, tense {+Pres, -Per, -Num, -EPP}]
In broad terms, the system has to structure the elements so as to determine who, or
what, did what (and perhaps, to whom). This is determined through theta
assignment, where verbs (and other predicates) assign thematic roles to arguments.
Theta assignment takes place within verbal domains, in this case through the
assignment of a theta role to Bill by sleep via the combinatorial operation Merge.
554
The system thus derives (101) and so is potentially in a position to make available
to the conceptual-intentional systems that it was Bill that was the theme of the
condition encoded in sleep.
(101) [VP Bill {+3
RD Per, + Sing Num} sleep]
The next step mandated by the numeration is the merge of tense with (101),
delivering (102) which adds information about tense, +Pres.
(102) [T tense {+Pres, -Per, -Num, -EPP}[VP Bill {+3
rd Per, +Sing Num} sleep]]
However this is not sufficient for the derived structure to be legible to the
conceptual-intentional system at the meaning interface. Some of the subscripted
features on tense, those marked +, are interpretable by the conceptual-intentional
systems. But others, marked -, are uninterpretable. There are grammatical person
and number features involved in agreement that add no further information for the
interpretive systems, as with the person and number features on tense. One other
such feature that does not carry any information for interpretation is the -EPP feature,
the “extended projection principle”, which serves to explain the movement of
arguments like Bill into subject position. We can represent elimination (or valuation)
through checking by underlining the eliminated uninterpretable feature.
In our example, the elimination of uninterpretable features involves at least
two steps. First the uninterpretable person feature –Pers and number –Num on tense are
554 This can easily be stated in feature checking terms, where sleep carries an uninterpretable (-N)
feature that needs checking by a (+N) item like Bill.309
eliminated through Merge with the VP that includes Bill. The uninterpretable person
and number features necessary for agreement are checked against the interpretable
person and number features Bill carries giving us (103).
(103) [T tense {+Pres, -Per, -Num, -EPP} [VP Bill {+3
rd Per, +Sing Num} sleep]]
Next, the remaining uninterpretable feature on tense, the –EPP feature, is eliminated
through copying of Bill, and the movement of Bill into subject position. This is
represented by enclosing Bill within <,>. Bill is pronounced at the start of the
sentence but assigned its thematic role in the verbal domain, thereby satisfying
conditions imposed by both sound and meaning. The derivation, as far as our
simplified model goes, ends with (104).
555
(104) [TP Bill {+3
rd Per, +Sing Num} [T tense {+Pres, -3
rd Per, -Sing Num, -EPP} [VP <Bill {+3
rd
Per, +Sing Num}> sleep]]]
Since all uninterpretable features have been eliminated, the derivation converges at
the interface with the conceptual-intentional system. This is the grammatical
contribution to a structure being acceptable to a speaker. Comparative
unacceptability is hypothesised to be a function of, amongst other things, the
number and type of uninterpretable features remaining that make the derivation
crash at interface.
Feature-driven derivation is brought together with P&P in the following way.
Universal principles govern the operations Merge and Move, legibility conditions at
the interfaces, and the availability, and co-tenability of grammatical features (both
within the lexical items and within the system as a whole). The principles are
uniform with parametric variation over the feature bundles that are fixed in
acquisition. Variations at the level of phrasal structure are hypothesised to be
ultimately due to small variations in feature bundling which ramify through Merge
and Move.
555 This simplified derivation does not include the level of structure that Adger (2003 pp.126-142)
claims is added by little v.310
One feature specification typically considered uninterpretable is structural
case (nominative and accusative case). An element bearing nominative case in
English can play any thematic role. The nominative he is the agent in (105), the
benefactor in (106), the experiencer in (107), the patient or theme in (108).
Moreover, the nominative can even bear no thematic role at all as with There in
(109).
(105) He invited Mary
(106) He got the prize
(107) He saw Mary
(108) He was invited/seen by John
(109) There was a snowstorm
Accusative case is equally blind to interpreted thematic properties. Unlike
nominative and accusative, other types of case, inherent cases, are linked to specific
thematic interpretations. For example, in languages with rich case systems, an
argument marked with locative case designates a location. But nominative and
accusative appear to be thematically irrelevant: in this sense, they are considered
uninterpretable.
Another feature specification which is considered uninterpretable is the
grammatical specification of person, number, and gender (and other analogous
specifications such as the class specification in some languages) which appear on
predicates in many languages. The specification of gender, number and person on
noun phrases has obvious interpretive import, but the specifications on verbs and
their auxiliaries are redundant, uninterpretable features. The external systems
interpreting linguistic structures will certainly want to know if the sentence is
talking about one or many individuals, but the reiteration of this information on
verbs does not add anything of interpretive value.
Chomsky suggests that such uninterpretable features are part of the
explanation of the ubiquitous displacement property of natural languages which
Moves elements from one place in a structure to a higher position in the structure.
556
556 See Chomsky (1995, 2002)311
Lexical items are very often articulated in one position in a structure but interpreted
as if they are somewhere else. For example, the displaced subject of passive
constructions is interpreted as if it is in object position, in a local relation with the
verb that assigns it its thematic role. The uninterpretable features may be part of the
mechanism for implementing displacement. If uninterpretable features and
displacement turned out to be an optimal mechanism then minimalists could deny
that they are grammatical imperfections.
Some parts of morphology have clear interpretive significance and hence are
not imperfections from the minimalist perspective. Plurality on nouns, for example,
is not an imperfection as it looks to have clear interpretative import for the
conceptual-intentional systems. Chomsky says:
You want to distinguish singular from plural, the outside systems want to know about that.
So, in fact, plurality on nouns is rather like different words: just as you have “table” and
“chair”, you have singular and plural, and there are sensible reasons why plural should be
an inflection and “chair” shouldn’t. Namely, everything has to be singular or plural, but not
everything has to be a chair or not a chair. So there are plausible reasons why some part of
morphology should be there.
557
Minimalists wonder why, for example, is there singular or plural feature on
elements for tense like s in (99)? As the singularity is already encoded on the noun
Bill, there seems to be no interpretive reason to have it on other lexical items too.
As inflections on verbs and adjectives are redundant to interpretation, they seem to
be an imperfection. A grammarian interested in pursuing MP will ask why they are
there. And, in this case of inflection, Chomsky thinks that “There is at least a
plausible [minimalist] suggestion: they are there as perhaps an optimal method of
implementing something else that must be there, namely dislocation.”
558
How do minimalists seek to explain inflectional features as optimal methods
for implementing dislocation? For Movement, three features are required: one to
identify the target of Movement and the kind of expression that can Move to it, one
that identifies the expression to be Moved and one that determines whether the
557 Chomsky (2002) p.111
558 Chomsky (2002) p.113312
target has the required extra position or not. In our example (99), the thing that is
Moved, Bill, is identified by its structural case, the target tense is identified by its
uninterpretable features of agreement and the extra position is identified by the –EPP
feature. EPP marks that “here’s a position to which you can dislocate to”
559. So,
roughly, we have three requirements on Movement, and the uninterpretable
inflectional features that are there to implement each requirement. If such a
hypothesis can be sustained, then it might be that inflectional morphology, beyond
the interpretable parts like singularity and plurality on nouns, is not an imperfection
after all but rather an optimal way of doing something that the faculty needs to do,
namely, Movement. The hypothesis that Movement is implemented by these
uninterpretable features is supported where we find evidence of a robust connection
between the inflectional richness of a language and the amount of Movement that it
implements.
560
3. Minimalism and the Evolution of Language
How could minimalist hypotheses about the grammatical system bear on the
evolution of language and why UG takes the form it does? Suppose that MP is on
the right track and FLN comprises bundles of lexical features, along with core
recursive operations, and there are externally imposed conditions which FLN meets
in a maximally efficient way. On this minimalist picture, much of the complexity in
grammatical structure is traceable not to complexity in the recursive operations of
FLN but rather to the lexicon and, in particular, conditions imposed on the
derivation by the peripheral components of FLB. This has some interesting
consequences for theories of why FLN takes the form that it does.
It makes apparent the possibility that the underlying computational
operations of FLN may have a different evolutionary explanation to the complex
peripheral systems of FLB. On the basis of this distinction between FLN and FLB,
HCF offer the speculative hypothesis that whilst “most, if not all, of FLB, is based
559 Chomsky (2002) pp.115-6
560 See Belletti and Rizzi (2002) p.33 and references cited there for discussion.313
on mechanisms shared with nonhuman animals” in contrast “FLN – the
computational mechanism of recursion – is recently evolved and unique to our
species.”
561 HCF suggest that the mechanisms of FLB are instanced, though in a far
less sophisticated form, elsewhere in the animal kingdom. By contrast, they argue
that grammatical recursion is species specific.
But HCF claim that if the core grammatical system involves only this simple
recursive device, then this may have the “interesting effect of nullifying the
argument from design, and thus rendering the status of FLN as an adaptation open
to question.”
562 Arguments from design, for a biological system being an adaptation,
are premised on the fact that the only known biological mechanism capable of
generating complex structure is natural selection. But according to minimalist
theories of the grammatical system, FLN itself does not exhibit complex structure;
it includes only the recursive operations which act on the properties of lexical items
to derive structures legible at the interfaces. If FLN itself does not have complex
structure then there is no such immediate argument for it being the result of natural
selection, where external pressures make successive selections amongst complex
and differentiated structures. Of course, if this line of reasoning is correct, then
conversely the failure of MP might suggest complexity to the core grammatical
system and might lend some support to the hypothesis that the system is the result
of progressive selections.
HCF are sceptical of the assumption that the evolution of FLN can be
explained as a matter of natural selection. It is their view that “minor modifications
to this foundational system alone seem inadequate to generate the fundamental
difference – discrete infinity – between language and all known forms of animal
communication.”
563 As they see it, there is:
[L]ittle reason to believe either that FLN can be anatomised into many independent but
interacting traits, each with its own independent evolutionary history, or that each of these
561 HCF (2002) p.1573
562 ibid.
563 HCF (2002) p.1574314
traits could have been shaped by natural selection, given their tenuous connection to
communicative efficacy.
564
And here we can see how grammatical theories about the structure of the core
grammatical system may begin to extend beyond explanatory adequacy and get
some purchase in arguments about why the language faculty takes the form it
does.
565
In evaluating how grammatical theory could bear on issues of language
evolution, Chomsky is concerned to highlight the range of factors involved in the
design of any biological system; in particular, environmental influence, genetic
factors and more general physical constraints (constraints that are language or even
organism independent).
566 Chomsky thinks that the first of these factors often been
assumed as the explanation of the faculty’s form, but that the last has often been
ignored:
The theory of evolution, not necessarily the workings of natural selection; and surely not
these alone, since, trivially, they operate within a physical “channel”, the effects of which
are to be discovered, not stipulated.
567
The workings of natural selection will be most to the fore where an evolved system
shows evidence of tinkering in achieving intricate structure. So the hypothesis that
the core grammatical system does not display the characteristic of intricate structure
could be directly relevant to the prospects of such an explanation. It is a plus point
of MP that the falsification of its guiding hypothesis would actually suggest
something about the evolution of language. To support the broader claim that
grammatical theory seeks integration with a theory of language evolution, it need
not be the case that minimalism is true: MP would be a way of pursuing this
integration even if minimalism turns out to be false. This seems to me to be the
perspective of HCF. They say:
564 ibid.
565 For an opposing view, see Pinker and Jackendoff (2005).
566 Chomsky (2005)
567 Chomsky (2002) p.47315
It has been a useful research guide to formulate the Strong Minimalist Thesis (SMT), which
holds that language is a “best possible” solution to the problem of linking SM [sensory-
motor interface] and CI [conceptual-intentional interface]. In these terms, the task of MP is
to clarify the notions that enter into the SMT and to determine how closely the thesis can be
approached. Insofar as this can be achieved, the traditional concerns of identifying the
specific features of FL are advanced, and the study of its evolution rendered more
feasible.
568
Chomsky has speculated that the special characteristics of FLN that minimalist
theories suggest might be spandrels: by-products of pre-existing physical
constraints rather than products of natural selection. He is keen to point out that
psychological capacities, like all biological functions, operate within a physical
channel. Psychological capacities, such as recursion, are implemented in neural
tissue in the brain. Hence, they are constrained by biophysical principles, physical
principles that govern all biological development. Chomsky speculates that such
physical constraints on design might turn out to be important, maybe more
important than adaptive function, amongst the plurality of factors involved in
shaping the grammatical system. Of course, it is an open empirical question whether
this speculation will prove prescient.
The point is not that FLN, forming part of FLB as it does, is not adaptive. In
allowing us to produce an endless variety of meaningful expressions and to
communicate an endless variety of thoughts, FLN is clearly of adaptive value. The
question is whether the particular structure of FLN is the product of adaptations,
acted on by natural selection. As Collins characterises Chomsky’s view, he is
suggesting is that:
We should be ‘pluralists’ about evolution, which amounts to no more than taking into
account all of the factors that make for organic design, not just environmental contingencies
and mutation: physical constraints, developmental processes, and adaptive pressures…such
a pluralism is not optional, for no course of natural selection operates in a vacuum; it must
568 Chomsky, Hauser and Fitch (2005) p.2316
proceed along a physico-chemical channel and must factor in developmental constraints
that are only just being revealed.
569
And Chomsky is keen to point out that no one hopes to explain cell division, the
presence of the Fibonacci sequence in plant structure, or other simple mathematical
sequences in nature, in terms of their being selected for.
What these attempts to move beyond explanatory adequacy suggest is that the
psychological conception of the goals of grammatical theory, which I defended in
sections (§2.2 and §2.3), offers the prospect of unification, ultimately with the core
biological sciences. This is a very attractive feature of that conception.
569 Collins (unpublished ms. b) p.4317
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